

GENDER AND
THE BRAIN DRAIN
FROM SOUTH AFRICA

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GENDER AND
THE BRAIN DRAIN
FROM SOUTH AFRICA

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SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROJECT
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South Africa is experiencing a substantial “brain drain”, underestimated in official emigration statistics. Yet there is uncertainty over issues such as why some leave and others stay, whether people who leave do so for good, and whether the brain drain will accelerate in the future. The surveys upon which this paper is based aimed to add some substance to the debate on the loss of core skills to the South African economy. They present a profile of the skilled population of South Africa and provide some insight into the factors determining emigration potential. Two distinct surveys were conducted: one of South African citizens and one of non-citizens (i.e. foreign immigrants).

In this policy paper, the focus is on *gender* as a key variable influencing potential emigration. The survey results suggest that *women have significantly lower emigration potential than men*, despite a remarkable concurrence between male and female South African citizens in their general attitudes and specific concerns about life in South Africa and abroad.

The following are the main findings demonstrating women’s lower emigration potential:

- Almost three quarters (73%) of the men had given “some” or “a great deal of thought” to emigrating, whereas the equivalent figure for women was only 61%. The gender difference is most striking in the category of respondents who had given “a great deal of thought” to emigrating.
- Women were more likely to express a desire to live outside South Africa temporarily, whereas more men expressed a desire to leave permanently.
- As prospective emigrants, women were more likely than men to make frequent return visits to South Africa, less likely to dispose of assets in South Africa, and less likely to wish to retire or be buried in a foreign country.
- Women had more limited foreign travel experience than men, and lower levels of contact with foreign professional associations or employment agencies.
- Women were more likely than men to say that it would be difficult or very difficult for them to leave South Africa. In addition, close to half the men and two-thirds of the women said they could not afford to emigrate.

If the survey results were an accurate predictor of future emigration, then the brain drain, in addition to being largely white, would be predominantly male. However the fact that most people migrate not as

individuals but in couples or families makes such a conclusion oversimplistic. The relationship between gender and migration has to be considered in terms of *gender relations* and of migration as a *household strategy*.

Much of the survey questionnaire was concerned with identifying motives for emigration. The main findings of a gender-based analysis of the results were the following:

- There was remarkable gender agreement in people's level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a range of "quality of life" indicators. Economic factors such as taxation and the cost of living, along with social concerns such as safety and security, are the main sources of dissatisfaction for both men and women.
- Within this broad overall concurrence, the categories for which skilled women expressed higher levels of dissatisfaction relative to men were employment-related factors such as their job, income, job security and prospects for professional advancement; and aspects of everyday family life such as access to acceptable housing, schooling and medical services.
- Overall women seem to be slightly more satisfied with their present quality of life than men, reinforcing the finding of women's lower emigration potential.
- High levels of dissatisfaction on the part of both genders across a number of quality-of-life indicators confirm that there are several push factors that might encourage skilled emigration. Most respondents also anticipate a *decline* in social and economic conditions over the next five years, especially in education and health care. Such pessimism was higher among men than among women.
- The biggest "push" factors for both men and women were *crime and lack of security*. There was a small gender difference in the relative significance of factors that would encourage people to stay in South Africa: men ranked improved security first, followed by "family" and "patriotism", whereas more women ranked "family" as the primary consideration that would prevent them from emigrating.

It must be noted that the male and female samples of South African citizens were distinctive on a number of counts. Although the "white" racial category dominates both groups, the proportion of Africans was far higher among the female respondents than among the men. Women were concentrated in occupations such as nursing and teaching, whereas men dominated professions such as accountancy and engineering. The female sample was also younger, less married and poorer than the male sample. A straightforward gender comparison may therefore reveal less

about gender alone than it does about the interaction between gender and these other variables.

Breakdown of the data by race-gender combinations suggests that African men have the highest emigration potential, followed by white men, African women and white women. *Gender thus seems to be a more significant determinant of emigration potential than race.* People of both race groups rated safety and security as the most significant push factor, reinforcing the national importance of addressing the crime problem as a deterrent to the brain drain. In terms of factors discouraging emigration, there seems to be a significant gender as well as a race dimension. Women in both race groups were more likely than men to identify “family” as a reason to stay in South Africa; men of both races were more likely to cite “patriotism”.

Demographic differences in the skilled foreigners sample likewise limit the utility of a straightforward gender comparison in understanding the “brain gain”. Men in the sample came from a wider range of countries than the women surveyed, especially African countries. They were less likely than women to have permanent resident status in South Africa, and more likely to be recent immigrants. This suggests that in addition to an Africanisation of skilled immigration since the end of apartheid, there has also been a *masculinisation*. The notion of direct “skills replacement” is over-simplistic, but if skilled emigration means the loss of families to countries like Australia and skilled immigration means a gain of single men from Africa, then this brings with it a host of potential social consequences.

The decision to emigrate from (or immigrate to) South Africa clearly depends on the interaction of a host of forces, certain of which are experienced or perceived differently according to gender. Any attempt to influence those forces and their impact must therefore be based on a sound understanding of *gender differences and similarities*, as well as of *gender relations*:

- One key implication of the finding that women have lower emigration potential is that this is likely to act as a significant brake on skilled emigration of *both genders*. In practical terms, most emigration is undertaken collectively rather than individually. For men with permanent partners and family dependants, the opinions of those people will be perhaps the single most important factor determining whether their own emigration potential is turned into reality. Women’s reluctance to emigrate therefore serves to keep women *and* men in South Africa.
- Intuitively, one of the policy implications of this study might be that affirmative action on *gender* grounds could be an effective strategy for reducing South Africa’s brain drain. However, if

such affirmative action were to lead to real or perceived disadvantaging of men, the strategy might prove counter-productive, encouraging skilled males to emigrate, taking their female partners with them.

- Another flaw in any simplistic gender-based strategy to reduce the brain drain is that the gender differences identified in the survey may have been caused by factors other than gender alone. Further analysis of the survey data, and indeed further surveys that allow more thorough demographic analysis, are required in order to investigate the cross-cutting of variables such as age, marital status, race, level of education, occupation etc. with gender, in determining migration attitudes and behaviour.

In understanding immigration or emigration, it is clear that “gender matters”. *Women make reluctant emigrants*. They are nevertheless concerned about their families’ welfare and security. Reducing the threat of crime is the single most important factor that would encourage skilled South Africans of both genders and all races to see a future for themselves and their children in South Africa. Effective crime reduction would also encourage skilled immigration from other countries. The lesson from a gender analysis of the brain drain is that it is in the *social* sphere of security, education and health care that the solution to the loss of core skills to the economy must be sought.

INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that South Africa has been experiencing a substantial “brain drain” as part of a global trend towards greater international competition for skilled migrants.¹ While estimates vary as to its causes and scale, it is clear that official statistics seriously underestimate the extent of the loss.² Yet there is considerable confusion over issues such as why some leave and others stay, whether people who leave do so for good, and whether the brain drain will accelerate in the future. In policy terms, a proactive skills-based immigration strategy might offset the impact of emigration, but this has only recently been recognized by government.

The surveys upon which this paper is based aimed to add some substance to the debate on the loss of core skills to the South African economy. The survey results need to be translated into meaningful policy that will retain skilled South African citizens and attract skilled migrants and immigrants. In order for this to happen, we need to know the scale of the brain drain as well as its demographic make-up. We need to ask not just how many people emigrate and why, but also *who* emigrates. Understanding *who* emigrates can help to shed light on the motives for emigration, including motives that may not be acknowledged or even recognised by potential emigrants themselves.

Previous studies have addressed some of these questions in terms of race, language group and nationality.³ Here, the focus is on *gender* as a key variable influencing potential emigration. Are women as likely as men to want to leave the country? Do they cite similar reasons for choosing either to go or to stay? How do *gender relations* affect potential emigration? What the survey results suggest is that women have significantly *lower* emigration potential than men, despite a remarkable concurrence between male and female respondents in their answers to several key questions regarding their general attitudes and specific concerns about life in South Africa and abroad.

Clearly gender is a primary variable in understanding migration attitudes and behaviour. Gender provides a key to understanding the brain drain, and thus to developing policy to prevent the loss of core skills from the South African economy. Given that the majority of the sample was married, and that men and women are likely to make migration decisions jointly rather than individually, skilled women’s attitudes are likely to act as a brake that keeps both themselves and their (probably similarly skilled) male partners in South Africa.

Yet the *explanations* for gender difference are not obvious, and may have less to do with gender *per se* than with other differences in the social, economic, demographic and professional attributes of the skilled

population as a whole. For example, are the apparent gender differences in emigration potential actually simple differences between men and women, or are they perhaps differences between people in different occupational or income categories? Far from reducing the significance of gender, however, this shows the importance of understanding the relationship between gender and migration in relation to the gendering of the labour market, and of society as a whole.

The analysis is presented in eight sections. The first section describes the surveys' methodology and scope. The second section presents a demographic breakdown of the "South African nationals" survey sample and explains why results showing differences in migration intentions and attitudes between men and women may not be attributable to gender alone. The next three sections provide a simple gender breakdown of the survey findings, comparing the responses of men and women and suggesting possible explanations for the gender differences identified. The sixth section tries to unravel the ways in which race, gender and other demographic variables intersect and interact to account for attitudes toward emigration. This is followed by a brief discussion of the "skilled foreigners" sample and the possible gender implications of the replacement of skilled South African emigrants with skilled foreign immigrants. The final section draws out the main conclusions from a gender analysis of skilled emigration and suggests possible policy measures to address the "brain drain" from South Africa.

METHODOLOGY AND THEORY

The starting point of the surveys was to come up with a definition of skilled people in order to identify the population from which the samples were to be drawn. A broad definition was adopted, defining skilled people as those "who are vital to the functional core of the economy":

The functional core of the economy does not only consist of people with post-graduate degrees, in well-paying, high level corporate positions. Skilled people typically possess some specialised, formal training (e.g. a Technikon or University qualification). But the functional core of the economy is also sustained by people who, despite having no advanced formal education, have worked their way up the corporate ladder or have started their own businesses.⁴

The survey therefore encompassed self-employed entrepreneurs as well as sectors such as science, technology, education, arts and culture. People qualifying as "skilled" were taken to be those aged 20 or above;

currently economically active; and who either (a) have matriculated and possess a technical diploma or university degree, or (b) own a business or hold a senior management position. Two distinct samples were selected, one of South African citizens and one of non-citizens (i.e. foreign immigrants).

The samples consisted of 725 skilled nationals and 400 skilled foreigners. The South African sample was surveyed in June-July 1998. It consisted of a random probability sample, stratified by province, and representative of the South African skilled population.⁵ Household telephone numbers were randomly selected from telephone directories. Within each household contacted, all people who met the abovementioned criteria were enumerated, and one was randomly selected for interview. To ensure adequate inclusion of certain types of core skills, namely engineering, accountancy and medicine, quotas were built into the sampling strategy to ensure that at least 30 people in each of these categories were interviewed.⁶

The survey of non-citizens was conducted in 1999. It is impossible to say how representative the sample was in relation to the total population of skilled foreign nationals in South Africa, as no reliable data on that population exist. SAMP interviewed an area-controlled sample of 400 skilled foreign nationals in the Gauteng, Cape Town and Durban metropolitan areas, where 1996 census data indicate that the majority of skilled immigrants are located. Within each metropolitan area, a snowball sampling method was used, starting by contacting a range of firms to identify potential respondents. As with the South African sample, only one person per household was interviewed.⁷

In neither sample was there any specific strategy to ensure a fixed percentage of female respondents. Yet of the South African nationals surveyed, 39% were women. Given historic gender discrimination, the designers of the survey were surprised at the relatively large proportion of women thrown up by the random stratified sampling procedure.⁸ This in part reflects the broad definition of “skills” employed in the survey, which included traditionally female-dominated occupations such as nursing and teaching. The “skilled foreigners” sample was made up of 32% women, slightly less than the proportion of women in the “South African nationals” sample but still a significant percentage, and certainly sufficient to enable a meaningful comparative analysis on the basis of gender.

There are nevertheless some limitations to the survey in terms of a gender analysis of its results. While the definition of skills was unusually broad, and therefore likely to be more gender-inclusive, it still prioritised production, profit-making and formal paid employment over the unpaid, reproductive labour, such as housework and child care, in which

women play a disproportionate role. Women who do not meet those economically-based criteria were thus left out of the sample. Likewise, the criterion of being currently economically active will have excluded skilled women who may have taken time out from their careers to raise a family.

Another qualification concerns the chosen methodology of interviewing individuals, rather than interviewing couples, families or households. People are not simply genderless “human capital” and “labour units”, but husbands and wives, fathers and mothers, sons and daughters. Most feminist research on migration has moved away from individual-based analysis, instead analysing migration as a *household strategy*.⁹ If it is to explain the significance of gender in the migration process, future research on migration in Southern Africa needs to adopt a more inclusive, household-based strategy in both data-gathering and data analysis.¹⁰

ACCOUNTING FOR GENDER

The present study is concerned primarily with *skilled South African citizens* and their attitudes towards, and potential for, emigration. The bulk of the paper consists of a direct, simple comparison between the responses of male and female South Africans to a selection of key questions. The “skilled foreigners” data set is analysed only as a complement to the data on South African nationals. Was there, for example, any indication that the replacement of emigrating skilled nationals with skilled immigrants might itself have gender implications?

A basic demographic breakdown of the “skilled South Africans” sample by gender and race, gender and occupation, gender and age, gender and marital status, and gender and household income is presented in Tables 1 to 5 (N = 725).

	Men	Women
African	11	30
White	79	65
Coloured	6	4
Indian	4	1

The survey results are analysed and presented in this paper in terms of straightforward comparisons between men and women. Yet as Tables 1 to 5 clearly show, the male and female samples are distinctive on a number of counts. Although the “white” racial category dominates both groups, the proportion of African respondents was far higher

among the female respondents than among the men.¹¹ This cross-cutting of gender and other variables (such as race, occupation, income,

Table 2: Main Occupational Categories (%)		
	Men	Women
Employer/Manager (more than 10 employees)	12	2
Employer/Manager (less than 10 employees)	14	11
Professional Worker	12	9
Lawyer	1	1
Accountant	12	5
Doctor/Dentist	5	4
Nurse/Medical Technician	<1	10
Teacher/Lecturer	7	29
Engineer	12	1

Table 3: Age Breakdown (%)		
Age	Men	Women
18 to 24	6	6
25 to 34	29	31
35 to 49	44	46
50+	20	14
No answer	1	3

Table 4: Marital Status (%)		
	Men	Women
Married	75	58
Separated	0	2
Divorced	2	10
Widowed	1	3
Co-Habiting	2	2
Single	20	25

age and marital status) makes it impossible to attribute any apparent differences in emigration potential between men and women to gender alone.

The “race” issue, for example, complicates basic male-female comparisons, as gender differences in the responses might in fact relate to a combination of race and gender rather than simply to gender *per se*.¹²

The race question also complicates analysis of the “foreigners” survey sample. Here the women, to an even greater degree than the men, were predominantly white immigrants from the UK who had been living in South Africa for several years. Comparing these women either with the women in the “South African citizen” sample or with the more ethnically and racially diverse males in the foreigner sample raises all sorts of questions about race, class, citizenship and identity, and cannot be assumed to reveal anything about simple *gender* distinctions or similarities.

Given the higher international demand for certain skills, occupation is another important variable to consider in attempting to predict the actual emigration potential of skilled South Africans. The proportion of men and women in different occupations is a stark demonstration of the highly gendered nature of employment in South Africa. Because of apartheid’s legacy, employment is also strongly racialised. Some skilled occupations are both racialised and gendered. For example, skilled black

Table 5: Monthly Household Income Categories (%)

	Men	Women
Less than R2000	3	4
R2100 to R4000	6	10
R4100 to R6000	6	17
R6100 to R8000	9	9
R8100 to R10000	10	13
R10100 to R14000	15	13
R14100 to R20000	18	11
R20100 to R26000	10	5
R26100 to R32000	4	2
R32100 to R38000	1	2
R38100 +	4	2
Refused	12	9
Don't Know	2	3

women are concentrated in professions such as nursing and teaching, while engineering and accountancy are dominated not just by men but by white men. A straightforward gender comparison may therefore reveal less about gender than it does about differences between people in professions of varying status, income and international marketability

Age is another variable which we might expect to influence emigration potential. According to conven-

ventional wisdom, older people have a lower emigration potential than younger people, owing to factors discouraging emigration such as ownership of fixed property and long-established professional and social networks in a particular place. Younger people, with fewer ties, find the prospect of emigration more attractive. In this survey sample, although the differences are small, the female group was slightly younger than the male group (Table 3). Men (and in particular white men) are notably dominant in the over-50 category, a reflection of South Africa’s past race and gender biases in education and employment. As discussed further below, the survey found that women, despite their relative youth, had *lower* emigration potential than men. This suggests that gender is a stronger determinant of migration attitudes and behaviour than age. Again, however, it is the *combination* and *interaction* of gender with variables such as age that needs to be examined.

The marital status of respondents is another factor complicating any simple comparative analysis on the basis of either race or gender alone (Table 4). The women in the sample were “less married” than the men, whether through divorce, widowhood or simply being unmarried. The precise influence of marital status on emigration potential is difficult to determine, but it cannot be insignificant, given that a high proportion of international migration that takes place in couples or families, and that marriage itself can be a motive for international migration. Further insights into the role of marital status in influencing emigration potential would require division of the sample into sub-groups such as “young single black females”, “middle-aged married white males” and so on.

Different skills, occupations and marital status translate into different levels of household income, with female respondents reporting lower household incomes than the male sub-sample (Table 5). Given that emigration is an extremely costly exercise, particularly for South Africans moving to “hard-currency” countries, the income differential between men and women is another factor to consider in attempting to assess their relative likelihood of joining the “brain drain”. Of course gender discrimination itself plays a role in the income differential between men and women. Whatever its precise causes, women’s lower income must serve to decrease their emigration potential, certainly for those women who by choice or circumstance are without a life-partner.

To summarise, the various demographic variables of South Africa’s skilled population act separately and in combination to influence emigration potential. This means that the relationship between gender and migration is neither direct nor simple. It is, however, fundamentally important. Gender difference has its own inherent significance in understanding migration behaviour; but gender is also a “lens” for illuminating the operation of other variables, such as age, occupation and marital status. Predicting emigration may well be an inexact science, but gender has to be included in the equation.

DO WOMEN’S BRAINS ALSO DRAIN?

An individual’s emigration potential depends on the answers to at least the following five questions:¹³

- First, to what extent has the skilled person considered the idea?
- Second, to what extent do they actually want to emigrate?
- Third, even if they want to leave South Africa, to what extent do factors outside the person’s control (such as financial costs) affect the likelihood of leaving?
- Fourth, exactly when do they plan to leave?
- Lastly, a distinction must be drawn between temporary and permanent movement (or emigration).

Comparing women’s and men’s responses to these questions provides some insight into the role of gender as a determinant of emigration potential.

The most basic indicator of emigration potential is simply whether a person has given any thought to emigrating. If not, then their emigration potential can be assumed to be close to zero. Here, there was a marked difference in the responses of men and women (Table 6). Almost three quarters (73%) of the men had given some or a great deal of thought to emigrating, whereas the equivalent figure for women was only 61%. The same comparison on the basis of race revealed very little

difference (69% of whites compared to 68 % of blacks had given at least some thought to emigrating).¹⁴

Table 6: Considering Emigration (%)

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country?		
	Men	Women
A great deal	37	20
Some	36	41
None at all	27	38
Don't know	<1	1

The gender difference is most striking in the category of respondents who had given “a great deal” of thought to emigrating: 37% of the men compared to only 20% of the

women. This indicates that there is a lower emigration potential among women, regardless of their race, compared to men. The potential pool of skilled emigrants may be large and multi-racial, but it would appear to be predominantly male.

Some indication of whether respondents actually *wish* to leave South Africa was obtained by asking people to what extent they would want to leave South Africa to live and work in another country on either a temporary or permanent basis (Table 7). With regard to temporary migration (i.e. for a period of less than two years), women were actually more enthusiastic than men at the prospect of a temporary sojourn abroad. For longer than two years, however, including permanent emigration, men were considerably more likely to say that they wanted “to a great extent” to move to another country.

Again, this suggests that in theory men have significantly higher emigration potential than women. This gender difference also means that at least some of the apparent difference between black and white skilled South Africans’ desire to emigrate is attributable to the different gender composition of the respective racially-defined sub-samples. Mattes and Richmond found that 34% of whites but only 16% of blacks had a great desire to move permanently to another country.¹⁵ Given that the black sub-sample was two-thirds female and the white sub-sample

Table 7: Desire to Leave South Africa (%)

	Temporarily (less than two years)		Permanently (more than two years)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Great	16	19	32	21
Some	23	30	28	28
Hardly	11	12	10	15
Not at all	44	35	24	30
Don't know	6	4	6	6

two-thirds male, black South Africans' apparent lower desire to emigrate could be partly a reflection of *women's* lower desire to emigrate.

The finding that 60% of skilled men and 49% of skilled women wish, at least to some extent, to leave the country for a period of longer than two years still gives cause for concern, even if it is significantly lower than the 74% figure quoted in a controversial *Sunday Times* article of 13 September 1998.¹⁶

Contemplating emigration, or even expressing a wish to emigrate, is still insufficient to constitute a 100% likelihood of emigration. Numerous variables determine the ultimate transformation of migration potential into actual international migration. These include social, economic, psychological and legal factors, many of them beyond an individual's influence or control.

The survey attempted to assess the *actual* probability of respondents' emigration by asking how *likely* it was that they would move to their chosen foreign destination, again with a time-period option of less or more than two years. These percentages were significantly lower, for both men and women, than the responses to whether they *wanted* to leave. For men, the percentage in the "very likely to leave for longer than two years" category showed a drop from 32% to 22%, relative to the "desire to leave for longer than two years" category. For women the equivalent decline was from 21% to 14% (Table 8). True emigration potential (likelihood of leaving) is thus considerably lower than the expression of a desire or intention to emigrate.

Significantly, the gender breakdown for the "likely" or "very likely to leave for longer than two years" categories almost exactly parallels the race breakdown. Mattes and Richmond found that 51% of whites and 41% of blacks expressed a likelihood of leaving the country for longer than two years.¹⁷ The equivalent comparison on the basis of gender was 49% of men and 41% of women. This suggests once more that it is the *combination* of race and gender that needs to be considered, rather than race or gender in isolation.

True emigration potential is also related to the setting of a specific

	Temporarily (less than two years)		Permanently (more than two years)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Very likely	10	11	22	14
Likely	20	19	27	27
Unlikely	21	25	15	21
Very unlikely	42	42	28	33
Don't know	7	3	7	5

time frame for emigration (Table 9). The rationale here was that people who have set a provisional date for emigration, or at least have a particular time frame in mind, are more likely to turn their emigration potential into reality than those who have not.

This question reduced the pool of prospective emigrants even further,

	Men	Women
In the next 6 months		
Very likely	3	2
Likely	2	7
In the next two years		
Very likely	5	4
Likely	22	18
In the next five years		
Very likely	14	10
Likely	30	27

although with an interesting gender twist. Women were more likely than men to express an intention of moving from South Africa within the next six months, with 9% of women but only 5% of men saying that it was either “likely” or “very likely” that they would do so.

For the longer time horizons of two and five years, men slightly outnumbered women in the “likely” and “very likely” categories, with 44% of men and 37% of women falling into these two categories combined for the five-year time frame. While still worryingly high, these figures are well below the numbers of men and women who claimed to have given “some thought” to emigration. The gender difference here is larger than the equivalent race-based difference, which was 42% for whites and 41% for blacks,¹⁸ adding weight to the theory that women in general have lower emigration potential than men, independent of race.

Thus, for all the questions that were asked to identify potential emigrants, the *lower emigration potential of women* relative to men was clear. If the survey results are anything like an accurate predictor of future emigration, then the brain drain, in addition to being largely white, will be predominantly male. However, such attempts at prediction show the limitations of depending on individual-based surveys alone, instead of looking at migration as a household undertaking, embarked upon in conjunction with spouses and other family members. For the most part, men and women migrate not separately but together as couples and families. This makes the gender difference even more significant, both as an explanatory variable and in terms of its policy implications for predicting actual emigration. To put it bluntly, *the emigration potential of a household depends on who wears the trousers*. Women’s greater reluctance to leave the country may act to keep both them and their male

partners in South Africa, however much higher men's independent emigration potential might be.

MOTIVES FOR EMIGRATION

Depending on the precise combination of factors involved, emigration can be perceived by those involved either as a positive step in search of new opportunities and experiences or as a reluctant but unavoidable flight from one's home country. Migration to another country is always the outcome of a balance between push and pull factors, with source and destination countries being weighed against each other in a complicated form of individual and household "cost-benefit analysis." Much of the survey questionnaire was concerned with these push and pull factors, starting with a range of questions to elicit people's perceptions of their present and future quality of life in South Africa. For the most part, there was remarkable gender agreement in people's level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a range of "quality of life" indicators (Table 10).

Economic factors such as taxation and the cost of living, along with social concerns such as safety and security, are the main sources of dissatisfaction for both men and women. Within this broad overall concurrence, the categories for which skilled women expressed higher levels of dissatisfaction *relative to men* were employment-related factors such as their job, income, job security and prospects for professional advancement; and aspects of everyday family life such as access to acceptable housing, schooling and medical services.

	Men	Women
Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with: (%)		
Present level of taxation	76	72
Cost of living	72	70
Upkeep of public amenities	73	65
Family's safety	70	64
Personal safety	68	62
Relative share of taxes	63	54
Customer service	58	53
Future of children in South Africa	56	54
Level of income	34	41
Prospects for professional advancement	27	35
Availability of affordable quality products	26	32
Ability to find a good school for children	26	30
Job security	23	30
Job	21	25
House	17	28
Medical services	20	23

Certain of the findings appear somewhat counter-intuitive, for example that women appear to be less dissatisfied than men with the present situation regarding their own and their family’s security. Generally women seem to be slightly more satisfied with their present quality of life than men, reinforcing the survey’s overall finding of women’s lower emigration potential.

Nevertheless, high levels of dissatisfaction on the part of both genders across a number of quality-of-life indicators confirm that there are several push factors that might encourage skilled emigration. In virtually all categories, levels of concern *increase* when the question was asked in terms of expected change over the next five years, with most respondents anticipating a *decline* in their social, economic and employment conditions (Table 11). This pessimism was especially marked in the category of access to good-quality schooling and medical care.

Perhaps the most surprising finding is that the highest levels of dissatisfaction for both men and women (and for both present and future conditions) were *economic* factors such as taxation and cost of living, rather than for more social factors such as personal security or their children’s futures.

Men appear to be more pessimistic overall than women, with some

of the gender difference in responses to the present-day quality-of-life questions almost disappearing or even being reversed for the future scenario, giving men higher levels of concern than women in all but a few categories.

Another comparative question asked respondents to compare their own lives with how they were five years ago. More women described their lives as having got “better” or “much better” (27%

Table 11: Perceptions of Future Quality of Life in South Africa

	Men	Women
Do you expect the following to get worse / much worse over the next 5 years? (%)		
Level of taxation	81	77
Cost of living	80	74
Upkeep of public amenities	77	60
Family’s safety	78	73
Personal safety	77	72
Relative share of taxes	72	76
Customer service	64	30
Future of children in South Africa	63	56
Level of income	41	39
Prospects for professional advancement	37	39
Availability of affordable quality products	51	52
Ability to find a good school for children	56	45
Job security	39	39
Job	42	37
House	34	38
Medical services	54	49

as compared to 18% of men). However a large part of this apparent gender difference is probably attributable to the marked racial difference between white and black South Africans, with the latter far more positive about the previous five years. Two-thirds of whites said their lives had got worse over the previous five years; two-thirds of blacks said their lives had improved.¹⁹ The higher proportion of blacks in the female sub-sample, relative to the male sub-sample, may thus exaggerate any specifically gender-based difference.

A gender breakdown of other responses to quality-of-life indicators underscores the remarkable similarity between genders in their relative level of contentment with life in South Africa (Table 12). In most cases, fewer than 10% of either men or women felt themselves to be personally worse off than others of their race, class, language or profession. Dissatisfaction was higher when expressed in group terms relative to other groups, but still surprisingly low, and certainly not high enough to suggest an imminent exodus by any social or economic group. Men expressed higher “in-group” dissatisfaction than women, notably in the categories of race and language, but this is likely to be the result of the different racial composition of the male and female sub-samples.

Overall personal conditions worse / much worse than (%)	Men	Women
Other South Africans	5	5
Other people in your profession	8	8
Other people in your economic class	8	11
Other people of your race	9	9
Other people who share your home language	7	5
Overall conditions of in-group worse / much worse than other groups (%)		
People of your race	23	18
People who share your home language	23	16
People in your profession	14	14
People in your economic class	16	13

In general terms, then, most skilled South Africans of both genders, despite high levels of concern over specific conditions such as high taxes, security and the cost of living, appear to be relatively content with their social and economic circumstances. Also demonstrating remarkable gender concurrence were

the findings for respondents’ comparison of the same set of quality-of-life indicators with those in their self-designated “most likely destination” (Table 13).

Yet although the gender difference was small, men were consistently more likely than women to rate the destination country as “better” or “much better” than South Africa, further testimony to their higher

Table 13: Comparison Between South Africa and Preferred Destination

Better or much better in destination (%)	Men	Women
Cost of living	54	53
Job	49	46
Prospects for professional advancement	51	47
Job security	52	52
Income	61	58
House	29	25
Ability to find a good school for children	54	52
Medical services	62	54
Level of taxation	64	57
Relative share of taxes	59	43
Personal safety	81	79
Family's safety	81	79
Children's future	68	61
Upkeep of public amenities	75	67
Availability of affordable quality products	66	55
Customer service	70	63

potential for emigration. For both men and women, it was in comparing South Africa with other countries, rather than in their earlier personal ratings of individual factors, that the matter of personal and family security came to the fore. Approximately 80% of both men and women rated safety as “better” or “much better” in their chosen destination, the highest incidence for any single factor.

Among the other factors most commonly rated by both genders as being relatively better outside South Africa were children’s futures, schooling, health care, the level of taxation and personal income, along with upkeep of public amenities, customer service and the availability of affordable quality products.

Marked similarity was also found in men’s and women’s responses to a question asking whether they thought people who had already emigrated had better lives now than when they lived in South Africa (61% of men and 60% of women answered in the affirmative). To most South Africans of either gender, the grass certainly does seem greener on the other side of the fence.

Respondents were then asked which was the single most important factor that would cause them to either leave or stay in South Africa (Table 14). Again there were strong similarities between men and women, with security being most commonly cited as the biggest “push” factor. There was a small gender difference in the relative significance of factors that would encourage people to stay in South Africa: men ranked improved security first, followed by “family ties” and “patriotism”, whereas more women ranked “family” as the primary consideration that would prevent them from emigrating.

Table 14: Push and Pull Factors		
	Men	Women
Most important factor that would cause you to leave(%)		
Safety and security	40	33
Crime	10	14
Economy	7	3
Children's future	5	6
Most important factor that would cause you to stay (%)		
Improved security	20	17
Family	14	22
Patriotism	12	9

Perhaps family ties are indeed the key to understanding women's lower expressed desire to emigrate. Certainly economic factors seem to take second place to personal and social factors when people are asked to identify their single biggest "push" factor, seem-

ing to contradict the high level of dissatisfaction with economic factors expressed in the general quality-of-life ratings. What these findings do clearly show is that there is a multitude of factors - social and economic, individual and societal - acting to encourage or discourage emigration; and that certain of these factors are experienced or perceived differently by men and women. Despite broad similarities of response by gender, it does seem that *there is something inherent to women, as women, that results in their lower emigration potential.*

DESTINATIONS, NETWORKS AND LOGISTICS

Whatever the forces influencing a prospective skilled emigrant, turning those forces into actual international migration involves practical and logistical decisions and arrangements. Most fundamental is the choice of destination. There was found to be very little gender variation in choice of destination. For men, the most favoured destination country was Australia, followed by the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. Women named the same top two countries as their most likely destination, followed by the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand (i.e. the same five countries but in slightly different order of preference).

The anticipated nature of skilled emigration from South Africa does not seem to indicate a permanent severing of ties (Table 15). This finding challenges the conception of a one-way "brain drain", as opposed to various forms of to-and-fro international movement and the development of transnational lifestyles. Over 40% of women said that they would want stay in their most likely destination for two years or less, compared with just over 20% of men. Women also expressed a greater

desire for more frequent return visits to South Africa should they emigrate, again suggesting the maintenance of strong ties with their country of origin and confirming women's lower emigration potential.

Length of stay at likely destination (%)	Men	Women
Less than 6 months	6	17
6 months to 1 year	2	6
1 to 2 years	14	19
2 to 5 years	14	17
More than 5 years	53	31
Don't know	11	9
Frequency of return (%)		
Weekly	2	4
Monthly	3	8
Every few months	10	17
Yearly	48	45
Every few years	14	11
Never	11	6
Don't know	12	9

of women's lower emigration potential (Table 17). Only 19% of the female respondents said that they would be either willing or very willing to give up their South African citizenship, compared to 32% of male respondents. Men were also significantly more likely than women to say they would want to retire or be buried in their most likely country of

	Men	Women
Willing to sell house in SA (%)		
Very willing	18	10
Willing	35	30
Willing to take savings out of SA (%)		
Very willing	22	15
Willing	37	32
Willing to take investments out of SA (%)		
Very willing	20	15
Willing	38	30

Another indication of the anticipated maintenance of links with South Africa can be found in the economic sphere. People seriously contemplating permanent emigration, with little prospect of return, are likely to be willing to dispose of property, assets and investments in South Africa. Answers to these questions again demonstrated women's relative reluctance to emigrate, with significantly fewer women saying that they would be willing to dispose of assets in South Africa (Table 16).

Questions about citizenship, retirement and burial provide another indication

of destination. Although difficult to explain, these gender differences are certainly striking, and suggest that women do feel stronger ties to "home".

Other predictors of actual migration potential include the social networks

	Men	Women
Willing to give up South African citizenship (%)	32	19
Willing to retire in country of destination (%)	45	36
Willing to be buried in country of destination (%)	42	28

and personal experience people have in foreign countries. The greater an individual's social and professional connections in another

country, and the more they know about a country, the easier it will be for them to move and settle there. Somewhat surprisingly, the skilled South Africans surveyed had relatively little personal experience of foreign travel, including travel to the countries listed as their most likely destinations (Table 18). Over 90% had never been to Australia, even though this was the country most frequently identified as the most likely destination. Geographically, women had more limited travel experience than men.

Few respondents of either gender had ever worked for a foreign company or foreign client, with the incidence of such experience again being even lower for women than for men. Women reported lower levels of contact with foreign professional associations or employment agencies.

Women were also significantly more likely than men to say that it would be difficult or very difficult to "leave South Africa to go and work in another country if you wanted to". The figures were 68% and 57% respectively, suggesting women have lower confidence in their prospects of success in a foreign country. Of course this could be

attached to the particular professions in which women are concentrated, but the interaction of gender with education, skills and occupation is clearly important.

Many respondents had been affected by the emigration of others, and knew friends, relations or former colleagues living abroad. While the incidence of friends

Travel once a year or more to (%)	Men	Women
Southern Africa	19	13
Elsewhere in Africa	2	4
Europe	7	10
North America	4	2
Australia/New Zealand	1	2
Asia	1	2
Never been to (%)	Men	Women
Southern Africa	44	60
Elsewhere in Africa	80	83
Europe	66	70
North America	79	89
Australia/New Zealand	90	92
Asia	89	94

and family who had emigrated was similar for men and women, men tended to know more fellow professionals who had left South Africa. The impact of emigration on the people and country “left behind” was widely perceived as negative, with the highest negative assessment being for the impact on “South Africa in general”. Interestingly, men were more likely than women to rate the impact of emigration as negative, despite their expressed intention to emigrate themselves. This gender difference applied at the personal level as well as in terms of the “impact on your profession” and “South Africa in general”.

A final important consideration is the actual financial cost of relocation. Respondents were asked directly whether they would find emigration affordable (Table 19). Here again there was evidence of women’s lower emigration potential relative to men, and of the general financial constraints that are likely to prevent even many men’s emigration potential from being turned into reality. Close to half the men and two-

thirds of the women said they could not afford to emigrate.

In sum, there are a number of indications that skilled South Africans’ actual emigration potential is not as high when the

	Men	Women
Very affordable	7	5
Affordable	41	27
Unaffordable	39	47
Very unaffordable	9	19
Don't know	4	2

analysis goes beyond a simple expression of desire or intention to emigrate. When asked to put their money (or their suitcase) where their mouth is, skilled South Africans begin to show rather less enthusiasm at the prospect of uprooting themselves to go and live permanently in another country. Even those who do express a desire to emigrate clearly wish to maintain strong social and economic ties with South Africa, and many of them say they wish eventually to return to South Africa after some time living abroad. Each of these brakes to emigration potential applies especially to women.

EXPLAINING EMIGRATION POTENTIAL: GENDER AND/OR RACE?

Before drawing any grand conclusions about the role of gender in skilled migration, and certainly before using the tentative finding of women’s lower emigration potential as the basis for any policy interventions, it is important to examine the relationship between gender and other demographic variables, especially that of race.

To re-state the basic statistical dilemma, the fact that two-thirds of the black sub-sample was female, while two-thirds of the white sub-sample was male, makes simple comparison between men and women inherently problematic. Race and gender categories are not discrete separate sub-samples. Every individual respondent has both a race and a gender. Sorting out whether responses to a particular question are influenced by race or by gender, or by some combination of the two, is therefore difficult, even impossible.

Race and gender also intersect more broadly; for example in terms of the division of labour, levels of income, access to education and training, prospects for professional advancement and so on. A further complication arises at the household level, with the existence of mixed-race and/or single-gender households. These concerns are fundamental to understanding any form of migration behaviour, including the particular category of skilled emigration under examination here. The simple gender comparison may in reality be revealing more about differences that exist in attitudes towards emigration between people of different races (or indeed occupations, income categories, or levels of education, each of which is both racialised and gendered). If we are going to properly understand the role of gender, it needs to be examined as it intersects with these other variables.

To give some idea of how the combination of race and gender may influence skilled emigration, Tables 20 to 23 provide a breakdown of responses to some of the key survey questions on the basis of both race

and gender, for the categories “African” and “white”.²⁰ The demographic detail that is lost in either a gender-based (but race-blind) comparison or a race-based (but gender-blind) comparison is immediately evident.

In terms of whether they had given “some” or “a great deal” of thought to emigration, the group with the highest emigra-

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country?				
	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
A great deal	32	38	18	22
Some	45	34	45	39
None at all	23	27	34	38
Don't know	0	<1	3	<1

To what extent would you want to move for more than 2 years? (%)				
	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
Great	21	35	13	25
Some	34	27	39	25
Hardly	6	9	9	15
Not at all	36	22	38	26
Don't know	2	7	1	9

Table 22: Likelihood of Leaving South Africa

How likely is it that you would ever move? (%)				
	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
Very likely	15	24	15	14
Likely	40	26	31	26
Unlikely	6	16	21	21
Very unlikely	36	26	33	31
Don't know	2	8	0	7

tion potential appear to be African men (77%). Next come white men (72%), followed by African women (63%) and white women (61%). In terms of actually wanting to

emigrate, white males replace African males as being most likely to say that they wish to “some” or “a great extent” to leave the country to live and work for a period of longer than two years. Second come African males, third African females and last again are white females.

African males resume first position in terms of their stated likelihood of leaving, with exactly the same percentage (55%) saying they are likely to leave as said they wanted to leave. For all three other race-gender combinations, there is a dramatic decrease between the desire and probability of emigrating. White women (40%) again have the lowest emigration potential as defined by the latter.

Among the key questions that warrant further demographic analysis are the stated “push” and “pull” factors for emigration. Table 23 shows some of the most important factors that would encourage people either to leave or to stay in South Africa, expressed in race-gender combinations. Overall, race does appear to be more significant than gender in determining people’s perception of these push and pull factors.

Table 23: Push and Pull Factors

Most important factor that would cause you to leave (%)				
	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
Safety and security	11	44	8	46
Personal safety	13	1	16	4
Income	19	<1	7	<1
Level of taxation	6	1	15	<1
Children's future	0	6	4	7
Most important factor that would cause you to stay (%)				
	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
Improved security	6	22	1	23
Family	11	16	13	27
Patriotism	11	12	5	10
Children's future	11	2	19	3

In terms of push factors, the finding that people of both race groups rated safety and security so highly reinforces the national importance of addressing the crime problem as a deterrent to the brain drain. Interestingly, Africans of both genders were more concerned than whites about their *personal* safety, while expression of a general concern about “safety and security” was four times higher among whites than Africans. This suggests that crime is experienced and perceived differently by blacks and whites. African male and female respondents’ relatively higher identification of financial concerns (such as personal income and level of taxation) suggests that these issues in particular need to be addressed if the objective is specifically to keep skilled blacks in the country.

In terms of factors discouraging emigration, there seems to be a significant gender as well as race dimension. Women in both race groups were more likely than men to identify “family” a reason to stay in South Africa; men of both races were more likely to cite “patriotism”. When it came to “children’s future” as a reason to stay, the difference was on the basis of race rather than gender, with far more African than white respondents seeing their children’s future in South Africa in a positive light.

A number of factors, including sampling error, could explain some of the numerous differences identified on the basis of combined race-gender categories.²¹ Certainly their explanation requires further analysis and research. Responses to key questions need to be analysed on the basis of other combinations of demographic attributes, not just of race-gender combinations but also factoring in age, marital status, occupation and other variables. But if the findings are representative of reality, they could provide a useful means of understanding differential emigration potential, and of translating that understanding into meaningful prediction and policy intervention.

SKILLED FOREIGNERS

Also requiring further investigation are the gender implications of the immigration of skilled people to South Africa from other countries. The history of such immigration has been examined elsewhere, but without an explicit gender analysis.²²

One of the findings of the “skilled foreigners” survey was the change in countries of origin of skilled immigrants since the end of apartheid, reflecting the removal of race-based discrimination in immigration policy.²³ Prior to 1991, European countries dominated, whereas the post-apartheid period has seen an increase in the number of skilled immigrants

from African countries. What also appears to be occurring, however, is a *masculinisation* of skilled immigration. Of the 400 foreigners interviewed, 68% were male. Broken down by gender, 61% of the “Western” immigrants were male, but the proportion went up to 79% for African immigrants.

This made a straightforward gender comparison essentially meaningless. Men in the survey sample came from a wider range of countries than the women surveyed, especially African countries. They were less likely than women to have permanent resident status in South Africa, and more likely to be recent immigrants. Comparing men and women, therefore, was also to compare post-apartheid African immigrants with apartheid-era European immigrants. Male skilled immigrants were also younger, and more likely never to have been married, than the females in the sample.²⁴ “Old” immigration seems to have been of the family variety, while “new” immigration includes a significant percentage of single men.

The notion of direct “skills replacement” is over-simplistic, but if skilled emigration means the loss of (mostly white) families to countries like Australia and skilled immigration means a gain of single black men from Africa, then this brings with it a host of potential social consequences. What are the implications for the overall gender composition of the skilled labour force? Do single male skilled immigrants see South Africa as their permanent home? Are they likely to marry South African women, or do they plan to bring female partners from their countries of origin once they have established themselves in South Africa? How will these immigrants become integrated into South African society? And what are the demographic, social and economic implications of the loss of skilled men from the source countries?

To an even greater extent than in the South African citizens’ sample, the foreigners survey demonstrates the cross-cutting of gender with other demographic variables, and the need for further analysis on the basis of variables such as age, marital status, race, country of origin and length of residence in South Africa, *in conjunction with gender*.

Explaining the changing racial, geographical and gender composition of the skilled immigrant population requires household surveys to complement the individual-based interviews conducted in this survey, including investigation into any emerging transnational household forms. Survey instruments should include specific questions relating to gender relations and possible gender-based motives for immigration to South Africa. Preliminary analysis of the results of the “skilled foreigners” data collected in this survey suggests that such research is a matter of urgency, as there are clearly significant gender implications in the changing sources and patterns of skilled immigration.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The decision to emigrate from (or immigrate to) South Africa clearly depends on the interaction of a host of forces, certain of which are experienced or perceived differently according to gender. Any attempt to influence those forces and their impact must therefore be based on a sound understanding of *gender differences and similarities*, as well as of *gender relations*.

For the most part, the gender differences are subtle and not at all straightforward to explain. Overall, the survey of South African citizens showed several broad *similarities* between male and female respondents. This is not entirely surprising. Rather, it highlights two crucial factors in understanding migration behaviour:

- Migration takes place within social institutions of marriage, family, household and inter-personal relations. Attitudes and opinions on emigration are the outcome of discussion and negotiation between men and women, particularly life partners.
- Migration attitudes and behaviour are strongly influenced by economic factors such as employment and income status. A focus on *skilled* migration automatically leads to certain attitudinal similarities within the sample population, regardless of gender.

Despite these broad similarities, *women were found to have lower emigration potential than men*, feeling stronger ties to home and family and having less confidence about their own ability to succeed in a new social and economic environment.

One key implication of the finding that women have lower emigration potential is that this is likely to act as a significant brake on skilled emigration of *both genders*. In practical terms, most emigration is undertaken collectively rather than individually. For men with permanent partners and family dependants, the opinions of those people will be perhaps the single most important factor determining whether their own emigration potential is turned into reality. Women's reluctance to emigrate therefore serves to keep women *and* men in South Africa. Indeed it may be that the gender difference in attitudes towards emigration is part of the explanation for the gap between those who have considered emigration and the considerably lower numbers of actual emigrants.

This means that *gender relations* are important determinants of a *household's* emigration potential. In response to the question "Who would be most likely to make the final decision about whether to leave South Africa?", 72% of the men said that they would make the decision personally, compared to only 45% of the women. Twenty-five percent of

the women said that their spouse would make the final decision, and only 16% of either gender said that the decision would be made jointly. Given such male dominance in household power relations, it may be that women's greater reluctance to leave is overridden, and skilled men *and* women may end up leaving the country. But it is in such intra-household gender relations that explanation of migration behaviour is to be found, and thus where future research into skilled migration should focus.

Intuitively, one of the policy implications of this study might be that greater affirmative action on *gender* grounds could be an effective strategy for reducing South Africa's brain drain. If women nurses and teachers are less likely to emigrate, the same might be true for women doctors, engineers and IT specialists. Training and employing more women might therefore reduce the risk of losing skills through emigration. However, if such affirmative action were to lead to real or perceived disadvantaging of men, the strategy might prove counter-productive, encouraging skilled males to emigrate, taking their female partners with them. Again, gender *relations* are key.

Another flaw in any simplistic gender-based strategy to reduce the brain drain is that the gender differences identified in the survey may have been caused by factors other than gender alone. The women in the sample of skilled South African nationals were racially, professionally, socially and economically different from the male sample. More of them were black; fewer of them were married; more of them were in occupations such as teaching and nursing; more of them occupied lower income categories.²⁵ It may have been these factors, rather than their gender *per se*, that reduced the likelihood of their emigration. Further analysis of the survey data, and further surveys that allow more thorough demographic analysis, are required in order to investigate the cross-cutting of variables such as age, marital status, race, level of education, occupation etc. with gender, in determining migration attitudes and behaviour. Far from reducing the significance of gender, such analysis would demonstrate the deep implication of gender in all forms of social organisation. As at the household scale, it is in gender-based processes and relations, and not simple gender differences, that explanation for the demographic make-up of the brain drain should be sought.

Perhaps the most significant finding in policy terms is not the gender differences but the striking gender concurrence on what it would take to make people stay in South Africa. Reducing the threat of crime is the single most important factor that would encourage skilled South Africans of both genders and all races to see a future for themselves and their children in South Africa. Effective crime reduction would also encourage skilled immigration from other countries.

It is important, however, that there should not be a simplistic equation of “skills loss” through emigration with “skills gain” through immigration. Attention must be paid to the demographic and especially the *gender* composition of skilled immigration. If, as the survey data suggest, skilled emigration means losing South African *families*, and skilled immigration means replacing them with *single men*, this fundamentally changes the demographic composition and social dynamics of the skilled population. This then raises a host of other issues, including the long-term stability of that population, its gender composition, and its integration into South African society. Policy should aim both to retain skilled South Africans and to attract skilled immigrants - temporary as well as permanent, and on a family as well as on an individual basis.

In understanding immigration or emigration, it is clear that “gender matters”. Women, it seems, make reluctant emigrants. They are nevertheless concerned about their families’ welfare and security. When perceived threats to that welfare outweigh women’s strong ties to place, a South African family, including one or more skilled adults, is likely to emigrate to somewhere like Australia or Canada. The lesson from a gender analysis of the brain drain is that it is in the *social* sphere of security, education and health care that the solution to the loss of core skills to the economy must be sought. Look after the people, in other words, and the skills will take care of themselves.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Jonathan Crush et al., eds., *Losing Our Minds: Skills Migration and the South African Brain Drain*, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 18, Cape Town, 2000; David McDonald and Jonathan Crush, “Understanding Skilled Migration in Southern Africa” *Africa Insight* 30(2) (October 2000):5-9.
- 2 Mercy Brown, David Kaplan and Jean-Baptiste Meyer, “The Brain Drain: An Outline of Skilled Emigration from South Africa” *Africa Insight* 30(2) (October 2000):41-47.
- 3 Robert Mattes and Wayne Richmond, “The Brain Drain: What Do Skilled South Africans Think?” *Africa Insight* 30(2) (October 2000):10-20.
- 4 Mattes and Richmond, “The Brain Drain”, p. 11
- 5 The total size of the “skilled” population of South Africa was derived from the All Media and Products Survey (AMPS), conducted annually on 30 000 households nationwide. Using this survey and our own definition of skills, the size of South Africa’s skilled population was estimated at 1.6 million.
- 6 Further details of the survey methodology can be found in Mattes and Richmond, “The Brain Drain”.
- 7 Robert Mattes, Jonathan Crush and Wayne Richmond, “The Brain Gain and Legal Immigration to Post-Apartheid South Africa” *Africa Insight* 30(2)

- (October 2000):21-30 and “The Brain Gain: Skilled Migrants and Immigration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa”, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 20, Cape Town, 2000.
- 8 Mattes and Richmond, “The Brain Drain”.
 - 9 Sylvia Chant, ed., *Gender and Migration in Developing Countries* (London: Belhaven, 1992); Sylvia Chant, “Households, Gender and Rural-Urban Migration: Reflections on Linkages and Considerations for Policy” *Environment and Urbanization* 10(1) (1998):5-21; Victoria Lawson, “Hierarchical Households and Gendered Migration in Latin America: Feminist Extensions to Migration Research” *Progress in Human Geography* 22(1) (1998):39-53.
 - 10 SAMP is currently planning national household and migration surveys in a number of SADC countries.
 - 11 In this paper, the term “black” is used in to include all persons of colour. The term “African” is used to refer to persons of specifically black African heritage.
 - 12 The same of course applies to the comparison between races, which contains an inevitable gender dimension.
 - 13 Mattes and Richmond, “The Brain Drain”, pp. 13-14.
 - 14 Ibid. p. 14.
 - 15 Ibid. p. 14.
 - 16 “74% of South Africans Ready to Quit the Country”, *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 13 September 1998.
 - 17 Mattes and Richmond, “The Brain Drain”, p. 14
 - 18 Ibid. p.14.
 - 19 Ibid. p.18.
 - 20 The “coloured” and “Indian” samples were too small for meaningful analysis.
 - 21 The demographic composition of the sample was 47 African men, 353 white men, 85 African women and 184 white women.
 - 22 Mattes, Crush and Richmond, “The Brain Gain”; Sally Peberdy and Jonathan Crush, “Rooted in Racism: The Origins of the Aliens Control Act” in J. Crush, ed., *Beyond Control* (Cape Town: IDASA and SAMP, 1998).
 - 23 Mattes, Crush and Richmond, “The Brain Gain”.
 - 24 Another interesting finding was that 19% of the female foreigners sample, but only 2% of the male foreigners sample, were divorced. This shows the significance of divorce as a motive for women rejoining the (skilled) labour force.
 - 25 The gender discrimination that underlies the different economic and professional profiles of the male and female sub-samples is certainly something that needs to be addressed, regardless of any implications for emigration.

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES

1. *Covert Operations: Clandestine Migration, Temporary Work and Immigration Policy in South Africa* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-51-9
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