DESTINATIONS UNKNOWN

Perspectives on the Brain Drain in Southern Africa

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Africa Institute of South Africa

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Thinking About the Brain Drain in Southern Africa

David A McDonald and Jonathan Crush

The movement of skilled people from one country to another is one of the most hotly contested public policy questions today. Debates amongst politicians, academics and bureaucrats about the scale and character of skilled migration, and the policies required to address these movements, are taking place in countries throughout the world.[1] As the opportunities for skilled personnel to move increases with globalisation and the shift to a service economy, as the costs of international travel decrease, and as the ability to communicate with other parts of the world becomes easier, it is likely that skilled migration itself will increase over the next few decades, magnifying its importance as a public policy issue.[2]

Compared to the volume of unskilled and forced migration, the international movement of skilled people is still relatively small, but its social and economic relevance outweighs its numerical significance for a number of reasons, some imagined, some real.[3] The loss of a country's "best and brightest" is seen not only as a loss of human resources but also as a general indicator of whether a country is a desirable place to live. Nothing conjures up the image of a country gone wrong like the belief that skilled people are leaving in droves: a public litmus test of sorts where citizens vote with their feet. If true, a skilled exodus heralds tougher times to come, as human and financial capital moves with skilled nationals.

Given the far-reaching social and economic implications of the so-called "brain drain", it is not surprising that there has been much public and academic hyperbole on the matter. Political leaders declare emigrants unpatriotic and selfish, while the media make wild and unsubstantiated statements about the extent of emigration and the motivations for it.

Southern Africa is no different in this respect. Skilled migration is currently a topic of hot debate in the region and it has attracted a wide range of claims and counter-claims, particularly in South Africa where the emigration of skilled nationals has generated considerable public attention during and since the demise of apartheid. In the early 1990s, for example, the brain drain became a card in the hands of those arguing for the entrenchment of white political privilege.[4] The issue re-emerged with unexpected force after 1994. Banner headlines declaring an "Exodus as Rainbow Nation's iridescence fades" (*Financial Mail*, 25 October 1996), "74% with skills want to quit SA?" (*Sunday Times*, 13 September

On Being a Regional Migrant

Shemmy Simuyemba

I work for an international donor agency in Gaborone. I never really thought of myself as a migrant until I attended a conference on labour migration in Pretoria in July 2000. I heard at the conference about the experiences of people who I have always traditionally thought of as migrants, i.e., the cross-border traders, semi-skilled and unskilled people. I had never really associated myself with them before. Now I do and I can relate better to their experience.

Previously I have always considered myself a professional working out of my home country rather than a migrant. As a professional working for an international organisation, I really did not feel like a migrant and people in the countries in which I have worked did not treat me like one.

I have been privileged to work in various countries and in different capacities. In 1985, I worked for a United Nations agency for one year in Ethiopia. I spent six years in Malawi from 1989 to 1994, with another United Nations agency. For the subsequent two years from 1994 to 1996, I worked in Maputo for a regional organisation. I am now working in Botswana for another agency. Of my roughly twenty years professional working life, I have spent 14 (including studying) out of my home country, Zambia.

Although I visit my home country regularly with the family, my children have spent most of their lives outside Zambia. I cannot say for certain what impact this has had in terms of their perceptions about their own country. As for myself, I have never thought of actually settling in a foreign country or getting citizenship in another country. I have always told myself, I will return home some day. When, I really do not know yet, but hopefully soon.

I cannot say I have had a problem with the hosts in the countries where I have worked. In my experience, they have been welcoming and accommodating. Both my professional peers and people generally, in all the countries I have worked in, have been very receptive. In retrospect, perhaps this is because I have worked with international organisations and therefore am not perceived as taking jobs away from locals.

There is always the argument that one needs to contribute to one's country. This is true, but I do not think one necessarily needs to be in their own country to do this. I think I have contributed to my country in a number of ways. These include supporting the extended family in various ways, making some investments at home and remitting funds. I also consider that I have influenced in a small way, policies at home by virtue of the institutions I have worked for, perhaps in a manner that may not have been possible had I stayed at home.

Unfortunately, as long as there are imbalances amongst countries in terms of opportunities whether real or perceived, people will migrate. This is a reality that governments of the region need to face up to and deal with. It does no good to pretend that the problem does not exist. Equally, citizens in the various countries need to be educated that as we get closer to building a regional economic community, there will be closer interaction of people and therefore more migration. The earlier everyone accepts this reality, the better it will be for migrants and the hosts.

Shemmy Simuyemba is a Zambian economist currently working in Botswana.

1998), and "Brain Drain Reaching Mind-bending Proportions" (*Cape Argus*, 4 August 2000) have contributed to a moral panic over the state of the country's social and economic stability. Equally vituperative responses from government officials attempting to defend their post-apartheid record have served to polarise the debate. The *Sunday Times* headline, for example, fuelled a national controversy on the subject, which started with a speech in Mauritius at a Southern African Development Community (SADC) conference by then-President Nelson Mandela where he suggested that "whites were running away from their country" and asserted that "the real South Africans were being sorted out in the process".

In other SADC countries, the longstanding brain-drain debate is a great deal more sophisticated.[5] At independence in the 1960s and 1970s, most countries inherited a woefully underdeveloped local skills base. Much advanced training had, perforce, to take place outside the country or region. Governments sending students overseas confronted the challenge of drawing them back again once trained. Local training became a much more attractive and cost-effective alternative and there was dramatic expansion of higher education in most SADC states. Independence also saw a major expansion in the numbers of highly skilled expatriates arriving in these countries, primarily from Europe, North America and the rest of Africa. Organisations such as the IOM also set up programmes to encourage skilled nationals to return home.[6]

Governments played a delicate game, offering skilled expatriates sufficient inducement to come and pass on their skills and experience while dissuading them from staying permanently. In the 1980s and 1990s, various new developments refocussed the brain-drain debate as many countries faced, for the first time, a potential drain of local skills to other countries within the SADC. The first movement of significance was the so-called "white flight" to South Africa from countries such as Zimbabwe and Mozambique.[7] Politically, their departure was unlamented but their exodus left sudden holes in the private and public skills base. Deteriorating economic conditions in some states (as a result of civil strife and South Africa's war of destabilisation) led to further uncertainty and departures, this time of skilled blacks. From the late 1970s, a silent drift of skills began from SADC and other African countries (particularly Ghana and Uganda) to the "independent" South African homelands of Transkei and Bophuthatswana. Prah's study of what he called "the great trek of talent" to the homelands involved an estimated 7000 highly-skilled Africans by the late 1980s.[8]

In the early 1990s, the end of apartheid produced fears within SADC of a renewed brain drain to South Africa from the rest of the region. Initially, these fears seemed justified. Skills migration to South Africa from all other SADC states jumped significantly in the run-up to the 1994 election. Some 200 medical doctors reportedly left Zimbabwe for Botswana and South Africa in 1992 alone.[9] Experts projected further losses and a significant impact on struggling local economies. The region's loss would be South Africa's gain, further exacerbating chronic regional inequalities. These fears have actually been muted by post-1994 South

African immigration policy which placed a very low premium on skills import from anywhere.[10] The other SADC states have been the unwitting beneficiaries of South Africa's anti-immigrationism. Work permits have been hard to come by and the movement of skilled Africans into South Africa has not yet reached anticipated levels.

Finding the Right Numbers

The need for reliable data on the extent and impact of skilled migration cannot be overstated, as the South African furore amply demonstrates. Unfortunately, the debate has been based more on misinformation and conjecture than methodologically sound research, with the *Sunday Times* article mentioned above being a good case in point. Although an impressive 11 000 people responded to a questionnaire in the "appointments" section of the newspaper, there is no way of knowing if the sample was representative of the skilled population in the country as a whole, making the survey entirely unreliable. Moreover, the largely financial and managerial nature of the jobs advertised constitutes a very narrow definition of skills, and the people reading the appointments section are more likely to be out of work, about to change their jobs, or dissatisfied with their current job – not a normal cross-section of skilled personnel. The readership of that paper is also largely white and English-speaking.

Another problem with the *Sunday Times* survey was that responses came from those who were sufficiently motivated to fill out the questionnaire and return it by post. Surveys that require people to post back responses, or phone in their opinions, are likely to be biased since those who have strong opinions are more likely to take the time to fill the questionnaire out and return it. In this case, the odds are strong that the sample is over-represented by people who want to make a statement about their disillusionment with the current state of affairs. In other words, the responses that led to the front-page banner headline and kicked off a national debate came from a group of people who read a traditionally white, English-language Sunday newspaper, and who are more likely to be dissatisfied with their present lot in life than a true cross-section of skilled South Africans.

There have been few serious efforts hitherto to take the brain-drain debate beyond the level of anecdote and urban legend. While Prah did make a serious effort at a representative survey of skills migration to the South African bantustans, the topic was of limited scope and the sample size small.[11] Considerably more problematic was a survey by Polonsky *et al.* of 73 emigrating South Africans on board a cruise ship destined for Australia, research that was subsequently published as a serious academic contribution.[12] Policy making on a topic as important as the brain drain must be based on far more sound and rigorous methodological research than this.

In 1998, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) instituted a series of nationally representative surveys in the SADC region on the attitudes of skilled people towards migration. Nationally representative surveys were conducted in South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho to provide detailed information on the scale and character of skilled migration (plans to include Zimbabwe were postponed due to the unexpected closure of the university at the time of the research). Future research on this issue is planned for Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique and will be published separately.

The research project was broken into three components. The first component was interviews with "skilled nationals" – i.e. skilled people who are citizens and residents of the country surveyed. A total of 1257 people were interviewed from a range of occupations and training: 725 in South Africa; 306 in Lesotho; and 226 in Botswana. The samples were based on the best demographic information available for skilled nationals in each of the countries and were conducted using rigorous selection methods and trained interviewers (more detailed methodological descriptions are provided in each chapter). Sample selection and questionnaires were consistent across the three countries. In South Africa, in particular, random sampling produced a highly skewed sample by race, with whites predominating in the sample. This is regrettable but inevitable given the apartheid legacy which denied blacks access to advanced training and skills development.

The second component of the research was interviews with non-citizens living and working in the country in which they were interviewed. These samples were also broadly representative of the pool of skilled people in this category, and sample selection and questionnaire formats were also consistent for the countries surveyed. A total of 400 interviews were conducted in South Africa and 125 in Botswana. Unfortunately, unrest in Lesotho and the subsequent intervention of SADC forces in September of 1998 interrupted interviews in that country, and data collection was halted after only 67 interviews with skilled foreigners.

The third component of the research was interviews with employers of skilled personnel. This work was only conducted in South Africa, due to logistical and budgetary constraints, and consisted of interviews with 200 public and private sector organisations from a wide range of industrial, commercial and service areas (including medicine, law, mining, and information technology). Once again, these interviews are broadly representative of skilled employers in the country and sampling and interviewing techniques followed standard research practices.

A final piece of research included in this volume was conducted by the South African National Skills Abroad (SANSA) network at the University of Cape Town. The SANSA article examines the pool of skilled South African nationals living in other parts of the world (predominantly Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and attempts to gauge both the quantitative and qualitative character of this diaspora.

In total, over 2000 people were interviewed by SAMP in three different countries, with an additional 2000 diasporic skilled South Africans covered in the SANSA database. This research therefore represents the widest sampling of skilled personnel yet conducted in Southern Africa. It serves as a reliable baseline of empirical data as well as a methodological yardstick for future research on the topic.

This collection is not, however, the final word on skilled migration in Southern Africa. The geographical scope needs to be expanded to compare more countries and there are still serious methodological challenges to be overcome (gaps in the demographic information on the skills profile in the region being the most significant). A host of new questions also emerged from the research. Other limitations derive from the quantitative research methods employed in these surveys. Closed-option, Likert-style questionnaires are useful insofar as they allow for large sample sizes and comparative data analysis, but they are limited in their ability to "get under the skin" of what motivates people to migrate (or not) and what their likely plans are for the future. Only detailed qualitative interviews with smaller samples of skilled people can provide this kind of ethnographic information, work that SAMP intends to conduct as part of its future research mandate.

The national sampling procedure deployed in this particular study produced a South African sample that was predominantly (75%) white. It must be emphasised, in case the reason is misunderstood, that this does not indicate racial bias in the actual methodology. Rather, it is a testimony to its accuracy. A white-biased sample is the inevitable result of sampling a population whose apartheid legacy is concentrated skills amongst whites in general, and white males in particular. The sample size of black South Africans is still adequate to draw conclusions about migration intentions but these should be seen as provisional until confirmed by a larger study. In addition, the emigration intentions of South Africa's future skills base (universities in which blacks are much better represented) could benefit from being researched.

The work presented in this collection should therefore be seen as "research in progress", an iterative process of understanding skilled migration in Southern Africa based on a range of methodologically sound research activities.

What Does "Skilled" Mean?

It is important to explain at the outset what is meant by "skilled" in this research. The idea of a brain drain implies a depletion of skilled people who are vital to the functional core of a national economy. While actual definitions of skilled persons may vary, they all tend to focus on people who have received some sort of specialised training that results in superior technical competence, talent, or abilities that are applied in professional occupations. Without these people, the operation and development of the economy would be severely hindered.

We have therefore opted in this research for a relatively broad definition of the term "skilled", one that encompasses a broader range of skills than the popular wisdom might imply. The functional core of an economy does not only consist of people with post-graduate degrees, in well-paying, high-level corporate positions. It is also sustained by people who, despite having no advanced formal education, have worked their way up the corporate ladder, have started their own successful businesses, or play a critical role in the public sector. Our samples therefore include anyone who has special training or work experience which is in relative short supply in relation to the labour market as a whole. Doctors, accountants, engineers and other professionals who are typically associated with skilled migration have certainly been included in the samples, but the skills base is not restricted to these categories.

The samples are also contextualised, in that what is deemed an important skill in one country may not be important in another. In Lesotho, for example, interviewees were drawn from a core list of professions but a decision was made to also include teachers and skilled artisans, since people from these areas are regularly seeking, and often finding, jobs in South Africa, and are in short supply in Lesotho.

Challenging Stereotypes

Official figures, in South Africa at least, dramatically undercount the extent of emigration. On the other hand, the SAMP surveys show that the alarmist rhetoric of crisis that pervades discussion of the brain drain in the popular press is misplaced. There is no doubt that there are thousands of South Africans, Batswana and Basotho leaving their countries to live and work in other countries in the region and other parts of the world, but the situation is far from desperate and there is no indication of a looming mass exodus in the near future. Skilled nationals in all three countries are generally satisfied with their work and lives and have no immediate plans to leave. Moreover, there is a pool of skilled foreigners who are equally satisfied with their lives in their host country and do not plan on leaving in the near future. Finally, and perhaps most revealing of all, employers of skilled personnel in South Africa do not appear to be having major problems hiring skilled nationals (with the notable, and globally relevant, exception of information technology personnel).

This is not to deny that many skilled people have given thought to leaving their home country or to say that South Africa, Lesotho and Botswana have an excess of skilled people ready to fill any vacant post. Far from it. In South Africa, an extremely high 69% of skilled nationals said that they have given the idea of emigration "some thought". Many have also made contact with potential employers overseas and many more have friends, colleagues or family members who have already emigrated, serving as examples and valuable reference points for their own possible emigration.

But, as this collection clearly shows, thinking about leaving, and actually doing so, are very different things. Only 20% of the skilled South Africans interviewed said that it was "very likely" that they would leave the country for a period of more than two years and only 3% said that it was "very likely" that they would leave within the next six months. A composite statistical index used to construct each person's "emigration potential" showed that only 2% of the sample falls into the "very high" category. These are hardly grounds for construction of a moral panic about a middle-class exodus.[13]

Skilled nationals in Botswana and Lesotho have a similar profile, although attitudes in Lesotho may have changed since the SADC intervention in 1998. In Zimbabwe, recent political developments also appear to have influenced the attitudes of skilled personnel towards emigration. But the survey results described here do reveal a remarkable stability and commitment amongst skilled professionals to the home country in at least three SADC states.

In terms of skilled foreigners, the surveys found that these people are also, by and large, happy to be living and working in their adopted country. Most have strong transnational links back home, send remittances to family and friends, visit home on a regular basis and are proud to call themselves citizens of their home country. Many also say that they want to return home at some point. But there is no sense of a large or immediate exodus from the host country. Skilled foreigners are generally satisfied with their jobs, and with their colleagues, and are involved in the communities where they live. They have, in other words, settled down for the medium term, if not permanently.

To risk a metaphor, skilled people in the region, be they skilled nationals or skilled foreigners, know where their suitcases are and have given some thought to what it would take to pack up and leave the country, but the suitcases are still in the cupboard and there are no plans to pull them out in the immediate future. There is no sense from this research that skilled people are going to make a rush on the banks, pack their things and leave tomorrow. Whether citizens or permit holders, skilled people in the three countries surveyed have significant material and emotional ties to the countries where they live and work: homes, friends, families, communities, jobs, and careers. There is a sense of patriotism and commitment to the home/host country that is largely ignored in the popular coverage of the brain-drain issue. If skilled people in the region have an alternative destination in mind, it is by and large a destination unknown, with no set timetable.

Another important aspect of the research worth highlighting here is the challenge it offers to stereotypes about emigration, particularly in South Africa. Popular myth in South Africa has it that English-speaking white males are most likely to want to leave the country, with women, Afrikaners and black South Africans, in that order, more likely to stay due to a lack of skills, a lack of a second passport, or a deeper commitment and ties to the country. Our survey of skilled nationals in South Africa, however, suggests that English-speaking whites are just as likely to want to stay in the country and that black South Africans and Afrikaners are almost as likely to want to leave. Only in the area of gender do there appear to be significant differences, with men in general more likely to leave than women. However, because men also dominate the more mobile professions, it is hard to say whether this is a function of inherent gender preference or simply a function of gendered structural inequality in the labour market.

Implications for Immigration Policy: The South African Case

The policy implications arising from the research are discussed in some detail for each country in the relevant chapters. But given the importance of the South African labour market in the region (and, indeed, on the continent), as well as the reforms to that country's immigration policy, it is worth relating the findings of this research to the new proposals.[14] When adopted, these policy reforms will replace the Aliens Control Act, the last major piece of apartheid-era legislation left on the books in South Africa, with far-reaching implications for South African citizens, residents and visitors.

The first point to emphasise is that the first term of office of South Africa's post-apartheid government was characterised by a general suspicion towards most forms of immigration.[15] Temporary and permanent immigration of skilled personnel have declined consistently since 1994. The government has come recently to revise its view and admit that skills immigration is not necessarily disadvantageous to South Africans. Indeed, the 1999 White Paper on International Migration explicitly asserts the government's stated interest in "attract[ing] qualified people in South Africa to offset the brain drain".[16] In early 2001, the African National Congress endorsed this policy goal.

The reasons for this softening of position are not unrelated to the lobbying efforts of big business. Some of these complaints are perfectly legitimate. The Department of Home Affairs is seriously under-resourced and, under the archaic Aliens Control Act, lacks the mechanisms to speed skills entry. Press reports suggest that it is still dealing with the skills needs of South African corporations in an *ad hoc* and unpredictable manner.[17] The lobbying of South African and international business involves the rhetorical construction of a "skills crisis". This crisis is supposedly crippling South Africa's international competitiveness. Interestingly, however, the magnitude and impact of the skills haemorrhage are simply assumed rather than demonstrated. The government's White Paper similarly makes no systematic effort to quantitatively demonstrate that there is actually a brain drain of crisis proportions.[18]

The White Paper and Bill's proposed new strategy for attracting skilled personnel to South Africa has two dimensions. First, they suggest that the South African government needs to make it easier for skilled persons to obtain extended work permits and/or permanent residency for themselves and their families. Second, they propose to let "market forces" determine where skills are most needed in the economy. The state, through the agency of the proposed Immigration Services, would continue to monitor the skilled labour market, and would establish a national training fund that employers who hire skilled foreigners would need to pay into to train South Africans for future jobs, but the bulk of the decision-making would be delegated to employers.[19]

The proposal to make it easier for qualified persons to obtain visas, work permits and temporary resident status for themselves and their families is a welcome corrective to the immigrant decision-making of the past. Simplification of administration and greater consistency in policy should go a long way toward attracting skilled people to the country. There are, however, a number of problematic assumptions and contradictory lines of argument in these proposals. The first problem is that skilled emigration (the brain drain) is not necessarily as significant a problem as it is made out to be in the White Paper and by various pro-business think-tanks.[20] In uncritically accepting popular wisdom on the issue without questioning the validity of the "facts" which led to this conclusion, the White Paper unwittingly sets itself up for a series of policy reforms which may not address the demographic and attitudinal realities of skilled migration. At the very least, the SAMP research reported here suggests that popular assumptions about the migration plans of skilled South African nationals and skilled foreigners cannot be taken for granted and that much more (academically sound) research is needed on this important topic.

A second problem concerns the proposed mechanisms for selecting skilled immigrants. As noted, the fundamental objective is to let "market forces" decide what kinds of skilled people are needed in the country. In its rejection of a centralised, state-run "points system" such as has been used in Canada and other immigrant-receiving countries to determine where skills are most needed, the White Paper argues that "[i]t is difficult for Government to determine what type of skills are required within South Africa, and who the people are that can contribute to our economic growth".[21] In the "final analysis, only the industry can tell who the industry needs, why and for how long". The White Paper argues that "it would be simpler if the industry by itself could determine what it needs to grow and prosper and were able to satisfy these needs from the world labour market" and proposes that Home Affairs delegate power to corporations to issue visas and permits.[22]

There is a fundamental tension between a *laissez-faire* approach to letting the market determine who should be let into the country and the legacy of control that has been so much a part of immigration policy and culture in the South African government in the past. White Paper statements like "the migration system should enable Government to retain control over who may enter the country and the conditions and length of his or her stay" are in direct contrast to the neoliberalism that also guides the document – e.g. "any government is likely to fail if it attempts to counter market forces moved by the invisible hand of economic fundamentals".[23]

The proposal to require employers to pay into a national fund to provide training to South Africans is also highly controversial. Official logic is that this fund would effectively make the cost of hiring a foreigner higher than that of an equivalently qualified South African. Thus, employers would only hire foreign workers when they really needed to do so. That this would happen even without this disincentive seems lost. More persuasively, the funds would add value to programmes aimed at expanding the skills base of South Africans. Nevertheless, the practicalities of such a system remain open to doubt and it would be almost impossible to enforce in a consistent and fair manner. And because skilled foreign migrants are also already likely to be more expensive to hire, this will be seen as an additional penalty for hiring workers that are actually needed. Such a policy could act as a disincentive to immigration and settlement by skilled non-citizens. This is only partially resolved by the proposed five-year residence requirement for citizenship.

A third issue is the manner in which the new approach to skilled migration creates a sense of "good" versus "bad" immigrants. From the very beginning of the document, the White Paper makes it clear that it is seeking to "let people who add value to our society in and to keep those that do not, out".[24] The people who add value are "those who invest, are entrepreneurs and promote trade, those who bring new knowledge and experience to our society and those who have the skills and expertise required to do the things we cannot properly do at this stage". Undesirables, by default, are those who do not have these skills or resources – in other words, poor and "unskilled" migrants who "compete for scarce resources" and "insufficient job opportunities", become "involved in criminal activities", and otherwise "weaken the state and its institutions by corrupting officials, fraudulently acquiring documents and undeserved rights and tarnishing our image locally and abroad".[25]

This kind of language directly contradicts assertions about the need to address xenophobia by "making communities understand the tragedy of illegal immigration", and potentially undermines the stated desire to attract skilled personnel by contributing to a general mood of distrust about non-citizens.[26] Reports of harassment of highly skilled professionals from other African countries are common and are no doubt related to the high rates of xenophobia in the country as a whole.[27] The White Paper proposals can only lead to further confusion and ill-sentiment on the part of South African nationals about newcomers to the country. Xenophobia must be addressed *in toto* as an issue of basic human rights and not as something that suits the narrow sectoral economic interests of a country one way or the other.[28]

A final tension relates to the question of where skilled immigrants are expected to come from. The White Paper lays out a hierarchy of immigration which seeks to "serve our people first; the people of the region and member states of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) second; the people of Africa third; and the rest of the world last".[29] But it fails to explain how this order of preference will be attained (once again raising the tension of the role of the market versus the role of the state), whether this hierarchy is constitutionally sound, or whether the skills needs of South Africa coincide with the geographic supply of the skilled immigrants it is hoping for. The Immigration

Bill is not any more enlightening on this point. If new legislation is to assist with this broader policy objective it would need to spell out in much more detail how it plans to achieve these objectives, whether it is appropriate to have geographically preferential immigration policies, whether it is practically feasible to implement, and what its implications might be for other SADC countries still concerned about a possible brain drain to South Africa. In a world of global head-hunting for increasingly mobile skilled personnel, South African policy-makers and immigration bureaucrats will need to be much more strategic in their efforts to attract the people they want, and will need to break down the false distinction between skilled and unskilled migrants if they are to deal with xenophobia as a whole.

Finally, the new policy is remarkably quiet on what would be required to stem the flow of skilled personnel out of South Africa. Part of the reason for this is the Constitutional right of South African citizens to move where they want (a right which millions of South Africans did not have under apartheid) and the reluctance of the South African government to institute policies to keep people in the country. But it nevertheless begs the question of what policy mechanisms might reduce the so-called "push" factors and convince people to stay. This volume examines this issue in some detail in the South African context by examining the likes and dislikes of skilled nationals with respect to their home country and how they compare it to their "most likely destination" if they were to leave.

Not surprisingly, crime and safety come up as one of the main "push" factors from South Africa. But even higher on the dissatisfaction list of skilled South Africans is the "present level of taxation" and "relative share of taxes in comparison to others". This concern with taxes pertains to much more than just emigration, of course, and taxes are only part of a much larger emigration-potential puzzle amongst skilled South Africans. But given the high profile that tax (and fiscal reform in general) has in South Africa, it is not inconceivable that levels of taxation could start to play an even bigger role in the emigration decision-making process.

This potential is made all the more likely with the downward pressures on personal taxes for high-income earners in immigrant-receiving countries like the United States, and has sparked a furious debate in some countries as to whether the personal tax differential is a source of their own brain drain. Notably, the debate in Canada is divided on the issue.[30]

Nevertheless, as fiscal conservatism continues to gain momentum in South Africa it will no doubt become a more explicit tool for keeping (and attracting) skilled personnel. But is this actually a line worth pursuing? Would South Africa, in its efforts to retain skilled personnel, simply be engaging in a "race to the bottom" of tax reforms? This is a race that it can barely expect to win on an international scale given the relatively limited scope for further fiscal cuts in South Africa and growing pressures from an increasing pool of poor and unemployed South Africans for more progressive redistributive tax measures.

Would South Africa not perhaps be better off addressing the concerns that skilled personnel have about crime and social upheaval with a more balanced redistributive fiscal framework, a fiscal framework that addresses the material roots of crime and unrest through poverty alleviation? Tax issues cannot be ignored, of course, but to focus on these narrow economistic reasons for emigration risks the potential of competing in an international tax reform race that cannot be won. The strategy also risks losing out on an opportunity to construct a more sound and attractive public sphere domestically that may ultimately go further in retaining the skills that South Africa needs.

Skilled Migration in Regional Context

A central contention of this collection is the importance of thinking of skills migration issues regionally. If regional integration in Southern Africa is going to take place in any meaningful way, the exchange of highly skilled personnel must be an integral part of it. At one level, this integration is already taking place, albeit at a slower pace than once anticipated. In the sample of 400 skilled foreigners in South Africa, for example, a total of 41% were from Africa with 18% from SADC countries. In Botswana, 77% of the sample of skilled foreigners were from African countries with the majority of those from SADC countries. In other words, there is a significant emerging regional exchange of skills taking place and SADC countries need to acknowledge, debate and support this interaction.

Thinking regionally also brings into question the whole notion of a brain drain. If skilled South Africans are working in Lesotho, or if skilled Zambians are working in Botswana, does this represent a loss of skills to the country of origin or does it represent a building and expanding of the skills base for the region as a whole? This is particularly true if these skilled people are in regular contact with colleagues back home or if they return home to practice their trade. A Zimbabwean doctor practising for ten years in South Africa may seem like a major loss to Zimbabwe at the time, but if this doctor returns with new skills and exposure to different systems it could create a "brain gain" for the country in the end and for the region as a whole.

In the end, of course, national boundaries remain a very tangible feature of the Southern African landscape, both physically and psychologically.[31] Colonial constructs die hard, and as the unsuccessful attempts to create a SADC Protocol on the Free Movement of People illustrate, it will be some time yet before national governments in SADC are able and willing to think favourably (let alone strategically) about the skills pool in the region as a whole. Nevertheless, we can be optimistic about the potential for southern African countries to attract and retain skilled personnel. The challenge for the policymakers will be to develop strategies based on sound empirical research in ways which benefit the region rather than play blindly into the lowest common denominators of globalisation.

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Chapter 1

The Brain Drain: What Do Skilled South Africans Think?

Robert Mattes and Wayne Richmond

In an interdependent and increasingly global economy, maintaining and enlarging a skilled labour force is vital to the national interest of many countries.[1] Yet South Africa appears to be in a tight squeeze. It is a developing new democracy committed to eradicating the massive social, economic and political disparities of its apartheid past. Part of this project is the empowerment and expansion of the pool of racially disadvantaged workers. But this cannot be achieved overnight.

At the same time, while statistics differ widely, significant numbers of educated professionals and entrepreneurs have been leaving South Africa to find work elsewhere, taking with them skills crucial to the country's development. And it appears that this flight has been exacerbated not only by the turmoil accompanying democratisation, but also the societal changes brought on by the post-apartheid transformation. Thus, attempts to train new skilled workers may strain to keep pace with the skills lost through emigration, producing a net loss of skilled workers, or what is known in South Africa as the "brain drain". Yet estimates of the size and impact of this brain drain vary widely and analyses of its causes remain speculative. Needless to say, the present and potential size of this skills exodus, as well as its actual and potential economic, social and political impacts are of major concern to policymakers.

In order to assess the present and potential extent of South Africa's brain drain, as well as more accurately understand its causes, the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) undertook a national study of the issue in mid-1998. The study had two primary aims:

- To provide nationally representative and methodologically rigorous empirical data on the emigration plans of skilled South Africans;
- To examine and assess the range of factors that contribute to skilled South Africans' desire to leave the country.

Measuring South Africa's Brain Drain

Historically, South Africa has been an immigrant- as well as migrant-receiving country.[2] Since 1940 the number of legal immigrants has generally exceeded the number of emigrants, resulting in an overall pattern of net in-migration gain.[3]

Escaping a Toxic Society

Nomusa Ngoma

The reason why I originally left South Africa is difficult to put into words that would make sense to someone else, particularly someone who has not experienced the effects of living under the apartheid system. The primary reason was the urgent need to escape the toxic society that was slowly driving me insane. I got tired of being treated as if I did not exist. For years I buried my head in my books, studied hard and graduated at the top of my class. I was a tax-paying member of society, contributing to the economy of the country and entrusted with the training and shaping of the next generation of health care workers, but still I did not exist.

It dawned on me that no matter what I did, how much I earned and excelled, as a Black person, my existence and my worth would never be acknowledged in South Africa. I knew I had to leave. I had thought about leaving many times before, but there were always reasons to put if off. It was unthinkable to leave my family – we had always been very close. My fellow Black people, particularly young people, whom I had the opportunity to train would be let down if I left. My peers said that people should stay and fight the apartheid system.

I left because the time was right. I wanted better opportunities for my children and myself. I was dying to pursue higher education. Immediately after I decided to leave, I got a job offer in Canada and the emigration process began. The process took over a year to complete because of the red tape. The reception in Canada was amazing. I felt like I could breathe again. Yes, there was culture shock, but for the first time I felt like I was a human being. Professionally, my expertise was valued and appreciated. Within 18 months of arriving in Canada, I was enrolled in a graduate programme. Soon after completing my degree I was offered a clinical research position at one of the local teaching hospitals. I am currently working on my PhD and raising a family. I continue to have very positive experiences in Canada. My job is challenging yet fulfilling. However, more than anything else I feel valued and people around me seem to acknowledge that I exist.

Many wonderful changes have occurred in South Africa since I left. We go back to visit family on a regular basis. The reception we get is mixed. Some people seem to resent the fact that we left South Africa in the first place. Some seem to resent even more the threat that we may one day want to return and take over their jobs. They remained through thick and thin and had fought the injustices of the apartheid system. Now that things have improved and more opportunities have opened up, how dare we think we can come back and take over?

I am perhaps more forgiving now because I do understand where they are coming from: living under the threat of retrenchments or constant fear of being passed over for promotion, the repercussions of the plummeting rand and many other threats that continue to plague our country. Having said that, I am aware of people who are willing to admit that perhaps expatriates have a lot of different skills, experience and perspective to offer.

Would I go back to South Africa? Yes, without a doubt. At least that is how I feel most of the time. Unfortunately it only takes about a week of being back to make me question my willingness to return for good. I do hope to return some day, as I know that I have a lot to contribute. Do I regret my decision to leave? While I do miss my family, the answer is NO, not for a second. It's been quite an adventure, even though I have had to work hard on my studies. I would do it over again in a heartbeat. Most importantly, my children will have better opportunities than I ever had growing up in the apartheid South Africa. To me, that's all that matters.

Nomusa Ngoma is a South African occupational therapist living in Canada.

Unfortunately, the statistics available from 1940 to 1990 fail to differentiate between skilled and non-skilled migrants. Yet it is interesting to note the fluctuations in net migration patterns and their correspondence to political and economic trends during the apartheid era, especially the periods of net loss in 1960–1961 (following Sharpeville), 1977–1979 (Soweto and its aftermath), and 1986–1988 (the State of Emergency) (Figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1: South African Immigration Gains and Losses, 1940–1990 (in thousands)



Source: Central Statistical Service.

Data from the period of South Africa's transition toward democracy (1991–1993) and post-apartheid period (1994 to the present) enable us to isolate economically active persons arriving in and leaving South Africa, who are defined by Statistics South Africa as employed persons (Figure 1.2).[4] The data from this period reveal a rapid decline from a net gain of economically active persons to a net loss. In 1996 South Africa experienced its worst loss for at least eleven years.[5] Yet it is also apparent that official figures drastically underestimate the extent of skills out-migration.

What is the actual extent of the brain drain, both in terms of its present and potential size? As seen above, official statistics are not gathered in a way that enables us to estimate this with any accuracy. Indeed, the chapter in this volume by Brown *et al.* shows that official statistics are far too low, by as much as two-thirds.[6] Furthermore, it is very difficult to draw firm conclusions about the type of people who are leaving since the data may not be collected in this way, or may be collected in different ways at different points in time. Neither is it very easy to determine for how long these emigrants are leaving or whether they intend to return at some point in the future. Migrants often leave with the intention of returning but change their minds once they have left. The few surveys which have been done are highly misleading.[7]

Figure 1.2: South African Skilled Immigration and Emigration Statistics, 1990–1997 (in thousands)



Source: Central Statistical Service.

Common wisdom tends to attribute the loss of skills to the perceived negative characteristics of the transition and democratisation period: political instability and uncertainty, heightened racial conflict, poor economic performance, a heavy fall in the currency, and increasing crime and violence. Yet most debate and analysis about the causes of this problem is based on hearsay and rumour.

Some systematic attempts have been made by various analysts, as well as Statistics South Africa, to document the factors that emigrants cite for leaving. Most often cited are the lack of safety and security, poor economic conditions, and poor social services.[8] Yet it is by no means certain that these are the key factors that actually push people out of the country. The questions have only been asked of those who have actually emigrated. But it is quite likely that crime, the economy and services would rate very highly as key grievances of all skilled South Africans. If so, then we must ask what distinguishes those who leave from those who stay behind.

Research Methodology

In terms of the sample population, the idea of a "brain drain" implies a depletion of skilled people who are vital to the functional core of the economy. In business, the functional core is simply a subgroup of key personnel in an organisation critical to its normal conduct of business. While actual definitions of skilled persons vary, they all tend to focus on people who have received some sort of specialised training that results in superior technical competence, talent, or abilities that are applied in professional occupations. Without these people, the operation and development of the economy would be severely hindered. Thus, for a survey of skilled South Africans, the definition of skills requires that we approach a broader range of people than the typical popular image might imply. The functional core of an economy does not only consist of people with post-graduate degrees, in well-paying, high-level corporate positions.

Skilled people typically possess some specialised, formal training (e.g. Technikon or University qualification). But the functional core of the economy is also at times sustained by people who, despite having no advanced formal education, have worked their way up the corporate ladder or have started their own successful businesses.

Skilled South Africans also include people at various levels of the corporate ladder. National economic performance will begin to break down not only when businesses lose a certain number of senior managers, but also when they cross a specific threshold of losses of middle-level people who fill vital administrative and support functions. Middle-level people also comprise the potential pool from which to fill senior positions in the future. A survey of skilled South Africans should also include individual entrepreneurs. The self-employed create jobs, add innovation and contribute to the overall growth of the economy. Finally, such a survey should also include not only people from the business or manufacturing sector but also from science, technology, education, and arts and culture. These people add value to the functional core of the economy by training skilled workers, contributing technological and scientific innovation or sustaining entertainment and tourist industries.

We therefore define a "skilled" South African, as conforming to the following criteria:

- A South African citizen;
- 20 years of age or older;
- Matriculated and possessing a Technikon diploma or University degree from a recognised institution (or in their final year of studying for a diploma or degree);
- Currently economically active (employed or looking for employment).

The only exceptions are people who have not either matriculated from high school or graduated from a tertiary institution, but who nonetheless own a business or hold a senior management position in their occupation: i.e., an owner, manager, supervisor, professional worker, commercial farmer or commissioned officer in the SANDF Permanent Force.

This definition enables us to use the All Media and Products (AMPS) Survey to estimate the actual size of the skilled population group in South Africa. The AMPS Survey is conducted annually in 30 000 households nationwide. Given the historical problems associated with census data in South Africa, it is often used as the basis for demographic research, and South Africa's market research industry regularly uses it to draw representative samples of the population. Based on 1998 AMPS data, the economically active population in South Africa is approximately 17 000 000. When we apply the criteria of education and senior occupational status to the AMPS data, we estimate the size of South Africa's skilled sector at 1 600 000 (or 9% of the economically active population).

In June-July 1998, we surveyed a random probability sample, stratified by province, representative of this South African skilled population. Telephone interviews were conducted with 725 skilled South Africans. Household phone numbers were randomly selected from provincial phone directories. Within each household contacted, all people who met the criteria were enumerated, and one was then randomly selected for interview. If no individual in the household met the requirements (or if the selected person could not be interviewed after three callbacks), another household was contacted until we reached our goal of 725. In the end, we made 4 250 phone calls to obtain 725 valid and complete interviews.

Finally, to ensure adequate representation of three small, but important types of skills (engineers, accountants and medical doctors), quotas were built into the sampling strategy to ensure at least 30 interviews in each category. In the end, we interviewed 54 engineers, 65 accountants and 36 medical doctors. The final sample was then weighted according to the AMPS data, and was thus representative of the South African skilled population defined by our criteria.[9]

The following section describes the responses of skilled South Africans to a series of questions designed to assess the present and potential extent of emigration. Then, we analyse the results of questions designed to assess a range of possible causes of emigration. Finally, using multivariate statistical analysis, the chapter assesses how well this range of factors accounts for the propensity of skilled South Africans to emigrate, as well as which factors are more or less important in explaining emigration.

South Africa's Skilled Population: A Profile

What does South Africa's skilled population of 1.6 million look like? Given the role of apartheid in reserving important positions in the economy for whites, it is no surprise that the sample was predominantly white (72%). But it is significant that 26% of the skilled sample were not: 18% were African, 8% coloured and 3% Asian (Table 1.1). While there is no comparable data from earlier points, this appears to be a snapshot of a rapidly growing African skilled sector.[10]

In the rest of this report, many stark differences emerge in the views of skilled white and skilled African respondents (as well as some surprising areas of similarity or consensus). However, because of the small number of cases, the responses of coloured or Asian respondents as a sub-group are not presented, though their views are present in results for total sample.

Common wisdom holds that Afrikaners virtually monopolised the political sphere during apartheid, but that white English speakers retained extensive control over business and industry.[11] Yet, as Table 1.1 shows, almost half of the sample is composed of white Afrikaners. The skilled population of South Africa also appears to have more women and young people than expected. The African sub-sample is younger than the white sub-sample and is predominately female, where the white sub-sample is predominately male (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). The skilled population is concentrated primarily in Gauteng province, and also in Western Cape and Kwazulu-Natal (Table 1.4).

Table 1.1: Racial Breakdown of Sample

Population group	Percentage
White (Afrikaans)	45
White (English)	27
African	18
Coloured	5
Asian	3
N = 725	

Figures in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value greater than zero but less than 0.5%.

Table 1.2: Gender Breakdown of Skilled South Africans

Gender (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Male	61	66	36
Female	39	34	64

Table 1.3: Age Breakdown of Skilled South Africans

Age (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
18–24	6	5	8
25–34	29	28	36
35–49	45	45	43
Over 50	17	19	9
Won't say	2	2	4
N=	725	522	131

Table 1.4: Province of Residence of Skilled South Africans

Province (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Gauteng	37	39	36
Western Cape	20	18	19
Kwazulu-Natal	13	12	17
Eastern Cape	7	7	7
Free State	6	6	6
North West	4	5	4
Northern Province	4	4	4
Mpumalanga	6	6	5
Northern Cape	3	4	3
N=	725	522	131

Over 20% of the sample are in households with a joint monthly income of less than R6 000 per month. However, there are substantial racial differences. Almost three-quarters of skilled African respondents (71%) have a joint, pre-tax, household income of R8 000 or less; the comparable white figure is 19% (Table 1.5).

Table 1.5: Household Income of Skilled South Africans

Gross monthly household income (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Less than R2 000	3	1	10
R2 001–R6 000	19	9	52
R6 001–R8 000	9	9	9
R8 001–R10 000	11	12	8
R10 001–14 000	14	16	7
R14 001–R20 000	15	19	1
R20 001–R26 000	8	10	1
R26 001–R32 000	3	4	0
R32 001–R38 000	1	1	0
More than R38 000	4	4	0
Refused to answer	13	12	4
N=	725	522	131

Only 6% of the sample had less than a High School Certificate or Matric pass (4% of white and 14% of African respondents). These people were in the sample because they held a managerial position in their occupation. A further 21% had only a Matric pass or its equivalent. These people were included either because they were in the final year of a Technikon diploma or University Bachelor's degree programme, or they held a senior management position in their occupation. As for the rest, three-quarters of the sample had a High School Certificate plus either a Technikon diploma or University Bachelor's degree (Table 1.6).

Table 1.6: Educational Qualifications of South Africans

Qualification (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Less than High School Certificate (HSC)	6	4	14
HSC only, or equivalent	21	19	26
HSC plus diploma or Bachelor's degree	58	60	56
Honours degree	9	10	6
Master's degree	5	6	3
Doctorate	1	2	1
N=	725	522	131

Just under one-third (31%) of the sample were self-employed, full-time entrepreneurs, either in the informal or formal sectors. Almost 60% (57%) worked full-time for someone else. Another 7% worked part-time either for themselves or someone else. A small percentage were unemployed but looking for work or did not yet have a diploma or degree but were in the final year of tertiary studies (Table 1.7).

Table 1.7: Employment Status of Skilled South Africans

Employment status (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Employed – full-time	57	58	58
Entrepreneur in formal sector – full-time	27	31	8
Entrepreneur in informal sector – full-time	4	3	7
Entrepreneur in formal sector – part-time	3	3	0
Employed – part-time	3	2	8
Final year student	3	2	8
Unemployed – looking for work	3	1	11
Entrepreneur in informal sector – part-time	1	0	1
N=	825	522	131

Predicting Emigration

Skilled South Africans are spread widely across a broad range of economic sectors (Table 1.8). There are distinctive patterns of sectoral participation by race. Predicting exactly how many of these skilled people will emigrate from South Africa in the future is difficult. Even if a person says they want to leave, there is no certainty that they actually will. In referring to who or how many skilled people intend to emigrate, we therefore refer to an individual's potential for emigration which is not the same thing as a firm prediction of future emigration patterns and trends.

Emigration potential is complex and consists of several different elements:

- First, to what extent has a skilled person even considered the idea?
- Second, to what extent do they actually want to emigrate?
- Third, even if they want to leave South Africa, to what extent do factors outside the person's direct control (such as financial costs) affect the likelihood of leaving?
- Fourth, exactly when do they plan to leave? There is a vast difference between those who have gone as far as setting some time deadline for their move and

Table 1.8: Employment Sectors of Skilled South Africans

Sectors (%)	Sample*	Total	Whites	Africans
Education/research	142	19	11	45
Secondary education	50	7	3	21
Primary education	47	6	3	17
Tertiary education	36	5	4	5
Research	9	1	1	2
Heavy industry	111	15	14	7
Manufacturing	40	6	6	2
Textile	13	2	1	2
Construction	32	4	4	2
Mining	8	1	1	1
Automotive	10	1	1	0
Steel and iron	8	1	1	0
Service industry	110	14	12	12
Retail	54	7	6	8
Real estate	10	1	1	0
Energy	15	2	2	2
Food	13	2	2	0
Transport	14	2	1	2
Private security	4	<0.5	0	0
Professional practice	89	12	22	13
Medical	42	6	10	11
Engineering	31	4	10	2
Law firm	16	2	2	0
Finance/banking	101	13	20	6
Accounting	39	5	12	3
Finance	32	4	4	3
Banking	20	3	3	0
Insurance	10	1	1	0
Government/military	44	5	5	6
Government	34	4	4	5
Military	10	1	1	1
Agriculture	38	5	6	1
N=	725	725	522	131

*Note: Unweighted data. All percentages based on weighted data.

those who have not. The longer one takes to make the move, the more likely that other factors might come into play to change the decision altogether.

- Lastly, a distinction must be drawn between temporary and permanent movement (or emigration). It makes little sense to speak of a brain drain if skilled people intend to return to South Africa after a short period of time. This is especially the case when people leave to study in other countries. In many ways, this can actually constitute an investment for the future of South Africa's economic well-being rather than a loss of skills. Permanent movement on the other hand is clearly indicative of a brain drain.

Only when all of these questions are considered can we give a more accurate estimate of the skilled emigration potential of skilled South Africans. The failure to adequately recognise these complexities can result in extremely misleading conclusions.

First, the survey asked about the degree of thought given to leaving South Africa. It is safe to assume that those who have not thought about the matter have no potential to move for the time being. Thus, this question helps define the outermost limit of the pool of South Africans who might conceivably leave. The pool is a large one. Over two-thirds (69%) say they have given the idea of emigration some thought (and 38% say they have given it a "great deal" of thought) (Table 1.9). These results are fairly similar to those obtained by a *Sunday Times* readership questionnaire. In that survey, 74% said they "would consider emigrating". Yet those who bought the *Sunday Times* on 13 September 1998 were assailed with provocative banner headlines proclaiming "74% with skills want to quit SA". These headlines fueled a heated and unedifying debate involving President Mandela, opposition parties and the news media. They were also highly misleading because thinking about leaving is far from synonymous with actually doing so.

Second, the popular perception of the brain drain is that it is a "white phenomenon" only. But when the responses of skilled whites and Africans are compared, there is a surprising level of similarity in attitudes, with 69% of white and 68% of African respondents having given emigration at least some thought. Some 33% of whites and 23% of Africans have given it a great deal of thought, suggesting that the emigration potential is higher amongst whites but far from insignificant amongst Africans.

Regardless of whether people have thought about leaving, to what extent do they actually wish to move? And, if they do say they want to leave, have they thought seriously enough about it to actually place some time frame on their exit?

The sample was therefore asked whether they would want to leave South Africa on either a temporary or permanent basis (Table 1.10). Following United Nations criteria, a period of more than two years absence is defined as a permanent move (emigration). That said, some skilled people might still wish to return to South Africa after living and working in another country for a period of time. Thus, what would be considered by international standards as permanent movement, and thus emigration, might not be totally equivalent to a permanent brain drain from South Africa, although it is certainly true that the longer one resides in a new country the lower the probability of returning home.

Table 1.9: Consideration of Emigration

Thought given to moving to another country to live and work (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
A great deal	31	33	23
Some	38	36	45
None at all	31	31	3
Don't know	1	0	2
N=	725	522	131

Table 1.10: Desire to Leave South Africa

Extent of desire to move temporarily to another country to live and work: less than 2 years (%)			
	Total	Whites	Africans
Great	18	18	17
Some	27	24	40
Total	45	42	57
Extent of desire to move permanently to another country to live and work: more than 2 years (%)			
Great	28	34	16
Some	28	28	38
Total	56	62	54
N=	725	522	131

It is clear that far fewer skilled people actually want to leave the country than suggested by the alarmist *Sunday Times* headlines. While 69% have given some thought to leaving, only 28% express a great desire to leave for a period of two years or more. While skilled African respondents are less likely than whites to have a very strong desire to leave for a period of more than two years, as many as 54% have an interest in doing so (compared to 62% of whites). And African respondents are actually more likely to want to leave for a period of two years or less (54% versus 26%).

How likely is it that wish will become reality? Thinking about leaving, and wanting to do it, are one thing. Actually doing so is quite another. Emigration is a fairly complicated and difficult process during which people must look at a much broader range of physical and psychological factors than sheer desire. They include factors such as costs, leaving family behind, and the prospects that such a move will improve one's quality of life. On the other hand, the desire to emigrate is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for emigration. For a range of reasons, people might feel they have no choice but to leave. Despite not wanting to do so, it may be seen as the most sensible decision for themselves and their immediate family members.

To summarise, 69% have given some thought to leaving, and 28% express a strong desire to leave. Some 20% of skilled respondents say that it is very likely that they would actually leave for a period of more than two years (Table 1.11). Slightly higher proportions of skilled whites (22%) than Africans (15%) say that a permanent move is very likely. On the other hand, skilled Africans are more likely to leave South Africa on a temporary basis (15%) than whites (10%).

Emigration is a formal and often lengthy process that involves obtaining official documentation, preparing applications and organising employment opportunities, quite apart from the sheer logistics of the move. Thus people who have mentally set a specific date, or at least a time frame, for leaving are far more likely to act upon their desires than those who leave it as an open-ended possibility.

Table 1.11: Likelihood of Leaving South Africa

Likelihood of ever moving temporarily to another country to live and work: less than 2 years (%)			
	Total	**Whites**	**Africans**
Very likely	11	10	15
Likely	21	16	39
Total	32	26	54
Likelihood of ever moving permanently to another country to live and work: more than 2 years (%)			
Very likely	20	22	14
Likely	29	29	27
Total	49	51	41
N=	725	522	131

Table 1.12 illustrates the extent to which the sample has a mental commitment to emigrate within a specified time frame. Specifying a time frame cuts the levels of potential emigration quite dramatically. Only 3% said that it was "very likely" that they would leave within six months, 5% in the next two years, and 13% within five years. The proportions of skilled Africans and whites who express a strong probability of leaving within six months or within two years are not dissimilar (though whites are more likely to express a stronger probability of leaving within a five-year time period).

Possibly the firmest indicator of a person's emigration potential is whether they have actually begun applying for basic emigration documentation (a formal requirement for any move to take place). As of mid-1999, the proportion of skilled South African respondents who have begun this process is much lower than for most other emigration potential indicators (Table 1.13). Some 6% say they have applied for work permits in another country, 5% have applied for permanent residence elsewhere, and 3% have applied for foreign citizenship. Again, there are only marginal differences between skilled white and black South Africans. Taken together with the racial breakdowns in Table 1.12 this strongly suggests that, at the

Table 1.12: Commitment to Emigrate

Likelihood of leaving South Africa (%)			
	Total	**Whites**	**Africans**
In the next 6 months (%)			
Very likely	3	3	2
Likely	4	2	10
Total	7	5	12
In the next 2 years (%)			
Very likely	5	5	3
Likely	20	20	22
Total	25	25	25
In the next 5 years (%)			
Very likely	13	15	8
Likely	29	27	33
Total	42	42	41
N=	725	532	131

Table 1.13: Applications for Emigration Documentation

Applied for (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Work permit in another country	6	6	5
Permanent residency in another country	5	5	4
Foreign citizenship	3	3	3
N=	725	532	131

level of the very firmest indicators of emigration, very similar proportions of skilled Africans are presently intending to leave the country as skilled whites. This is an aspect of the brain drain that has enjoyed no public or government awareness and profile.

How do these various components of the emigration decision fit together? Figure 1.3 reveals the consistent decline in indicators of likely emigration as we move from consideration, to desire, to likelihood, and to specified, increasingly shorter time periods. Thus, as greater mental and physical commitments are required from the respondent, emigration potential declines sharply.

In order to test if the responses can be combined into a single valid index that reliably summarises each person's potential to emigrate, we used a statistical procedure known as Factor Analysis. Factor Analysis examines the similarity or dissimilarity in patterns of responses to a range of question items to determine whether respondents react to them in common ways. If they do, we can infer that the various questions capture different elements of a common underlying dimension, and can thus aggregate responses to these questions into a single index.

The analysis does not include data on applications for work permits or other overseas documentation. These actions are a consequence of a decision to leave rather than indicators of the probability of reaching that decision. Factor Analysis confirmed that responses to four questions (desire to move for two years or more, the likelihood of moving for two years or more, likelihood of moving within two years, and likelihood of moving within five years) formed a valid and reliable index that measures a skilled person's emigration potential. Questions about whether people had considered moving, and whether they would move in the next six months, did not fit into this index because the pattern of responses to these questions was significantly different from the consistent pattern of the other four responses.

Index scores for each respondent were calculated by looking at their average score across the four key questions. Since each of the items has a four-point score, the range of the average index scores also runs from 1 to 4. Those who scored "4" (i.e., said "very willing" or "very likely" to all four items) were classified as having a

Figure 1.3: Emigration Potential vs. Decision-making Intensity (%)



"very high" probability of leaving. Those who scored between 3.75 and 3.25 (or who gave some combination of very intense and intense replies) were classified as having a "high" probability and so on.

Once an index score was calculated for each skilled respondent, the following conclusions emerge:

- 2% of the sample fall into the "very high" category of emigration potential (of leaving South Africa for a period of two years or more, within the next two to five years);
- 10% have a "high" emigration potential;
- 25% have a "moderate" emigration potential;
- 28% have a "low" emigration potential;
- 16% have a "very low" emigration potential;
- 20% have "no" emigration potential at all.

Thus, if only those skilled South Africans with a "very high" emigration potential left the country in the next five years, this would translate into a potential gross loss of around 32 000 skilled people in the next five years (2% of a skilled population estimated at 1.6 million). Taking into account the margin of error in surveys of this sample size, that number could be as low as 6 000 or as high as 58 000. If all of those with a "high" or "very high" potential left, the number would jump to a massive 192 000. With the margin of error, this could range from 155 000 to as high as 229 000 in the next five years. To place these estimates in perspective, Brown *et al.* (in this volume) estimate that 43 000 "professionals" (which they admit excludes a number of other skilled categories, such as managers) have emigrated to the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the past nine years. Overall, they claim that 233 000 have emigrated during that period, though they suggest that very high proportions of these would be skilled. These are estimates of gross skilled emigration or "gross loss". Any complete estimate of the brain drain, or "net loss" of skilled workers also needs to take into account the potential counter-balancing impact of skilled foreigners that enter South Africa. But "professional" immigration to South Africa in the past nine years amounts to no more than 10 000.

The Emigration Potential Index suggests that the assumption that the government need only worry about "white" emigration is a grave misconception. There is no difference in the proportion of skilled whites and Africans who fall into the "very high" category (2% of either group). It is true that a higher proportion of skilled whites (11%) than skilled Africans (4%) fall into the "high" probability category. But adding the two together, the difference in proportions of skilled whites versus skilled Africans with a "high" or "very high" probability of leaving the country within five years, is not nearly as great as might be expected.

Figure 1.4: Emigration Potential of Skilled South Africans in Next 5 Years



The Nature of Skilled Emigration from South Africa

If skilled respondents with a "high" or "very high" emigration potential do leave, where will they go? And will they completely sever all links with South Africa? Table 1.14 displays the top five most likely countries of destination of this sub-sample. Overall, the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada rank as the five destinations most often mentioned. These preferences confirm the spatial patterns of skilled emigrant destinations reported by Brown *et al.* (this volume).

Table 1.14: Intended Destination of Emigrants

Most likely country (%)	
United States of America	24
Australia	22
United Kingdom	15
New Zealand	12
Canada	11
N = 87	

While the popular image of the brain drain is of people cutting all ties with home, this is not necessarily accurate. People may, for a range of reasons, return or intend to return at some stage in the future. Even when such a return is not expressly foreseen, uncertainty about what the future holds might also limit the extent to

Table 1.15: Duration of Emigration

Length of stay at most likely destination (%)	
Less than 6 months	1
6 months–1 year	2
1–2 years	8
2–5 years	14
More than 5 years	71
Don't know	4
Frequency of return (%)	
Weekly	0
Monthly	4
Once every few months	7
Yearly	57
Once every few years	20
Never	12
Don't know	2
N = 87	

Table 1.16: Links with South Africa

Willingness to sell house in South Africa (%)	Total
Very willing	35
Willing	46
Willingness to take all savings out of South Africa (%)	
Very willing	49
Willing	40
Willingness to take all investments out of South Africa (%)	
Very willing	42
Willing	42
Willingness to give up South African citizenship (%)	
Very willing	23
Willing	34
N = 87	

which ties are cut. Table 1.15 reveals that the vast majority of those likely to leave in the next five years say they would want to stay away for more than five years. At the same time, only one in ten say they would never return home. Almost 70% say they would return at least once a year or more.

Emigration involves decisions about property, savings, investments, and ultimately, citizenship. The willingness to relinquish these things is a far better indicator of the intention to return. A willingness to cut all these ties indicates a strong intention not to return. Between 80% and 90% of likely skilled emigrants are willing to cut all economic ties with the country (e.g., sell their house or take out savings and investments). A significant proportion (57%) is willing to give up South African citizenship (Table 1.16). Hence the potential for a permanent move appears strong.

Yet not all potential emigrants are completely sold on putting down deep roots in their probable country of destination. Some 36% say they do not want permanent residence, 40% do not want citizenship, and only half give indications of a lifetime stay by saying they want to retire, or be buried there.

The other important question is what differentiates skilled people who express a high potential to emigrate from those who do not? Dissatisfaction with overall "quality of life" is often cited as an important factor that pushes skilled South Africans out of the country. Indeed, the common wisdom is that the South African brain drain is heavily driven by white perceptions of a deteriorating quality of life since the demise of apartheid.

Skilled South Africans were therefore asked about their level of satisfaction with a wide variety of measures of "quality of life". Factor Analysis demonstrated that people do not respond to all these items in the same way, but rather react differently to different clusters of questions. There are high levels of dissatisfaction with (a) the cost of living, (b) levels of taxation, (c) safety and security, and (d) the standard of public and commercial services in South Africa. In each of these cases (with the exception of standard of services), dissatisfaction extends across racial boundaries and is not a predominantly white preoccupation (Table 1.17).

Table 1.17: Satisfaction with Quality of Life in South Africa

Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Cost of living	71	72	64
Present level of taxation	74	75	74
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	59	59	59
Personal safety	66	65	61
Family's safety	68	69	54
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	70	79	37
Customer service	56	65	27
Future of children in South Africa	55	61	29
Availability of affordable/quality products	28	29	31
Job	23	18	39
Security of job	26	20	44
Level of income	37	30	60
Prospects for professional advancement	30	32	35
Ability to find the house wanted	21	17	37
Ability to find a good school for children	27	27	27
Ability to find medical services for family	21	19	23
N=	725	522	131

Evaluation of their children's future is statistically closely related to how they rate specific public and commercial services, rather than to issues of safety, cost of living, schools or health care. Questions on public and commercial services tap what many refer to as the issue of "declining standards". Thus, skilled people seem to think about the future of their children in much the same way as they view the question of "standards".

In contrast, skilled South Africans are far less dissatisfied with personal economic conditions, schools or available health care. The single exception is African dissatisfaction with current income levels, which is understandable given the low income levels enjoyed by skilled African respondents relative to their white counterparts.

More important than people's absolute assessment of conditions is the relative judgment they make when comparing their own conditions to those of others. For the most part, skilled South Africans do not exhibit high levels of relative dissatisfaction. They seem to understand that they are better off than the bulk of their fellow citizens, or others in their race or language group. Yet, they also do not see themselves as doing worse than other people of the same economic status, or others in their same profession (Table 1.18).

While skilled South Africans are more likely to think that their "in-group" (i.e., own race group, language group, profession, economic class) is doing worse than other groups in the country, these levels are still very low. Only a minority of skilled

Table 1.18: Relative Dissatisfaction with Quality of Life

Overall personal economic conditions are worse or much worse than (%)	Total Yes	Whites	Africans
Other South Africans	6	5	8
Other people in your race group	9	9	11
Other people who share your same language	7	6	8
Other people in your profession	8	8	8
Other people in your economic class	9	9	11
Overall conditions of in-group are worse or much worse than (%)			
People of your race	22	22	19
People who share your same language	20	21	17
People in your profession	14	14	11
People in your economic class	15	15	12
N=	725	522	131

Africans think that Africans as a group, or those who share their home language, are doing worse than other groups in the country. Nationally representative samples of black African South Africans also show surprisingly low perceptions of relative deprivation.[12]

We see far higher levels of relative dissatisfaction among skilled whites when we ask them to compare their lives today with five years ago. Some 65% of skilled whites say their lives have become worse in the past five years. In stark contrast, 65% of skilled Africans say life has become better.

Regardless of how things are now, skilled South Africans do tend to feel that conditions will only get worse (Table 1.19). They are particularly pessimistic about

Table 1.19: Perceptions of Future Conditions in South Africa

	Total	Whites	Africans
Do you expect the following to get worse or much worse in the next 5 years? (%)			
Cost of living	78	85	51
Present level of taxation	79	83	69
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	70	77	56
Personal safety	75	81	54
Family's safety	76	82	53
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	70	83	23
Customer service	59	71	20
Future of children in South Africa	60	71	22
Availability of affordable/quality products	50	58	26
Job	40	42	33
Security of job	38	39	35
Level of income	40	44	39
Prospects for professional advancement	38	41	39
Ability to find the house wanted	35	38	30
Ability to find a good school for children	52	61	21
Ability to find medical services for family	43	60	20
N=	725	522	131

their future cost of living, levels of taxation and safety, and the standard of public services. Again, this pessimism extends across the racial divide. Pessimism about personal economic futures and the availability of quality medical services and good schools is less severe, though still significant. Along with their views on the standard of services and the future of their children, skilled Africans are, in fact, relatively optimistic about the future of their personal economic conditions and ability to find quality education and health care for their families.

Internationally, a great deal of contemporary migration is related to aspects of the political arena; the most well-known politically motivated migration is the flight from oppression and persecution, or political turmoil and instability. However, the impact of political factors on skilled people may take different forms. Due to their higher mobility, skilled people may have a lower threshold of sensitivity and thus react not only to oppressive government, but also to unsatisfactory or disagreeable government and policies. A declining faith in the political system or a distrust in the government of the day may similarly precipitate emigration to countries with more attractive political environments.

The survey probed several different political issues. Factor Analysis indicated that the responses to these questions could be clustered into a smaller set of separate issues expressed in Table 1.20. Skilled whites are highly dissatisfied with government performance, feel that it does not represent them and distrust government. Skilled Africans are far less pessimistic. While skilled whites feel that government is largely uninterested in their opinions, and give government a very low approval rating, most feel that the actions of government have been detrimental to them personally and to whites more generally. Skilled Africans in marked contrast, give government a high approval rating and look favourably on its actions. Interestingly, perceptions of the fairness of government are quite similar. There is no room for complacency for government here; over 50% of skilled South Africans of both race groups find government unfair in its treatment of themselves and their race, class and language group.

A final political issue widely cited in public debate as a factor pushing skilled whites out of the country is the government's affirmative action policy. The results confirm that skilled whites are widely opposed to this policy (83%) while only 20% of skilled Africans express similar views (Table 1.21). Given that they are the primary beneficiaries of the policy, the high level of support amongst Africans is unsurprising. What is striking, though, is the pervasiveness and strength of white opposition to affirmative action. The general arguments for affirmative action (righting of past wrongs) clearly have little resonance for whites.

After establishing which country would be their most likely destination if they left South Africa, respondents were asked to compare the two. Substantial numbers of skilled South Africans consistently see greener pastures abroad (Table 1.22). Especially attractive, when compared to South Africa, are the perceived safety and security situation, standard of services, levels of taxation, schools, health care and children's future prospects. Skilled Africans are much less likely to

Table 1.20: Perception of Government by Skilled South Africans

	Total	Whites	Africans
Approval rating (%)			
Do you approve of the way the national government has performed its job over the last year? (% approved/strongly approved)	29	17	67
How much of the time can you trust government to do what is right? (% all of the time)	18	7	62
How interested do you think the government is in hearing what people like you think? (% very interested/quite interested)	27	15	74
Responsiveness of government			
Interest of government in the opinions of (% yes)			
People of my race group	23	22	82
People in my economic class	43	23	77
People who share my language	37	16	80
Impact of government			
Impact of actions of government over the last year (% positive or very positive)			
Personally	41	29	75
People of same race	27	14	73
People who share same language	29	18	71
People in same economic class	36	26	76
South Africa	32	10	76
Discrimination by government			
Extent to which the following are treated unfairly by government (% always or to a large extent)			
People of my race group	42	42	47
People who share my language	43	43	49
People in my economic class	36	34	46
Me personally	33	31	46
N=	725	522	131

Table 1.21: Attitudes of Skilled South Africans to Affirmation Action

Attitude (%)	Whites	Africans
Strongly oppose	42	6
Oppose	41	14
Total	83	20
N=	522	131

Table 1.22: Comparison Between South Africa and Overseas Destination

Better or much better overseas (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Cost of living	54	55	38
Present level of taxation	61	64	46
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	52	57	28
Personal safety	80	86	55
Family's safety	80	86	53
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	72	81	32
Customer service	67	76	36
Future of children in South Africa	65	73	32
Availability of affordable/quality products	62	69	34
Job	43	48	42
Security of job	52	53	46
Level of income	60	61	52
Prospects for professional advancement	49	49	46
Ability to find the house wanted	28	25	30
Ability to find a good school for children	53	56	38
Ability to find medical services for family	59	66	27
N=	725	522	131

see conditions abroad as better than in South Africa, yet they are just as likely as whites to feel that people who have left South Africa lead improved lives. Skilled Africans are also just as likely as skilled whites to feel that they personally would improve their lives by moving to other parts of the world.

There are factors related to "networks" and "logistics" that can affect a decision to go or stay. The degree to which people think conditions are better in another country, for example, may depend upon their knowledge of other countries, or their personal contact with people in those countries. For example, the perceived physical and emotional ease of emigration may vary depending upon whether someone has close contacts in the country of destination who can help manage entry into the new world. This is probably even more important among skilled populations. Because of the growth in international communications, skilled people are more likely to have access to greater information about other places in the world.

There are also a host of logistical factors to consider. Regardless of how green the grass appears on the other side, people will not emigrate if they cannot afford to get over the fence. Because of a greater material stake in their home countries, skilled people are more likely to weigh the costs of uprooting and moving.

Skilled South Africans have relatively low levels of direct, regular contact with people or firms in foreign destinations. Very few people regularly travel outside the country (Table 1.23). Few whites (15%) and only 2% of Africans have worked for foreign companies or clients overseas. While around one-quarter (27%) say they are in regular contact (at least once every few months) with professional associations abroad, only 15% have regular contact with fellow professionals abroad, and an even smaller proportion (7%) with foreign employment agencies.

However, significant proportions of skilled South Africans, especially whites, have been touched by emigration in very direct ways. One-fifth of skilled whites (20%) say a member of their immediate family has left to live and work abroad,

Table 1.23: Experience of Regular Travel Abroad

Travel once a year or more to (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Southern Africa	16	18	9
Elsewhere in Africa	3	3	5
Europe	7	9	3
North America	3	4	2
Australia/New Zealand	2	1	1
Asia	1	1	1
N=	725	522	131

Table 1.24: Knowledge of Other Emigrants

Know at least one emigrant amongst (%)	Total	Whites	Africans
Members of immediate family	19	20	11
Members of extended family	36	40	14
Close friends	59	69	17
Co-workers	40	45	14
People in profession known personally	57	66	19
N=	725	522	131

and one-third (36%) say a member of the extended family has left. As many as 59% know a close friend who has left. In the professional environment, 40% say they have lost a co-worker, and 57% say someone they know in their profession has left (Table 1.24).

Prior exposure to emigration increases the probability of leaving (by reducing the unknown), but also means that there is the beginning of a personal network somewhere overseas. Between one-fifth to one-third of skilled South Africans say they "often" receive information about living conditions in other countries from a range of different sources (family, friends, newspapers, professional associations and professional journals). Between one-fifth and one-quarter say they "often" get information about job opportunities in other countries through these sources.

In order to assess the degree to which emigration is logistically feasible, respondents were asked how easy it would be for them to leave South Africa to go and work and live in another country, and whether they felt that moving and finding a new home would be affordable. Significant proportions of skilled South Africans see few logistical obstacles to emigration. Over one-third (37%) say it would be "easy" or "very easy" for them to leave, and 42% think they would be able to afford the costs of moving and finding a new home.

Conclusion

This study suggests that 2% of skilled South Africans have a "very high" emigration potential, and another 10% have a "high" potential to leave in the next five years. A much higher proportion still have thought about emigrating. What do the findings of this survey imply for possible strategies to keep skilled South Africans in the country?

Whether the grass is actually greener abroad is an open yet answerable question. However, such research might be a useful way for government and civil society to create a better, more realistic understanding among skilled South

Africans of what things are really like in other countries, especially the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. It is important to remember that skilled South Africans have very little experience with foreign employers and very little first-hand experience of these countries (at least in the form of regular travel).

One other way of testing whether there is something that government can do, or at least avoid doing, in order to keep as many potential emigrants in the country as possible is to examine the responses of those 10% of skilled workers with a "high" emigration potential to two specific questions. First of all, they were asked what, if anything, would lead them to stay in South Africa. Only 12% of those with a "high" emigration potential said that there was "nothing" that could make them stay. One-quarter (25%) said improvements in safety and security would make them stay (Table 1.25).

Table 1.25: Factors Affecting a Decision to Leave South Africa

Most important factor causing person to stay (%)	Total
Improvement in safety and security	25
Family roots	15
Nothing	12
Future of children in country	7
Climate/weather/nature	5
Better government	3
Patriotism	3
Good schools	3
Job security	3
N=	59

Second, the entire sample was asked whether potential government steps to restrict emigration would make them more or less likely to leave. From the responses, government policies to make emigration more difficult would be counter-productive and hasten the exit of almost half of this group. Other specific steps such as requiring a year's national service from students leaving professional schools, an end to dual passport holding, or increased fees for documents would also hasten the exit of between one-third to one-quarter of this group.

Notes and References

1 S Castles and M Miller, *The Age of Migration*, London: Macmillan, 1993.

2 S Peberdy, *Selecting Immigrants: Nationalism and National Identity in South Africa's Immigration Policies, 1910 to 1998*, PhD Thesis, Kingston: Queen's University, 1999.

3 This report is not primarily concerned with immigration (the migration of foreigners into South Africa). However, together with emigration data, these statistics are necessary in calculating the net gain or loss (the total number of immigrants minus the total number of emigrants) of skilled individuals on an annual basis. Quite simply, a brain drain is recognized when there is a net loss of individuals who are highly skilled. Conversely, where there is a net gain of highly skilled individuals a brain gain is believed to exist.

4 Data is not available for 1993.

5 While 1986 saw a far greater net loss, it is not clear what proportion qualified as skilled.

6 While Statistics South Africa data show 82 000 South Africans in total emigrating to the five major destination countries (USA, UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada) in the past nine years, they claim that the immigration records of those countries show 233 000 incoming South Africans. These are total emigrants, not only skilled.

7 See for example, '74% with skills want to quit SA', *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg), 13 September 1998.

8 B Haldenwang, *Migration Processes, Systems and Policies*, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch Press, 1998; Statistics SA, *Tourism and Migration: 1994–1996*, Pretoria: Central Statistics Service Report No 1000-03510-1425-8560, 1998.

9 Any result obtained from a randomly obtained sample is subject to a known degree of sampling error. Sampling theory calculates the margin of error at a 95% probability level. This means that any result based on a sample of this size (725) will reflect the actual population parameter within a range of plus or minus 3.7 percentage points (for estimates between 45% to 55%) to plus or minus 1.6 points (for more extreme estimates such as 10% or 90%). However one out of every twenty samples may produce results that vary from the population parameter by even larger margins. Results based on smaller sub-samples (e.g. Africans or whites) will obviously be subject to greater sampling errors depending on the size of the sub-sample.

10 O Crankshaw, *Race, Class and the Changing Division of Labour Under Apartheid*, London: Routledge, 1997.

11 D O'Meara, *Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics of the National Party, 1948–1994*, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996.

12 R Mattes and H Thiel, 'Public Opinion and Consolidation in South Africa', *Journal of Democracy*, vol 9, no 1, 1998.

Chapter 2

Women in the Brain Drain: Gender and Skilled Migration from South Africa

Belinda Dodson

The "brain drain" from South Africa is now recognised as part of a global trend towards greater international competition for skilled immigrants.[1] The motive for this volume, and for the surveys upon which it is based, was to add quantitative and qualitative substance to the perceived loss of core skills from the South African economy. If the survey results are to be translated into meaningful policies to retain skilled South African citizens and attract skilled immigrants, it is important to understand the scale of the phenomenon, and its demographic make-up. Understanding who emigrates sheds light on the motives for emigration, including those that may not be acknowledged or even recognised by prospective emigrants themselves.

Other chapters address this question in terms of race and nationality. Here, the focus is on gender as a key variable influencing potential emigration behaviour. Are women as likely as men to want to leave? Do they cite similar reasons for choosing either to go or to stay? Does any gender bias in the brain drain have implications for particular professions (and thus sets of skills) and vice versa? Clearly gender is a primary variable in understanding migration attitudes and behaviour.

What the survey results suggest is that women have significantly lower emigration potential than men, despite a remarkable concurrence between male and female respondents in their answers to several key questions regarding their general attitudes and specific concerns about life in South Africa and abroad. Yet the explanations for this gender difference are by no means obvious, and may have less to do with gender per se than with other differences in the social, economic, demographic and professional attributes attached to the male and female sub-sets of the survey sample. For example, women were concentrated in professions such as nursing and teaching, while men dominated engineering and accountancy. Are these differences between men and women, or simply differences between occupational categories? Far from reducing the significance of gender as a variable, however, the latter option shows the importance of understanding the relationship between gender and migration in terms of individuals' location within broader social and economic structures, in which gender is already deeply implicated.

Why I left Zimbabwe

Roy Mathe

I am a mathematics specialist at Project Literacy in South Africa. I left Zimbabwe seven years ago. I was a high school teacher in Zimbabwe, teaching mathematics. At the time I left teaching, in 1992, I was the Head of the Maths Department and also a senior teacher. I had joined the teaching field in 1986 as a student at Hillside Teachers' College, the best-ranked education college in the country at that time. After some time in the profession, I realised that it did not offer many prospects. The next promotional post would have been a Headmaster. The packages for teachers remained very low and that prompted me to explore alternative routes.

I had plenty of relatives in South Africa, who encouraged me to seek alternative employment here. It was then that I resigned from my post at the end of December 1992 and came to South Africa at the beginning of 1993.

The other reason which has been a problem to many people in Zimbabwe is the discrimination that is practised by the Government of Robert Mugabe. As long as you are from Matabeleland and not a Shona, your opportunities of advancing are not that bright. The Shona people are the ones that hold senior positions in every part of the country at the expense of the Ndebele.

The mismanagement of the economy led to a drop in the standard of living. This led to the government implementing an ESAP (Economic Structural Adjustment Programme) in about 1987. That made the Zimbabwean economy deteriorate even more. This was further exacerbated by rampant corruption among government officials. The adjustment programme never succeeded and only led to the economic problems becoming worse.

I intend staying in South African until the situation normalises in Zimbabwe. I still hold my Zimbabwean citizenship and I have no intention of changing it in the foreseeable future.

Roy Mathe is a Zimbabwean mathematician living and working in South Africa.

Methodology and Theory

The analysis in this chapter is concerned primarily with skilled South African citizens and their attitudes towards, and potential for, emigration. The bulk of the chapter consists of a direct comparison between the responses of male and female South Africans to a selection of key questions. Other SAMP data are analysed only as a complement to the data on South African nationals, and are used, for example, to ask if there is any indication that the "replacement" of emigrating skilled nationals with skilled immigrants might itself have gender implications.

The sample consisted of 725 skilled nationals and 400 skilled foreigners. Of the South African nationals, 39% were women. This is a relatively high percentage for a country where gender discrimination has by no means disappeared, not least in access to higher education and in professional hiring patterns. The primary reason is the deliberately broad definition and scope of skills employed in the survey.[2] While some effort was made in the sampling to include representation of designated key sectors, such as medicine, engineering and accountancy, there was no deliberate attempt to ensure gender representativeness. Indeed the designers of the survey were themselves surprised at the large proportion of women thrown up by the random stratified sampling procedure. The "skilled foreigners" sample was made up of 32% women, still a significant percentage and certainly sufficient to enable a meaningful comparative analysis on the basis of gender.

While the survey results are analysed and presented in this chapter in terms of straightforward quantitative comparisons between men and women, the detailed demographics of the sample populations reveal a number of attributes that render this approach problematic, and any gender-based findings at best provisional and at worst misleading. Surprisingly, as many as 35% of the female respondents in the "skilled nationals" sample were black (including African, coloured and Asian), compared to only 21% of the equivalent male sample (Table 2.1).[3] Given that most of the sample was male and white, these figures become even more dramatic when translated into a gender breakdown by race group (rather than a racial breakdown by gender): two-thirds of the white respondents were male, whereas the black sub-sample was two-thirds female. The "race" issue complicates the basic male-female comparison, as apparent gender differences might in fact relate to a conjunction of race and gender rather than simply to gender.[4] Also, given that women were over-represented in some occupations, and men in others, a straightforward gender comparison may in fact reveal less about gender than it does about more general differences between people in professions of varying status, income and international marketability (Table 2.2).

The female sample was also younger, with lower incomes, and less likely to be married than the male sample (Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5). While some attempt is made in this chapter to disentangle these ties, a more thoroughgoing statistical interrogation of the data would be required to obtain anything like a complete picture. The race question also complicates analysis of the non-citizen sample, in which the women, to an even greater degree than the men, were predominantly

Table 2.1: Race and Gender Breakdown (%)

	Men	Women
African	11	30
White	79	65
Coloured	6	4
Asian	4	1
N=	444	281

Table 2.2: Main Occupational Categories (%)

	Men	Women
Employer/manager (less than 10 employees)	12	2
Employer/manager (more than 10 employees)	14	11
Professional worker	12	9
Lawyer	1	1
Accountant	12	5
Doctor/dentist	5	4
Nurse/medical technician	<1	10
Teacher/lecturer	7	29
Engineer	12	1
N=	444	281

Table 2.3: Age Breakdown (%)

Age	Men	Women
18–24	6	6
25–34	29	31
35–49	44	46
50 +	20	14
Refused to answer	1	3
N=	444	281

white immigrants from the UK who had been living in South Africa for several years. Clearly, comparing these women either with the women in the South African nationals sample or with the more ethnically and racially diverse male immigrant sample raises all sorts of questions about race, class, citizenship and identity, and cannot be assumed to reveal anything about unmediated gender distinctions or similarities.

Other caveats need to be made concerning the broader theoretical assumptions underpinning the research, and indeed the very conceptualisation of "skilled migration", as they relate to gender. As Mattes and Richmond (in this volume) write, skilled people were defined for the purposes of the SAMP survey as those

Table 2.4: Marital Status (%)

	Men	Women
Married	75	58
Separated	0	2
Divorced	2	10
Widowed	1	3
Co-habiting	2	2
Single	20	25
N=	444	281

Table 2.5: Monthly Household Income (%)

	Men	Women
Less than R2000	3	4
R2 100–R4 000	6	10
R4 100–R6 000	6	17
R6 100–R8 000	9	9
R8 100–R10 000	10	13
R10 100–R14 000	15	13
R14100–R20 000	18	11
R20100–R26 000	10	5
R26 100–R32 000	4	2
R32 100–R38 000	1	2
R38100 +	4	2
Refused to answer	12	9
Don't know	2	3
N=	444	281

"who are vital to the functional core of the economy". The definition was intentionally broad, and therefore likely to be more gender-inclusive than a narrower, more rigid definition of core economic skills. It nevertheless prioritised production, profit-making and formal paid employment over the unpaid, reproductive labour (such as housework and childcare) in which women play a disproportionate role. Thus not only were women who did not meet these skills criteria left out of the analysis, but the contribution of their reproductive activity to the functioning of the economy was systematically undervalued.

This can be extended to a broader theoretical critique of the very distinction between skilled and unskilled migration. Definitions of skills, together with their associated gendering, are historically, geographically and culturally contingent. They are especially fluid in an era of globalisation and in the much-vaunted "new economy", with its associated de-skilling and re-skilling of labour, including new patterns of gender division and organisation. Surely the very notions of "skilled" and "unskilled" migration now need to be fundamentally re-thought, not least in terms of gender.[5] Indeed new gender relations and family forms, often "stretched" over space and thus involving new spatial and temporal patterns of migration, are an inevitable outcome of the structural transformation taking place in the global economy. Transnationally-dwelling couples and multinational families are now commonplace across the whole skilled/unskilled migration spectrum.[6] The changing reality of international migration is outpacing the theoretical and analytical tools, even the very language, we have at our disposal to try and understand it.

A final theoretical and methodological point concerns the sampling technique and questionnaire survey instrument employed in this study. The chosen methodology interviewed individuals, rather than couples, families or households. Most feminist research on migration has moved away from such individual-based analysis, instead perceiving and analysing migration as a household strategy involving gendered interpersonal relations and social networks, and not simply as a collection of individual choices and decisions. The survey approach adopted in the present study thus sets limits on gender-based analysis of the data. These theoretical and methodological caveats aside, the straightforward gender comparison presented here does shed some light on gender differences in skilled South Africans' attitudes towards emigration.

The analysis is presented in six sections. The first four sections of the chapter provide a gender breakdown of the survey sample and of the survey findings. The fifth section presents a series of cross-tabulations of the survey results by race and gender in an attempt to further unravel the ways in which these two key variables intersect and interact, comparing African women with white women, African men with white men, white women with white men and African women with African men. The sixth, and final, section presents further analysis and interrogation of the data purely on grounds of gender, in order to highlight significant areas of similarity and difference between male and female respondents. Findings from the non-citizens data set are also discussed in this section, in an attempt to predict the possible gender implications of the "replacement" of skilled South African emigrants with skilled immigrants.

A Gender Profile of South Africa's Skilled Population

A basic demographic breakdown of the survey sample by gender and race, occupation, age, marital status and household income is presented in Tables 2.1 to 2.5. As the figures clearly show, the male and female sub-sets of the sample are distinctive on a number of counts. Although the "white" racial category dominates both gender groups (Table 2.1), the proportion of black respondents was far higher among the female respondents than among the men. This cross-cutting of race and gender cannot be fully examined here, but it has undoubted if unclear significance for attitudes towards emigration. It certainly makes it impossible to attribute any apparent differences in the survey's findings for men and women to gender alone. It also raises interesting questions about the actual demographic composition by race and gender of South Africa's skilled population, including the race and gender composition of particular professions and occupations. If the high proportion of women in the black sub-sample is indeed a representation of present-day reality, it raises the question of whether black women are being relatively favoured over black men in the de-racialising of education, training and employment in post-apartheid South Africa.

Employment categories add a third demographic variable to the factors determining people's potential for emigration, with race, gender and occupation occurring in particular combinations for individual respondents (Table 2.2). The relative proportion of men and women in different occupations is a stark demonstration of the strongly gendered nature of employment in South Africa. Employment is also strongly racialised.[7] Indeed it is the combined racialisation and gendering of certain occupations that is reflected in the concentration of black women in nursing and teaching, while engineering and accountancy are dominated not just by men but by white men. Indeed had the survey adopted a more traditional, narrow definition of core economic skills, the sample would have been even more heavily biased towards white males. Given the higher international demand for certain skills – criteria that are built into the immigration policy of several of the favoured destination countries for South African emigrants – occupation is another important variable to consider in attempting to predict the real emigration potential of skilled South Africans.

Age is another variable with potential impact on emigration. According to conventional wisdom, older people have a higher level of emigration inertia because of factors such as ownership of fixed property and long-established professional and social networks in a particular place. Younger people, with fewer such ties, find the prospect of emigration more attractive. In this survey sample, although the differences are small, the female sub-sample was slightly younger than the male sub-sample (Table 2.3). Men are notably dominant in the over-50 category, a reflection of the combined race and gender bias in education and employment in South Africa in previous decades. The finding that the women in the sample, despite their relative youth, had lower emigration potential than men suggests that gender is a stronger determinant of migration attitudes and behaviour than age. Again, however, it is the combination and interaction of gender with variables such as race, occupation, age and marital status that needs to be examined.

The marital status of respondents is another factor complicating any simple comparative analysis on the basis of either race or gender alone (Table 2.4). The women in the sample were "less married" than the men, whether through divorce, widowhood or simply being unmarried. The precise influence of marital status on emigration potential is difficult to determine, but it cannot be insignificant, given that a high proportion of international migration is of couples or families, and that marriage itself can be the primary motive for international migration.

Different skills, occupations and marital status translate into different levels of household income, with female respondents reporting lower household incomes than male respondents (Table 2.5). Given that emigration is an extremely costly exercise, particularly for South Africans moving to "hard-currency" countries, the income differential between men and women is another factor to consider in attempting to assess their relative likelihood of joining the brain drain. Of course, gender discrimination itself plays a role in the very existence of that income differential, illustrating the embeddedness of gender in the other variables involved in trying to understand migration behaviour. Whatever its precise causes, women's lower income must serve to decrease their emigration potential, at least for women who by choice or circumstance are without a wealthier life partner.

Reading these tables in conjunction with both the racial breakdown in Chapter One and the gender/race cross-tabulation presented later in the present chapter, the complex and changing demographics of South Africa's skilled population become apparent. These demographic variables act both separately and in conjunction to influence emigration potential. This means that the relationship between gender and migration is neither direct nor simple. It is, however, fundamentally important, not simply because of its own inherent significance in understanding migration behaviour but also because a gender lens can illuminate the operation of other variables, such as age, occupation and marital status. Predicting emigration may well be an inexact science, but gender has to be included in the equation.

A Women's Brain Drain?

In assessing an individual's real and perceived likelihood of emigrating, a number of factors have to be considered. The questionnaire on which the survey interviews were based had to incorporate a wide range of questions, referring both directly and indirectly to emigration, in order to tease out some of this complexity. An individual's emigration potential depends on the answers to at least the following five questions:

- To what extent has the skilled person considered the idea?
- To what extent do they actually want to emigrate?

- Even if they want to leave South Africa, to what extent do factors outside the person's control (such as financial costs) affect the likelihood of leaving?
- Exactly when do they plan to leave?
- Lastly, a distinction must be drawn between temporary and permanent movement (or emigration).

Comparing women's and men's responses to these questions provides some insight into the role of gender as a determinant of emigration potential.

The crudest indicator of emigration potential is simply whether a person has given any thought to emigrating. If not, then their emigration potential can be assumed to be close to zero. Here, there was a marked difference in the responses of men and women (Table 2.6). Almost three-quarters (73%) of the men had given some or a great deal of thought to emigrating, whereas the equivalent figure for women was 61%. The same comparison on the basis of race revealed very little difference (69% of whites compared to 68% of blacks had given at least some thought to emigrating). The gender difference is most striking in the category of respondents who had given "a great deal" of thought to "moving to another country to live and work": 37% of the men compared to only 20% of the women. This indicates that there is a smaller pool of potential emigrants among women, regardless of their race, compared to men. The potential pool of skilled emigrants may be large and multi-racial, but it would appear to be largely male. Gender could well prove to be the key to understanding the brain drain, and thus to developing policy to prevent the loss of core skills from the South African economy. Given that the majority of the sample was married, and that men and women are likely to make migration decisions jointly rather than individually, skilled women's attitudes may well be a brake that keeps both themselves and their (probably similarly skilled) male partners in South Africa.

Some indication of whether respondents actually wish to leave South Africa was obtained by asking people to what extent they would want to leave South Africa to

Table 2.6: Considering Emigration (%)

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country?	Men	Women
A great deal	37	20
Some	36	41
None at all	27	38
Don't know	<1	1
N=	444	281

Table 2.7: Desire to Leave South Africa (%)

	Temporarily (less than 2 years)		Permanently (more than 2 years)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Great	16	19	32	21
Some	23	30	28	28
Hardly	11	12	10	15
Not at all	44	35	24	30
Don't know	6	4	6	6
N=	444	281	444	281

live and work in another country on either a temporary or permanent basis (Table 2.7). Women were actually more enthusiastic than men at the prospect of a temporary sojourn (less than two years) abroad. For longer than two years, however, including permanent emigration, men were considerably more likely to say that they wanted "to a great extent" to move to another country. Again, this suggests that men have significantly higher interest in emigration than women. But that about half of skilled women want, at least to some extent, to leave the country for a period of longer than two years still gives cause for concern.

Contemplating emigration, or even expressing a wish to emigrate, is still insufficient to constitute certain emigration. Numerous variables determine the ultimate transformation of potential into action. These include social, economic, psychological and legal factors, many of them beyond the realm of individual influence. An attempt was made in the survey to assess the actual probability of respondents' emigration by asking how likely it was that they would move to their chosen foreign destination, again with a time-period option of either less than or more than two years (Table 2.8). These percentages were significantly lower, for both men and women, than the responses to whether they wanted to leave. For men, the percentage in the "very likely" category dropped from 32% to 22%, while for women it dropped from 21% to 14%. Real emigration potential is clearly considerably lower than the hypothetical desire or intention to emigrate. Significantly, the gender breakdown for the "longer than two years" category almost exactly parallels the race breakdown, suggesting that the race comparison may in large measure also be a gender comparison, and that it is therefore the combination of race and gender that needs to be considered.

People who have set a provisional date for emigration, or at least have a particular time frame in mind, are more likely to realise their emigration potential than those who have not. Respondents were therefore asked to express a specific

Table 2.8: Likelihood of Leaving South Africa (%)

	Temporarily (less than 2 years)		Permanently (more than 2 years)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Very likely	10	11	22	14
Likely	20	19	27	27
Unlikely	21	25	15	21
Very unlikely	42	42	28	33
Don't know	7	3	7	5
N=	444	281	444	281

Table 2.9: Commitment to Emigration (%)

	Men	Women
In the next 6 months:		
Very likely	3	2
Likely	2	7
In the next 2 years:		
Very likely	5	4
Likely	22	18
In the next 5 years:		
Very likely	14	10
Likely	30	27
N=	444	281

time frame for their prospective emigration (Table 2.9). This reduced the pool of "genuine" prospective emigrants even further, although with an interesting gender twist. Women were more likely than men to express an intention of moving from South Africa within the next six months, with 9% of women but only 5% of men saying that it was either "likely" or "very likely" that they would do so. For the longer time horizons of two and five years, men outnumbered women in the "likely" and "very likely" categories, with 44% of men and 38% of women falling into these two categories combined for the five-year time frame. While still worryingly high, these figures are a far cry from the 73% of men and 61% of women who claimed to have given "some thought" to emigration. This gender difference again suggests that women in general have lower emigration potential than men, independent of race. Men and women for the most part emigrate not separately but together as couples and families. This makes the gender difference even more significant, both as an explanatory variable and in terms of its policy implications for predicting actual emigration. To put it bluntly, the emigration potential of a household may depend on "who wears the trousers".

Motives for Emigration

Any migration, especially to another country, is the outcome of a balance between push and pull factors, with source and destination countries weighed against each other in a complicated form of cost-benefit analysis. Depending on the precise combination of factors involved, emigration can be perceived by those involved either as a positive step in search of new opportunities and experiences or as reluctant but unavoidable flight from one's home country. Much of the survey questionnaire was concerned with ascertaining these push and pull factors, starting with a range of questions to elicit people's perceptions of their present and future quality of life in South Africa.

For the most part, there was remarkable gender agreement in people's level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a range of "quality of life" indicators (Table 2.10). Within this broad overall concurrence, the categories for which women expressed higher levels of dissatisfaction relative to men were employment-related factors such as their job, income, job security and prospects for professional advancement; and aspects of everyday family life such as access to acceptable housing, schooling and medical services. Certain of the findings appear somewhat counter-intuitive; for example, women appear to be less dissatisfied than men with the present situation regarding their own and their family's security. In fact, overall women seem to be slightly more satisfied with their present quality of life than men, reinforcing the survey's overall finding of women's lower emigration potential.

High levels of dissatisfaction on the part of both genders across a number of these quality-of-life indicators confirm the push factors that might encourage skilled emigration. In virtually all categories, levels of concern increase when the question was asked in terms of expected change over the next five years, with most respondents anticipating a decline in their social, economic and employment conditions (Table 2.11). This pessimism was especially marked in the category of access to good-quality schooling and medical care. Interestingly, men appear to be more pessimistic overall than women, with some of the gender difference in responses to the present-day quality-of-life questions almost disappearing or even being reversed for the future scenario, giving men higher levels of concern than women in all but a few categories.

Another comparative question asked respondents to compare their lives at present with five years ago. Matching their greater satisfaction and optimism about life in South Africa, more women described their lives as having got "better" or "much better" (27% as compared to 18% of men). Perhaps the most surprising finding is that the highest levels of dissatisfaction for both genders, for both present and future conditions, were found for economic factors such as taxation and cost of living, rather than for more social factors such as personal security or their children's futures. Given the broad overall similarities between genders, however, it does seem that there is something inherent to women *as women* that

Table 2.10: Perceptions of Present Life in South Africa (%)

	Men	Women
Dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with:		
Cost of living	72	70
Present level of taxation	76	72
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	63	54
Personal safety	68	62
Family's safety	70	64
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	73	65
Customer service	58	53
Future of children in South Africa	56	54
Availability of affordable/quality products	26	32
Job	21	25
Security of job	23	30
Level of income	34	41
Prospects for professional advancement	27	35
Ability to find the house wanted	17	28
Ability to find a good school for children	26	30
Ability to find medical services for family	20	23
N=	444	281

Table 2.11: Perceptions of Future Quality of Life in South Africa (%)

	Men	Women
Do you expect the following to get worse or much worse over the next five years:		
Cost of living	80	74
Present level of taxation	81	77
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	72	76
Personal safety	77	72
Family's safety	78	73
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	77	60
Customer service	64	30
Future of children in South Africa	63	56
Availability of affordable/quality products	51	52
Job	42	37
Security of job	39	39
Level of income	41	39
Prospects for professional advancement	37	39
Ability to find the house wanted	34	38
Ability to find a good school for children	56	45
Ability to find medical services for family	54	49
N=	444	281

results in their lower emigration potential despite their similar levels of concern to men over the various push factors in operation.

A gender breakdown of responses regarding respondents' quality of life does not shed much further light on questions of relative emigration potential on the basis of gender, except to underscore the remarkable similarity between genders in their relative level of contentment with life in South Africa (Table 2.12). In most cases, fewer than 10% of men and women felt themselves to be personally worse off than others of their race, class, language or profession. In general terms, then, most skilled South Africans, despite high levels of concern over specific conditions

Table 2.12: Relative Dissatisfaction with Quality of Life (%)

	Men	Women
Overall personal conditions worse or much worse than:		
Other South Africans	5	5
Other people in your profession	8	8
Other people in your economic class	8	11
Other people of your race	9	9
Other people who share your home language	7	5
Overall conditions of in-group worse or much worse than:		
People of your race	23	18
People who share your home language	23	16
People in your profession	14	14
People in your economic class	16	13
N=	444	281

such as high taxes, security and the cost of living, would appear to be remarkably content with their social and economic circumstances.

There is also remarkable gender concurrence in the comparison of quality-of-life indicators with those in their self-designated "most likely destination" (Table 2.13). Men were consistently more likely than women to rate the destination country as "better" or "much better" than South Africa, further testimony to their higher potential for emigration. For both men and women the matter of personal and family security came to the fore in making comparisons. Approximately 80% of both men and women rated security as "better" or "much better" in their chosen destination, the highest incidence for any single factor. Among the other factors most commonly rated by both genders as being relatively better outside South Africa were children's futures, schooling, health care, the level of taxation and personal income, upkeep of public amenities, customer service and the availability of affordable quality products. Another marked similarity is that 61% of men and 60% of women believe that those who have already emigrated have better lives than when they were in South Africa.

In addition to these general ratings of quality of life, respondents were asked which was the single most important factor that would cause them to either leave or stay in South Africa (Table 2.14). Again there were strong similarities between men and women, with security being most commonly cited as the biggest push

Table 2.13: Comparisons Between South Africa and Intended Destination (%)

	Men	Women
Better or much better in destination:		
Cost of living	54	53
Present level of taxation	64	57
Relative share of taxes paid in comparison to others	59	43
Personal safety	81	79
Family's safety	81	79
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	75	67
Customer service	70	63
Future of children in South Africa	68	61
Availability of affordable/quality products	66	55
Job	49	46
Security of job	52	52
Level of income	61	58
Prospects for professional advancement	51	47
Ability to find the house wanted	29	25
Ability to find a good school for children	54	52
Ability to find medical services for family	62	54
N=	444	281

factor. There was a small gender difference in the relative significance of factors encouraging people to stay in South Africa. Men ranked improved security first, followed by "family ties" and "patriotism", whereas more women ranked family as the primary consideration. Family ties are perhaps a key to understanding women's lower expressed desire to emigrate from South Africa.

Certainly economic factors seem to take second place to personal and social factors when people are asked to identify their single biggest push factor. This seems to contradict the high level of dissatisfaction with economic factors expressed in the general quality-of-life ratings. What these findings clearly show is that there is a plethora of factors acting to encourage or discourage emigration, and that certain of them are indeed experienced or perceived differently by men and women.

Table 2.14: Push and Pull Factors (%)

	Men	Women
Most important factor that would cause you to leave:		
Safety and security	40	33
Crime	10	14
Economy	7	3
Children's future	5	6
Most important factor that would cause you to stay:		
Improved security	20	17
Family	14	22
Patriotism	12	9
N=	444	281

Destinations, Networks and Logistics

Whatever the balance of push and pull factors acting on a prospective skilled emigrant, turning those forces into actual migration involves further practical and logistical decisions and arrangements. Most fundamental is the choice of destination. Here there is very little gender variation in choice of destination. For men, the most favoured destination was Australia, followed by the United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. Women named the same top two countries as their most likely destination, followed by the United Kingdom, Canada and New Zealand (i.e., the same five countries but in slightly different order of preference).

The anticipated nature of skilled emigration from South Africa does not suggest a permanent severing of ties, challenging the conception of a one-way brain drain as opposed to various forms of to-and-fro international movement (Table 2.15).[8] Over 40% of women said that they would want to stay in their most likely destination for two years or less. Women also expressed a greater desire for more frequent return visits to South Africa should they emigrate, again suggesting the maintenance of strong ties with their country of origin.

Another indication of the anticipated maintenance of links with South Africa can be found in the economic sphere. People seriously contemplating permanent emigration, with little prospect of return, are likely to be willing to dispose of property, assets and investments in South Africa. Answers to these questions again demonstrated women's greater reluctance to emigrate, with significantly fewer

Table 2.15: Duration of Emigration (%)

	Men	Women
Length of stay at likely destination:		
Less than 6 months	6	17
6 months–1 year	2	6
1–2 years	14	19
2–5 years	14	17
More than 5 years	53	31
Don't know	11	9
Frequency of return:		
Weekly	2	4
Monthly	3	8
Every few months	10	17
Yearly	48	44
Every few years	14	11
Never	11	6
Don't know	12	9
N=	444	281

Table 2.16: Economic Links with South Africa (%)

	Men	Women
Willing to sell house in SA		
Very willing	18	10
Willing	35	30
Willing to take savings out of SA		
Very willing	22	15
Willing	37	32
Willing to take investments out of SA		
Very willing	20	15
Willing	38	30
N=	444	281

Table 2.17: Country of Citizenship, Retirement and Burial (%)

	Men	Women
Willing to give up South African citizenship	32	19
Willing to retire in country of destination	45	36
Willing to be buried in country of destination	42	28
N=	444	281

women than men saying that they would be willing to dispose of assets in South Africa (Table 2.16). Questions about citizenship, retirement and burial were another indication of women's lower emigration potential (Table 2.17). Only 19% of the female respondents said that they would be either "willing" or "very willing" to give up their South African citizenship, compared to 32% of male respondents. Men were also significantly more likely than women to say they would want to retire or be buried in their most likely country of destination.

Other predictors of actual migration potential include the social networks and personal experience people have in foreign countries. The greater an individual's social and professional connections in another country, and the more they know about a country, the easier it will be for them to move and settle there. Surprisingly, people in the sample had relatively little personal experience of foreign travel, including travel to the countries listed as most likely destinations (Table 2.18). Over 90% had never been to Australia, yet this was the country most often given as the most likely destination. Although the difference was small, women were more likely than men never to have left South Africa. Few had ever worked for a foreign company or foreign client, with the incidence again being lower for women than men.

Even if they were not personally well-travelled, many have been affected by the emigration of others, and knew friends, relations or former colleagues living abroad. While the incidence of friends and family who had emigrated was similar for men and women, men tended to know more fellow professionals who had left South Africa. Perceptions of the impact of emigration on the people and country "left behind" tended to be negative. Again there was striking gender agreement. Skilled South Africans are thus unlikely to embark lightly on so radical a step as emigration, and are certainly aware of the costs of emigration, both social and economic. A final important consideration to be factored into prediction of the likelihood of emigration is the actual financial cost of relocation. Respondents were asked directly whether they would find the costs of emigration affordable (Table 2.19). Here again was evidence of women's lower emigration potential relative to men, and of the general financial constraints that will prevent even many men's emigration potential from becoming realised.

Thus there are a number of indications that skilled South Africans' emigration potential may not be as high in reality as a superficial assessment of their

Table 2.18: Experience of Regular Travel Abroad (%)

	Men	Women
Travel once a year or more to:		
Southern Africa	19	13
Elsewhere in Africa	2	4
Europe	7	10
North America	4	2
Australia/New Zealand	1	2
Asia	-	-
Never been to:		
Southern Africa	44	60
Elsewhere in Africa	80	83
Europe	66	70
North America	79	89
Australia/New Zealand	90	92
Asia	89	94
N=	444	281

Table 2.19: Affordability of International Relocation (%)

	Men	Women
Very affordable	7	5
Affordable	41	27
Unaffordable	39	47
Very unaffordable	9	19
Don't know	4	2
N=	444	281

expressed desire or intention to emigrate might suggest. This is especially true of women. When pressed, skilled South Africans, whether consciously or otherwise, begin to show rather less enthusiasm at the prospect of actually uprooting themselves to go and live permanently in another country. Even those who do express a desire to emigrate clearly wish to maintain strong social and economic ties with South Africa, and many of them wish eventually to return to South Africa after some time spent living abroad.

A Matter of Gender and/or Race?

Before drawing any general conclusions about the role of gender in skilled migration, it is important to examine the conjunction of gender and race, both in general theoretical terms and as it relates to this particular survey. To restate the basic statistical dilemma, the fact that two-thirds of the black sub-sample was female, while two-thirds of the white sub-sample was male, makes simple comparison between men and women an inherently problematic exercise. "Blacks" and "women" are not separate sub-samples, but twin attributes mutually embodied in individual respondents. Race and gender also intersect in broader socio-economic terms, each being the basis for various forms of discrimination – for example in terms of the division of labour, levels of income, access to education and training, prospects for professional promotion and so on. A further complication arises at the household level, with the existence of mixed-race and/or single-gender households. These concerns are not simply methodological nit-picking, but absolutely fundamental to understanding any form of migration behaviour, including the particular category of skilled emigration here under examination. The simple gender comparison may in reality be revealing more about differences that exist in attitudes towards emigration between people of different races (or indeed occupations, income categories, or levels of education, each of which is both racialised and gendered). If we are going to properly understand the role of gender, it needs to be examined as it cuts across all these other variables.

To give some sense of how the conjunction of race and gender may influence skilled emigration, Tables 2.20, 2.21, 2.22, and 2.23 provide a breakdown of

Table 2.20: Considering Emigration (%)

	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
How much consideration have you given to moving to another country?				
A great deal	32	38	18	22
Some	45	34	45	39
None at all	23	27	34	38
Don't know	0	<1	3	<1
N=	47	353	85	184

Table 2.21: Desire to Leave South Africa (%)

	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
To what extent would you want to leave for more than 2 years?				
Great	21	35	13	25
Some	34	27	39	25
Hardly	6	9	9	15
None at all	36	22	38	26
Don't know	2	7	1	9
N=	47	353	85	184

Table 2.22: Likelihood of Leaving South Africa (%)

	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
How likely is it that you would ever move?				
Very likely	15	24	15	14
Likely	40	26	31	26
Unlikely	6	16	21	21
Very unlikely	36	26	33	31
Don't know	2	8	0	7
N=	47	353	85	184

responses to some of the key survey questions on the basis of both race and gender, for the categories "African" and "white" (i.e., excluding coloured and Asian respondents, particular sub-groups which warrant separate attention).[9] The detail that is lost in either a gender-blind, race-based comparison or a race-blind gender-based comparison is immediately evident. In terms of whether they had given "some" or "a great deal" of thought to emigration, the group with the highest emigration potential would appear to be African men (77%). Next came white men (72%), followed by African women (63%) and white women (61%). In terms of actually wanting to emigrate, white males replace African males as being most likely to say that they wish to "some" or "a great" extent to leave the county to live and work for a period of longer than two years. Second come African males, third

Table 2.23: Push and Pull Factors (%)

	African Men	White Men	African Women	White Women
Most important factor that would get you to leave:				
Safety and security	11	44	8	46
Personal safety	13	1	16	4
Income	19	<1	7	<1
Level of taxation	6	1	15	<1
Children's future	0	6	4	7
Most important factor that would cause you to stay:				
Improved security	6	22	1	23
Family	11	16	13	27
Patriotism	11	12	5	10
Children's future	11	2	19	3
N=	47	353	85	184

African females and last again are white females. Somewhat puzzlingly, African males resume first position in terms of their stated likelihood of leaving, with exactly the same percentage (55%) saying they are likely to leave as said they wanted to leave. For all three other race-gender combinations, there is a dramatic decrease between the desire and probability of emigrating. White women (40%) again have the lowest emigration potential as defined by the latter.

If the findings are in any measure representative, they could provide a useful means of understanding differential emigration potential, and of translating that understanding into meaningful prediction and policy intervention. The essence comes back to understanding couples, families and households. Both this sample and the actual population of skilled South African citizens are largely white and male. Most skilled white South African males, as the sample proves, are married. Most of their spouses are likely to be of the same race and opposite gender (i.e., white women). The finding that white women seem to have the lowest emigration potential surely must act as a significant brake on skilled migration of both genders. The same would appear to be true, albeit to a lesser extent, in terms of the gender difference in the African sub-sample.

Table 2.24 shows some of the most important factors that would make people either leave or stay in South Africa, expressed in terms of the frequency with which each occurred on the basis of race-gender combinations. Overall, race does appear to be more significant than gender as the underpinning to people's perception of these push and pull factors. In terms of push factors, the finding that people of both race groups rated safety and security so highly reinforces the national importance of addressing the crime problem as a deterrent to the brain drain. However, the numerical incidence of "safety and security" as a push factor was four times higher among whites than Africans, suggesting that the threat of crime is experienced and perceived differently by different social groups.

It is also interesting to note that Africans of both genders were more concerned than whites about their personal safety. African male and female respondents' relatively higher identification of financial factors suggests that these issues need to be addressed if the objective is specifically to keep skilled blacks in the country. In terms of factors discouraging emigration, there does seem to be a significant gender as well as a race dimension, with women of both races reporting "family" with greater relative frequency than "patriotism" compared to men in their respective race group. Whether or not an individual emigrates clearly depends on the outcome of the interaction of a host of forces, forces experienced and perceived differently on the basis of race and gender. Any attempt to influence those forces and their impact must therefore be based on a sound understanding of racial and gender variation.

A couple of further variables provide added insight into the significance of gender in understanding skilled emigration. In terms of household status, 90% of men but only 29% of women gave their status as "head of household", with the majority of women giving their status as spouse of the head of household. This becomes important when considering responses to the question: "Who would be most likely to make the final decision about whether to leave South Africa?" Amongst the men, 72% said that they would make the decision personally, compared to only 45% of the women. A quarter of the women said that their spouse would make the final decision, and approximately 16% of each gender said that the decision would be made jointly. Not simply gender alone but gender relations are thus important determinants of household emigration potential. If this male dominance in household power relations indeed pertains, then male's greater emigration potential may not be countered by women's greater reluctance, and skilled men and women may end up leaving the country.

A final consideration concerns the gender implications of the immigration of skilled people to South Africa from other countries. The history of such immigration is examined elsewhere by Mattes, Crush and Richmond (in this volume). Men in the survey sample came from a wider range of countries than the women surveyed, especially African countries. They were less likely than women to be permanent residents, and more likely to be recent immigrants. They were also younger, and more likely never to have been married. The notion of any such direct "replacement" is over-simplistic, but if skilled emigration means the loss of families to countries like Australia and skilled immigration means a gain of single black men from Africa, then this brings with it a host of potential social consequences. Once more, the importance of considering migration as a household strategy, in which gender relations are fundamental, is underscored.

Conclusions

The survey data show a strong concurrence between male and female respondents, although women clearly have lower emigration potential overall than men. For the most part, the gender differences are subtle and nuanced; certainly not at all straightforward in their explanation. Yet this result should not be entirely surprising. Rather, it highlights two crucial factors in understanding migration behaviour. Firstly, migration takes place within social institutions, including institutions of marriage, family, household and interpersonal relations. Men and women do not operate as discrete entities but are mutually entangled in intersecting biological, social and legal relationships. Similarities of opinion should therefore not be surprising, as those opinions are the outcome of discussion and negotiation between men and women, particularly life partners.

Secondly, migration attitudes and behaviour are strongly influenced by economic factors such as employment and income. These in turn are strongly gendered. A focus on skilled migration automatically eliminates certain categories of gender difference, such as that of access to education and employment, and leads *ab initio* to certain attitudinal similarities within the sample population, regardless of the gender of the individual respondents. Thus while the present study has offered tentative explanations for some of the observed gender similarities and differences, full explanation of the significance of gender in the brain drain demands further research, including detailed ethnographic investigation of individuals within the basic social and economic institutions and relationships that shape and direct their lives.

In practical terms, most emigration is undertaken collectively rather than individually. Skilled individuals, male and female, have partners and families who move with them. For men with permanent partners and family dependants, the opinions of those people will be perhaps the single most important factor determining whether their own emigration potential is turned into reality. Even when it is only a single individual who emigrates, others are inevitably involved in both the decision and its implications. In all of this, gender is a crucial variable. If women have lower emigration potential than men, feeling stronger ties to home and family and having less confidence about their own ability to succeed in a new social and economic environment, then one of the policy implications of this study may be that greater affirmative action on gender grounds may be an effective strategy for reducing South Africa's brain drain, across categories of race, language, occupation and even gender.

If female nurses and teachers are more reluctant to emigrate, the same may well prove true for female accountants, doctors, engineers, information technology professionals and senior managers. If, on the other hand, it is not the gender of the people with skills but the very nature of certain skill sets and professions that makes them vulnerable to the brain drain, any such gender-based social engineering will fail. But until there has been further research, including further interrogation of this survey's findings, in terms of combinations of variables such as race, education, occupation, age, marital status and gender, the role of gender on its own as an influence in skilled migration remains in the realm of speculation.

Notes and References

1 M Brown, D Kaplan and JB Meyer, 'The Brain Drain: An Outline of Skilled Emigration From South Africa', *Africa Insight*, vol 30, no 2, 2000, pp 41-47; J Crush, D McDonald, V Williams, R Mattes, W Richmond, CM Rogerson and JM Rogerson, *Losing Our Minds: Migration and the Brain Drain from South Africa*, Southern African Migration Project Policy Series No 18. Cape Town: SAMP, 2000; also see McDonald and Crush in this volume.

2 Mattes and Richmond, this volume.

3 If one looks at the African category alone, the difference is even more striking, with 30% of the women and only 11% of the men falling into this racial category.

4 The same of course applies to the comparison between races, which contains an inevitable gender dimension.

5 Another issue that could be explored here is the increasing separation of brains from bodies in terms of the exercise and exchange of skills, made possible by international tele-commuting and global "e-lancing". While some professional activities will always remain "embodied", and therefore place-bound, people across a range of professions no longer need to relocate in order to work in a different country, nor to remain living in one country in order to continue working there. This has enormous implications for the future of skilled migration, as recognised by organisations such as the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA).

6 J Crush and D McDonald, 'Transnationalism, African Immigration and New Migrant Spaces in South Africa', *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol 34, no 1, 2000.

7 Mattes and Richmond, this volume.

8 A decision was taken to report the findings for this section for the sample as a whole rather than just those with a high probability of leaving (as in Chapter One). The primary reason was the small size of the sub-sample of women indicating a high probability of leaving. As a result, this gender analysis is not strictly comparable with the race analysis in Mattes and Richmond.

9 The small size of the African male sample (only 47 out of 725 respondents) means that these figures are not necessarily representative.

Chapter 3

Dealing in Scarce Skills: Employer Responses to the Brain Drain in South Africa

CM Rogerson and JM Rogerson

Little concrete information exists on the actual shortages experienced by *different types* of employers in the South African economy or how these different types of employers are addressing the question of specific skills shortages. Yet the answers to these questions have potentially important policy implications for the design of new immigration policies in South Africa. The policy importance of high-level skills recruitment is underlined in the context of globalising labour markets and of growing international competition for select groups of highly skilled workers, such as medical personnel, chartered accountants or computing specialists. In virtually all the leading South African newspapers there are regular advertisements by an increasing number of international companies, personnel consultancies or recruitment agencies seeking to attract South African human resources to Europe, the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The arrival and growth in South Africa of a new industry of immigration consultants and lawyers are further testament to the dangers posed for the country of globalising labour markets.

The objective in this chapter is to present the findings of a detailed investigation into responses to the brain drain by employers of skilled personnel in South Africa. The survey sample of 200 enterprises was designed to be as representative as possible of employers across the spectrum of the public and private sectors. Findings from this survey are supplemented by material drawn from the business and technical press. The research was undertaken during March-September 1998. Overall, the investigation was (a) designed to identify the scale and types of skills shortages which presently exist in South Africa and (b) to assess the hiring practices, attitudes and responses of enterprises dealing with skills shortages in key areas of the economy.

The findings are analysed in four sections. First, the research methodology is detailed. Second, a profile of the skills pool of major South African employers is developed to highlight areas of skills shortage, both immediate and anticipated. Then the focus shifts to how South African employers are dealing with skill shortages. Key issues of concern include their attempts to deal locally with these shortages, to source skilled personnel from outside South Africa and the

The Family Plan

Marcus and Grace Rodgers

About 12 years ago, we formulated a family plan to spend at least 5 years abroad – living, working/studying, and travelling, to experience life in other countries. The plan was put on the back burner due to financial constraints. Grace, 50, is a trained nurse, having trained and worked at two state hospitals and a private one where she accepted voluntary retrenchment due to re-structuring in 1998. She enquired at a UK-based nursing recruitment agency about the possibility of obtaining a nursing position in the UK, was recruited in Cape Town and took up her post in Feb 1999. I (Marcus) am 49 with an accounting background and extensive experience in the NGO sector.

Originally, Grace was going to be away in the UK for a year. But an opportunity arose for her to do a year-long university course in Accident & Emergency procedures. She was interested and her employer (a NHS-Trust based hospital) arranged for her to renew her work permit for another year. Grace had been in the UK for 3 months when our youngest daughter Nicci, then 15, joined her as she was missing her mother terribly. I then decided to join Grace and Nicci in Dec 1999.

Living and working in the UK is proving to be a very enriching experience. Grace changed her job after 18 months in the Accident Emergency department of the hospital. The situation was quite pressurised, exacerbated by staff shortages, a lack of beds, and poor management. Grace now works as a District nurse (i.e., visiting patients at their homes) in a London borough, also with an NHS Trust. I have been working at Save the Children (UK) since March 2000 and now have a two-year contract as from January 2001. Nicci has completed her GCSE's and is doing a two-year Drama Course at a college in London.

We live in a two-bedroomed flat which is quite costly (£780 per month). However we are within walking distance of the London Underground transport network, which is convenient. We do not have a car particularly because the transport system is so well-developed. For both of us, working and living here is a very enriching experience – relating to people of numerous nationalities and hence diverse cultural backgrounds, within a work and social environment. We enjoy our present jobs thoroughly. As parents, we feel at ease with Nicci doing her studies here in a less crime-ridden environment, as she travels to and from college as well as to her part-time job by public transport. While both of us earn relatively more here, the cost of living is such that not much is allowed for savings or investment.

We don't know how long we will remain in the UK. Grace's work permit has now been renewed for a further four years. We are thinking of staying at least until Nicci has completed her studies. We do eventually intend to return to South Africa after a bit of travelling after the UK. We remain in very close contact with our eldest daughter and grandson in Cape Town. They have visited us twice since we got here. We communicate via email and telephone with a number of close friends and family quite regularly.

Marcus Rodgers is an accountant and Grace Rodgers a nurse. They are both South Africans working in the UK.

recruitment problems encountered with the Department of Home Affairs. In the concluding section of the report, the policy implications of the research findings are identified.

Research Methodology

In seeking to construct a profile of the skills pool and of skills shortages in the South African labour market, a questionnaire was designed and administered to a representative sample of South African employers of skilled personnel. The interview was targeted at senior administrative personnel, normally the human resource manager or personnel manager, of major employers of skilled personnel. The interview schedule included a mixture of closed- and open-ended questions. Key themes included an analysis of an enterprise's skilled workforce, current skills shortages, recruitment and training practices for coping with a loss of skilled personnel, and attitudes towards migration policies in South Africa.

The definition of "skilled personnel" is contested in the international literature with various definitions based on educational levels and occupational status. A typology of skilled international migrants has been constructed by Gould in which a useful distinction is drawn between circulatory movements (for example, managers within multinational companies) and permanent migration (resulting in brain drain).[1] Although the term "skilled personnel" is a slippery concept, it generally includes the following occupational categories: high-level and general managers; scientists, engineers and those with professional technical skills; professionals in education, health and welfare; professionals in administration; and, professionals in literature, arts and sport.[2] In more recent analyses, the occupational category of computer and IT specialists is included as a separate category. Finally, in the developing world context, the category of high-skilled personnel also includes other occupational groups, including certain blue-collar technical workers.[3] These guidelines from international research provide the basic definition of "skilled personnel" used in this investigation. Nevertheless, in this survey employers were not asked to follow a single definition of "skilled" employees.

The sample of 200 enterprises was designed to represent the key employers in the South African economy for whom the question of skilled labour supply is important. The starting point was the various sets of listings of major South African companies compiled annually in the *Financial Mail Top Companies Survey*. This source provides a ranking of leading enterprises on the basis of their asset base or market capitalisation on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE). As these listings primarily focus on listed companies on the JSE, it was necessary to supplement this initial source with additional company data and listings of enterprises.

Other sources used were the University of South Africa Bureau of Market Research Industrial Register for manufacturing enterprises and a range of special sectoral surveys conducted by *Engineering News*. By drawing from these alternative sources we included groups of major foreign multinationals operating in South Africa and smaller (often niche) enterprises not always captured in listings such as the *Financial Mail Top Companies Survey*. Finally, the sample included a group of public sector or parastatal employers operating in various sectors of the economy, in particular education, health, and finance.

The final sample consisted of a range of different sectors, sizes of enterprises (as defined both by their asset base and numbers of employees) and ownership structures (public sector vs. private sector, foreign companies vs. local enterprises).[4]

The activities undertaken by the enterprises span the key non-agricultural sectors of the economy. Table 3.1 shows the sectoral identification of the 200 enterprises. The largest category, 56% of the total, was manufacturing or industrial enterprise.

Table 3.1: Sectoral Breakdown of the Sample

Sector	Number of companies
Mining	6
Computers and IT	14
High-tech industry	69
Other industry	47
Construction	7
Tourism and entertainment	13
Banking and finance	8
Business services	19
Education and health	17
Total	**200**

Table 3.2 indicates the different types of manufacturing enterprises included in the sample. The major group of industrial enterprises falls into the classification of high-technology manufacturers. The specific types of manufacturing activity captured by the term "high-technology" include producers of electrical and industrial machinery; other machinery; radio, television and communications equipment; pharmaceuticals; scientific instruments; and office, computing and accounting machinery.[5]

Table 3.2: Breakdown of the Industrial Sector Companies

Number of companies	
High-tech industrial sector	
Pharmaceuticals	13
Other high-tech industry	56
Other industrial	
Food (7) and beverages (1)	8
Textiles and clothing (2); footwear (1)	3
Furniture	5
Paper, printing and publishing	6
Chemicals and rubber, and plastics	9
Pottery & glass	2
Metals, engineering and transport	14
Total	**116**

The strong representation of industrial enterprises in the sample was the result of a decision to target high-technology enterprises as a category with special needs for highly skilled personnel. The term "high-technology" can be applied to both high-technology manufacturing and to computer, service and IT support enterprises. In total, 69 of the 116 industrial enterprises would be classified as high-technology, alongside a group of 14 computer and service enterprises. This means that a total of 83 (41.5 %) high-technology enterprises were included in the sample.

Outside the high-technology sector, the survey sought to capture the skills situation and shortages of a cross-section of enterprises in several other areas of the South African economy, including mining, construction, tourism and entertainment, banking and finance, business services, computers and information technology and, education and health.

Table 3.3 reveals that the sample included enterprises with a range of sizes. Special concern was centred upon the needs and issues of large employers (defined as a minimum of 300 employees). Among the group of 88 large enterprises were a number of giant organisations such as Standard Bank, First National Bank, Old Mutual, Sappi, Sasol, AECI, and the Premier Group. The major large enterprises were leading industrial companies such as Nestle, 3M, Volkswagen, Hoechst, Bayer, Billiton and Dorbyl.

In total 88 (44% of the sample) firms are classed as large enterprises. Manufacturing enterprises, which comprised 58% of the overall sample also formed 58% of the group of large labour employers. In certain sectors, such as banking and finance, education and health, and mining, a high proportion of the interviewed enterprises could be classed as large. By contrast, in sectors such as business services, computing and information technology, tourism and entertainment, the majority of enterprises are medium-sized (between 51-299 employees).

Table 3.3: Large Enterprises with More than 300 Employees

Sector	Number of companies	Percent of sector sample
Mining	5	83
Computers and IT	2	14
High-tech industry	19	28
Other industry	32	68
Construction	5	71
Tourism and entertainment	2	15
Banking and finance	8	100
Business services	5	26
Education and health	10	59
Total	**88**	**100**

The survey sample also included a range of medium- and specialist small-sized enterprises. Many of these medium- and small-sized enterprises were clustered outside the industrial sector in activities such as IT support and business services (accounting, law, advertising, broking).

In terms of ownership structure, the sample included 16 public sector and 184 private sector enterprises. Public sector enterprises included a number of major universities, a provincial department of health, the Development Bank of Southern Africa and newer government organisations such as Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency.

The division between foreign and local ownership is shown in Table 3.4. The sample captured foreign companies operating across several sectors of the South African economy. In total, foreign enterprises represented 27.5% of the sample.

Table 3.4: Number of Foreign and Local Companies

Sector	Foreign	Local
Mining	1	5
Computers & IT	4	10
High-tech industry	29	40
Other industry	12	35
Construction	0	7
Tourism and entertainment	1	12
Banking and finance	0	8
Business services	8	11
Education and health	0	17
Total	**55**	**145**

The majority of interviews were conducted through a telephone survey lasting up to 40 minutes. The average length of interview was between 15-20 minutes. The interview was undertaken with senior personnel available and knowledgeable about the personnel and human resources of their enterprises. To obtain a satisfactory interview response, multiple contacts with enterprises were often required. In some instances ten or more telephone calls were made to secure an interview. Where enterprises requested a faxed interview schedule this was done, although the response rate was extremely poor (two replies out of nearly 30 faxed questionnaires).

The majority of enterprises responded in a co-operative and positive fashion. But certain problems were experienced in the interview process and these should be noted.

With several private large conglomerate or multi-divisional enterprises, it was difficult to locate an individual with the appropriate knowledge to speak on behalf of the enterprise *as a whole*. High-profile examples of this problem included Anglo-American and South African Breweries. Often, therefore, the interview focused on particular divisions within the enterprise that were focal points for the employment of high-skilled personnel.

Commonly, human resource or personnel managers were genuinely unable to provide detailed statistical information about different categories of skills within enterprises. Once again, large enterprises were a particular problem. Instead of quantitative information, qualitative responses were elicited in several elements of the interview schedule. A small but not insignificant problem in interviews with larger enterprises was the fact that certain human resource or personnel managers did not have the experience to answer all questions.

Special problems arose in securing information from public sector employers, especially in the health sector. We had hoped to interview several provincial departments of health and education concerning the well-publicised and documented departure of their personnel. Regrettably, this was not possible as requests for interviews were constantly referred back to national departments in Pretoria, from which no meaningful response could be obtained.

Finally, there was no co-operation whatsoever from a small segment of the targeted individuals or enterprises. Despite assurances of confidentiality, refusal to participate was encountered from senior personnel in Coca-Cola, Eskom and Simba. Most remarkable of all for a survey of this nature, was the complete lack of co-operation from South Africa's Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), a parastatal body with major responsibility for issues relating to high-level manpower planning in South Africa. Although the lack of co-operation was regrettable, it in no way reduces the validity of the results of this investigation.

The final sample of 200 enterprises is a representative cross-section of the spectrum of employers of skilled personnel in South Africa. In particular, the survey captures a cross-section of enterprises from a range of different sectors, of different sizes and with different ownership characteristics. It includes a set of enterprises, private and public sector, foreign and local, which are leaders in the market for high-skilled personnel in South Africa. Besides those individual enterprises already named, the sample included the following: De Beers, Samancor, Microsoft, Q Data, Acer, Unisys, Log-Tek, TML Media, General Electric, Samsung, Sulzer, Panasonic, Bridgestone, Roche, Revlon, Reebok, Otis, Dorbyl, LTA, Stocks and Stocks, Rand Merchant Bank, Investec, Arthur Andersen, SBC Warburg, Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Kessell Feinstein, Young and Rubicon, Hunt Lascaris, KPMG, SATOUR, the Morningside Clinic, Rand Clinic, and the Universities of Witwatersrand, Cape Town, South Africa, and Pretoria.

High Skills: Local or Foreign?

In this section, the patterns and profile of the high skills base is unpacked. This is followed by an examination of the impact of emerging skills shortages.

In total, the 200 enterprises employ an estimated 101 000 skilled personnel with the largest absolute numbers in banking and finance, education and health, and industry. The sectors with the lowest absolute numbers of skilled personnel were entertainment and tourism, and construction. In some respects, however, these figures are misleading for they fail to take into consideration the total number of employees in particular sectors of the economy.

A better indicator of the relative importance of skilled personnel in different sectors of the South African economy is a comparison of the numbers of skilled workers in relation to total workforce of individual enterprises. Table 3.5 shows the

Table 3.5: Skilled Workers as a Proportion of the Total Labour Force

Sector	Number of companies in each category			
	<25	25–50	51–75	>75
Mining	3	1	1	0
Computers & IT	1	3	2	8
High-Tech industry	29	18	10	8
Other industry	27	13	5	2
Construction	6	0	0	1
Tourism and entertainment	6	4	1	1
Banking and finance	1	1	3	2
Business services	1	2	7	9
Education and health	0	1	9	7
Total	74	43	38	38
Total Sample (%)	38	22	20	20

proportion of skilled workers in relation to total employment in the sample enterprises. Of the 193 enterprises for which information was available, 39% of enterprises have half of more of their employees classed as skilled personnel and 20% of enterprises have a share of 75% or more of their workforce so classified. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 38% of enterprises have only 25% of their workforce classed as skilled personnel and 17% have less than 10% of the total.

It is evident that there are important sectoral variations in the employment and relative significance of skilled personnel in relation to the total workforce. Across the nine sectors captured in the survey it is possible to identify four sectors in which the ratio of skilled personnel to total employment is especially high. These four sectors are education and health (in which skilled personnel represents at least 50% of the total workforce for 94% of enterprises), business services (74%), banking and finance (71%) and computers and IT services (71%). For these four sectors the proportion of enterprises with over 75% skilled personnel is a significant indicator of major pockets of skilled workers in the South African economy.

The most high skills intensive sectors were found to be computers and IT services (57%), business services (47%), education and health (41%) and banking and finance (29%). In total, these four sectors accounted for 78 000 skilled employees, the major numerical segment of the survey. In several computer services and IT enterprises the proportion of the labour force that was classified as highly skilled was as large as 90% or more. Such examples of highly skilled personnel were also recorded in the business services and education and health sectors.

Five sectors recorded shares of skilled workers below the sample average: mining, other industry, tourism and entertainment, industrial high-tech and construction. In total, these five sectors accounted for approximately 23 000 skilled personnel in the surveyed enterprises. There were still many enterprises, particularly in the industrial high-tech sector, in which the proportion of skilled personnel was 75% or more.

The number of companies employing non-South African and South African highly skilled personnel are shown in Table 3.6. The most striking finding is that over half employ a skilled workforce of citizens or permanent residents alone. Some 46.5% employ foreign highly skilled workers. Some variations by sector are again in evidence. The highest proportions are in banking and finance, computers and IT services, education and health, and business services. One surprise was the high proportion of construction enterprises that engage highly skilled non-South African personnel. Sectors of the economy with a low foreign skill component include mining, other industry, industrial high-tech, and, least affected of all, tourism and entertainment.

Table 3.6: Composition of Skilled Employees by Citizenship

Sector	Companies with skilled workforce 100% South African	Companies with skilled workforce partly foreign
Mining	3	3
Computers and IT	5	9
High-tech industry	46	22
Other industrial	27	20
Construction	2	5
Tourism and entertainment	9	4
Banking and finance	1	7
Business services	7	12
Education and health	6	10
Total	**106**	**92**
Sample (%)	**54**	**46**

Note: Category "South African" includes permanent residents of South Africa; "foreign" category refers to those on work permit.

Across the 200 surveyed enterprises, however, foreign skilled personnel number in total only between 2 000 and 3 000 workers (Table 3.7). The largest individual pockets are in education and health, and banking and finance. These small numbers, however, should not devalue the significance of this foreign skilled workforce component. In many instances, it represents the highest echelons of corporate management (managing directors) or critical elements for the workings of enterprises across several sectors, not least in education and health.

Table 3.7: Proportion of Skilled Non-South Africans

Sector	0% Skilled workforce	1–10% Skilled workforce	11–50% Skilled workforce	51–100% Skilled workforce
Mining	4	1	1	0
Computers and IT	5	8	0	0
High-tech industry	45	21	1	0
Other industry	26	16	5	0
Construction	2	4	1	0
Tourism and entertainment	9	4	0	0
Banking and finance	1	4	1	2
Business services	7	10	2	0
Education and Health	7	2	4	2
Total	**106**	**70**	**15**	**4**
Sample (%)	**54**	**36**	**8**	**3**

In absolute numbers, therefore, the foreign high skills component is only a minor element in the skills profile of major South African enterprises. Indeed, only 15% of sample enterprises employ more than 10 non-South African high-skilled personnel. Quite clearly the sectors of the economy that are most heavily affected by the engagement of foreign skilled personnel are education and health, and banking and finance.

In certain multinational enterprises, foreign skilled personnel are not in South Africa on a long-term basis. Rather, they are part of intra-corporate movements involving a rotation of personnel or exchange programmes. The sources of foreign skilled personnel vary, with the most common countries of origin being the UK, Germany, the USA, Italy, and Australia. Significant numbers were also from

Portugal, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Russia. Overall, the number of skilled personnel recruited from other African countries was relatively small with the largest sources being Zimbabwe and Ghana. Indeed, because of its proximity and close ties with South African business, Zimbabwe was the most common African source for skilled personnel recruitment.

In sum, this study reveals the relatively small numbers of non-South African skilled personnel in relation to total employment in the country. Overall, non-South Africans represent more than 5% of the total labour force in only 8% of our sample enterprises.

The Effect of the Brain Drain

This section investigates the effects of the emigration of skilled personnel on the operations of enterprises in South Africa. Interviewees were asked to assess the flow and impact of emigration during two different periods: the period before the democratic transition and the four years (1994–1998) since.

First, the companies say that the impact of the emigration of skilled personnel has been much greater in the post-election period (Table 3.8). Moreover, the tempo of emigration of skilled personnel appears to have escalated, especially

Table 3.8: Impact of Emigration of Skilled Personnel on Companies

	Pre-1994			Post-1994		
Sector	None	Negligible	Significant	None	Negligible	Significant
Mining	3	1	0	1	3	2
Computers and IT	6	4	1	4	5	5
High-tech industry	55	11	0	33	12	24
Other industry	40	6	0	18	18	11
Construction	5	1	0	5	1	1
Tourism and entertainment	10	2	0	11	1	1
Banking and finance	3	3	1	1	3	3
Business services	13	3	0	5	5	9
Education and health	7	7	1	3	4	10
Total	**142**	**38**	**3**	**81**	**52**	**66**
Sample (%)	**78**	**21**	**2**	**41**	**26**	**33**

from 1996 onwards. Overall, one-third of enterprises rated as "significant" the outflow and impact of the emigration of skilled personnel in the post-apartheid period compared to a corresponding rating of 2% in the pre-elections period.

For policymakers this finding is alarming for it underscores an accelerating trend in the exodus of skilled personnel from South Africa.[6] More importantly, this out-migration is beginning to exert an important impact on the workings of major South African enterprises. Indeed, the finding signals a real danger for policymakers. Unless measures are introduced to retain existing skilled personnel or to facilitate a counter-flow of skilled personnel into the country, the ramifications of the brain drain on the functioning of the South African economy may become more widespread. Moreover, at the time of survey, the demand for skilled personnel has been dampened by a period of low economic growth. The chairperson of a sectoral manufacturers association noted: "Skills are in such short supply that I don't know what (South African) business will do if there is an economic upturn."

A second key result is more positive for policymakers. Against the very clear evidence of growing emigration from South Africa is the finding that this is of only minor importance compared to the total skills base of surveyed enterprises. In 41% of enterprises the issue of emigration of high-skilled personnel was rated as of no importance whatsoever and in a further 26% of cases of only "negligible" significance. What these results suggest is that whilst the brain drain continues, there are few signs at present of a crippling of enterprises due to an inability to source necessary replacement skills. Once again, however, the situation during the post-election period has become progressively worse. Some 98% of responding enterprises rated the impact of emigration as none or negligible before 1994. The corresponding figure for the post-1994 period falls to 67%.

A third key finding is the sectoral variation in the impact of the emigration of high-skilled personnel. In the pre-1994 elections period, emigration flows were deemed significant for only a handful of the survey sample of enterprises (2% of the total). At the time of the survey, the numbers of enterprises reporting a significant impact had risen appreciably especially within five sectors: education and health (59%), business services (47%), banking and finance (43%), computers and IT services (35%) and industrial high-tech (35%). Sectors least affected by emigration were tourism and entertainment, and construction – both are areas of the economy in which the proportion of skilled personnel to total employment is relatively low.

Fourth, South African enterprises confront a different situation from multinational companies operating in South Africa. For South African-owned enterprises, the effects of an emigration of high-level skills appear to be more problematic. Foreign companies can source skills from the enterprise's global network of employees, through short-term appointments, staff exchanges or recruitment within the existing international network. The financial resources and power of these global enterprises reduces the potential impact of the emigration of high-level skills.

The open-ended responses of interviewees to questions concerning the emigration of skilled personnel disclosed a number of important themes. First, the reasons for departure from South Africa confirm media concerns about crime and violence, the downturn in the economy, and perceptions of falling standards in the public education and health sectors.[7] Another core reason given for the drain of skilled personnel is the highly attractive salary packages offered by enterprises in North America, Europe and Australia. In the specific case of the health sector, Saudi Arabia was an important destination for skilled nurses because of the lucrative employment packages available.[8]

Second, a notable proportion of departing skilled personnel are individuals returning to their countries of birth after living and working in South Africa (as permanent residents) for lengthy periods. Not surprisingly, the most common destinations for this type of emigrant are the UK and Germany. This includes many personnel towards the end of their working careers.

Third, in the case of younger skilled personnel, the reasons for departure include seeking a broader international work experience. This particular group of skilled employees therefore may not necessarily represent a permanent loss to the South African economy. Nevertheless, some younger skilled emigration is undoubtedly permanent because of the attractive work packages offered by overseas enterprises.

Fourth, Gauteng-based enterprises experience the worst problems. A common theme in the corporate interviews was Gauteng personnel seeking internal transfers to the Western Cape because of its attractive residential environment and perceived lower levels of crime and violence. On a long-term basis, this trend might threaten and undermine Gauteng's position and long-term economic development as South Africa's "smart province".

The most severe emerging skills shortage clearly relates to computing and information technology personnel. A global labour market has emerged in the sphere of computing and IT skills. Within this market, South Africa is rapidly losing competitive ground to the aggressive recruitment strategies and lucrative employment packages of enterprises in the USA, Western Europe and Australasia.[9] As one specialist IT service enterprise stated: "South African IT personnel are highly marketable all over the world. As a company this is difficult to counter. We offer staff share options which mature after three years of service but for most this is not enough of a sweetener to make them stay."

The emerging shortage of specialist computing and IT service personnel is a pervasive problem in the South African economy. Several other cracks are emerging in the existing skills base of South Africa. One was exposed in an interview with a major multinational pharmaceutical and chemicals concern. Based on an internal audit and needs analysis, the recruitment of specialist local skills, such as pharmacists, veterinarians, chemical engineers or environmental specialists, is still not a major problem. But major difficulty arises at the higher management and supervisory scale where composite skills and experience are necessary.

Another crack was evident in several interviews with industrial and high-technology enterprises. Whilst technical skills, such as engineering skills, were possible to source, signally absent was a more sophisticated combination of technical and financial or sales/marketing experience required for high-level managerial appointments. Indeed, the issue of the shortage of high-level personnel in South Africa with both technical and financial or marketing skills was a consistent theme.

Certain specialist niches of skills are also showing signs of drying up in the South African labour pool. Many are of a highly technical and very specialised nature. They include logistics industrial engineers, armature winders, control engineers, polishers for high-quality furniture manufacturers, instrumentation engineers, civil engineers with project management experience, telecommunications personnel with a combination of technical and sales expertise, and many others.

A factor that underpins some of the emerging shortages is the decline or lack of take-up of certain apprenticeship programmes. As one interviewee argued: "No one is coming through the ranks... young people do not want to go through apprenticeships and consequently we will be suffering shortages in the near future." Another factor relates to South Africa's isolation from the international economy which has resulted in a shortage of experience and qualified personnel in several areas of international marketing.

Further insights into the impact of recent emigration of skilled personnel from South Africa are provided by the following selection of quotations:

> We are losing marketing skills rapidly to overseas companies. The company has lost 20% of its workforce since the end of 1997 to Dubai, Australia and the USA. These skills have been built up locally as people have been trained and had a few overseas trips to further their training. Then they were poached or they up and go overseas. It is almost a waste of all the time and money spent on their training. One of the people who went to Australia was an IT specialist and marketing manager so a big loss to the company. A South African survey in which we took part revealed that IT remuneration within South Africa was OK but internationally we were not competitive. (International IT company)
>
> There is a lot of uncertainty among the younger staff members. Some of them left before the elections and they are still going. We try and counter this by using our international mother company contacts to send South African employees overseas. They payback time overseas with time worked at the South African office. By doing this, more employees consider staying with the company in South Africa because there is something in it for them. However, as many as 50% do not come back. (South African office of blue-chip international financial services company)

One non-executive director left for Australia after he was car-jacked and a gun put to his five-year-old child's head. In the last two years (1997 and 1998) a lot of people have spoken about leaving. It is the general topic of conversation. Crime is the number one problem. Everyone says that they don't want to go but will leave if something (crime-related) happens to them or their family. (Large industrial company)

The MD was going to leave (overseas) and take the company with him but he was shot dead one month before leaving. The company is expecting to lose quite a few skilled personnel in the near future. They are preparing to go overseas because of the crime and violence in the country and because they see little future for white males in South Africa. (High-technology industrial enterprise)

Dealing in Scarce Resources

South African enterprises clearly regard high-skilled personnel as a resource that is beginning to deplete and even exhibit signs of scarcity. Moreover, competition for such scarce resources is growing more intense both as a result of internationalised labour markets for several sectors (most importantly computer and IT service personnel) and as a result of democratic South Africa's late re-insertion into the international economy.

Approaches To Recruitment

The major potential source of recruitment for new high-skilled personnel is South Africa rather than overseas. The survey disclosed that the majority of enterprises prefer to hire local South African personnel into high-skilled positions whenever possible. The advantages of local personnel are several and obvious.

First, foreigners often require a period of settling-in before becoming adapted to the local business environment. Second, the hiring of South African personnel is considerably cheaper, particularly in terms of relocation costs, home leave, housing and school fee allowances. Indeed, many companies stress that the recruitment of foreign personnel is a last resort as the costs of hiring from Europe or USA are so onerous, because the recruited employee is often paid a package comparable to that in their country of origin. Even the costs of recruitment of skilled personnel from other parts of Africa are extremely high. Overall, the survey disclosed no differentiation in the recruitment of skilled personnel from Europe, North America or Africa. The key issue in recruitment was the quality of the individual person rather than the country of origin.

Table 3.9 shows the different kinds of recruiting methods deployed by the 200 surveyed enterprises. The majority of enterprises use more than one method, usually for different types of skilled personnel. The most common technique is the

Table 3.9: Recruitment Methods for Skilled Personnel

Method	Companies (%)
In-house	31
Head-hunters	14
Newspapers	30
Agencies	24
Specialist agency	58
Word of mouth	25
Other	5

Note: N = 200.
The total exceeds 100% as many enterprises used several different methods of recruitment.

engagement of specialist personnel agencies to track and hire new skilled personnel; nearly 60% of enterprises use the services of such agencies. In certain sectors, however, the use of such specialist agencies is avoided as it is felt that they do not understand the highly specialised needs for skilled technical personnel, for example, in parts of the food sector.

Beyond the use of specialist personnel recruitment agencies, other methods include in-house advertising, newspaper personnel advertisements, word-of-mouth advertising, and use of general personnel agencies. In word-of-mouth recruitment, bonuses are sometimes offered to existing staff if they are successful in sourcing new high-skilled personnel. Whilst the employment of head-hunters is one of the least utilised recruitment methods, it is the preferred method for recruiting senior personnel (such as corporate managers) or specialised research and development (R&D) personnel. Head-hunting is also a strategy for poaching personnel with necessary experience for top-level managerial appointments. Finally, the category of "other recruitment methods" includes linkages to universities or technikons through bursaries or graduate recruitment programmes, the use of internet advertising, and recruitment through industry training boards.

The Question of Training

A key issue in offsetting the brain drain is the training programmes offered to employees. The operation of training programmes is a major means for expanding an enterprise's asset base of skilled personnel. As one industrial listed enterprise argued: "We know a lot of skills have left South Africa but it is important to train existing employees up. There is still a lot of untapped skills available."

A positive finding was that the vast majority of the surveyed enterprises – 85% of the total – are involved in some form of training and skills upgrading of their personnel. In many cases the budgets allocated to training and upgrading of personnel are substantial and impressive. For example, one leading listed South African-owned industrial enterprise has an annual training budget in excess of R4 million. As a consequence, this particular specialist enterprise "had no gaps in expertise as they bring people up through the company ranks". In this company the training programme necessitated the import of overseas personnel on 2–3 year contracts: "They share their skills and knowledge and by the end of the contract the South African personnel are able to competently take on the job".

The most common approach to skills training is through in-house or enterprise training programmes (Table 3.10). Of the sample enterprises, 62% are engaged actively in the business of in-house training for skilled personnel. A second, less common, approach is to bring in skilled personnel from overseas to operate training programmes. This training strategy is particularly prevalent amongst overseas-based multinational enterprises in South Africa. A third, and more common, training approach is to send South African personnel overseas for a period to upgrade their skills. Nearly 35% of sample enterprises applied this

Table 3.10: Training Methods for Skilled Personnel

	Number of companies in each category				
Sector	**In-house**	**Bring here**	**Send overseas**	**Use local institution**	**No training offered**
Mining	1	1	1	1	3
Computers & IT	11	2	4	4	0
High-tech industry	46	14	27	23	10
Other industry	36	7	12	23	2
Construction	6	0	3	1	1
Tourism and entertainment	5	5	4	1	2
Banking and finance	3	3	6	1	0
Business services	10	1	8	7	3
Education and health	6	3	4	6	9
Total	124	36	69	67	30

Note: N = 200.
Responses add up to more than 200 companies as many enterprises used more than one training method.

approach, including many multinationals who choose to send South African personnel to their parent plant or head offices on technology exchange programmes. Another aspect of overseas training is the sponsoring of South African personnel to attend international short courses or conferences. Finally, the outsourcing of training to other South African institutions is a strategy for one-third of enterprises. Among these specialist local training institutions are South African university business schools and local technikons.

The training of South African personnel is a double-edged sword for many enterprises. On the one hand, training programmes improve the personnel skills and asset resources of enterprises. On the other hand, the heightened skills of employees opens the danger of corporate poaching, including from overseas enterprises, as well as increasing the general awareness and marketability of South African skilled employees to alternative job opportunities.

The quality of South African IT personnel, health professionals and engineers is recognised by international overseas recruitment agencies. In perhaps the most extreme case recorded in the survey, a Boston-based computer training company came to South Africa to train personnel employed in a high-technology defence-related business. The Boston representative was so impressed by the calibre of the South African IT personnel that "within three months they had poached the entire department".

The Quality of New Recruits

In the context of accelerating opportunities for skilled personnel internationally and factors locally such as crime and violence, South African enterprises are necessarily having to treat their skilled labour resources very carefully. Moreover, as mentioned above, training is of critical significance in maintaining the quality of an individual enterprise's labour force.

In the vast majority of cases (86%) the quality of new personnel is rated as either the same as or better than that of the outgoing personnel. That so many enterprises are satisfied with the newly hired high-skilled personnel is perhaps an indicator that the dramatic popular press scenarios of impending economic collapse due to brain-drain haemorrhage are massively exaggerated. In some cases, the departure of skilled personnel is seen as offering opportunities for new blood:

> Sanctions have gone and there are a lot more opportunities. New recruits have brought benefits to the company. Prior to 1994 a lot of people in industry sat in the same job for years. Now, however, there are new people with new ideas and this shift is good for the company. (Industrial high-technology company)

The high degree of satisfaction with new local recruits can be read as an indication that most training and educational institutions in South Africa continue to produce the quality of skills that are required for the economy to be globally competitive. That said, a number of areas of concern were noted by interviewees. In particular, several industrial companies drew attention to the fact that whilst university graduates remain of high quality, educational and training standards had fallen at the technikons. One multinational food and drinks company noted that "technical standards have dropped and we will now only consider university graduates".

Although there is general satisfaction with the quality of new local personnel, many enterprises drew attention to the increased difficulty and time spent in recruiting. Another common concern relates to the high remuneration packages required and demanded by highly skilled personnel in South Africa. In a situation of growing shortages for highly skilled labour, the costs attached to recruiting such labour have risen markedly. A large South African owned industrial enterprise bemoaned the fact that "new recruits come with a premium. If you want quality, you have to pay more".

Another important issue is the loss of experience in personnel that emigrate. A large South African-owned industrial enterprise summed up the situation: "Expertise is lost, the base skill is the same but insight into the industry is lacking". A high technology manufacturing enterprise concurred: "The generic skills in South Africa are still OK. However, when top people emigrate, it is a big loss as it takes 3-4 years for the new recruit to rise to that level".

Finally, a local listed manufacturing enterprise pointed out that: "We find that we don't get all the skills we require when we recruit. We have to live with it and hope that the new recruits pick up the necessary skills on the job".

Recruitment of Skilled Personnel from Overseas

The recruiting of skilled personnel from outside South Africa is a final option (and often a last resort) for addressing shortages of skilled personnel in the South African labour pool. Table 3.11 presents findings concerning the dealings of the enterprises with the South African Department of Home Affairs.

The first point is that 58% of the interviewees had no direct experience of dealing with the Department of Home Affairs. But 42% were in a position to comment on a history and experience of interaction with the Department. Many enterprises deal with the Department at a distance, filtered through the use of an agency, lawyers or consultants. At least twelve enterprises actually employ consultants, lawyers or agents as intermediaries.

The broad findings are not complimentary to the Department as a whole. The majority of respondents (60%) rated as "negative" or "very negative" their experience of dealing with the Department recruiting high-skilled personnel. Another 38% of interviewees rate their dealings with the Department of Home Affairs as only "adequate". Only one interviewee in a sample of 200 responded very enthusiastically and rated them as "very positive". Multinational companies appear to experience fewer difficulties than South African enterprises in securing

Table 3.11: Relationships with the Department of Home Affairs

Have you ever dealt with Home Affairs in recruiting skilled personnel from outside the country (%)	
Yes	42
No	58
How would rate your experience in dealing with Home Affairs (%)	
Very positive	1
Adequate	38
Negative	31
Very negative	29
Note: N = 200; 68	

work permits for skilled staff from overseas. The procedures for intra-company transfers across international borders are somewhat more relaxed than for the direct recruitment of new personnel from overseas.

Positive or adequate responses were associated with the development of contacts and long-term relationships with very senior staff at the Department of Home Affairs or linkages with high ranking officials in other departments. Indeed, the level of understanding and assistance offered by senior personnel at Home Affairs was a factor appreciated by many enterprises. It appears that enterprises experience a learning curve in their dealings with the Department, beginning with highly negative experiences and shifting later to more positive assessments as they develop relationships with senior staff.

The troubling picture that emerges is that it is "who you know at Home Affairs" that is an important determinant of the kind of problems experienced in staff recruitment from overseas. Several commented that "If you know someone (at Home Affairs) it is easier" or that the "right people are very helpful". Strikingly, the most positive assessments of the Department of Home Affairs came from two parastatal agencies. In one interview, Home Affairs was described as "brilliant" and in the other the enterprise only has to "speak to Trevor Manuel (the Minister of Finance) and the person they need is appointed very quickly".

The overall picture that crystallises is that the Department of Home Affairs is a major obstacle to South African enterprises urgently seeking to recruit high-level skilled personnel. Across the different sectors captured by the survey, similar descriptions were applied and the same themes repeated. A host of interviewees spoke in stark terms of their experience with Home Affairs as "shocking", "horrendous", "nightmarish" (the most common description), "crazy", "dreadful", "pathetic", "time-consuming" or "awful".

Several structural problems appear to exist which block or frustrate the entry of skilled personnel from overseas.

- Excessive time is required to deal with the bureaucratic processes. Interviewees spoke of waiting for 2–3 months, a delay that is costly for businesses. Many indicated that they were wholeheartedly in support of the principle of seeking to employ South African personnel as a first preference. However, once those options were exhausted the bureaucratic procedures that they confront are far too lengthy and urgently need to be streamlined.
- Overall, the view is widespread that Home Affairs processes for securing highly skilled personnel are obstructive, time-consuming and far too procedural. Other common complaints are that service is shocking, queues outrageous and the waiting time for applications (sometimes up to 5 months) unduly long.
- The increasing cost to companies of using lawyers or consultants and the efficiency losses due to delays in recruitment of personnel from overseas. An associated set of issues is the costs imposed upon the affected individuals. The financial cost of applying to come and work in South Africa may be R8000, an amount that is seen as too costly to risk, especially when individuals may go through the bureaucratic procedures and then be denied the necessary work permit. In addition, fees of R5000 were quoted as baseline charge to hire lawyers "who know somebody at Home Affairs", a cost which amounts to thinly veiled bribery.
- Lack of transparency in the decision-making process within Home Affairs. Interviewees stressed that everyone who goes through the bureaucratic process may be treated in a different way. An interviewee from a leading high-technology manufacturer stated that "there is no control and no set procedures so you are at their mercy". Enterprises complain that no reasons are given for the rejection of particular applications whilst others admit that direct bribes have been paid in Pretoria to secure the entry into South Africa of desperately needed industrial personnel. Overall, a very common opinion is that the Department is "xenophobic" and that in recent years it has made the entry (as well as renewal of permits) of highly qualified personnel into South Africa more difficult .
- The lack of transparency in the internal operations, functioning and staffing at the Department of Home Affairs. Several companies spoke of telephone contact as almost impossible with the Pretoria office. Moreover, the unprofessional conduct of Home Affairs personnel was commonly mentioned. If Home Affairs personnel could be reached they were "unobliging and a pain". The experience of dealing with staff was described in an interview with a major industrial enterprise as like "talking to rocks". Another human resource manager for a major multinational enterprise said that within Home Affairs procedural methods need to be radically re-assessed: "If they don't like the tone of my voice they could refuse the work permit".

- The Department of Home Affairs dismally fails to understand the needs of business for highly qualified personnel. Several companies spoke of Home Affairs paying "lip service" to the needs of large business enterprise, of failing to consult with business as to its needs for highly qualified personnel, and lacking any appreciation of the value of highly skilled personnel creating additional employment opportunities for unskilled workers or of the value of the embedded training and human resource skills that could potentially flow into South Africa. In one case, a high-quality furniture producer requested a work permit for a highly skilled Russian furniture carver. The request was declined; subsequently the carver secured a Green Card for entry into the USA.

The conclusion from our interviews is that the workings of the Department of Home Affairs have a negative impact upon affected enterprises and the economy as a whole. In the case of many private sector enterprises, new growth and job opportunities for the South African economy have been either postponed or, in many instances, lost through what employers perceive to be the Department's inability, unwillingness or failure to expedite the entry into the country of a relatively small number of highly skilled personnel.

Conclusions

The national objectives of making South Africa a world class player and globally competitive within certain key economic sectors and markets cannot be realistically achieved without a substantial pool of highly skilled personnel. The issue of highly skilled personnel will therefore be of increased significance to South Africa in the next decade.

Our survey demonstrates that the present skills position within the South African economy is not yet at crisis or breaking point. Nevertheless, the emigration of skills through brain-drain movements to North America, Europe or Australasia is occurring at an accelerating rate. Behind this rising tempo of migration are unacceptable levels of crime and violence, economic stagnation, and perceptions of declining standards in the quality of public sector services, most notably education and health.

Despite the growing outflow of skills and highly publicised shortages of public sector health personnel, the skills base is being maintained in most areas of the economy. The survey, however, points to certain cracks in this skills base and the potential dangers if certain policy issues remain unaddressed. Of particular concern is the loss of personnel with high-level experience which can only be made up over many years.

The research shows the nature of the skills shortage that will threaten enterprises in South Africa over the coming years. An important strategic challenge confronting enterprises is in retaining and securing skilled staff to enable future growth. At the national level, and in the Department of Home

Affairs, a greater degree of appreciation of the significance of retaining high-skilled personnel is needed. Our findings suggest that the present attitudes and workings of the Department of Home Affairs are extremely obstructive and that the Department's current policies concerning high-skilled personnel function as a negative drag on the present and future performance of the economy.

Our recommendations to deal with the issue of highly skilled personnel in South Africa relate to retention of the existing base of skilled personnel, and the attraction from overseas of additional personnel with valuable skills that are in local short supply:

- Enterprises themselves must address the question of human resource upgrading through training and also be sensitive to the growing competition for staff particularly within certain internationalising labour markets for skilled personnel. For national policymakers, the best policies to retain the skills base are those which grow the economy, address crime and maintain or improve existing standards in public education and health.
- Dealing with overseas personnel requires certain changes in the internal workings of the Department of Home Affairs, a streamlining of application and entry procedures for highly skilled personnel and greater transparency in the application process. One step forward, suggested by many interviewees, would be the introduction of a points system for immigrants or work permit applicants similar to that in use by many other countries. But this system has been explicitly repudiated in the Draft White Paper on International Migration, despite its qualified endorsement in the earlier Green Paper on International Migration.
- Given the critical importance of highly qualified personnel and their relatively small numbers, it might be appropriate to set up a special unit within the Department of Home Affairs to deal with highly skilled personnel. There is a clear need to bridge the existing gap between private and public perceptions of the need for skilled personnel in South Africa. A small special unit might be able to liaise more effectively with the major South African users of highly skilled personnel (private sector business, education and health, high-technology) in order to deal with procedures and approval applications for work and entry into the country of such personnel.
- The negative perception of the Department of Home Affairs is all-pervasive in the corporate sector. This perception of incompetence, favouritism, obstructionism and lack of transparency should be addressed. Criteria should be clear and consistent and facilitate economic growth. Policy reform in the area of high skills import is urgently needed. The bureaucratic and attitudinal problems experienced by companies can only be addressed by devoting adequate resources to training and upgrading skills within the department itself.
- The new corporate work permit system proposed in the White Paper could ease the problems experienced by many enterprises when importing high skills

personnel. Most enterprises would probably qualify for such permits. The bizarre proposal to "penalise" companies financially who import foreign skills is likely to be counter-productive. As this study shows, enterprises already prefer South African employees, import only where necessary and bear considerable extra cost in doing so. The proposal to force employers to pay a "training levy" on foreigners to encourage them to hire locally seems like a cash-grab with little economic logic.

Acknowledgements

Thanks are offered to the interviewees of the 200 surveyed enterprises for their participation in this study, to David McDonald and Jonathan Crush for their patience and comments, and to the Southern African Migration Project for commissioning and funding this research.

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Chapter 4

The Brain Drain: An Outline of Skilled Emigration from South Africa

Mercy Brown, David Kaplan and Jean-Baptiste Meyer

The brain-drain issue has recently become a high-profile public policy issue in South Africa. The media and policymakers are showing increasing concern over the drain of highly skilled professionals from the country. A major unresolved question is the actual scale and impact of the brain drain on South Africa.[1] There has been growing suspicion that official emigration data significantly underestimate the numbers of South Africans leaving the country to settle abroad. But we do not know with any certainty quite how inaccurate this data actually is.

Given the obvious problems with official emigration data, a more reliable way of assessing the true extent of emigration would be to examine data from the recipient countries. But there are two problems with generating this data. First, South Africans emigrate to a wide variety of countries. And second, data from destination countries is not always available or accessible. In order to begin to quantify the shortfall in South African statistics, this chapter compares the data from Statistics South Africa (SSA) with statistics from the five major recipient countries of South African emigrants – the UK, Canada, USA, New Zealand and Australia.[2] The analysis clearly shows that there is significant official underestimation of the extent of South Africa's brain drain.

The brain drain, by definition, is not simply a question of absolute numbers. The skills profile of emigrants is also an important determinant of the impact on a country and economy.[3] Official South African statistics are not any more helpful on this particular issue. There is simply no way of knowing precisely which skills, and in what quantities, South Africa is losing. Here, destination country data is again of value. Most of the major destination countries collect data on the skills of immigrants by country of origin. This data can be used to generate a picture of the occupational categories most affected by emigration from South Africa.

Finally, there is an assumption in much of the debate that the "brain drain" represents a permanent loss of skills to a country's economy and development.[4] This would require that emigrants retain no backward linkages, or that emigrants who have resettled elsewhere are still not interested in contributing to their countries of birth even if the right opportunities are made available. We have

The Pain of Crime

Ike Ntsikelelo Nzo

In 1991, I came back to South Africa, after 26 years in exile, to explore the possibility of transferring my postgraduate psychiatry training from Sydney in Australia to South Africa. I was already two years into a five-year psychiatry programme. During that exploration, I came across a doctor who probably thought me insane for contemplating returning. Inside, I was angry with him because I felt he was insulting my sense of patriotism. Today, 10 years later, I am beginning to think that doctor was not far off the mark.

The criminals and criminality, unique to South Africa, have dealt a huge blow to my sense of patriotism. I am now at a point in my life where I am agonisingly contemplating emigrating or going back into exile. Some people in the political world will be shocked and disappointed by this. I am the only child of the late Alfred Nzo, the longest-serving secretary-general of the ANC and the first black foreign minister of South Africa.

My personal experience as a psychiatrist practising in the black townships and my experience as a father has led to the conclusion that criminals are going to cost this country much more than apartheid did. Last year in my practice, I jotted down file numbers of individuals who, with their families, had been affected by violent criminal acts in different forms. Over two to three months I recorded 23 such cases. The stories behind the numbers had a huge psychological effect on me. Last year I started having nightmares. The nightmares were on a consistent theme, of me being hijacked and pleading with the hijackers not to kill me as I had children whom I had to see through to adulthood. In my last nightmare this year, they actually shot me.

There is a cliché in South Africa that goes like this: if you yourself have not been a victim of crime then you know somebody who has been. One of my sons and two friends were riding their bikes last year in the suburb I live in. They were confronted by gunmen who wanted to take their bikes away. Somehow the crime was aborted by the appearance of an adult on the scene. By then the criminals had threatened my son and his friends with all sorts of dire consequences if they ever told anyone.

Last month I read in one of the daily newspapers an article headlined "Fear is suffocating South Africa". The article reported a study had found that about 44% of South Africans live in fear. Fear is a very potent emotion. Fear can lead to hatred and aggression. If one looks at some of the racism that is still present in our country, it can be traced back to the emotion of fear. If you look at the mob justice and vigilante actions that you read about, those actions can be traced back to the fear that criminals have generated in communities by their violent acts and intimidation of people into silence.

Seven years into the new South Africa, I think the time has come for us to stop offering social and political excuses for violent criminal acts where the sole motive is monetary gain for the perpetrator who knowingly disregarded the human rights of his victim. Violent crimes have a direct impact on emotions. The situation becomes untenable when the sole motive of the perpetrator is monetary gain for himself and not some noble cause. I would like economists to calculate the psychiatric and surgical costs to the individual if he or she survives a violent crime, the cost to the family and the cost to the economy. People shout a lot at President Thabo Mbeki and Safety and Security Minister Steve Tshwete to solve the problem of crime. No amount of shouting will ever get them, or future presidents and ministers of safety and security, to solve the crime problem unless the culture of buying stolen cellphones, TVs and cars is eradicated.

Dr Ike Ntsikelelo Nzo is a psychiatrist with a practice in Soweto.

argued elsewhere that many emigrants do not cut their actual and emotional ties with home and that they represent a strong latent pool of skills into which a country can tap.[5] Diaspora networks are increasingly recognised as a means of mobilising skills abroad and offsetting some of the negative impacts of skills loss and the brain drain.[6] The SANSA project at the University of Cape Town represents one such mechanism for providing South Africans abroad with concrete opportunities for contributing to their former country. The aims and objectives of SANSA are described elsewhere.[7] In this paper, we utilise the skills database generated by SANSA to pose the question of what professions and which sectors are most likely to benefit from a South African diaspora network.

Assessing the Real Extent of Emigration

Official SSA migration data is derived from forms voluntarily completed by those emigrating through one of the three main international airports. Emigrants who do not complete the forms or depart from any other location are not captured in the official data.[8] In addition, the statistics do not necessarily capture South Africans who leave for some other purpose (such as temporary work, travel or study) and subsequently settle overseas. Logically, therefore, the volume of emigration is an undercount, but by how much?

To answer this question, data was collected for the major five recipient countries of South African emigrants for the period 1987 to 1997. Recipient country data on South African immigration was obtained from Statistics New Zealand, the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United Kingdom Immigration Research and Statistics Service and the Citizenship and Immigration Office of Canada.[9]

Immigration categories are reasonably comparable across countries. All of the data sets refer to immigrants entering a country, although some state the origin of the migrant by country of birth (e.g., the USA) while others refer to the last country of residence before immigration (e.g., Canada). We can assume that this difference of recording method does not significantly affect the bulk of the South African data, since most of the people recorded by last country of residence would logically have been permanent residents in South Africa before departure. The data sets are mostly complete, except for the figures for the UK and the US for 1997 and Canada for 1987 – that is, only three missing observations out of 45.[10]

Comparison of data from all five recipient countries with South African figures shows consistent official under-reporting of emigration from the country (Table 4.1). The magnitude of the discrepancy decreases over time, perhaps indicating not only that more people are leaving but that they are less willing to report it. In sum, an estimated 233 609 people left South Africa to settle abroad in these five countries between 1989 and 1997. The official figure for these countries, as reported by SSA, is only 82 811. There is thus significant under-reporting of

Table 4.1: South African Emigration to Five Major Recipient Countries, 1987–1997[11]

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
NZ	632	246	209	202	223	422	2 054	2 638	2 046	2 648	2 689	14 009
NZ (SSA)	411	176	83	64	50	126	*242**	1 465	939	1 266	1 157	5 979
Aus	3 792	3 024	2 424	2 084	1 274	1 021	1 654	2 792	3 190	3 211	4 281	28 747
Aus (SSA)	3 484	2 588	1 275	1 292	928	694	*1 309*	1 298	1 507	1 767	1 508	17 650
UK	6 700	7 000	11 700	6 400	8 000	6 900	9 400	8 100	4 200	11 400	*10 988*	90 788
UK (SSA)	3 817	2 295	1 420	1 804	1 800	1 987	*3 716*	2 880	2 045	2 243	2 162	26 169
Can	*1 748*	1 672	1 558	1 083	1 014	1 141	1 822	2 910	1 753	1 526	1 898	18 125
Can (SSA)	755	722	454	349	266	285	*566*	947	679	774	557	6 354
USA	1 741	1 832	1 899	1 990	1 854	2 516	2 197	2 144	2 560	2 966	*2 563*	46 724
USA (SSA)	543	325	174	278	307	314	*566*	752	882	963	832	5 936

* All estimates italicised.
NZ=New Zealand; Aus= Australia; UK=United Kingdom; Can=Canada; SSA=Statistics South Africa

emigration in official South African statistics: only 35% of the emigration stream was captured by official data-collection methods. These bald figures do not, however, provide any insights into the profile of emigrants. It is therefore necessary to ask what skills these emigrants possess.

Quantifying the Skills Lost

A similar comparison between SSA and recipient country data can be undertaken for particular categories of immigrant, such as professionals (Table 4.2).[12] This category of immigrant includes "professional, semi-professional and technical occupations", but excludes managerial, administrative and executive occupations.[13] Complete data on the emigration of professionals is only available for New Zealand. Australia and Canada have several missing years. US data was only available for one year and no breakdown at all was available for the UK.

Given these gaps, two methods were used to arrive at estimates.[14] The first method was the same as that used to assess total emigration. SSA statistics and recipient country data were used to extrapolate total figures for professional emigration. This method generated an estimate of 41 496 professional emigrants between 1989 and 1997. This is nearly four times larger than the official figure of 11 255.

Table 4.2: Emigration of Professionals from South Africa, 1989–1997

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
AUS (SSA)	312	291	198	189	*356*	274	308	420	310	2 658
AUS	*558**	*479*	295	213	353	610	765	696	1 122	4 533
NZ(SSA)	25	24	12	49	*93*	349	209	297	286	1 344
NZ	60	59	63	104	551	656	462	628	631	3 214
CAN (SSA)	94	85	63	69	*136*	224	173	170	118	1 132
CAN	*327*	*227*	*213*	243	407	677	421	315	421	3 251
USA (SSA)	56	68	89	81	*153*	216	235	254	258	1 410
USA	*399*	*418*	*389*	*528*	*461*	*450*	*538*	618	*538*	4 339
UK (SSA)	275	331	296	349	*661*	450	368	422	444	3 596
UK	*2 574*	*1 408*	*1 760*	*1 518*	*2 068*	*1 782*	*924*	*2 508*	*2 417*	16 959

* All estimates italicised.

The second method was based on only the countries and years for which data was available and complete. This data was then compared with SSA data for that country and year. There proved to be a very systematic pattern of discrepancies. On this basis missing data was extrapolated and summed with actual figures to derive totals for each period. The figures were slightly lower than those obtained by the first method, but were still significantly higher than the official SSA figures (Table 4.3).

Immigration of professionals has dropped significantly during the 1990s (Figure 4.1).[15] This exacerbates the effects of emigration and the brain drain since there is little compensating in-flow of skills. However, this is not a new phenomenon. The loss of professionals began well before 1994. Indeed, a brain drain has been evident during and after each period of political crisis in South African history, dating back to the early 1960s.[16] Nevertheless, the volume of the

Table 4.3: Migration of Professional South Africans

	1989–92	1994–97
Immigration (SSA)	6 714	3 295
Emigration (SSA)	3 721	7 534
Emigration (SANSA figures)	16 447	19 890

Figure 4.1: Immigration and Emigration of Professionals



brain drain has increased post-1994. In the period 1994–1997, we estimate that between 6 000 (Method 1) and 4 600 (Method 2) people in the professional category emigrated each year, compared with 3 800 per annum in the period 1989–92.

Figure 4.2: Classification of South African Immigrants by Recipient Countries



Skills Profile of Emigrants

Recipient country data on the occupational profiles of South African emigrants is also incomplete. The figures below summarise the available data. They confirm that emigration represents a considerable loss of skills, training and experience to South Africa and in some instances a major acquisition for the recipient countries.

A more detailed occupational breakdown is only available for two countries: Canada and New Zealand. These countries provide some idea of which occupational categories are most affected by emigration (Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3: Classification of Immigrants by Professional Sub-Category



In both countries, natural sciences/engineering and health are clearly sectors in which South Africans cluster in greatest number. Another significant category in the New Zealand data is education. The New Zealand data gives a particularly detailed picture within the main sub-categories. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 provide a breakdown of the sub-categories of natural sciences and engineering and health.

Health professionals and engineers account for the greatest share of emigration to New Zealand. However, the numbers decrease after the peak in 1993, compared to an increase in some of the other categories like computing and nursing.

Compensating for the Brain Drain

The cumulative loss of skills through the brain drain is having a definite impact in South Africa. A restrictive immigration policy has exacerbated these effects. There is sometimes an assumption that once South Africans emigrate, they are lost to their country and its development. This is not necessarily true, particularly if there are mechanisms in place for South Africa to tap into the skills of its diasporic population.

Figure 4.4: Natural Sciences and Engineering Immigrants to New Zealand



Figure 4.5: Health Professional Immigrants to New Zealand



In this context, the aim of the SANSA project is to connect highly skilled South Africans abroad with their South African counterparts so they can engage in collaborative projects which will benefit the development process in South Africa. To mobilise this latent population and create the SANSA network, 25 000 questionnaires were sent out to highly skilled South Africans all over the world, inviting them to join the network. To date, over 2 000 highly skilled South African expatriates have joined the SANSA network.

It is unfortunately not possible to establish the representivity of the SANSA database in relation to the whole skilled South African diaspora. However, the data is certainly likely to be more representative of that section of the emigrant population that is interested in continuing to be part of the country's development. It is therefore useful to provide a profile of this population to ascertain what kinds of emigrant skills are available to South Africa through a network such as SANSA.

The SANSA members are located in 69 countries with the majority in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Zimbabwe, Namibia and New Zealand (Figure 4.6). Most of them are between 20 and 60, which means that SANSA is a professional rather than student network. The network consists mainly of males, with females constituting only 25% of the membership. The majority appear to have retained their South African citizenship (Figure 4.7). This, in itself, may be a sign that they still feel a strong connection to the country.

Figure 4.6: Location of SANSA Network Members



SANSA members left South Africa at progressively later stages in their lives over the decades (Table 4.4). From the 1950s onwards, the average age of the emigrant population on emigration has become increasingly older. The fact that the average age on emigration increases over time suggests that more and more South African emigrants have left as already trained and established professionals.

Study abroad has often been proposed as a major motivating factor for emigration. For example, according to the National Science Foundation, two-thirds of the foreign-born scientists and engineers working in the USA obtained

Figure 4.7: Nationality of SANSA Network Members



their doctorates in that country.[17] Figure 4.8 shows the qualifications of SANSA members. They are certainly highly qualified with 28.8% holding a doctorate degree. Seventy-six percent hold at least a Bachelor's degree. Of these, 88% of them obtained their Bachelor's in South Africa, 89.2 % obtained an Honours degree in South Africa and 57% obtained their Master's in South Africa.

The vast majority of SANSA members had already acquired at least a first and even a second degree in South Africa. However, a significant number only acquired post-graduate degrees, particularly doctorates and post-doctorate qualifications, once they had left South Africa (Figure 4.9).

Table 4.4: Age at Emigration of SANSA Network Members from South Africa

Decade	Average Age
1930–1939	16
1940–1949	16.5
1950–1959	22.6
1960–1969	23.8
1970–1979	27.5
1980–1989	30.9
1990–1999	32.5

Figure 4.8: Qualifications of SANSA Network Members



Figure 4.9: Places Where SANSA Members Obtained Their Degrees



The diversity and richness of professional skills available through the SANSA network immediately becomes apparent from an examination of the database. Members with a humanities and social science background are in a slight majority (29%) (Figure 4.10). However, there are also considerable numbers with expertise in business and management administration (27.5%), natural sciences (23%), health (18%) and engineering (18%). In terms of current profession, interest is highest amongst people working in the private sector (38%), academia (37%), government (10%) and health (8%) (Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.10: Field of Expertise of SANSA Network Members



Note: Percentages do not add up to 100, because some are active in more than one field.

Figure 4.11: Professional Sectors of SANSA Network Members



Conclusion

This paper highlights a number of important issues surrounding the brain drain. First, the South African brain drain is clearly much more significant than the official figures suggest. Certainly the country needs to revisit its methods of data collection on emigration and, if possible, build in a systematic comparison with data that can easily be obtained from recipient countries.

Second, most emigrants are highly skilled and well-trained and many of them are located professionally in occupations which are in demand domestically. Third, a significant number leave South Africa as well-trained professionals. However, there is a tendency for the professional emigrants to acquire further post-graduate training abroad. There is therefore a concern that many of South Africa's best-trained persons emigrate – although frequently their advanced training is undertaken only after emigrating. Fourth, the South African diaspora represents a well-trained, capable, uniquely highly skilled pool of individuals.

Contrary to popular opinion, however, emigration does not necessarily mean that all of these skills and expertise are lost to South Africa. Opportunities do exist for the country to make use of the skills of these expatriates even while they reside abroad. The SANSA network, which aims to connect highly skilled South Africans abroad with their South African counterparts, is a first step towards mobilising South Africa's diaspora and countering the damaging effects of the brain drain.

Notes and References

1 J-B Meyer, D Kaplan and M Brown, *Assessing the South African Brain Drain: A Statistical Comparison*, Cape Town: Development Policy Research Unit, 2000.

2 According to official statistics these countries collectively account for 75% of South African emigration. There is no way of determining whether this is true for total emigration, but these are certainly the favoured destinations of the majority of potential emigrants.

3 D Kaplan, 'Migration of the Professional, Semi-professional and Technical in South Africa: Past Patterns, Current Trends and Policy', in J Charum and J-B Meyer, *International Scientific Migrations Today: New Perspectives*, Paris: IRD, Colciencias, 2000.

4 J-B Meyer, M Brown and D Kaplan, *The Brain Drain in Southern Africa: Old Issue, New Evidence*, Report to the European Commission, Brussels, 1999.

5 D Kaplan, 'Reversing the Brain Drain: The Case for Utilising South Africa's Unique Intellectual Diaspora', *Science, Technology and Society*, vol 2, no 2, 1997.

6 J-B Meyer and M Brown, *Scientific Diasporas: A New Approach to the Brain Drain*, UNESCO Management of Social Transformation (MOST) discussion paper series, 1999.

7 See the SANSA website at http://www.uct.ac.za/org/sansa/

8 Reasons for completing these forms may vary from one individual to the other. It is understandable that somebody leaving the country might not feel especially obliged to provide information to the government. Immigration data is likely to be more accurate since highly skilled immigrants tend to use legal channels. However, South Africa does have significant refugee and illegal migration movement from the rest of Africa. The evidence suggests that both streams contain numbers of skilled and highly-trained immigrants, even if they are not always specifically using their skills and previous training.

9 Statistics New Zealand, *External Migration, Permanent and Long-Term Arrivals from South Africa by Period and Occupation*, Ref: C2963TM, 1989–1997; Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs of Australia, Bureau of Immigration Research, *South African-born Settler Arrivals for Financial Years 1987–1988 to 1997–1998*; Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs of Australia, Bureau of Immigration Research, Table B12, *Settler Arrivals by Region/Country of Birth, By State of*

Intended Residence By Major ASCO Groups for Financial Years 1991–1992 to 1997–1998; United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 3, *Immigrants Admitted By Region and Country of Birth, Fiscal Years 1986–1996*; United States Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Table 21, *Immigrants Admitted By Major Occupation Group and Region and Selected Country of Birth, Fiscal Year 1996*; Immigration, Research and Statistics Service of the United Kingdom, *International Migration, Estimates from International Survey: Commonwealth Country of Last or Next Residence*, Table 2.3, Series MN no 23, 1987–1996; Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), *Permanent Residents, Table IM7, Country of Last Permanent Residence by Year of Landing, 1988–1994*; CIC, *Permanent Residents, Table IM7, Country of Last Permanent Residence by Year of Landing, 1989-1995*; CIC, *Permanent Residents, Table IM19, Country of Last Permanent Residence by Intended Occupations (Major Groups), 1992-1995;* CIC, *Permitted Residents Admitted From South Africa by Intended Occupation Based on the CCDO Codes, 1996–1998.*

10 Missing figures were extrapolated from SSA data on a proportional basis; see Meyer *et al.*, 2000, for a description of the methodology used.

11 Official Data is from Statistics South Africa. *Statistical Releases, Tourism and Migration.* P0351, Jan 1989-Sept 1998; Statistics South Africa, *Statistical Reports, Tourism and Migration.* 03-51-01, 1989–1997.

12 Kaplan 2000.

13 The latter category is much smaller and the relevant data discrepancy with official figures varies greatly from year to year and country to country. For this reason, inferences and extrapolations are subject to a much greater margin of error. See Meyer *et al.*, 2000.

14 For detailed calculations, see Meyer *et al.*, 2000.

15 Mattes, Crush and Richmond, in this volume.

16 Kaplan 2000.

17 Meyer and Brown 1999.

Chapter 5

The Brain Gain and Legal Immigration to Post-Apartheid South Africa

Robert Mattes, Jonathan Crush and Wayne Richmond

Until recently, South Africa was an "immigrant-receiving" nation.[1] According to official statistics, the country consistently experienced net immigration gains from 1940 until 1994, temporarily interrupted by periods of political upheaval (Figure 5.1). Under apartheid, legal immigration was limited to whites only, primarily from Western Europe. This policy was not officially removed from the statute books until 1991. However, in the 1980s the National Party government, seeking to bolster its bantustan policy, allowed homeland administrations to import skills from Africa and Asia. Officially, South Africa remained a net immigration country during the tumultuous transition years from 1990 to 1994. However, this picture is misleading since official figures seriously underestimate the extent of emigration. The official net emigration losses of the last five years similarly fail to reveal the full extent of the loss. One of the reasons is that immigration no longer keeps pace with emigration. Indeed, post-1994 skilled immigration policy has become increasingly restrictive.

Immigration is certainly not widely viewed as a public policy tool that could benefit South Africa and South Africans. Rather, immigrants (even the most highly skilled) are stereotyped as a threat to South African jobs. The reasons for this narrowing of national vision have been explored elsewhere.[2] They include the racially sullied immigration history of the country, the impact of nationalism and new nation-building, a poor understanding of the relationship between skills and economic growth, and growing xenophobia.

The public debate around South Africa's brain drain has focussed almost obsessively on the emigration of skilled South Africans from the country.[3] But skilled emigration is only one side of the story. Before we reach firm conclusions about whether South Africa is experiencing a net loss of skilled labour, the volume of that loss, and its impact on the South African economy, needs to be weighed against the numbers and types of skilled non-South Africans living in and immigrating to South Africa.

Skilled immigrants and migrants make important contributions to any country's economic growth and development.[4] Immigrants can fill the gaps

Our Adopted Home

Ingrid Ebersöhn

I am qualified in psychometric testing. My husband, Gerhard, and I left South Africa in early 2000. Our decision was motivated by a combination of factors. If we had been at another stage of our lives and careers, we might not have left at all. The decision was not made lightly and took a lot of thinking through, planning and organising. We felt we should be clear about our reasons for leaving, and have as much information as possible on the situation we were going to enter.

For us, the list of advantages of going outweighed other considerations. Our personal safety, especially that of our child, was our main concern due to the high level of violent crime. The rising high cost of living was also increasingly frustrating. We have around ten to fifteen years of working experience and a fairly long working life ahead of us, with little prospect of further promotion or development (in our specific case), as well as a fairly good possibility of (repeated) retrenchment and unemployment. This was demotivating for us as employees. In everyday life, poor service and inefficiency almost everywhere, was another frustration. We had to decide whether we would live with all the turmoil of a country in transition, which could take the rest of our lives, or whether we would leave behind familiar jobs and colleagues, family and friends, and a beautiful country to make a new start.

Starting over is an opportunity to do things differently, to change your career, to try something new. It can literally mean starting over, working your way from the bottom up again. We have found our new start in New Zealand to be mostly what we hoped for. Although there are a lot of unfamiliar things, we are leading a much less stressful way of life now. Although this country has its own problems, these are on a much smaller scale than what we were used to in South Africa. We have taken up permanent residence, but have not decided whether we will become citizens in three years time. This would mean losing our South African citizenship, as South Africa does not allow dual citizenship. At this stage, we are happy and feel that we made the right decision. We will certainly be back to visit South Africa, but New Zealand is now our adopted home.

Ingrid Ebersöhn is a South African psychologist living in New Zealand

created by emigrating skills or the inadequacies of a country's education and training system. Even more important, skilled immigrants bring innovation to an economy through new ideas and skills.[5] This is seldom recognised in the anti-immigration discourse of post-apartheid South Africa.

In order to shift the debate so that skills immigration is not perceived as a universal evil by South Africans and its real potential is realistically debated and assessed, two things must happen. First, there needs to be far more precise documentation of the extent of the skills lost through brain drain. A recent study by the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) project at UCT claims that official statistics on emigration are far too low, by as much as two-thirds.[6] Official statistics on emigration count self-declared émigrés, and do not capture those

Figure 5.1: South African Migration: Net Official Gains & Losses, 1940–2000



Source: Central Statistical Services 1994, *Tourism and Migration* 1993; Central Statistical Services 1995, Tourism and Migration 1995.

who might leave permanently under the pretext of, or subsequent to, a temporary visit.[7]

Second, there needs to be greater awareness of the profile and contribution of South Africa's current stock of skilled immigrants. Studies of skilled immigrants in other countries have shown that they rarely fit the popular stereotypes. There is no reason why this should not be true for South Africa as well. This paper therefore aims to build a profile of South Africa's current skilled immigrant population. The analysis addresses the following questions: (a) who are these immigrants? (b) when did they come to South Africa? (c) are there significant differences between pre-1990 and post-1990 immigrants? and (d) how do they perceive and experience the xenophobic smog which is said to blanket much of the country?

These questions are addressed in this paper using data generated from a 1999 SAMP survey of skilled non-citizens in South Africa. No one is sure exactly how many skilled non-citizens live in the country. There is also no precise knowledge of where they reside or work. This makes it impossible to draw scientific, representative samples. To obtain information which was as valid and reliable as possible in the circumstances, SAMP interviewed an area-controlled quota sample of 400 skilled foreign nationals in the country.[8] Face-to-face interviews were conducted in the Gauteng, Cape Town and Durban metropolitan areas. Many no doubt also reside in other metropolitan and rural areas, but due to the immense difficulty and cost in locating them, the survey was limited to these three metropolitan areas.[9]

From Dominance to Diversity

Official immigration figures show that until the 1980s, Western Europe (and the UK in particular), were the major sources of immigrants for South Africa. The peak decade for European immigration was 1965 to 1975, when 300 000 immigrants entered the country (Table 5.1). European immigration fell sharply after 1985. African immigration prior to the 1970s was primarily of whites from other countries to the north. The peak period coincided with white flight from independence in Africa.

In the 1980s, South Africa's immigration stream became somewhat more diverse. With the nominal "independence" of the homelands of Transkei, Ciskei and Bophuthatswana, skills were imported from a more diverse range of sources, including Asia, the region and the rest of Africa. Significant numbers of Taiwanese immigrants were welcomed by the apartheid government as part of this strategy. In 1991, the longstanding definition of an immigrant as someone "assimilable" by the white population was abandoned. The pattern of diversification continued in the 1990s despite declining overall numbers of immigrants (Table 5.2 and 5.3).

The new, post-apartheid restrictionist attitude towards immigration has affected flows in two main ways: first, the numbers of people being allowed to

Table 5.1: Immigration to South Africa by Source Region, 1926–1995

	Europe	Africa	Asia	Americas	Oceania
1926–30	30 871	791	742	746	511
1931–35	18 537	1 130	464	766	508
1936–40	30 896	1 596	845	1 369	841
1941–45	5 422	928	417	328	198
1946–50	91 573	4 027	3 438	1 865	1 189
1951–55	70 242	7 841	1 375	1 576	637
1956–60	48 857	14 187	1 423	1 386	654
1961–65	89 658	58 231	2 563	2 734	1 189
1966–70	157 087	44 418	2 918	3 218	2 511
1971–75	142 584	27 838	2 754	3 666	3 843
1976–80	76 381	50 343	2 189	2 441	2 428
1981–85	98 191	58 603	3 136	2 837	1 278
1986–90	28 189	13 946	4 730	2 422	554
1991–95	18 999	8 474	12 462	1 890	498

Source: S Peberdy, 'Selecting Immigrants'.

Table 5.2: Immigration to South Africa by Major Countries of Origin, 1995–1997

	1995	1996	1997
Europe			
U.K.	1 046	1 052	623
Germany	249	253	162
Netherlands	113	118	56
Bulgaria	95	103	–
Yugoslavia	96	93	–
Asia			
Taiwan	247	244	182
India	303	342	367
Pakistan	79	79	96
Africa			
SADC	1 056	1 178	870
Non-SADC	287	423	480
Americas			
USA	145	171	136
Canada	93	36	37

Source: DHA Annual Reports.

legally immigrate to South Africa has fallen consistently since 1994 (Table 5.4). The argument that this is because few people wish to emigrate to South Africa is almost certainly incorrect. With limited opportunity for legal immigration, South Africa's skills base has ironically been augmented by undocumented immigration and official corruption.[10] This is the regrettable downside of the absence of a proactive immigration policy. South Africa's economy is also relatively developed in comparison to the rest of the continent and to much of the 'Third World'. Thus, South Africa has comparative advantages that make it a preferred destination for many skilled workers.

Second, the new restrictionism has affected temporary skills imports. The official figures indicate that the number of work permits issued to foreign temporary residents increased during the 1990s but has fallen consistently since

Table 5.3: Immigration to South Africa by Source Region, 1990–1998

	Total	Europe	Africa	Asia	Other
1990	14 449	7 560	1 628	2 837	2 474
1991	12 379	5 767	2 065	3 650	897
1992	8 686	3 869	1 266	3 005	546
1993	9 824	4 541	1 701	3 165	417
1994	6 398	2 784	1 628	1 645	342
1995	5 064	2 272	1 343	1 063	386
1996	5 407	2 315	1 601	1 137	454
1997	4 352	1 630	1 281	1 148	473
1998	4 371	1 614	1 169	1 207	381

Source: DHA Annual Reports.

Table 5.4: Temporary Residence Permits, 1990–1998

	New	Renewals	Total
1990	7 657	30 915	38 571
1991	4 117	32 763	36 880
1992	5 581	33 318	38 899
1993	5 741	30 810	36 551
1994	8 714	29 352	38 066
1995	11 053	32 838	43 891
1996	19 498	33 206	52 704
1997	11 361	17 129	28 490
1998	10 828	11 207	22 035

Source: DHA Annual Reports.

1996 (Table 5.4). The 1998 figure was the lowest for many years. Employers have been frustrated and blocked at every turn as they seek to import high-level skills from outside the country. This discontent has swelled into a torrent of criticism as the policy has seriously interfered with the economic plans and operations of key enterprises. There are signs that the message is getting through, and a loosening of restrictions has been promised. However, the Draft Immigration Bill proposes a new system that is bureaucratically cumbersome and may simply exacerbate the situation further.[11]

The profile of the sample selected for this study of skilled immigrants should, if in any way representative, reflect something of South Africa's diverse immigration history. This proved to be the case. In the survey sample, the major source region was clearly Europe (47%) and the most important source country the United Kingdom (31%), a clear legacy of South Africa's racist past (Tables 5.5 and 5.6).

South Africa's more recent history of immigrant diversification is also clearly reflected in the sample. As many as 41% of the sample were from elsewhere in Africa (with 18% from the SADC region and 23% from other countries). The snowball sample method picked up respondents from 10 African countries with Nigeria, Zimbabwe and the DRC prominent. The fact that almost a quarter of the sample were from non-SADC African countries points to a newer, post-1990 trend in South Africa's immigration experience, the movement of skilled Africans (as immigrants and asylum seekers) to the country following the demise of apartheid. The relatively high proportion of African respondents, in comparison with overall immigration figures (Table 5.6), was a function of the fact that the survey identified many skilled African respondents who enjoy only temporary residence status in South Africa.

For purposes of internal comparison, the sample can be divided in various ways. First, comparisons are possible between the older, primarily European, stream of immigrants and the newer breed of African (im)migrant. The former are associated with the population engineering of apartheid immigration policy. Nearly 73% of South Africa's skilled residents from Europe interviewed entered

Table 5.5: Origin of Survey Respondents by Region of Origin

	%
Western Europe	47
Rest of Africa	23
Southern Africa	18
North America	4
Asia/Far East	3
Eastern Europe	3
Australasia	1
Other	3

N=400, unless otherwise specified.
Note: For this and all subsequent tables, percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Table 5.6: Citizenship of Survey Respondents

	N	%
Britain	123	31
Nigeria	32	8
Germany	22	6
Zimbabwe	15	4
DRC	21	5
Netherlands	16	4
Ireland	11	3
United States	9	2
Malawi	9	2
Zambia	9	2
Ghana	9	2
Portugal	8	2
Lesotho	8	2
Uganda	8	2
Botswana	8	2
Swaziland	6	2
Belgium	6	2
Canada	5	1
Austria	4	1
Cuba	4	1
Kenya	4	1
N=400		

Note: Only countries with at least 1% listed.

South Africa before 1991. The latter, increasingly global movement is associated with the new opportunities and attractions of post-apartheid South Africa. As Table 5.7 shows, 87% of non-SADC African respondents entered the country after 1991, highlighting the recency of South Africa's reconnection to the rest of the continent. SADC-country citizens were about evenly split between the two, indicating that the brain drain from neighbouring states began before the formal end of apartheid, and has continued since.

Table 5.7: Origins of Immigrants by Length of Residence

	Europe	Rest of Africa	Southern Africa	Other	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid-1991)	27.1	86.9	53.4	73.6	49.1
More than 8 years (before mid-1991)	72.9	13.1	46.5	36.8	51.2
N=	199	92	71	38	400

A second point of comparison therefore is between "old" and "new" immigrants. We use the year 1991 as the nominal divide between old (apartheid) and new (post-apartheid) immigrant movements. The former was predominantly European but included some African and Asian immigrants who entered under the country's late apartheid policies. The latter was predominantly African, but included Europeans and other skilled personnel associated with the post-apartheid influx of foreign capital to the country.

The final point of comparison is between permanent residents ("immigrants") and temporary residents ("migrants"). As Table 5.8 clearly shows, three-quarters of skilled non-citizens who have been in the country since before mid-1991 are permanent residents. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of skilled non-citizens who entered after 1991 (91%) are temporary residents on work permits. Nearly 80% of western skilled residents have permanent residence status compared to only 44% of African non-citizens. The impact of a restrictionist immigration policy on the degree of commitment and permanence of non-citizens seems obvious, although it could be that the modern, skilled worker is less interested in permanent residence.

Comparisons are useful for a number of reasons. First, they provide valuable insights into the character, skills, attitudes and behaviours of old versus new immigrants. Second, we can test the pervasive assumption in South Africa that the rest of the continent has little to offer; certainly its citizens are often stereotyped in the media and on the streets in predominantly negative terms. Third, the reality is

Table 5.8: Residency Status of Immigrants

	Permanent residence	Work permit	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid-1991)	24.6	91.1	49.1
More than 8 years (before mid-1991)	75.5	9.2	51.2
N=	253	147	400

that South Africa is currently a more attractive permanent immigration destination for Africans than it is for people from Europe. If South Africa were to adopt a more open policy towards skilled immigration, Africa would be a major source of potential immigrants (as happened fleetingly in the early 1990s). It is therefore useful to know something about the new African immigrants already in South Africa.[12]

Comparing Old and New Migration

A systematic comparison of the different immigrant sub-groups revealed some distinctive differences. First, their residential geography is distinctively different (Table 5.9). Old immigrants cluster in Cape Town and Durban, while new immigrants are found in absolute and proportionally greater numbers in the economic heartland of the Gauteng area. Similarly, African skilled migrants (at 83%) are even more concentrated in Gauteng compared to the other centres.

Second, the sample revealed the distinctive gender characteristics of the immigrant sub-groups. Both the western and African populations were predominantly male (Table 5.10). However, the western sample had proportionally more females. Much old immigration was of the family variety and the training and mobility of skilled Africans in their home countries remains male-dominated. Third, in terms of formal educational qualifications, there was little obvious difference between African and western non-citizens (Table 5.11).

Table 5.9: Place of Residence

	Greater JHB	Cape Town	Durban	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid-1991)	79	13	8	100
More than 8 years (before mid-1991)	43	30	27	100
Western (European/North American)	44	32	24	100
African	83	9	9	100

Table 5.10: Gender of Skilled Immigrants

Gender	Total	Western	African	Other
Male	68	61	79	64
Female	32	39	21	36
N=	400	199	163	38

Table 5.11: Educational Qualifications of Skilled Immigrants

Educational Qualification	Total	Western	African	Other
Less than High School Certificate (HSC)	1	1	0	0
HSC only, or equivalent	7	11	1	4
HSC plus a diploma or Bachelor's degree	68	61	74	84
Honours degree	10	10	10	0
Master's degree	12	12	14	4
Doctorate	3	4	1	8
N=	400	199	163	38

However, there was a much greater difference in the qualifications of old and new immigrants. There emerged a very strong trend for more recent, post-1991 arrivals to be better educated (Table 5.12). Almost 70% of skilled non-citizens with university degrees and 60% with post-graduate training arrived after 1991. This finding clearly contradicts the idea that the "quality" of immigrants to South Africa has been in decline. Under apartheid, a white skin was the usual passport to entry. Under the new dispensation, skills and value have become much more important determinants.

Fourth, despite the similar educational profile of western and African skilled residents and the superior profile of post-1991 entrants, the earning potential of the two groups varied considerably (Table 5.13). Western skilled residents tend to have higher incomes than their African counterparts. For example, some 63% of skilled Africans earn less than R10 000 a month (compared with only 24% of westerners). Again, a third of Africans, but only 10% of westerners, earn less than R6 000 a month. In part, this is a function of natural career progression (with long-

Table 5.12: Qualifications of Skilled Immigrants

	High school or less	HS + diploma	Bachelor's degree	Post-graduate	Total
Up to 8 years (since mid-1991)	16.1	31.7	69.1	58.2	49.1
More than 8 years (before mid-1991)	83.9	68.4	31.1	41.8	51.2
N=	100	142	129	98	400

Table 5.13: Income of Skilled Immigrants

Income	Total	Western	African	Other
R2 001–R6 000	19	10	32	12
R6 001–R8 000	14	9	21	4
R8 001–R10 000	7	5	10	8
R10 001–R14 000	16	17	15	20
R14 001–R20 000	18	23	11	28
R20 001–R26 000	11	13	6	12
R26 001–R32 000	5	10	3	0
R32 001–R38 000	2	2	1	4
More than R38 000	5	9	1	4
Refused to answer	2	2	0	8
N=	400	199	163	38

time immigrants tending to earn more than newcomers in any context). But there are obvious racial legacies here. Any white immigrant in the old South Africa immediately enjoyed job and promotion preference over a black counterpart.

Fifth, the survey provided useful insights into the shifting occupational distribution of skilled migrants since the demise of apartheid. New migrants are disproportionately represented in the medical, educational, financial, and research and technical fields. They are severely under-represented in the commercial and manufacturing sectors. This may simply be a reflection of a lack of demand in industry, although this argument is difficult to sustain in the face of persistent complaints from business about the bureaucratic difficulties of accessing skilled non-South African labour.

Discouraging Permanence

One of the most striking features of post-1994 immigration policy has been the hostility to the permanent, and even temporary, import of skills from outside. There is a pervasive but highly misleading assumption in government that every job occupied by a non-citizen is one job less for a South African. This fallacy has produced a policy environment that favours limiting skills in-migration, and temporary rather than permanent settlement. This contrasts markedly with apartheid policy where (white) permanent immigration and assimilation were encouraged and promoted.

How transient are South Africa's skilled non-citizens? One way to answer this question is to examine their longer-term migration aspirations. About half of the sample were interested in remaining in South Africa for longer than five years, with another 24% currently undecided (Table 5.14). The overall numbers wishing to acquire citizenship were much lower (at around 25%) but there was significant interest amongst African immigrants in doing so (Table 5.15).

Another way to answer the question is to examine their continuing economic commitments to their country of origin. Non-citizens who maintain tangible links to their home countries have a much greater potential ability and likelihood of returning. One-half (50%) of the respondents still had a bank account in their home country. But the numbers were significantly lower on the other indicators. One-third (35%) still owned a house (35%) and investments (34%) in their home country, and a fifth (19%) still have a job to return to. Western respondents were much less likely to have retained a house back home, a reflection of their more permanent residence status. African respondents were slightly less likely to have a foreign bank account. Other than that, regional differences were minimal (Table 5.16).

Another measure is how often they returned to their home country. Very few appeared to have cut all ties, with only 12% saying "never". On the other hand, only 16% said they returned home "often". Most do so on an irregular basis.

Table 5.14: Residence Intentions

How long do you want to stay in South Africa?	Total	Western	African	Other
Less than 6 months	2	2	1	0
6 months to 1 year	3	3	0	12
1 to 2 years	7	6	7	8
Up to 5 years	17	13	20	28
More than 5 years	49	48	55	20
Don't know	24	27	17	32
N=	400	199	163	38

Table 5.15: Attitudes to Citizenship

To what extent do you want to become a citizen of South Africa?	Total	Western	African	Other
Large extent	24	16	37	16
Some extent	23	17	29	28
N=	400	199	163	38

Table 5.16: Connections with Home Country

In your home country, do you still:	Total	Western	African	Other
Own a house (% yes)	35	18	53	52
Have a bank account (% yes)	50	53	44	60
Have investments (% yes)	34	34	34	32
Have a job to return to (% yes)	19	15	21	36
N=	400	199	163	38

Africans were far less likely to do so even though their destinations are much closer (Table 5.17).

Another way of assessing the likelihood of staying in South Africa is by examining ties to the country. As expected, old (white) immigrants were far more likely to have permanent residence in South Africa: nearly 80% of westerners versus only 56% of Africans interviewed. The latter, who are predominantly post-1991 arrivals, face considerable constraints in acquiring permanent residence. In fact, only 7% of the sample had work permits and had actually applied for permanent residence.

But how many temporary residents would opt for permanence if the climate were more conducive? Of the work permit holders, almost half (45%) said that they would want "to a large extent" to become a permanent resident. Other indicators also suggest a considerable interest in a more permanent commitment to the country: 9% of the sample have already applied for South African citizenship and a quarter expressed a high level of desire to become a citizen. Similarly, a quarter expressed a strong desire to retire in South Africa.

However, not everyone wishes to make such a commitment. This is not surprising since the sample picked up two different "types" of post-apartheid skilled foreign

Table 5.17: Frequency of Return to Home Country

How often do you return to your home country?	Total	Western	African	Other
Often	16	18	10	32
Occasionally	27	31	22	20
A few times	13	17	9	4
Once or twice	32	26	40	32
Never	12	8	18	12
N=	400	199	163	38

resident: individuals who are temporary residents by design or preference (e.g., employees of foreign companies or in contract posts) and those who would prefer to immigrate to South Africa permanently, but cannot. African skilled workers were much more likely to express a strong desire to become citizens. Even though more than 60% expressed some interest in obtaining citizenship, that does not always appear to translate into a desire to stay for the rest of their lives. Just over one-third were interested in retiring in South Africa, and only 20% wanted to be buried there. Conversely, the older immigrants from the west were considerably more likely to express interest in retiring and being buried in South Africa. Almost half of the respondents said they wanted to stay in South Africa longer than five years.

Skilled non-South Africans do still display a significant level of symbolic and patriotic ties with their home country. Eight in ten respondents agreed that they were proud to be called a citizen of their home country, and two-thirds agreed that citizenship in their home country was an important part of their self-image. Half wanted their children to be citizens of their home country, and slightly less than half still felt that they have a duty to contribute to the development of their own country. At the same time, it is important to note that these levels of assent are substantially lower than those given by a sample of ordinary South Africans about their South African patriotism.[13] Europeans and North Americans tended to be less enthusiastic about their identification with their home countries, probably because they have been in South Africa much longer. Continued identification with their home countries does not seem to preclude assimilation within South African society. While 87% agreed that their fellow citizens continue to see themselves as citizens of their country, some 80% also agreed that they also "tend to blend in with the people of South Africa and their culture".

Perceptions of South Africa

The survey results revealed that skilled non-citizens are very satisfied with their personal economic conditions in South Africa, their access to health care and quality schooling, and the cost of living. This extended across respondents from differing areas of origin (Table 5.18). The most important exception was the dissatisfaction of Europeans and North Americans with the cost of living (64% "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied").

The respondents were much less satisfied with the standard of services available in South Africa. By a wide margin, they were also dissatisfied with their level and share of taxation. Finally, there was an overwhelming concern about the lack of personal and family safety.

Regardless of where people perceive themselves to be now, a more important question is where they think they will end up and why. Are skilled non-citizens optimistic about their personal futures in South Africa? Here there was a clear difference of opinion between western and African migrants, between old and new immigrants (Table 5.19). Most Africans felt that the various elements of their

Table 5.18: Perceptions of Life in South Africa

	Total	Western	African	Other
Personal economic conditions	**% satisfied/very satisfied**			
Job	79	83	72	84
Prospects for professional advancement	69	49	70	72
Job security	63	68	55	67
Level of income	51	50	52	56
Cost of living	47	36	59	56
Taxation				
Present level of taxation	15	13	18	12
Relative share of taxes compared to others	20	18	25	8
Education and health care				
Medical services	66	62	71	56
Education for children	45	39	55	40
Standard of services				
Upkeep of public amenities	35	19	53	44
Customer service	35	18	55	44
Future of children in South Africa	18	11	27	16
Safety and security				
Personal safety	15	13	18	12
Family's safety	13	9	17	12

personal economic future in South Africa would continue to improve, in marked contrast to the pessimism of white non-citizens. These differences in attitude are remarkably similar to those between white and black South Africans. Certainly, there is little reason why white non-citizens should not have imbibed many of the same gloomy attitudes as their white South African counterparts. The optimism of skilled Africans about the country and their place in it is a reminder to South African policymakers that the South African experiment enjoys wide support amongst skilled black Africans in the country.

A range of evidence from the media to systematic opinion surveys reveal that South Africans are highly xenophobic and opposed to immigration, and that migrant workers and refugees often find themselves on the receiving end of discrimination, intolerance and violence.[14] The question, therefore, is whether skilled non-citizens are in any way immune from the stereotyping and hostility that is assumed to apply to all foreigners. The survey seems to suggest that the professional and higher income status of this group may shield them from much of the harsh treatment meted out to ordinary foreign workers, immigrants and refugees (Table 5.20).

Skilled migrants were certainly not unaware of the general negative bias in the country. More than a quarter said that South Africans hold very negative views;

Table 5.19: Expected Improvements in Next Five Years

	Total	Western	African	Other
Personal economic conditions	**% satisfied/very satisfied**			
Job	42	22	69	40
Prospects for professional advancement	29	10	53	28
Job security	39	17	67	40
Level of income	45	29	66	40
Cost of living	47	36	59	56
Taxation				
Present level of taxation	14	4	27	12
Relative share of taxes compared to others	1	11	22	12
Education and health care				
Medical services	32	7	64	24
Education for children	28	7	56	20
Standard of services				
Upkeep of public amenities	31	12	56	40
Customer service	32	12	58	36
Future of children in South Africa	24	9	45	16
Safety and security				
Personal safety	26	10	48	16
Family's safety	25	10	45	16
N=	400	199	163	38

Table 5.20: Perceived Attitudes of South Africans

	Total	Western	African	Other
Perceived attitudes towards foreign residents of:	**% negative/very negative**			
People from South Africa	28	19	41	12
Co-workers	9	7	10	16
People in profession	6	5	6	16

tellingly, 41% of skilled respondents from Africa feel this way. But only small minorities felt that their co-workers or others in their professions have a negative bias toward foreign residents. A smaller proportion (17%) felt that South Africans had a negative view of people specifically from their home country, and again this proportion jumped to 36% among skilled Africans.

Perhaps more important, only 4% reported that their personal relations with South Africans were "negative". Indeed, not one respondent chose the option "very negative". Only very small numbers felt that people from their home country were discriminated against by ordinary South Africans or the South African government, or that they personally were discriminated against (Table

Table 5.21: Interaction with South Africans

	Total	Western	African	Other
Do you generally have negative or positive relations with people from South Africa? (% negative/very negative)	4	2	5	12
To what extent are you personally treated unfairly by the SA government? (% large extent)	7	10	3	8
To what extent are you personally treated unfairly by South Africans? (% large extent)	5	2	8	4
To what extent are people from your home country treated unfairly by the SA government? (% large extent)	12	12	12	4
To what extent are people from your home country treated unfairly by South Africans? (% large extent)	8	1	19	0

Table 5.22: Personal Experience of Violence and Crime in South Africa

	Total	Western	African	Other
% Harassed	35	29	45	16
% Assaulted	18	15	23	12
% Robbed	57	56	59	48

5.21). In some sense these were remarkably tolerant and accepting responses, since the personal exposure to unpleasant incidents is not insignificant. Nearly 60% of skilled non-citizens have been robbed since they first arrived in South Africa, over a third have been harassed and one in five has been physically assaulted (Table 5.22).

One plausible explanation is that they compare their situation in South Africa favourably with conditions back home. Certainly this seems to be the case when it comes to personal economic conditions; most skilled non-citizens felt that they are better off in South Africa. Only with regard to job security and levels of taxation did significantly more people feel that they would be better off at home. This is hardly surprising given current government policy towards the employment of non-citizens. Nevertheless, skilled migrants from African countries were consistently more likely to think that things are better in South Africa (Table 5.23).

The picture begins to change when we shift to comparing standards of services. Differences according to region of origin become particularly stark, with the majority of Europeans and North Americans saying these things would be better at home, and at least two-thirds of African respondents saying things are better in South Africa than in their home countries. Favourable evaluations of South Africa are at their lowest ebb with regard to safety and security. Only 7% and 8% respectively felt that their family safety and personal safety are better in South Africa. In contrast, 77% and 88% said these matters would be better at home. This ought to be a sobering finding for South Africans. There is a widespread perception that the rest of Africa, in particular, is a chaotic and violent place. Yet, for skilled Africans, South Africa is a far more threatening and dangerous environment.

Perhaps the most important question a skilled worker asks him- or herself when considering staying on in South Africa is whether life has improved as a result of the decision to come in the first place. The survey revealed quite clearly that coming to South Africa had been a positive career move for themselves and other fellow nationals (Table 5.24). Fully 70% said that the lives of the fellow nationals they know who had come to South Africa have improved as a result of the move. More significantly, 65% said that their own lives have improved. Very small minorities felt their lives had worsened, with the balance saying that things have remained as they were.

Table 5.23: Comparing South Africa with Home Country

Personal economic conditions	Total	Western	African	Other
Job	57	46	75	36
Job security	33	19	50	36
Level of income	46	27	71	36
Cost of living	58	47	75	32
Taxation				
Present level of taxation	16	11	22	16
Relative share of taxes compared to others	14	8	23	16
Education and health care				
Medical services	36	11	71	32
Education for children	27	8	51	24
Standard of services				
Upkeep of public amenities	34	8	67	36
Customer service	33	9	61	48
Future of children in South Africa	20	5	39	16
Safety and security				
Personal safety	8	1	16	8
Family's safety	7	1	16	4

Table 5.24: Living Conditions in South Africa versus Home Country

In general, would you say your life today is better, about the same or worse than it was in your home country?	Total	Western	African	Other
Better/much better	65	62	70	52
About the same	25	25	22	36
Worse/much worse	9	8	8	12
N=	400	199	163	38

The general thrust of the analysis is that skilled non-citizens in South Africa are generally far more interested in putting down roots in South Africa than is permitted by current policy. What would happen if the government were to adopt a more immigrant-friendly stance? Here the statistical method known as Multiple Regression Analysis is useful to answer the question: "What factor, or combination of factors, best explains the length of desired stay in South Africa?" Or, more generally, which of the factors included in the survey will ultimately determine how long South Africa will hold onto the skilled foreign population already inside the country?

The statistical analysis indicates that a very limited set of factors account for variations in the likelihood of skilled respondents' staying in South Africa. It also reveals important differences between skilled westerners and skilled Africans. With regard to the former, the most important explanations (in a statistical sense) for desiring to stay in South Africa are the degree to which they believe their personal economic prospects will improve in the next five years and the degree to which they foresee improvements in the general state of services and the future of their children in this period. Thus, regardless of their satisfaction with their present personal conditions, or state of services, it was people who felt that those things would continue to improve who were significantly more likely to want to stay in South Africa indefinitely (conversely, those who expected things to get worse were significantly more likely to want to leave sooner).

Five other factors were also significant determinants of the length of desired stay in South Africa: (a) the more people were dissatisfied with present levels of taxation, the more likely they were to want to exit the country in the next few years; (b) to the extent that people felt that they were discriminated against by the South African government, they were less likely to want to stay; (c) to the extent that people felt they were personally doing better than others in South Africa, they were more likely to want to stay; (d) the more they were involved in professional associations in South Africa, the longer they were likely to stay; and (e) to the extent that they felt that South Africans had positive views of foreigners, they were also more likely to stay.

In the case of skilled Africans, only one variable emerged as a significant predictor of desired length of stay in South Africa. They were significantly less likely to want to stay in the country to the extent that they have negative relations with South Africans or feel they are discriminated against by ordinary South Africans and the South African government. Because the impact of discrimination was so strong in differentiating between those skilled Africans who wanted to leave South Africa soon, and those who wanted to stay for an indefinite period, it is important to ask what would happen if levels of discrimination and intolerance against Africans could be reduced.

To answer the question, these variables were removed from the equation. The result was that satisfaction with present personal economic conditions became the sole predictor of skilled Africans' desired length of stay. In other words, by simply removing the effect of discrimination, skilled Africans who are satisfied with the state of their personal economic conditions are significantly more likely to want to stay in South Africa.

Conclusion

Brain drain pessimism has focussed mainly on the exit of skills from South Africa with little focus on what South Africa can do to attract more skilled workers from abroad or to keep those who stay. Lurking behind much of this one-sided focus is the misguided assumption that national development and skills migration are incompatible. In fact, the opposite is the case.

While we need to be cautious about generalising from this sample of skilled foreign workers to all skilled foreign workers in South Africa, the survey provides many rich insights and propositions that can be tested in the future with surveys of more systematically selected samples of foreign workers, or by other types of systematic research.

Skilled foreigners in South Africa (old and new migrants, Europeans and Africans), by wide margins, feel that their lives have been made better by virtue of coming to the country. They are very satisfied with their personal economic conditions and their access to schooling and quality health care. They are also relatively optimistic about their personal prospects in South Africa over the next five years. However, they do show concern over the quality of other types of services, taxes, and especially personal and family safety. More importantly, they worry about the future of their children, and the prospects of declining services and an even further deterioration of their security.

Continued economic prosperity and improvements in commercial and public services and standards, such that they feel assured of their children's future seem to be the most important factors in keeping these skilled workers in the country. The recent economic recovery, as well as tax cuts, should presumably have important positive effects among this group. In contrast, a range of potential issues, such as movements towards an even more progressive taxation scheme, or a return of the deteriorating currency, high interest rates and high inflation that were experienced during the recession of 1998 could have the opposite effect.

There are clearly very important changes afoot in the composition of the skilled foreign workforce in South Africa. Compared to the situation just a decade ago when a similar survey would have been hard pressed to find significant numbers of black skilled workers from the rest of Africa, 41% of this sample were from Africa. This seems to suggest that South Africa is beginning to capitalise on the comparative developmental advantages it holds over the rest of the continent as an attractive destination for skilled workers.

It is interesting to compare the survey results with the companion survey of skilled South Africans.[15] That survey revealed that, with a few exceptions, skilled white South Africans are consistently more pessimistic about South Africa (both in terms of present and future conditions in South Africa, as well as in comparisons of South Africa with other countries) than are skilled Europeans and North Americans, the very people with whom white South Africans would presumably identify. At the same time, that survey demonstrated that few white South Africans have any regular direct experience with the very countries that they list as their most desired destinations. Skilled foreigners in South Africa at least have the advantage of having seen what the grass looks like on both sides of the fence in forming their evaluations, and by and large, they prefer the grass in South Africa.

At the moment, skilled African non-citizens are broadly satisfied with South Africa, and fairly optimistic about its future. What is required to keep them is, first and foremost, a change in their treatment at the hands of ordinary South Africans and their government. In this regard, the problems keeping skilled Africans appear to be the same ones confronting the formulation of a more rational immigration policy in general: xenophobia, intolerance and discrimination against foreigners, particularly those from the rest of Africa.

Finally, is there anything from this research to guide efforts by business and government to increase the entrance of foreign skills into the South African economy? While more systematic research would have to be done among skilled people in other countries to assess their images of South Africa, the views of those already there can provide an important start. In answering the question often posed by puzzled South Africans to skilled foreigners, "Who would want to move here?" the survey suggests at least one answer.

Even with all the uncertainties and changes that accompany periods of rapid political and economic transition, skilled people can make their lives better. South Africa is a dynamic society with a substantial economy still capable of producing the quality of lifestyle that highly qualified people desire (whether they be from the First or Third Worlds). At the same time, the results also suggest that without sending clear signals that will increase certainty about the future, and without a sharp reduction in xenophobia and communication of that reduction to skilled people outside the country (especially to those living in Africa), it will be increasingly hard to convince any skilled people that there is green grass in South Africa.

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8 The fieldwork was co-ordinated by Idasa's Public Opinion Service and conducted by Decision Surveys International (DSI) in June and July 1999. The interviews were conducted in English and lasted approximately 45 minutes each. At least 15% of each interviewer's questionnaires were back-checked. Interviewees had to be foreign citizens; 20 years or older; have matriculated and be in possession of a Technikon diploma or University degree from a recognised institution (or in their final year of studying for a diploma or degree); and be currently economically active (employed or looking for employment). The only exceptions were people who had not matriculated and/or graduated from a tertiary institution, but who nonetheless occupied a senior management position in their occupation. Within each metropolitan area a snowball sampling method was used. As a first step, interviewers contacted a range of firms thought to employ significant number of skilled foreign workers and developed other contacts and networks to find potential respondents. Once initial contact was made and an interview completed, these respondents were then asked about other skilled foreigners they might know, and many of these people were subsequently interviewed when possible. Only one interview was conducted within each household.
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Chapter 6

To Stay or Not to Stay: Perspectives on the Emigration Potential of Skilled Batswana

Eugene K Campbell

When Botswana attained independence in 1966 there were very few "highly skilled" nationals to fill technological, managerial and other positions deemed critical to development. The commencement of diamond mining in the 1970s, and the related economic growth and development activities that followed, necessitated considerable importation of foreign skilled labour to assist in the nation building process. At the same time, the government of Botswana also implemented a strategy of human resource development for Botswana citizens. Between 1979 and 1989, primary school enrolment increased by 66% while secondary school and University of Botswana (degree) enrolment increased by 247% and 335%, respectively. Between 1991 and 1997 about P379 million was spent on human resource development, increasing annually by 9%.[1]

These educational policies have managed to localize a wide range of positions previously held by expatriates. However, income and position/rank held by nationals do not appear to be commensurate with that of expatriate staff. Meanwhile, job opportunities in South Africa are often more appealing. Vacant positions in Botswana that require a Master's degree may only require a Bachelors degree in South Africa and salaries are often better. A further source of frustration amongst skilled Batswana is the perceived failure of many recent University of Botswana graduates to realise their dreams of accelerated promotion in Botswana.

These concerns are strictly anecdotal, however. Statistical data on permanent emigration does not exist in Botswana (Botswana citizens are not required to complete immigration forms when leaving or entering the country) and there has never been any systematic or representative empirical research on the more qualitative aspects of skilled emigration from the country.

This study is an attempt to redress this gap by providing baseline data on what skilled Batswana are thinking about emigration, whether they have emigrated in the past, and what their plans are for the future. After a brief outline of the methodologies used, and a description of the interview sample, the chapter discusses the "emigration potential" of skilled Batswana: that is, how likely is it that skilled Batswana will leave the country, how often have they considered

Staying in Zambia

Bizeck Phiri

I joined the University of Zambia as a Staff Development Fellow in the Department of History in 1980. In 1983 I was appointed a lecturer. At that time, there were five expatriate staff and eight Zambian staff. Today, 17 years later, I am the longest serving member of the teaching staff in the Department of History.

By the mid-1980s, a new trend had developed. Several Zambians sent abroad for studies opted to remain there, or returned only briefly to Zambia before taking up appointments at universities in neighbouring countries where salaries and conditions of service were more attractive. All the expatriate staff either returned home or took up appointments in neighbouring countries. The Zambian staff migrated to neighbouring countries in search of better salaries and conditions of service. The University has lost over 200 qualified Zambian staff members. The cumulative loss to the university has been enormous.

Why have I stayed on at the University of Zambia? The reasons are both personal and professional. When I returned from my doctoral studies in 1991 I had the responsibility of looking after my aging mother. I considered it morally wrong to leave the country at the expense of my family obligation. I chose to do what I considered to be the correct thing to do and that was to look after my old mother. She finally died at the age of 84 in 1997.

Professionally, I was also making steady progress. Between 1992 and 1994 I was Head of the Department, from 1994 to 1996 I was Assistant Dean in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, and between 1996 and 1997 I was Dean of Student Affairs. During this entire period I published and was promoted. My career was thus going well at the University of Zambia. However, when I resigned from the position of Dean of Student Affairs in 1997, the economic situation in the country was quite weak. Salaries for academic staff and conditions of service were very poor compared to the neighbouring countries. I decided, at last, to leave.

However, something happened to change my mind. One of the push factors for so many academics was that university salaries did not give one a chance to own property. Just when I had an opportunity to leave, the university implemented the government policy of selling some of its houses to staff. I was made an offer to buy the university house I occupied. It was an offer I could not refuse. That was perhaps the only chance I had of ever owning a property. When I weighed my options, I opted to stay on and slowly begin to make payments towards the purchase of the house.

Hopefully, by the time my mortgage is paid off, things will have improved and I may not need to leave the University of Zambia, except perhaps on sabbatical leave. For now, the door is still open. I will re-examine my options after fully paying for the house.

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leaving, where would they go, and so on? The chapter then assesses whether or not this emigration potential is a concern. In other words, does Botswana face an emigration exodus in the foreseeable future? The final section of the chapter looks at the decision-making factors related to emigration: what is it that keeps people in Botswana and what is it that may motivate them to leave?

In sum, it would appear that Botswana is not facing an immediate "brain drain" crisis. Ongoing efforts to localise skilled positions in both the public and private sector, continued investments in higher education and a relatively strong economy and currency serve to encourage skilled Batswana to stay in the country and to attract back foreign-trained Batswana. Nevertheless, strong economies in South Africa and Namibia, as well as opportunities in Europe and North America, combined with frustrations about the lack of income parity with expatriates and limited upward mobility could create the conditions for increased emigration in the near future. The government of Botswana would be advised to monitor this situation and to generate regular and useful information on emigration statistics and expectations.

Research Methodology

The intent of the survey was to interview a wide range of public and private sector professionals in areas deemed to be important to the development of Botswana. For logistical and budgetary reasons it was not possible to include every sector of the economy but the sample did include the private sector, the Ministries of Education, Health, Finance and Development Planning, the University of Botswana, the Botswana Institute of Accounting, the Botswana Institution of Engineers, and the Botswana Law Society. All these organisations were informed about the study and were requested to furnish a complete list of all their members and skilled personnel, nationwide. The information provided included names, rank, postal address and telephone numbers. The information from government ministries also included pay scales which helped distinguish between "skilled" and "unskilled" employees.

A smaller list of interviewees was then drawn from the master list using random selection methods, with the exception of the University of Botswana where sample selection was done using the internal telephone directory. This initial sampling procedure gave a list of 900 possible interviewees, 80% of whom were sent a questionnaire by mail and 20% of whom received a hand-delivered questionnaire.

The research assistants were university students. After a week of training, the research assistants did the actual selection of samples, stamped, addressed and posted or hand-delivered the questionnaire packages and made follow-up telephone calls and visits to retrieve completed questionnaires within Gaborone. Each questionnaire package included a stamped envelope for easy return of completed questionnaires to the researchers. With very few exceptions, respondents preferred to complete the questionnaires themselves. Thus the canvasser method of enumeration was not applied, as was initially intended. Though attempts were made to retrieve completed questionnaires from respondents working outside Gaborone, almost all of them were returned by post. The survey was done between 10 August and 30 October 1998 and the waiting period for completed questionnaires was up to the end of November 1998.

A total of 226 people returned the completed questionnaires for a response rate of 25.1%, a normal response rate for mail-out surveys. The data were then entered into an SPSS database.

Profile of the Sample

As outlined in Table 6.1, the sample is drawn from a wide range of professions in the country. Education, health care and accounting make up the bulk of the interviewees, but there are also dentists, lawyers, graphic designers, radio producers and public relations officers included in the sample.

In terms of gender, 38% of the sample were men and 62% were women (Table 6.2). This gender ratio is due in large part to the high number of (female) nurses

Table 6.1: Current Occupation of Respondents

Occupation	Number	%
Nursing	50	22
Accounting/auditing/finance	36	16
Other	28	12
Education (administration)	25	11
Lecturer/professor	22	10
Teacher	16	7
Management	12	5
Statistician	12	5
Lawyer	11	5
Engineering	5	2
Dental/medical	5	2
Lab technician/analyst	4	2
Total	**226**	**99**

Note: Figures in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value greater than zero but less than 0.5%.

Table 6.2: Demographics of the Sample

Gender (%)	
Male	38
Female	62
Average age	**37.5 years**
Race (%)	
African	96
White	2
Coloured	2
Household monthly incomes (before tax) (%)	
Less than P 2 700	11
P 2 800–P 5 400	32
P 5 500–P 8 200	15
P8 300–P11 000	12
P11 100–P16 600	10
P16 700–P 30 600	6
P31 700–P41 800	5
More than P44 700	9
Highest educational qualification (%)	
Less than high school certificate	3
Diploma without high school certificate	7
High school certificate	8
Diploma with high school certificate	32
Bachelor's degree	26
Honours degree	1
Post-Graduate Diploma	1
Master's degree	21
Doctorate	1
N = 226	

that responded to the questionnaire, however, and is not necessarily representative of the gender profile of skilled Batswana in general.

The average age of the sample is 37.5 years and just over half (53%) of the sample are either married or co-habiting with a partner, suggesting a relatively established demographic profile for the sample as a whole. Respondents also have an average of 4.1 dependents and 3.2 partial dependents, implying a significant degree of domestic responsibility (financial and otherwise).

Income levels of the sample vary considerably, from less than P2 700 per month in joint household earnings to over P53 000 per month (before tax). One in five of the respondents interviewed reported household earnings of more than P16 700 per month, a considerable income by any Southern African standards, particularly when one takes into account the strength of the national currency (the Pula) relative to other currencies in the region. However, 43% of the sample is earning less than P4 300 per month in joint household income and 36% of the respondents said they only made it through the last 12 months by spending some of their savings and/or borrowing additional cash. It should also be noted that the modal point for joint monthly incomes is approximately P6 000–P4 000 per month lower than that of skilled immigrants living in Botswana (see Chapter 7), giving credence to the oft-heard complaint amongst skilled Batswana that they are paid less than skilled migrants in the country. However, the samples used in the two studies are not directly comparable in terms of occupations so it is difficult to draw a firm conclusion in this regard.

In terms of education, the largest portion of the sample (32%) hold a diploma from a college while a further 26% hold a Bachelor's degree, and 21% a Masters degree. Only 1% of the sample has a doctoral degree. The majority (64%) received their highest educational qualification in Botswana. Of those who obtained their certificates outside the country, the UK was the most popular location (16%), followed by the USA (10%). Although it costs less economically (and in terms of cultural and psychological stress) to study in neighbouring South Africa, only 2% of the sample completed their highest degree there.

It should be stressed, however, that the self-selecting sample is not entirely representative of the pool of skilled Batswana living in the country. Doctors, for example, are not well represented and women are disproportionately represented for the reasons described above. Nevertheless, the sample is the largest and most widely representative group of skilled Batswana interviewed to date and serves as a useful and methodologically sound indicator of the experiences and attitudes of this important group of people.

Emigration Potential

In order to try to determine the "emigration potential" of skilled Batswana, we asked a series of questions related to how much consideration people have given to the idea of emigrating, their desire to emigrate and the likelihood of emigrating.

Table 6.3: Consideration Given to Moving to Another Country

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country to live and work (%)	
Great deal	13
Some	28
None at all	58
Don't know	1
N = 222	

The extent to which people have considered emigration is outlined in Table 6.3, where it is evident that the majority (58%) of the sample have never given it any consideration. However, 13% of the sample have given it a "great deal" of consideration and fully 28% have given it "some" consideration.

We then asked respondents how much they "want" to emigrate and "how likely" it is that they would emigrate. In both cases people were given the option of emigrating for "less than two years" and for "more than two years". The results are outlined in Table 6.4 and show that respondents are more likely to say they would move for a short period of time than they would for a longer period of time. In other words, temporary migration as opposed to permanent emigration is the

Table 6.4: Desire and Likelihood of Emigration

	Desire to move to another country for less than two years (%)	Desire to move to another country for more than two years (%)		Likelihood of moving to another country for less than two years (%)	Likelihood of moving to another country for more than two years (%)
To a great extent	19	20	Very likely	4	8
To some extent	40	33	Likely	25	19
Hardly at all	12	13	Unlikely	35	25
Not at all	21	28	Very unlikely	28	37
Don't know	7	7	Don't know	7	12
N = 226					

preference. Nevertheless, 20% of the sample said they want to move to another country for more than two years "to a great extent" and another 33% said they would want to do this "to some extent".

When it comes to the "likelihood" of moving, only 4% said it was "very likely" that they would leave the country for less than two years and only 8% said it was very likely that they would leave for more than two years. More importantly, only 1% of the respondents said that it was very likely that they would leave the country in the next six months (Table 6.5). There was a slight increase in the number of people that said it was very likely that they would leave in the next two years or the next five years. However, these figures are still quite low, suggesting that there is very little likelihood of a mass exodus of skilled Batswana in the foreseeable future.

Table 6.5: Likelihood of Emigrating in Six Months, Two Years or Five Years

	Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very unlikely	Don't know
In the next six months	1	2	21	70	6
In the next two years	2	10	26	55	45
In the next five years	7	13	18	45	17
N = 226					

Interestingly, women were more likely than men to *want* to emigrate and slightly more likely than men to say that there was a good *likelihood* that they would emigrate. This could be due to the fact that most of the women interviewed were in professions (i.e., nursing and education) where there are many opportunities outside of Botswana but it could also be a reflection of the growing mobility of women in Southern Africa in general.[2] In terms of age, younger respondents were more likely to say that they want to emigrate than older respondents. Similarly, unmarried respondents were more likely to want to emigrate than married respondents, as were those with few or no children/dependents. These findings fit with international trends on migration, where it is generally younger, single, and less attached people that are more likely to migrate.

There was also a slightly higher propensity amongst degree holders to emigrate than non-degree holders. Interestingly, respondents with higher incomes are slightly less likely to be interested in emigration, perhaps because they are satisfied with their income situation in Botswana. In terms of occupations, lawyers and accountants would appear to be the most likely candidates for emigration.

When asked what would be the "most preferred" country to live and work in if they were ever to leave Botswana, the most popular responses were the USA (27%), South Africa (21%), UK (19%) and Namibia (8%). The rest of the responses were scattered amongst Australasian, European and African states. When asked the "most likely" destination if they were ever to leave Botswana, the same general set of countries emerge, but South Africa becomes the most common response (26%) and the UK drops to only 12%. Clearly, South Africa looms large on the list of potential emigration destinations, unsurprisingly given the physical proximity of the country, the cultural and linguistic linkages between the two countries, and the wide range of opportunity in a relatively diverse South African economy.

When asked how long they would stay in their most likely destination if they "had to leave Botswana", just over half said they would want to stay for less than two years but a third said they would stay for two to five years and 15% said they would stay for more than five years.

Commitment to Botswana

A large majority of the respondents surveyed have a very strong attachment to Botswana and are indeed quite patriotic. Over 80% expressed strong feelings of pride in being citizens of Botswana and approximately 70% said they hope their children will have the same feelings towards the country. Another 80% said they have a "strong desire" to assist in building Botswana's economy and society. This last point is reinforced by the fact that 60% of respondents disagreed with the statement that "It really does not matter where one is a citizen as long as the person has a good quality of life" (although 34% of skilled nationals did agree with this statement).

The skilled Batswana interviewed are also overwhelmingly trustful of their national government, with more than 90% saying that they "trust the government to do what is right". Another 82% of respondents agreed with the statement that "it would be justified for the government to pass legislation requiring citizens of Botswana to work in the country for several years after completion of their education". It should be noted here that a policy of national service (*Tirelo Sechaba*[3]) has been in effect in Botswana since the early 1980s, and has been generally well received, which may have influenced these results. Nevertheless, the highly positive responses are no doubt also a reflection of the generally high levels of satisfaction in the minds of the respondents with government performance and the role that the state plays in development initiatives.

This commitment to Botswana is further illustrated by the very low number of respondents (2%) who are interested in seeking citizenship in another country. As many as 96% said they are unwilling to give up their Botswana citizenship. Likewise, only a few would sell their house, take all their savings, or take all their investments out of Botswana if they were to leave the country (3%, 4% and 5%, respectively).

The only point where respondents qualified their commitment to Botswana was (revealingly) on issues of taxation. Less than 40% of skilled Batswana feel the government would be justified in requiring its citizens to pay a larger share of their income in taxes according to the ability to pay. Indeed, only 36% consider the tax level in Botswana to be better than that in South Africa, USA, UK and Australia and fewer than 30% feel that their relative share of taxes paid to the government is better than what applies in these other countries. Finally, just less than half of those surveyed feel the government of Botswana would be justified in requiring citizens to pay taxes on income earned outside Botswana.

In sum, the majority of respondents are not interested in long-term emigration but there are a significant number that say they would leave the country if they had the opportunity (or were forced to leave for personal or economic reasons) and would stay out of the country for variable periods of time. These figures are not cause for alarm, particularly given the fact that very few respondents said they plan to leave in the near future and so many are clearly committed to Botswana. However, they should not be ignored, and suggest that the government of Botswana and employers of skilled personnel do need to take the question of skilled emigration seriously. If there were to be a dramatic downturn in the economy in Botswana, for example, it is possible that the number of potential migrants could increase significantly, leaving Botswana with a serious skills shortage.

Decision-Making Factors

Comparing Botswana to other Countries

In an effort to try and understand the decision-making process on emigration, we asked a series of questions about how people compare Botswana to the country which they indicated as the "most likely destination" (MLD) if they were to leave Botswana. The results reveal three interesting trends (Table 6.6). On the one hand, respondents clearly feel that Botswana offers them more security in terms of job tenure and the safety of oneself and one's family. On the other hand, respondents clearly feel that opportunities for job advancement and income are better outside of Botswana along with social services like schools, medical services, public amenities, shopping, and customer service. Finally, there is a polarisation of responses on some of the indices, with respondents divided on which country offered the better overall living conditions, cost of living, quality of jobs, ability to find a good house, and future of one's children.

It would appear, therefore, that it is only job security and safety where skilled Batswana feel that Botswana is clearly better than their MLD. These are important issues, of course, and could well be decisive in keeping skilled people in the country. If safety or job security were to become a concern it could very well tip the balance in favour of emigration. Alternatively, if social services were improved it could well convince those who are thinking about emigrating to stay in the country. Indeed, on almost every index, those who think conditions are better in

Table 6.6: Comparison of Conditions in Botswana and MLD

Conditions (%)	Better in Botswana	About the same	Better in most likely destination (MLD)	Don't know
Your personal safety	61	18	10	11
Your family's safety	60	20	9	11
The security of your job	52	17	15	16
The future of your children in Botswana	48	13	30	9
Overall living conditions	41	17	36	6
Cost of living	41	16	40	3
Your level of taxation	36	17	13	35
Ability to find the house you want to live in	33	16	23	18
Your job	31	13	49	7
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	29	17	14	40
Prospects for professional advancement	20	15	57	8
Your level of income	20	11	60	9
Ability to find medical services for your family and children	16	17	57	10
Ability to find a good school for your children	13	13	65	9
Availability of affordable quality products	11	10	70	9
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g.. Parks, beaches, toilets, etc.)	9	13	66	12
Customer service	8	21	44	17
N = 226				

their MLD are also more likely to have given a lot of consideration to emigrating. This association is particularly strong with respect to opportunities for professional advancement and income.

Possible Reasons for Leaving Botswana

We also asked which factors would be most likely to cause them to want to stay in Botswana and which would be most likely to cause them to leave. Not surprisingly, the primary factor influencing a decision to leave is prospects for professional advancement (Table 6.7). This reason comprised 27% of valid reasons for all skilled Batswana and 29% for those who have considered emigrating. Income is a close second for those who have considered emigrating (27%) but is not quite as important for the sample as a whole. Cost of living, a factor directly related to income and taxation, appears as the third most important factor that may influence a skilled Motswana to emigrate.

Also not surprising is the fact that few respondents listed job security as a possible reason for wanting to emigrate. In fact, it has zero effect on those who have considered emigrating, once again underscoring the high levels of job assurance for skilled nationals in the country. Housing, personal safety and children's future in Botswana also have little effect on the consideration to emigrate, as do other social services like public amenities, shopping and medical services, suggesting that these may not be critical decision-making factors.

It is interesting to note, however, that the ability to find good schools for children in Botswana has much less effect (4%) on those who have considered emigrating than those who have never considered emigrating (11%). This may be due to the fact that those respondents who have considered emigrating tend to have higher incomes and are therefore likely to be able to send their children to expensive private schools of their choice in Botswana. The fact that the ability to find good medical services for one's family and children in Botswana is less a factor in the emigration decision process among those who have considered emigrating is probably due to the same reason. Gaborone Private Hospital and several private clinics in Gaborone and Francistown offer very good medical service.

Possible Reasons for Staying in Botswana

The reasons given for staying in Botswana are essentially a reverse of the reasons given for leaving (Table 6.8), with personal/family safety and job security constituting the two most important factors. Cost of living is the third factor and illustrates the polarisation in attitudes on this subject referred to above. It is noteworthy that the survey was conducted at about the time that salaries of government staff and related organisations were increased by 25%. The initial expectations which followed this increase may explain at least some of the respondents' positive view towards cost of living in the country.

Table 6.7: Possible Reasons for Emigrating

Reason to emigrate (%)	Proportion of total sample citing as reason for wanting to emigrate	Proportion of those who "have considered emigrating" citing this as reason for wanting to emigrate
Prospects for professional advancement	27	29
Income	19	27
Cost of living	19	18
Ability to find good school for child	11	4
Respondent's job	6	12
Ability to find good medical dervices	3	1
Personal/family safety	4	1
Availability of quality goods	2	4
Customer services	2	2
Future of children in botswana	2	0
Ability to find good housing	1	0
Taxation	1	1
Job security	1	0
Upkeep of public amenities	1	0
Other	2	1
N = 180; 84		

The second column in Table 6.8 gives the responses of those who have "never considered migrating". These responses are effectively the same as the total sample and suggest a high degree of consensus amongst skilled Batswana on the factors that would influence them to stay in the country.

The Role of Information in the Decision-Making Process

Information plays a role in the migration decision-making process. As evidenced in Table 6.9, respondents who have given a "great deal of consideration" to

Table 6.8: Possible Reasons for Staying in Botswana

Reason for staying in Botswana (%)	Proportion of total sample who cited this as a possible reason for staying in Botswana	Proportion of those who said they have "never considered migrating" citing this as reason for staying in Botswana
Personal/family safety	36	39
Job security	26	25
Cost of living	11	11
Respondent's job	6	6
Taxation	6	4
Prospects for professional advancement	4	3
Income	5	4
Future of children in botswana	2	3
Ability to find good housing	2	3
Ability to find good school for child	1	-
Ability to find good medical services	1	1
Being at home	1	-
N = 168; 177		

emigrating are far more likely to have obtained information about living conditions and job opportunities in other countries on a regular basis. It is impossible to determine from the data whether or not the consideration to emigrate or the search for information came first. However, there is a clear and very strong relationship between the two, with newspapers and professional journals being a source of information for a large majority of those who have given a lot of consideration to emigration. Interestingly, a significant number of those who said they have not given any consideration to emigration still seek information on living conditions and job opportunities elsewhere, suggesting that there may be some latent potential here for them to also consider emigration. In total, approximately one-third of the entire sample said they "often" use newspapers and journals for information on living conditions and jobs in other countries.

Table 6.9: The Role of Information in Decision-Making

	Amount of consideration given to the possibility of emigrating		
Source of information for those (in each category) who "often" get information about living conditions in other countries (%)			
	A great deal	**Some**	**None at all**
Professional journals/ newsletters	52	41	30
Newspapers	76	59	47
Friends	66	23	25
Family	45	24	13
Professional associations	45	31	27
Source of information for those (in each category) who "often" get information about job opportunities in other countries (%)			
Professional journals/newsletters	69	27	21
Newspapers	76	36	24
Friends	48	10	9
Family	38	11	6
Professional associations	45	15	12
N = 226			

Ability to Leave the Country

The likelihood of emigration is also a factor affecting one's ability to actually leave the country. We therefore asked respondents how easy or difficult it would be for them to go and work in another country if they wanted to, and whether or not they would be able to afford moving to another country. The results are presented in Table 6.10 and suggest that over a third (39%) of respondents would be able to leave the country if they wanted to and approximately a quarter would be able to afford it. The flip-side of these responses is that 43% said they would find it difficult to leave the country and 52% said they would not be able to afford it, once again underlining the fact that although some emigration may occur, mass emigration is highly unlikely in the near future.

The Role of Family in Decision-Making

Decisions about international migration usually involve more than just the potential migrant. We therefore asked who would be the final decision-maker on

Table 6.10: Ability to Leave Botswana

Ease of leaving Botswana to go and work in another country (%)	
Very easy	11
Easy	28
Difficult	24
Very difficult	19
Don't know	18
Affordability of costs of travelling to another country and finding a good home (%)	
Very affordable	3
Affordable	23
Unaffordable	35
Very unaffordable	17
Don't know	22
N = 221	

the question of emigration and what role family encouragement (or discouragement) plays in this process. Table 6.11 presents the findings for the sample as a whole, from which it is apparent that most families would discourage emigration. No doubt this would have an influence on the decision-making process, despite the fact that over two-thirds said that they would be the final decision-makers.

Table 6.11: The Role of Family in Decision-Making

Would your family tend to encourage or discourage you from leaving Botswana?	
Strongly encourage	6
Encourage	9
Neither	14
Discourage	28
Strongly discourage	33
Don't know	10
N = 187	

Proof of this family influence is seen in the strong correlation between those who say they have given a "great deal" of consideration to emigration and those who say their families would encourage them to go. Those who said they had *not* considered emigration were more likely to say their family would discourage it. Furthermore, those who have given a lot of consideration to emigrating are more likely to claim to be the final decision-makers on these issues.

Conclusions

Based on the interviews in this study it seems unlikely that Botswana faces a major exodus of skilled nationals in the foreseeable future. The economy is relatively buoyant, the currency is strong and the state continues to invest significant resources into training and localisation. More tellingly, the vast majority of those interviewed are generally happy with conditions in Botswana, proud to be a citizen of the country and trust the government. There are clearly areas where respondents would like to see conditions improve in Botswana (e.g., social services, room for professional advancement) but these do not appear to be fatal flaws, at least not yet.

These largely positive results are not grounds for complacency, however. Rather, they should be seen as an indication of what Botswana is doing well and what it is doing less well in terms of retaining skilled Batswana. The results should be seen as a warning sign of what could happen if the economy were to stumble, if the government were seen to be corrupt or if personal safety were to become a problem.

The present study has succeeded in identifying the major concerns (good and bad) of skilled Batswana when it comes to emigrating and many of the key decision-making criteria. Future studies should expand the number of professions interviewed and also interview policymakers and public and private sector executives with the aim of obtaining information on hiring practices/obstacles and attitudes towards policy reform. What, for example, would policymakers and employers have to say about the perceived limits of professional advancement or the apparent differential between the salaries of skilled Batswana and skilled immigrants? As Southern Africa heads towards a more unified and globalised future, skilled migration is only going to grow in importance and the government of Botswana would be well advised to monitor and address these issues in a proactive, rather than a reactive, manner.

Notes and References

1 BIDPA, *Study of Poverty and Poverty Alleviation in Botswana*, Gaborone: Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1997; Republic of Botswana, *National Development Plan 8, 1997/98-2002/03*, Gaborone: Government Printer, 1997; Republic of Botswana, *Annual Economic Report, 1998*, Gaborone: Government Printer, 1998;

Republic of Botswana, *Annual Economic Report, 1999*, Gaborone: Government Printer, 1999.

2 B Dodson, 'Women on the Move: Gender and Cross-border Migration to South Africa', in DA McDonald (ed), *On Borders: Perspectives on International Migration in Southern Africa*, New York: St Martin's Press, 2000.

3 *Tirelo Sechaba* ("work for the nation") is designed to expose students who have completed Form 5 to pre-employment work experience in areas outside their places of usual residence while at the same time giving these young adults the opportunity to give community services to the nation. Increasingly, it has become an important part of the educated Motswana's life. For instance, it is a prerequisite for gaining government scholarships to study in tertiary institutions within and outside Botswana. It is anticipated that this policy will be terminated soon, however.

Chapter 7

Skilled Immigrants in Botswana: A Stable But Temporary Workforce

John O Oucho

Botswana became independent in 1966 with an economy that revolved around animal husbandry and little more. When diamond mining began in the 1970s, the country underwent rapid transformation and the country's economy began to grow. Today, Botswana has one of the most vibrant and fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa, and, as a result has also become a major destination for migrants from all over the world, particularly skilled migrants.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the attitudes of these skilled immigrants: why did they come to Botswana, what do they do in Botswana, how long do they intend to stay? It is hoped that this information will lead to a better understanding of the role that skilled foreigners play in the socioeconomic make-up of Botswana and what their plans are for the future. Are skilled people from outside the country happy with Botswana? Is there anything that the government of Botswana can do, or should be doing, to attract or retain skilled immigrants in the country?

Currently, the government of Botswana has an informal policy of "promotional entry" by which it tries to attract skilled personnel from other countries to fill critical areas of skills shortage (e.g., doctors, university professors). Moreover, the Directorate of Public Service Management has been sending recruitment missions all over the world to recruit skilled personnel. It is critical, therefore, to have a better understanding of skilled migration into the country and what the future may hold. This research is the first attempt to systematically evaluate the experiences and attitudes of skilled immigrants in Botswana and sheds light on a wide range of issues.

The chapter consists of six sections. The first section provides an overview of the country's economy, population and government policy as they relate to skilled immigration. The second section explains the methodology used to select respondents, collect and analyse data, and presents the profile of the sample in terms of their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, economic status before and after immigration into Botswana, and their work status in the country. The conditions experienced by these skilled immigrants while living in Botswana are the focus of section three. This discussion includes foreigners' relations with Batswana, their perceived treatment in the country, their perceived socio-economic status, and their social relations and networks. Section four is a

Why I Stay Here

Hadija Murenga

The majority of Kenyan citizens are not about to make a move. They would rather be rendered jobless but remain in Kenya. This could be called 'patriotism'. These are real Kenyans, born and bred, who will die in Kenya no matter what. This also has to do with the pervasive cultural belief that 'he who leaves his own culture becomes a slave'. Most Kenyans cannot think of themselves as slaves elsewhere. They would rather live hand to mouth but be in their own country. There are various horror stories circulating locally about the kind of jobs many Kenyans are forced to take when they are in foreign countries, especially the USA (cleaning toilets, newspaper vending, baby-sitting, cooking, etc.). Most Kenyans would rather do similar jobs back at home than travel overseas and end up doing the same thing.

Attachment to one's family, traditions, culture which leads to love for one's country is another reason why most people in Kenya are not willing to migrate to other countries. The fear of culture-shock is another reason. The cost of migration is also another reason why most Kenyans have not thought of emigrating to other countries. The majority of Kenyans live in the rural areas and are poor. Migration to such people is a total luxury especially when they are never sure of where the next meal will come from. Most Kenyans are not able to raise their airfare or other transport costs; so how can such people think of migrating? So, the question is, is migration really an urgent subject for most Kenyans? The answer is no.

Like many skilled Kenyans, I believe that the right time for my migrating to another country has not come. I do still hope that it will and am actually looking forward to it and working towards it. I personally wished to learn locally and start my long journey in career development before thinking of emigrating. Like many people I know, I also wanted to have a family while at home in Kenya. I am happy that I have accomplished my dreams up to now. I am a lecturer in the Department of Sociology and I am married with two sons. My wish now is to get a good PhD scholarship which would enable me to study abroad with my family and hopefully look for employment on completion. But even if this dream comes true, I intend to come back home to Kenya someday.

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discussion of how skilled immigrants compare Botswana with their home country and a third country. The responses provide useful insights into the reasons for emigration from, and maintenance of links with, the home country, as well as the possibility of returning there or moving to a third country. Section five reports on the nature and extent of the maintenance of links with the home country. Indices of such links investigated include periodic returns home and remittances made to the home country – their frequency, recipients and value. Finally, the chapter offers some recommendations for policy as well as future research.

Botswana as a Migration Destination

Most sub-Saharan African countries have been in economic decline for the past two decades. Of the few African countries which have recorded economic growth, Botswana has exhibited an unusual economic resilience, largely attributable to its political stability and rich diamond deposits. In the three decades since independence, the country's GDP per capita has increased from P1 683 in 1966 to P7 863 in 1994/95, growing at an average annual rate of 6.1%.[1] With the exception of Seychelles and Mauritius, the country also had the most impressive Human Development Index of all the SADC member states (0.741 in 1993), although this dropped slightly to 0.678 in 1995 (and 0.577 in 2001).[2]

Incorporated in this impressive record is the development of infrastructure. The length of tarred roads increased nearly twenty times from 219 kilometres in 1975 to 4 177 kilometres in 1995, while ownership of motor vehicles went from 15 400 to 191 500 in the same time period. Domestic electricity generation increased from 270 million kwh in 1975 to 1 040 kwh in 1995 and the number of telephone subscribers went from virtually nothing to 50 477 by 1995.[3] These are dramatic strides by any measure and demonstrate the relative prosperity that the country and its nationals have enjoyed in the first thirty years of independence while much of sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed decline. The National Development Plan 8 expects that this prosperity will continue, with real economic growth projected at 4.5% per annum over the period 1995/96 to 2020/21, a rate higher than the population growth rate.[4]

Source Countries of Legal In-Migration

The importance of Botswana as an immigration country is attested by Tables 7.1 and 7.2 which report African and non-African sources of immigration into the country before 1992. African immigrants were mainly from South Africa, followed by Zimbabwe. While the majority originated from SADC countries, the non-SADC countries of Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria play an appreciable role in the immigration equation. This country-of-origin mix is rare in a small population such as Botswana's and attests to the country's growing importance as an immigration country in Africa.

Table 7.1: African Population of Botswana by Country of Origin (1981 and 1991)

Country of citizenship	Census			
	1981		1991	
	Number	%	Number	%
South Africa	3 807	44	6 254	34
Zimbabwe	2 375	27	5 308	29
Zambia			2 154	12
Malawi	234	3	771	4
Angola	403	5	596	3
Ghana	93	1	569	3
Lesotho	464	5	547	3
Tanzania			498	3
Uganda			319	2
Mauritius			316	2
Namibia	521	6	310	2
Kenya			132	1
Swaziland	125	1	117	1
Nigeria	99	1	117	1
Rest of Africa	612	7	331	2
Total	**8 733**	**100**	**18 538**	**100**

Note: Figures in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value greater than zero but less than 0.5%.

Non-African immigration involves a good spread of countries in Europe, Asia, America and Oceania (Table 7.2). More than half of immigration was from Europe with the United Kingdom accounting for about 53% in 1981 and 64% in 1991 of all Europeans. Asia accounted for a mere 14% of total immigration in 1981 but almost 40% of all non-African immigration. India accounted for just above half of the Asian total, followed by China with approximately one-fifth.

Research Methodology

Data collection for the survey was based on a sample of employees selected from five principal employers in Botswana: staff of the University of Botswana; members of the Institution of Engineers; members of the Botswana Law Society drawn from

Table 7.2: Resident Population from Europe, Asia, America and Oceania (1981 and 1991)

Country of citizenship	Census			
	1981		1991	
	Number	%	Number	%
Europe				
Denmark			110	2
Germany			359	6
Ireland			200	4
Italy			174	3
Norway			125	2
Netherlands			203	4
Portugal			148	3
Sweden			140	3
United Kingdom	3 650	73	3 559	64
Yugoslavia			104	2
Rest of Europe	1 335	27	484	9
Total	**4 985**	**100**	**5 606**	**100**
Asia				
China			946	23
India			2 128	51
Pakistan			157	4
Sri Lanka			431	10
Rest of Asia			531	13
Total	**946**	**100**	**4 193**	**100**
Americas				
United States	631	81	653	74
Canada	122	16	121	14
Rest of Americas	23	3	107	12
Total	**776**	**100**	**881**	**100**
Oceania				
Australia			130	84
Rest of Australia			25	16
Total	**179**	**100**	**155**	**100**

the law firms registered with the society; members of the Association of Accountants; and three key Government Ministries (Health, Education, and Finance and Development Planning). Other professional institutions that had been approached to provide lists of their employees failed to provide the information in time and were unfortunately dropped from the survey. The sample is therefore not representative of *all* skilled sectors in the country but it does provide a representation of key skilled occupations, both in the public and private sector.

From these lists of professions, a random, unstratified sample of non-Botswana citizens was generated and a total of 850 questionnaires were dispatched in August 1998 in two ways. First, research assistants hand-delivered questionnaires to the prospective respondents in the Gaborone area. On delivery of the questionnaires, the research assistants requested an appointment for face-to-face interviews. Where this was not possible, respondents were asked to complete the questionnaires and return them by mail. Second, the research assistants mailed questionnaires and followed them up after some time to determine whether they had been mailed back to the research office. By November 1998, 140 surveys had been completed (either in person or sent in by mail). Of these, 15 had to be discarded, leaving a total sample size of 125 individuals (or 14.7% of the initial list).

One possible explanation for this relatively low return rate (25% is normal for most mail surveys) is that some skilled immigrants suspected that the research was meant to elicit information which was either too confidential or which could be prejudicial to their tenure as expatriate workers in Botswana. Although some of these prospective respondents called the research co-ordinator's office for reassurance, they were still reluctant to complete and return questionnaires or have them collected. Nonetheless, the sample size is adequate for the purposes of providing insights into skilled foreigners in Botswana and for application of inferential statistical analysis where applicable. Most importantly, the sample represents a broad cross-section of important skills areas and thereby provides invaluable insight into this hitherto under-researched group of non-citizens in Botswana.

A Profile of the Sample Population

The skilled immigrants in our sample originate mainly from African, European and Asian countries (Table 7.3). Interestingly, despite the fact that we did not sample by country of origin, our sample is nevertheless similar to that of the universal sample of immigrants enumerated in the 1981 and 1991 censuses (Tables 7.1 and 7.2), suggesting a high degree of representivity and limited change in the 1990s. Approximately 60% of the sample come from Africa, with South Africa emerging as the most important country of origin, followed by Zambia, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya. Of the European source countries, the UK emerges (not unexpectedly) as the single most important country of origin, but a striking feature of the European immigration is the spread of origins in Western and Eastern Europe. Those of Asian origin are dominated by India (also not

Table 7.3: Sample by Country of Origin

Country and region	Country of passport		Home country	
	Number	%	Number	%
Africa	74	60	77	63
South Africa	12	10	15	12
Cameroon	1	1	1	1
Liberia	1	1	1	1
Sierra Leone	1	1	1	1
Ghana	7	5	7	6
Nigeria	2	2	2	2
Sudan	1	1	1	1
Eritrea	-	-	1	1
Ethiopia	2	2	1	1
Kenya	8	7	7	6
Tanzania	6	5	7	6
Uganda	5	4	5	4
Burundi	1	1	1	1
Zimbabwe	8	7	8	7
Zambia	14	11	14	11
Malawi	5	4	5	4
Asia	**19**	**15**		**14**
India	11	9	11	9
Sri Lanka	4	3	4	3
Bangladesh	3	2	1	1
Israel	1	1	1	1
Europe	**25**	**21**		**20**
Netherlands	1	1	1	1
Belgium	1	1	1	1
Yugoslavia	1	1	1	1

Table 7.3: (Continued)

Country and region	Country of passport		Home country	
	Number	%	Number	%
United Kingdom	15	12	13	11
Norway	1	1	1	1
Germany	1	1	1	1
Ireland	3	4	3	2
Russian Republics	2	2	1	1
Bulgaria	1	1	3	2
North America and Caribbean	**4**	**3**	**3**	**2**
United States	2	2	2	2
Canada	1	1	-	-
Trinidad and Tobago	1	1	1	1
Oceania	**1**	**1**	**1**	**1**
Australia	1	1	1	1
Total	**124**	**100**	**123**	**100**

unexpectedly), followed by Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Finally, North America, the Caribbean and Oceania are unimportant origins, though the case of the USA is contradicted by census data and may represent a low response rate. In racial terms, 50% of the sample was African, 36% White, 12% Asian and 2% Coloured.

The official status of the sample is overwhelmingly "work permit holder" (85%). Only one person among the respondents had permanent residence, 3% had temporary residence and 11% hold exemption certificates. The reason for this pattern will become clear later.

As evidenced in Table 7.4, the occupational spread of the sample fits with the targeted categories of "skilled" professions, with the largest number of interviewees being in a medically-related field. It is also worth noting that 90% of the sample were employed full-time in their home countries before coming to Botswana, with an additional 8% and 1% being self-employed in the formal and informal sector respectively.

While the average age of internal migration in sub-Saharan African countries is 20–29 years, it is generally higher in international migration, a rule that is supported by this sample with a mean age of 42.[5] This result is also consistent with

Table 7.4: Occupation of Interviewees

Current occupation	Number	%
Medical practitioner/doctor	21	9
Accountant	20	18
Professor/lecturer	25	22
Finance manager	9	8
Auditor	5	5
Radiographer	5	5
Director	3	3
Lawyer	3	3
Librarian	3	3
Specialist surgeon	3	3
Financial controller	2	2
Manager/managerial office worker	2	2
Chief technical officer	1	1
Engineer (mining)	1	1
Graphic designer	1	1
Speech therapist	1	1
Physiotherapist	1	1
Vocational training college instructor	1	1
Technical advisor	1	1
Education officer	1	1
Cosmetologist	1	1
Psychiatrist	1	1
N = 111		

the stepwise migration hypothesis which suggests that most skilled foreigners must first have worked and gained experience in their own or other countries before migrating to Botswana.

Also unsurprising is the finding that the highest percentage of skilled foreigners in this random sample are males, accounting for 85% of the total. Men have traditionally dominated cross-border migration in Sub-Saharan Africa and gender inequalities in terms of access to higher education. Access to senior managerial and professional positions has no doubt exacerbated these gender imbalances when it comes to skilled migration.

Nevertheless, it is equally evident that women are increasingly participating in cross-border movements in the region and it is likely that skilled women will come to feature more prominently in the area of skilled migration as well.[6] In fact, many of the spouses of the predominantly-male sample are already working in skilled or semi-skilled areas, suggesting a considerable skilled cohort of women is already in place in Botswana B if not by design then at least by default (Table 7.5). There is also the possibility that skilled female immigrants self-selected themselves out of the survey by not returning the questionnaires. Unfortunately, the census data does not allow us to cross-reference these gender statistics.

Some 84% of the sample are married, once again underscoring the fact that skilled migrants tend to be older and more established than non-skilled migrants.

Table 7.5: Occupations of Spouses of Interviewees

Current occupation	Number	%
Teacher/lecturer	20	19
Nurse/medical technician	14	13
Professional worker	10	9
Accountant	9	9
Managerial office worker	6	6
Employer/manager of establishment with fewer than 10 Employees	4	4
Lawyer	3	3
Medical doctor/practitioner	3	3
Engineer	2	2
Non-manual office worker	1	1
Services worker	1	1
Supervisory office worker	1	1
Housewife/househusband	30	29
N = 104		

Of the 123 skilled foreigners indicating their academic qualifications, 85% hold a Bachelor's degree or higher, with fully 23% of the sample holding doctoral degrees (due in part to the large sub-sample of university lecturers). The degrees themselves cover a wide range of disciplines, from chemistry to education to commerce, and represent a galaxy of reputable institutions in Africa, Europe, Asia and North America (e.g., Oxford, Yale, University of Cape Town, Chittigong Medical College).

The UK was the most common country of education, with 23% of the sample obtaining their highest qualifications there. But African countries account for 46% of the educational institutions attended, with South Africa alone accounting for 14%. Interestingly, only 2% of the sample obtained their highest educational qualification in Botswana. All in all, the sample represents a very highly qualified group of people with an impressive list of qualifications from 28 countries on four continents – a truly cosmopolitan source of expertise.

The joint monthly income of the sample (before tax) is shown in Table 7.6. Some 24% of the households earn an income of between P5 500–P8 200, and the mean monthly income is P6 517. It is also important to note that 29% of skilled foreigners earn between P8 300–P13 800 a month, 23% earn P19 500 and above, and 8% earn P53 000 or more. These are extremely high income levels by any standards in the SADC region.

Botswana as Host Country

This next section looks at Botswana as a host country. Are skilled immigrants happy living in Botswana? Do they feel they are well treated in the country by

Table 7.6: Joint Monthly Household Income Before Tax

Income (Pula)	(%)
P2 800–P5 400	11
P5 500–P8 200	24
P8 300–P11 000	18
P11 100–P13 800	12
P13 900–P16 600	9
P16 700–P22 200	6
P22 300–P33 400	7
P33 500–PP53 000	8
Over P53 000	8
N = 125, Mean = P6 517	

citizens and government? How do they perceive their personal situation in the country vis-à-vis other groups? And finally, do skilled immigrants feel they have an important role to play in the country?

For the overwhelming majority of respondents (70%), life is deemed to be better in Botswana than in their home country (Table 7.7). Only 4% said things are "worse" in Botswana, suggesting high levels of overall satisfaction. An overwhelming majority of respondents (83%) also said that their relations with Batswana are good, with only 3% saying they are "negative" (Table 7.8). Clearly the people interviewed in this survey are satisfied with their interactions with Batswana and with their overall life situation.

Table 7.7: Comparison of Life in Botswana and Home Country

Quality of life in Botswana versus home country (%)	
Much better	10
Better	60
About the same	20
Worse	4
Don't know	6
N = 124	

Table 7.8: Skilled Foreigners' Relations with Batswana

Relations with people from Botswana (%)	
Very positive	37
Positive	46
Neither positive or negative	14
Negative	2
Very negative	1
N = 125	

Surprisingly, therefore, almost half of the sample (46%) feel that foreigners are perceived negatively by Batswana (Table 7.9). These opinions take a turn for the better when it comes to the perceptions of the attitudes of co-workers and others in the respondent's profession, but there would appear to be a widespread unease with how they are perceived by the public at large.

Table 7.9: How Skilled Foreigners Think They are Perceived

How skilled foreigners think they are perceived by (%)	Positive	Negative	Neither/ don't know
Batswana	30	46	24
Co-workers	60	18	23
People in profession	64	12	26
N = 125			

This concern is also evident in two questions about "unfair treatment" in Botswana (Table 7.10). Over a third of respondents (36%) felt that foreigners as a whole are treated unfairly by Batswana at least "to some extent", and about a quarter felt that they personally have been treated unfairly by Batswana. These figures are only 18% and 13% for perception of how the government of Botswana treats foreigners or them personally unfairly, suggesting once again an institutional behaviour which is more accommodating to skilled foreigners than the general public's reception. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that a majority of respondents have "hardly" or "never" been treated unfairly by Batswana citizens or government, underscoring the generally high levels of satisfaction with life in Botswana.

Respondents were also asked about their satisfaction with a range of socio-economic conditions (Table 7.11). With the interesting exception of "customer service", a large majority were either satisfied or neutral on each of the points. Moreover, a large majority expect conditions in Botswana to remain the same or

Table 7.10: Unfair Treatment in Botswana

	Large extent	Some extent	Hardly at all	Never	Don't know
Unfair treatment of foreigners in general by (%)					
Batswana	5	32	36	14	14
Government of Botswana	3	15	34	33	16
Unfair treatment personally by (%)					
Batswana	2	22	36	36	4
Government of Botswana	3	11	31	51	5
N = 125					

get better over the next five years, with only 24% saying they expect conditions to get worse.

These results also highlight the probable importance of non-economic factors in the retention of skilled immigrants in Botswana (e.g., housing, schooling for children, safety). As important as "Pula power" and high salaries may be, access to services like good health care and the safety of oneself and one's family undoubtedly play into the decision-making process. It seems evident from Table 7.11 that the majority do not have any major grievances on the social front.

Table 7.11: Perceived Socioeconomic Conditions in Botswana

Level of satisfaction with (%)	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Your personal safety	77	15	6	2
Your family's safety	73	14	7	6
Your job	70	18	11	1
Your level of taxation	67	12	10	1
Ability to find medical services for your family and children	63	15	19	2
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	61	22	12	5
Availability of affordable quality products	56	23	20	1
Your level of income	55	20	25	B
Cost of living	52	17	31	B
The security of your job	49	30	20	2
Ability to find the house you want to live in	5	22	31	3
Ability to find a good school for your children	42	19	27	13
Prospects for professional advancement	39	23	35	4
Upkeep of public amenities	37	14	43	6
Customer service	28	15	60	1
The future of your children in Botswana	25	33	25	18
N = 125				

When it came to comparisons with other groups in Botswana, the vast majority were again satisfied with their situation, saying that their personal conditions and those of foreigners as a whole are equal to, or better than, each of the groups we asked about (Table 7.12). Interestingly, these responses applied equally to comparisons between foreigners as well, suggesting a relative degree of socio-economic parity amongst the various nationalities represented in the sample.

Table 7.12: Perceived Conditions of Skilled Foreigners Versus Other Groups in Botswana

Perceived conditions of skilled foreigners with (%)	Better	Same	Worse	Don't know
Other foreign residents living in Botswana	26	55	13	6
Other people from your home country living in Botswana	27	59	9	5
Citizens of Botswana	49	33	14	9
Other people in your profession	17	69	13	2
Other people in your economic class	9	76	13	2
Other people of your race	23	60	9	8
N = 125				

Finally, the vast majority of the respondents feel that they have a role to play in the development of the country (Table 7.13). Fully 44% of the sample feel that they personally have a "major" role to play while an additional 50% feel they have "some role" to play. Only one out of 125 respondents felt they had no role to play. No doubt this is a reflection of the satisfaction that respondents have with their social and work lives in the country and the generally good relations they have with Batswana and corporate/government institutions. If people are made to feel that they belong then they are more likely to feel like they can contribute. The fact that 55% of the sample are involved in some kind of community association and 52% are involved to some extent in community service indicates a considerable amount of extra-curricular activity as well.

The only real concern with respect to the experience of the respondents living in Botswana is a concern with crime: 29% say they have been harassed and 29% say they have been robbed. Only 4% claim to have been assaulted in Botswana, however, suggesting that the crime experienced by this group of foreigners is not particularly violent, and perhaps explaining why 77% of respondents said they were satisfied with their personal safety in Botswana (Table 7.11). Nevertheless, the high rates of robbery and harassment are of concern. There was also one reported case of rape.

Table 7.13: Perceived Role of Skilled Foreigners in Botswana

Perceived role of skilled foreigners in relation to (%)	Major role	Some role	Minor role	No role at all	Don't know
You personally	44	50	5	1	B
Foreign residents who live here	47	44	6	1	2
People from your home country who live here	33	57	7	1	2
People in your economic class	45	49	5	1	1
People who share your home language	45	49	5	1	1
People of your race	28	55	10	3	4
N = 125					

Contrasting Conditions in Botswana with Home Country

As noted earlier, the majority of the sample said that "life is better" in Botswana than their home country. This does not mean, however, that conditions in the home country are necessarily bad. In fact 44% of the sample said that conditions at home are "satisfactory" (Table 7.14). Moreover, close to half said they expect conditions in their home country to improve in the next five years.

Table 7.15 provides a more specific breakdown of how the home country compares with Botswana. It would appear that income-related issues are where Botswana is deemed better. Other important issues like schooling for children, job

Table 7.14: Satisfaction with Overall Conditions in Home Country

How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with overall conditions in your home country? (%)	
Very satisfied	10
Satisfied	34
Unsatisfied	35
Very unsatisfied	19
Don't know	3
N = 124	

Table 7.15: Comparison of Conditions in Botswana and in Home Country

Comparison of conditions between Botswana and home country (%)	Better in Botswana	About the same/don't know	Better in home country
Overall living conditions	60	33	7
Your level of taxation	66	21	13
Your level of income	64	21	16
Cost of living	55	16	29
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	49	38	14
Your personal safety	49	30	22
Your family's safety	48	32	20
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets)	36	26	38
Your job	33	41	26
Availability of affordable quality products	32	26	40
The future of your children	27	27	46
Ability to find medical services for your children and family	25	29	46
Prospects for professional advancement	20	26	54
Customer service	20	20	60
Ability to find the house you want to live in	17	27	55
Ability to find a good school for your children	15	25	60
The security of your job	14	30	56
N = 125			

security, housing and prospects for professional advancement were actually deemed to be better in the home country by a majority of respondents, suggesting that most skilled foreigners in Botswana have opportunities and satisfactory conditions to go home to.[7]

This last point is reinforced by the fact that 98% of the sample have visited their home country on at least one occasion since being in Botswana and 29% return home often. Furthermore, 61% own a house in their home country, 85% have a bank account in their home country and 56% have investments there. Only 28% have a job to return to at home, but presumably they gave up their job to come to Botswana. It should also be noted that 79% of the sample have sent remittances to friends and/or family in their home country, with 22% sending at least a quarter of their income.

The close ties of non-citizens with their home country is further evidenced by the responses given to the questions in Table 7.16. The sense of pride, attachment

Table 7.16: Skilled Foreigners' Views About Their Ties to the Home Country

	% Who agree
It makes you proud to be called a citizen of your country	83
Being a citizen of your country is an important part of how you see yourself	72
You would want your children to think of themselves as citizens of your home country	67
It is your duty to contribute your talents or skills to the development of your home country	53
	% Who feel this is justified
Require citizens to work in the home country for several years after completion of their education	47
Require citizens who have received government bursaries for education to complete some form of national service	78
Require citizens to pay taxes on all income earned outside of the country	9
Require citizens to pay a large share of their income in taxes according to their ability to pay	32
Require citizens to serve in the armed forces in cases of national emergency	57
Limit the amount of money you may send out of the country	18
N = 123	

and responsibility to the home country comes out very clearly in these responses, and although there is strong resistance to the notion of paying taxes to the home government this does not mean they would necessarily want to avoid paying taxes if living *in situ*.

Nevertheless, this sense of close ties with the home country is balanced by the fact that a majority of the sample also appear to be very happy with the overall living conditions in Botswana. As a result, there is no reason to suspect a mass exodus of skilled foreign workers from Botswana in the near future. Skilled immigrants in the country do have options outside of Botswana that they would be happy to return to and a strong commitment to "home", but they also appear to be satisfied with their lives in Botswana.

Plans for the Future

We also asked a series of questions about plans for the future. The results show a stable, but clearly temporary, cohort of skilled migrants. When asked how long they plan to stay in Botswana, almost a third plan to stay for more than five years, while a further 22% say they will stay for up to five years, with a mean length of stay of four years (Table 7.17). Only 7% plan on leaving the country within one year.

Table 7.17: Intended Length of Stay in Botswana

Planned length of stay (%)	
Less than six months	3
Six months to a year	4
One to two years	20
Up to five years	22
More than five years	31
Don't know	20
N = 124, Mean length of expected stay = 4 years	

Nevertheless, the majority of the sample see themselves as temporary sojourners in Botswana. As Table 7.18 attests, relatively few are interested in becoming permanent residents of the country and fewer yet want to become citizens, retire, or be buried in the country.

When asked where they would go if they were to leave Botswana, 52% said they would return to their home country and 39% said they would go to a third country (the remaining 9% did not know). Of the third country possibilities, the USA and Australia were the preferred destinations (Table 7.19).

Table 7.18: Desire to Stay in Botswana

Desire to (%)	To a large extent	To some extent	Hardly at all	Not at all	Don't know
Become a permanent resident of Botswana	21	29	11	33	7
Become a citizen of Botswana	12	21	15	42	10
Retire in Botswana	7	25	15	39	14
Be buried in Botswana	7	14	10	50	21
N = 121					

Table 7.19: Preferred Third Country Destinations

Country (%)	
USA	16
Australia	15
New Zealand	10
South Africa	10
Canada	8
Namibia	7
Britain	6
Malta	2
Mauritius	2
Uganda	2
Other	12
N = 87	

As many as 42% of respondents said they would leave Botswana if it became difficult for them to renew their work permits (Table 7.20). The fact that the overwhelming majority of respondents had no problem applying for their most recent permit would suggest that there is no danger of this happening in the near future, but it does highlight once again the potential "footloose-ness" of this pool of skilled foreigners.

Table 7.20: Ease of Obtaining Work Permit

Ease of obtaining most recent work permit (%)	
Very easy	38
Easy	43
Difficult	6
Very difficult	2
Have never had one	6
Don't know	5
Response if work permit was difficult to get in the future (%)	
Leave the country	42
Unsure	19
Reapply for another	25
I have permanent residence	2
Don't know	14
N = 117, 188	

Policy Implications and Conclusions

The following policy-relevant questions and recommendations arise from the research:

- Given the importance of skilled immigrants to Botswana's economy, the government should regularly undertake to collect and analyse data on skilled migration. This administrative data source would complement census data which are less detailed and generally static. That the vast majority of skilled foreigners expect to return to their home countries at the end of their work in Botswana underscores the need to have regular and dynamic information gathering. Since this survey, some significant changes have already taken place which may accelerate return migration of skilled foreigners. One important change is the taxation of expatriates' gratuities from July 1999, which may deter expatriates from an already expensive country. Another is the withdrawal of fringe benefits such as fees subsidies for expatriate workers' children. These and other future developments could have important implications for what skilled immigrants think about Botswana and it is important to understand how social and economic policy may affect the conditions (real or perceived) of this group of people.

- Generally good relations between skilled immigrants and local Batswana bode well for the future by creating an environment in which immigrants feel welcomed, thereby helping to attract and retain skilled people. But the government of Botswana cannot afford to be complacent on this point and should take heed of the concerns that many of the respondents expressed about negative treatment by Batswana citizens and the (latent) xenophobia that some perceive amongst the general public. Botswana is not immune to these kinds of attitudes, and should there be a significant downturn in the local economy there could be a parallel reduction in the amount of goodwill shown to immigrants occupying key skilled positions. The government of Botswana would be well advised to take a proactive approach to information generation and public education so as to avoid any serious xenophobic sentiments and activities in the future. This point applies to all types of migrants and refugees living in the country, of course, but may require a particular strategic focus for skilled immigrants.
- There is a need for the institutions from which the sample for the study was drawn, as well as other institutions that employ skilled people in Botswana, to quantify and qualify the roles of skilled immigrants vis-à-vis those of nationals as a means of undertaking strategic employment planning (for themselves and the government of Botswana).
- As skilled migrant workers are generally a transient population, they are inclined to keep moving wherever their personal and their families' conditions are likely to improve. Therefore, the government of Botswana in general, and employers in particular, should be sensitive to how their policies and policy changes on migration compare to those of other SADC states in particular. By not doing this, employers in Botswana will lose out to their counterparts in Namibia and South Africa. The competition for skilled personnel in the SADC region is becoming increasingly intense as SADC member states try to improve their economies, and in lieu of a more harmonised and/or regionalised approach to immigration in the region, the government of Botswana will need to be more cognisant of the policies and strategies of their neighbours when it comes to attracting and retaining skilled persons.
- While Botswana has provided a viable economic climate for skilled immigrants and immediate members of their families, it should complement this with a viable social climate (which migrants currently consider to be better in their home countries). If skilled immigrants were sure that they could own houses as easily as nationals, that their children and families would have better access to good schools and medical services and that socially they would mix easily with Batswana, they would have less reason to emigrate or relocate from Botswana soon.
- The general satisfaction with the economy of Botswana notwithstanding, the declining trend in "Pula power" is a source of anxiety. Should expatriates be paid in hard currencies such as the US dollar or pound sterling? Should expatriates'

fringe benefits be improved and those already withdrawn be restored? Should expatriates' gratuities be taxed? These are questions which must draw the attention of policymakers as changes take place in the economic arena, especially because of the growing need for human resources in fast developing countries such as Botswana.

In conclusion, skilled immigrants appear to be satisfied with their situation in Botswana, and although most intend to return to their home country within a few years there is no reason to expect a mass exodus in the near future. As long as the country remains economically vibrant, politically stable and safe, it is very likely that skilled immigrants will continue to remain in, and be attracted to, Botswana.

But despite these generally positive findings it is clear that respondents in this survey show some concern with how they are perceived and treated by the general public in Botswana. There is also some displeasure expressed with respect to social amenities like housing and education. These latter points are too broad to make any specific policy recommendations, but they do underscore the need for more detailed and regular research to track the attitudes of skilled immigrants.

For policymakers in Botswana, this chapter will hopefully serve as a benchmark of information for reviewing the country's immigration policy and for addressing the fears and concerns of skilled foreigners. For the research fraternity, the study is but the beginning of a process that should continue in international migration research in the region.

Notes and References

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7 It is worth noting again the strong dissatisfaction with "customer service" in Botswana; a point which may have some bearing on the international tourism ambitions of the country.

Chapter 8

Migration Attitudes of Skilled Professionals in Lesotho

John Gay

The movement of people between Lesotho and South Africa has been a continuous process ever since the two nations were created in the mid-nineteenth century. Even before that time there was an ebb and flow of individuals and clans within the southern African region, one result of which was the gradual separation of Sesotho- and Setswana-speaking peoples. The languages and the people were most likely unified prior to 1800, although there were differences among families and clan groups. There have been five distinct phases in the migration process since Moshoeshoe I brought refugees together into a unified kingdom:

- Refugees move from the highveld into what is now Lesotho;
- Entrants into the money economy return to South Africa for unskilled work;
- Adventurous families enter the mountains for grazing and then farming;
- Job-seekers without land seek work in Lesotho's new urban areas;
- Skilled workers in Lesotho's towns seek better jobs in South Africa.

The first major movement of people across the Caledon River came as a result of the so-called Great Trek of Afrikaans-speaking people into what became the Orange Free State. Basotho sought a land where they could be free. They were joined by bands of refugees from south and east of the Drakensberg Mountains, who were fleeing the wars in what are now the Eastern Cape and Kwazulu-Natal. Lesotho's boundaries were finally fixed in the 1860s, and the country was taken as a protectorate by Britain in the 1870s.

At that point there began a movement back across the river into the lands where the Basotho had formerly lived. The reason was economic. Gold and diamonds were discovered, and labourers were needed. Basotho saw the opportunity to make a good living from mining, so that they could promote the already rapid economic growth of their country. Eldredge reports that "In 1875 it was possible for a worker at the mines to earn enough money to buy a gun in just one or two months".[1]

For almost a century, most Basotho migration was external, once Lesotho and South Africa became politically different entities. From the point of view of many Basotho, however, the migration could also be considered internal, since the mining houses occupied land traditionally held by Basotho and Batswana.

Conflicting Emotions

Elizabeth Thompson

At the beginning of the 21st century, with the advent of 'white flight' – when transformation to black power accelerated the departure of the racially-obsessed from South Africa – it is interesting for me to ponder the questions: Do I remain committed to this country? Do I still feel the urgency to remain rooted to this place? Or do I move and locate myself abroad?

I have always despised those who fled in fear of the mythical darkness of Africa. Yet life at the former homeland universities has been wracked with instability and terrible uncertainty. The hysteria of staff faced with retrenchment, and the duplicity of an executive declaring that institutions will not close, but privately (one day after the death of my father) holding me and my department at the University of Zululand responsible for the sinking ship, has not been an easy path to tread. Keeping the lid on my emotions has been impossible at times. Sometimes I find myself wondering why I do not retreat.

Maybe in my psyche is the madness of my Scottish ancestry – missionaries who crossed the ocean to do what they believed they should do. Alternatively, my decisiveness to stay may be a rational choice because Africa offers both the new/old, as well as the marginal/central, in the accelerating pace of globalisaton of the world. There are no easy answers. But migration is not a possibility for me.

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Going Home

Bonny Maladzi

I have been in the UK for 19 months and I am returning home in 4 months time. I have a 5-year work permit as a social worker, so it is not the pressures of finding a permit or finding work that have influenced my return home. It is my choice to go home. I think I can make a more positive contribution back home – someone has suggested that South Africans, especially black South Africans, have a moral obligation to return and to help build the country, and maybe they're right. Personally I can make more of an impact as a social worker in an underprivileged area than in an affluent country like the UK.

I have met quite a few other South Africans living and working in the UK. All of them miss their country, and especially the food and weather. Some of them are very honest in saying that they are not going back as they do not think that South Africa will get out of the hole it is in (and has been in for a long time). On the other hand, there are quite a few who believe that South Africa has the potential to go forward, but that it will take a lot of hard work and that when that has happened they will be more than willing to return to South Africa. I think many of them have lost faith in our current government, but they don't say who should make those changes before they go back.

I think by returning I can lend a helping hand. We might not have been part of the problem that caused all of this, but why not be part of the solution?

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Moreover, many relatives of the Basotho who moved into Lesotho remained in their traditional lands, giving occasion for Moshoeshoe's people to visit and even stay with family members across the clearly artificial border.

Within Lesotho itself people moved from the lowlands to the foothills and then the mountains, as the population grew and the available land shrank due to erosion and the creation of villages and their related infrastructure. But this movement slowed down when it became clear in the mid-twentieth century that there was little virgin land left for newcomers. Lesotho stabilised as a primarily rural agricultural country, with the only urban areas being small towns which existed for the benefit of the colonial administration and the tiny, but growing, Basotho middle class.

At independence, the capital city Maseru and its peripheral villages (themselves still largely agricultural) had only 18 797 residents.[2] The other eight administrative centres were much smaller, with a total of 24 119 residents, giving a grand total of 42 916 urban and peri-urban dwellers, who formed only 4.4% of the total population of 969 634. By contrast, the 1961 census reported 100 400 absentee workers, of whom about 55 000 were in the mines. It is most likely true that most of the remaining 45 000 were also in South Africa, working on the farms and railways, in industries, as domestic servants, and as illegal brewers and hawkers, since there were almost no job opportunities for migrants in Lesotho's nine very small towns. Influx controls were imposed by South Africa during the 1950s, but there were still ways to beat the system, particularly because almost all citizens of Lesotho have relatives across the border.

Not until after independence in 1966 was there a significant shift in migration patterns, with educated, employed and employable people moving to the towns. Independence meant the rapid expansion of the civil service, as the ruling party paid its political debts to its supporters. It also meant the first beginnings of a small industrial base. As a result, the population of the towns grew dramatically. The 1976 census gives an urban population of 136 202, which represents a population growth rate of 12.2% during the decade.[3] In 1986 the total population in urban areas was 186 120.[4] If other rapidly growing towns, where traditional agriculture is possible for fewer families every year, are included in addition to the official urban centres, then in 1986 there were more than 300 000 town and city dwellers.[5] Table 8.1 shows the total urban population and the growth rate, as defined in this way, for the period up to 2005.

Why do so many people migrate to the towns and other urban areas? Since they can no longer make a living in agriculture, they must find some other source of livelihood. One alternative source has always been migration to South Africa, while still retaining a home in Lesotho. However, according to Mhlanga, the number in the mines has dropped steadily from a peak of 127 400 in 1990 to 73 500 in 1997.[6] The Labour Force Survey also estimates that another 39 700 persons were employed in other sectors in South Africa in 1997, for a grand total of 113 200.[7] This figure is only marginally higher than the 100 400 who claimed employment in

Table 8.1: Urban Population and Growth Rate, 1996–2005

	1966	1976	1986	1990	1995	2000	2005
Urban population	29 947	100 394	312 794	429 050	574 178	698 069	839 550
Percent of total population	3	8	20	24	30	34	39
Year growth rate (%)	NA	13	12	8	6	4	3

Source: TAMS 1996, Annex K.

South Africa according to the 1966 census, while the non-agricultural, and thus urban, population in Lesotho has grown tremendously.

The contrast between the numbers actually employed in South Africa with the numbers of urbanised people as given in Table 8.1 clearly shows a serious need for jobs, whether in Lesotho or elsewhere. According to the Labour Force Survey, a total of 16.9% of the economically active population between 16 and 65 years of age either actively sought employment or wanted to find a job in late 1997. The problem increases every year, when approximately 50 000 children turn 16, and thus potentially enter the job market. The fact that many remain in school for a few more years simply postpones the problem. That roughly 10 000 persons reach retirement age annually is a partial help, but by no means solves the problem.

In short, every year more Basotho need jobs, and every year there are fewer jobs for them in the mines in South Africa. The bulk of the new recruits to the labour force first make the effort to find work in Lesotho, since they now realise that the mines are taking almost no raw recruits. It is to Lesotho's credit that the economy has been able to maintain a 16.9% open unemployment rate, to a large measure due to the rapid growth of Lesotho's GNP per capita, at rates exceeding 10% in the mid- and late 1990s. However, this rate of expansion of the economy is now dropping dramatically, following the completion of the Katse dam and infrastructure, and as a result of the political instability experienced in 1998, culminating in the riots, burning and subsequent South African (SADC) invasion of September 1998.

Thus those with skills are seeking work outside the country. A major opportunity for skilled Basotho arose following the Soweto riots of 1976, because large numbers of South African young people failed to complete their schooling. As a result there are sectors in South Africa, such as medicine and other professional disciplines, where not enough black candidates have been trained to fill all the positions available. It has often been reported that many skilled Basotho have jumped in to fill the vacuum, thus leaving skilled jobs unfilled and seemingly unfillable in Lesotho.

In the case of the health sector, for example, there were only 1 839 nurses listed in the country's medical and dental register in mid-1998, leaving many established posts unfulfilled.[8] Even in 1989, many health workers were migrating to South

Africa to fill empty posts there.[9] The reason why the nurses did not stay in Lesotho was at the time said to be poor pay and working conditions.

This situation has led many people to speak about a "brain drain" from Lesotho to South Africa, or anywhere they can find better jobs. As a result, the Southern African Migration Project decided in mid-1997 to conduct a survey on attitudes toward migration of skilled citizens and foreigners in Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa.

Research Methodology: Intended and Actual

The goal for the Lesotho survey was to include roughly 500 skilled nationals and 300 skilled immigrants. The professions to be included would be drawn from a core list of key disciplines, including engineers, medical practitioners, accountants, lawyers, planners, architects and senior business managers. In addition, each country was given some flexibility in choosing additional areas, depending on local circumstances. In the case of Lesotho, the decision was made to include teachers and skilled artisans, since people from these professions are regularly seeking, and often finding, jobs in South Africa.

A series of delays meant that Lesotho was only able to start drawing up lists of professionals from professional associations and employers towards the middle of 1998, but prospects still looked good for a successful study. The plan was that people from these and other lists would be contacted either by telephone or in person. Where necessary the interviews would be completed by the field worker, but in most cases it was expected that the interviewees would complete the forms themselves. Initial contacts were made, appointments were set up, and the goal of 500 nationals and 300 foreigners seemed within reach.

Quite independently a series of political events in Lesotho meant that the delay in starting would have disastrous consequences for the study. Almost simultaneously with arranging the first meetings with professionals and the first interviews, the political situation in Lesotho took a very serious turn for the worse. The first letter to potential interviewees went out on 30 July. However, on 3 August the opposition political parties, which had suffered an overwhelming defeat in the May 1998 election, began a sustained protest, claiming that fraud had cost them seats in the new Parliament. Many offices were closed, making it difficult to proceed. The protests would culminate on 22 September with an intervention by the South African Defence Force and general riots and looting in Maseru as well as other major towns in Lesotho.

Needless to say the political unrest meant that the research would suffer. The research team did its very best to collect completed interviews, but many potential interviewees could simply not be reached. Initially, some sought to be invisible, because the protesters were threatening people who went to work in government and even private offices. Instead of showing up for appointments, many gave the very legitimate excuse that they were afraid. Foreigners were especially wary of being too visible, since many of them have felt threatened over the years by latent xenophobia, leading to prejudice against Africans from north of the Limpopo. That their fears were legitimate was proved in the riots and looting of 22 September when many foreign-owned businesses were looted and burned.

It is to the credit of the field workers that they were able to complete 306 interviews with skilled nationals and 67 with skilled foreigners. However, this success came at a cost, in that the field workers cast their net wider than had been originally planned. Instead of working only with the lists they had been provided by the professional associations, they were forced to go out as "head-hunters". This meant that the interviewers sought out and interviewed any skilled person that they felt might possibly be attracted by and attractive to employment opportunities outside the country. As a result the mix of professions and skills in the final data set only marginally meets the criteria set at the November 1997 planning meeting. In particular, there were far too many teachers, since at the time they were just about the only group of people who were regularly on the job, and not enough other senior professionals.

In the end, a few of the completed interviews were rejected as being too remotely linked to a possible brain drain. Perhaps some others should be rejected, but it is felt that these persons, despite the fact that their educational qualifications did not meet the initial standards, stood a chance of getting employment outside Lesotho. Basotho of various occupations have always sought jobs in South Africa, not only because they have skills which South African industry needs, but also because they live close by and have friends and relatives who can advise when jobs are available. It has also been suggested during the apartheid era that Basotho would be preferred to South African blacks, since they were less likely to cause political trouble.

Final Sample

Table 8.2 gives the basic characteristics of the 306 Basotho and 67 foreigners who were entered into the database: 46% of the Basotho were males and 53% females; in contrast, 84% of the foreigners were males and 16% females.

The foreign professionals are generally better educated than the Basotho, and are more likely to be unmarried and have fewer dependents. This conclusion cannot be said to be statistically significant, because of the problems in choosing the samples. But it very likely represents the reality of those who might choose or who have already chosen to move to a new country.

The foreigners interviewed are clearly doing better financially than the Basotho. It must once again be remembered that the sample is very far from random. However, it is likely that foreigners in Lesotho in fact have a better living standard than Basotho, and that this standard is further enhanced by the smaller number of dependents. This finding is borne out by the results of Table 8.4, which shows the level of savings by Basotho and foreigners.

Table 8.2: Demographic Characteristics of Interviewees

Demographic characteristic (%)	Basotho	Foreigners
High school education or less	50	8
First degree	27	31
Higher degree	23	61
Aged 20–39	66	62
Aged 40 or above	34	38
Not married	36	27
Married	63	73
Head of household	53	65
Not head of household	47	29
No children	26	NA
1–2 children	45	NA
3 or more children	29	NA
0 dependants	6	28
1–4 dependants	31	56
5–8 dependants	41	12
9 or more dependants	22	4

Note: N = 306 Basotho, 67 foreigners.
Figures in tables may not add up to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value greater than zero but less than 0.5%.

The level of savings for Basotho professionals is strongly correlated with the number of dependants and with the monthly income per dependant, but not at all with the actual monthly income. What seems to be important is not how much the person receives but what he or she does with it to help those who depend on that income. The foreign professionals are living more comfortably than the Basotho professionals, and in their case the level of savings is correlated with the monthly income rather than the number of dependants.

The largest group consists of teachers in secondary and tertiary institutions, and the second largest of medical personnel. Of these the Basotho who were interviewed were mostly nurses, almost all female. The foreign medical professionals, on the other hand, were mainly doctors, the majority male. Those

Table 8.3: Income and Income Per Dependent Distribution

	Basotho	Foreigners
Monthly income (%)	Mean=M6 639	Mean=M8 067
<M2 000	24	5
M2 000–M6 000	43	30
M6 000–M14 000	22	55
M14 000 or above	11	10
Monthly income per dependent (%)	**Mean=M1 314**	**Mean=M3 713**
<M200	18	0
M200–M400	18	2
M400–M800	24	7
M800–M1 600	18	28
M1 600 or above	23	63

Note: N = 294 Basotho, 60 foreigners.

Table 8.4: Level of savings for Basotho and Foreign Professionals

Level of savings (%)	Basotho	Foreigners
Save money	18	38
Just get by	30	39
Spend some savings	17	11
Spend savings and borrow	35	12

Note: N = 305 Basotho, 66 foreigners.

in manual work include electricians, mechanics and carpenters, whose skills also make them eligible and attractive for employment across the border.

This pattern of occupations is clearly far different from that of the ordinary population. As mentioned previously, these were the persons most commonly still on duty during the troubled period. The median number of years that Basotho professionals have worked on their present job is 7 and the mean is 8.3, while 11.7% have worked on their present job for less than a year. One in five have worked for a foreign company for a mean of 3.3 years and 14.2% for a foreign client for a mean of 2.5 years. The median number of years in Lesotho for foreign

Table 8.5: Occupation Categories for Basotho and Foreign Professionals

Occupation (%)	Basotho	Foreigners
Manual work	4	0
Production or sales	4	0
Office work	2	0
Accounting	5	2
Professional	10	0
Science and research	5	5
Engineering or architecture	7	6
Medical	16	30
Public service	2	2
Teaching	38	52
Management	9	3

Note: N = 292 Basotho, 66 foreigners.

professionals is 3 and the mean is 4.2. They were not asked the actual number of years they had spent in their present position.

Attitudes of Basotho Professionals to Leaving Lesotho

The questionnaire included several questions which measure attitudes towards leaving Lesotho and possibly finding work outside the country. Table 8.6 gives the degree to which interviewees said they would consider moving to another country to live and work.

Table 8.6: Degree of Considering Moving to Another Country by Sex

How much consideration have you given to moving to another country to live and work? (%)	Males	Females	Total
A great deal	33	33	33
Some	37	33	35
None at all	30	35	33

Note: N = 142 males, 161 females.

Leaving Lesotho to find a job elsewhere is a real possibility for two-thirds of the sample. Only a third of the interviewees have never thought of moving, while another third have given it some thought, and a third have considered it very seriously. It is very striking that there is hardly any difference between men and women in their responses to this and subsequent questions. In what follows, therefore, the tables will include only the totals for Basotho, rather than breaking the totals down by gender. Interviewees were then asked what the most likely country is to which they might move. Table 8.7 gives the most desired and most likely destinations.

Table 8.7: Preferred and Most Likely Destinations of Basotho Professionals

If you ever had to leave Lesotho, which country would you most likely end up living in?	Most preferred (%)	Most likely (%)
South Africa	40	48
Botswana	33	32
Other African country	34	3
United Kingdom	6	3
Other European country	5	4
USA/Canada	9	6
Australia/New Zealand/Japan	34	4

Note: N = 293 most preferred, 292 most likely

That South Africa is the leading country, with Botswana not far behind, is not surprising. South Africa is the traditional source for employment outside Lesotho, and is considered by many to be the leader in economic expansion in the region. On the other hand, Botswana is growing rapidly, and has a currency which is substantially stronger than the South African Rand. Moreover, Setswana and Sesotho are almost the same language, and as a result Basotho feel comfortable living and working in Botswana. It is interesting that so many persons believe they will finally move to a country outside of Africa. There is only a slight difference between the preferred and most likely destinations, suggesting a high degree of optimism on the part of those who were interviewed.

More direct are the questions whether the interviewees would want to move to the most likely destination, and if so how likely it is that they would do so. Table 8.8 lists the level of desire to move to the most likely destination within the next two years or after two years.

Table 8.8: Level of Desire to Move to Most Likely Destination

To what extent would you want to move to your Most Likely Destination to live and work?	A short period (less than 2 yrs)	A period longer than 2 yrs
Great extent	21	35
Some extent	41	31
Uncertain	6	8
Hardly at all	11	11
Not at all	15	20
N = 300		

Almost two-thirds of both men and women want to move, and the urgency about wanting to move increases with time. It is also striking that so few are uncertain. There is apparently a hard core of one-fifth of the men and one-sixth of the women who have no desire to leave Lesotho. What ought to disturb Lesotho nationalists is that this number is so small. In the SAMP random sample of adults in Lesotho conducted in 1997, 58% of adults with at least a high school education stated that they wished to live in South Africa for at least a short period, although only 25% wished to live there permanently. Too few persons with the same occupations as those included in the present survey were interviewed in 1997 to make the figures meaningful. Table 8.9 lists the percentage of interviewees who feel that it is likely they would move within or after the next two years.

To say that one expects to leave is a stronger statement than only to say one would like to leave. Even on this more realistic and sober assessment, more than half those interviewed, both males and females, expect to have left Lesotho

Table 8.9: Level of Likelihood of Moving to Most Likely Destination

How likely or unlikely is it that you would ever move to your Most Likely Destination to live and work? (%)	A short period (less than 2 yrs)	A period longer than 2 yrs
Very likely	15	25
Likely	29	28
Uncertain	12	12
Unlikely	27	19
Very unlikely	17	16
N = 300		

sometime after the next two years. The women in this case are slightly more cautious than the men, preferring to postpone the move somewhat. Of the Basotho, both men and women, interviewed in the 1997 random sample, 67% felt that it was likely they would live in South Africa for a short period, but only 31.3% felt it likely that they would live there permanently.

The question was asked once more, in a slightly different way, concerning the likelihood of moving from Lesotho within six months, two years or five years.

Table 8.10: Likelihood of Moving Within 6 Months, 2 Years or 5 Years

How likely or unlikely is it that you will move from Lesotho? (%)	In the next 6 months	In the next 2 years	In the next 5 years
Very likely	6	13	19
Likely	7	22	27
Uncertain	13	15	20
Unlikely	35	21	12
Very unlikely	42	29	22
N = 296 next 6 months, 299 next 2 years, 297 next 5 years.			

The data in Table 8.10 are somewhat more conservative than those in Table 8.9, which in turn represents more realism than Table 8.8. However, it is still clear that almost half of the interviewees expect to have left the country within five years. The difference between Tables 8.10 and 8.9 may lie in Table 8.10's cut-off point of five years. Some of those who say they will eventually leave may be thinking of the indefinite future, which could well be after five years.

Factors Supporting the Departure of Professional Basotho

The survey included a wide variety of questions which explore reasons for the possible departure of interviewees from Lesotho. These include the basic socio-economic data concerning the individual and his or her employment, as well as the household. They also include many questions which measure the attitudes of the interviewees to life in Lesotho and expectations of life abroad. This section explores the relations between these possibly determinative variables and the interest in and willingness to depart.

In this analysis, two questions will be used as dependent variables. The first asks how much consideration has been given to moving to another country to live and work, and the second asks how likely a move from Lesotho is in the next six months, two years or five years. The answers to the second question will be combined, to give a composite score which is the sum of the answers to the three parts.

As the previous tables show, there is essentially no difference between male and female skilled Basotho as to whether they want or expect to leave the country. However, age plays a very important role. There is a correlation of -24 between age and interest in leaving the country, and an even higher correlation of -28 between age and likelihood of leaving, both significant at beyond the .000 level. The older the person the less likely he or she is to leave. Children of the household head are much more likely to move than either the head or the spouse. There is a significant negative correlation between the number of children and the likelihood of leaving.

Those interviewees who were unemployed or self-employed had thought of emigrating significantly more often than those with present employment. However, there was no significant difference between the two groups when considering the actual likelihood of moving. What is particularly striking is that the person's current occupation, current field of employment and highest qualification make almost no difference to the desire or the likelihood of moving. The only group which shows any deviation from the general pattern consists of persons who have accounting skills and are in the financial or sales business, who are somewhat more likely to remain in Lesotho than those in other occupations. Income and the number of dependents also do not make a difference to the desire or the likelihood of moving.

Except for the expected factor of growing conservatism with age, it would appear that the issues which matter do not include the normal social and economic characteristics of the individual who might move. What then can be found to relate to the brain-drain process? The next set of possibilities lies in the attitudes of people towards their country and foreign lands.

In order to test the hypothesis that attitudes make the real difference between those who do and do not want to move, variables were computed which sum related concepts in the survey instrument. Each is created by adding the scores on a series of related questions, which are scaled from a strong positive feeling for Lesotho as a home and a nation to a strong negative feeling about Lesotho.

Twelve of these composite variables correlate significantly with both the consideration of moving and the likelihood of moving out of Lesotho. The variables and the levels of correlation are given in Table 8.11.

Almost all of the correlations are significant at less than the .001 level. The variables are listed in order of the level of support for and interest in Lesotho, with a mean of the two correlations as the criterion for ranking them. The first five correlations are negative, indicating that the lower the degree of support for and interest in Lesotho the higher the willingness to leave. The last seven correlations are positive, showing that the greater the knowledge of and interest in foreign countries, the greater the correlation. The number of cases on which the correlation is based is given after each correlation.

Table 8.11: Correlations of Departure Variables with Attitude Variables for Basotho

Variable	Considering moving	Likelihood of moving	Mean
1. Identity with Lesotho	-.345 (287)	-.319 (287)	-0.3
2. Willingness to help Lesotho	-.243 (290)	-.201 (290)	-0.2
3. Impact of government on oneself and one's group	-.191 (286)	-.252 (288)	-0.2
4. Personal satisfaction with present state of affairs	-.279 (294)	-.156 (294)	-0.2
5. Condition of one's group compared with others	-.213 (242)	-.182 (243)	-0.2
6. Contacts with people and groups outside Lesotho	.152 (295)	.243 (295)	0.2
7. Knowledge of conditions abroad	.216 (265)	.215 (263)	0.22
8. Knowledge of available jobs abroad	.221 (264)	.226 (264)	0.22
9. Preference for likely destination versus Lesotho	.272 (295)	.203 (295)	0.24
10. Willingness to leave possessions in Lesotho	.241 (286)	.246 (291)	0.24
11. Applications made to most likely destination	.253 (288)	.265 (293)	0.26
12. Identity with most likely destination	.355 (263)	.276 (267)	0.32

In every case the correlations are in the expected direction, namely, that acceptance of Lesotho as home is negatively correlated with considering leaving Lesotho and with the possibility of doing so in the future. Likewise, disenchantment with Lesotho is strongly and positively correlated with considering leaving Lesotho and with the possibility of actually doing so in the near future. This is a question of attitude, not simply a question of money or family circumstances, although the overall evaluation of Lesotho grows out of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with material conditions.

The first variable measures the degree of identity with Lesotho. Persons who identify closely with Lesotho are those who feel proud to be called citizens, feel they have more in common with Basotho citizens than other professionals, want their children to be citizens, have a strong desire to help Lesotho, and want to use their talents for this purpose. Such persons are unlikely to consider leaving or actually to make the decision to move. Identity is a measure of emotional and material commitment to the country, and it is the most important factor leading a person to leave or to stay. More than half of the interviewees agreed with all aspects of the commitment to Lesotho. If all else about their life in Lesotho were good, they might well stay. But the remaining variables in the analysis tell a different story. Patriotism may be present, but the realities of life in Lesotho are such as to encourage many people to leave.

The second variable measures willingness to work in Lesotho after completing school, to pay taxes, to serve in the army or to restrict the amount of money to be sent abroad. People who are willing to help Lesotho in these ways have some motivation to remain in the country. Those who feel no obligation to their home country are the ones who are most likely to seek employment elsewhere. This too is an important measure of patriotism and national feeling. About a quarter of those interviewed felt that these demands are justified, while only 4.4% thought they are unjustified. This again shows that there is a core of real national feeling among the group.

The third variable indicates that a positive impact by the government on the individual, as well as on the racial and economic group to which he or she belongs, provides a strong incentive to remain in Lesotho. However, only 14% of the interviewees felt that the government had made a positive impact on themselves, their race, their fellow Sesotho speakers, their economic class and their country. It is particularly striking that only 31% felt that the government had made a positive impact on the country. Most of these skilled professional Basotho are not happy with the performance of the government. They may be patriotic and willing to help their country, but the present government does not satisfy them.

The fourth variable measures the interviewee's satisfaction with the cost of living, job security and prospects, income, housing, schooling, medical services, taxation, safety, children's future, public amenities and convenient shopping. The person who is satisfied with the present state of affairs is less likely to leave than the person who finds conditions hard to bear. Furthermore, while many people are satisfied with at least some aspect of life in Lesotho today, there was no one who was satisfied with everything. On the other hand, 30% were dissatisfied with every aspect of the state of affairs in Lesotho. The problems with the present situation in the country are explored in more detail in Table 8.12, where the percentage believing that each condition is better in the foreign country is listed.

The condition of those who belong to one's profession, race, home language and economic class has a strong bearing on both the consideration of moving and the actual intention to do so. If the groups to which one belongs are doing poorly at present in Lesotho, as shown in the fifth variable, the person is more likely to leave. In the case of Lesotho, there are persons who feel that government and private employers favour persons from wealthy families as well as families which have high social and political status. Such persons are dissatisfied and are likely to try to find work elsewhere. The feeling exists that some employers would prefer to hire white expatriates rather than Basotho. About 41% of those interviewed feel that conditions of blacks in Lesotho are worse than those of other races, and 36% believe that conditions of Sesotho speakers are worse than conditions of those who speak other languages.

These five variables comprise the set of conditions and circumstances which are likely to hold people at home and keep them from considering leaving. Likewise, at the other extreme, where the person is alienated from his or her nation by poor conditions, these circumstances lead Basotho to want to leave their country. The next seven variables indicate which problems with life in Lesotho are likely to encourage a person to move abroad.

Actual knowledge of life outside Lesotho is an important motivating factor. Contacts with people abroad, as shown in the sixth variable, prepare the way for people to consider moving. Those who are in touch with their fellow professionals, either individually or through associations, are most likely to leave. Whether the desire to leave or the attempt to contact colleagues comes first is not clear. More than one in five is in contact with fellow professionals outside Lesotho at least once a month, 12% with professional associations, and 7% with employment agencies.

Information about living conditions abroad and knowledge of available jobs through journals, newspapers, friends, family and professional associations also strongly lead people to consider and to lay plans for leaving Lesotho. In this case, also, the desire to leave because of dissatisfaction with conditions in Lesotho may be the catalyst which motivates people to explore possibilities abroad. It is striking that 57% at least once in a while check sources of information about life in foreign countries, and nearly half look into the possibilities of jobs abroad.

The ninth variable comprises an overall summary of comparison between Lesotho and the most likely destination and strongly influences the attitude toward moving. This variable includes cost of living, job, professional advancement, income, housing, schooling, medical care, taxation, safety, children's future, public amenities and convenient shopping. These factors are explored in detail in Table 8.12, where the most important reasons for leaving and staying are outlined. It is striking that only one person of all those interviewed felt that Lesotho was much better in every way than the most likely destination, while 16 interviewees felt that the most likely destination was much better in every way than Lesotho. Equally disturbing is the finding that one-third felt that the most likely destination was better or much better than Lesotho in every way, while only 1.3% felt that Lesotho was better or much better than the foreign country.

The willingness to leave permanent possessions behind in Lesotho is the next variable. It is a strong measure of being prepared to pull up stakes and move. Those who would sell their house, take their savings and investments out of the country, and even give up citizenship are most likely to go. Of the persons who answered the question, 12% were willing to sell their home in Lesotho, and 19% were willing to give up their citizenship

Next is the number of applications which the person has made for residence and citizenship in the most likely destination, which is strongly correlated with the desire and likelihood of moving. If such applications have been made, then the decision has in effect already been made to depart. Around 9% of the interviewees said they have applied for a work permit abroad, 8% have applied for permanent residence, and 7.5% are seeking citizenship. Evidence from other studies, as well as other results obtained in this present study, suggest that these figures are likely to be low, however.[10] It is probable that more have in fact applied, but are not willing to admit it, since the admission carries a political stigma.

The final variable measures the intention to become a permanent resident of the most likely destination, to become a citizen of that country, to retire there, and finally to be buried there, with a maximum score meaning total commitment to the most likely destination, and a minimum meaning complete rejection of moving there at all. The positive correlation of .355 with consideration of moving to that country means that there is a very high likelihood that those who are considering moving there are serious about putting down permanent roots outside Lesotho. More than half of the sample to some extent wish to get permanent residency in the most likely destination, 48% desire to be citizens, 40% wish to retire there, but only 18% are willing to be buried there.

Table 8.12 gives the principal reason for leaving Lesotho or remaining at home. These reasons support and give substance to the findings given above. The third column gives the percentage of members of the sample who said that each item is better or much better in the most likely destination. A few of the responses which people gave as reasons for leaving or staying in Lesotho were not included in the questions concerning whether the situation is better in Lesotho or the most likely destination.

There are a few differences between men and women which should be noted, even though gender differences are not included in the table. Women are slightly more inclined to see a better salary as a reason to leave Lesotho, while men think of family safety more often than women as a reason to remain in Lesotho.

Overall Table 8.12 shows that the motivation for leaving Lesotho is not primarily based on the present social and economic realities of the family. Rather it is based on the expectation that life would be better on the other side. For many people, there is little to keep them in Lesotho. It is striking that a huge 94% of the interviewees gave a principal reason for leaving Lesotho, while only 76% gave a principal reason for remaining in the country. Of those who gave a reason for leaving, but not a reason for staying, almost two-thirds expect to leave the country within the near future.

In most cases the situation outside Lesotho is better than that in the country. The exceptions are only four: job security, taxation, and personal and family safety. Otherwise there is a strong preference for the most likely destination, strongest in

Table 8.12: Reasons for Basotho Professionals Leaving and Staying

Would the following be better in Lesotho or in your Most Likely Destination, or about the same? (%)	Most important reason for wanting to *leave* Lesotho	Most important reason for wanting to *stay in* Lesotho	Conditions are better or much better in MLD than in Lesotho
Cost of living	11	7	64 (300)
Having a job	11	3	80 (299)
Job security	3	12	44 (297)
Advancement	13	4	80 (299)
Income	37	6	88 (298)
Taxation	-	2	40 (294)
Good house	2	5	62 (301)
Good school	4	1	73 (301)
Health care	2	1	74 (301)
Personal safety	2	16	36 (301)
Family safety	5	26	35 (299)
Children's future	7	7	60 (296)
Stability, peace	1	4	Not asked
Patriotism	-	4	Not asked
Government	2	-	Not asked
Amenities	0	-	76 (301)
Personal	-	3	Not asked

Note: N = 286 reason for wanting to leave Lesotho, 231 reason for wanting to stay in Lesotho, (N) in rows in last column.

terms of income, personal advancement, employment, good schooling and good health care.

Moving outside of Lesotho is clearly a gamble. The rewards are a better job, a good salary, chances to get ahead and better facilities. The risks are lack of job security and an increased danger to oneself and one's family. Some interviewees make the gambler's choice, while others remain behind. A few persons speak of patriotic loyalty to Lesotho, but only one person spoke of the quality of Lesotho's government as a reason to stay. Far more believe that the government in South Africa is better able to serve the people than the government of Lesotho. This finding is consistent with the earlier finding that, whereas the Basotho professionals claim to love their country and claim that it is fair to expect them to perform their duties to the country, the majority do not think the government is behaving in the right way. Patriotism can only go so far, if the conditions for exercising patriotism do not exist.

The most important conclusion to be drawn from the data is that many (in this case more than half of the unfortunately non-random sample) of the professionally qualified Basotho are considering moving out of the country. What motivates them is not so much their present social and economic condition, but their hopes for a better future outside Lesotho. It is their impression of what life is like across the border, rather than the reality of what their life is like at home that will send them abroad.

Attitudes of Foreign Professionals towards Lesotho

The key issues which arise from the analysis of attitudes of foreign professionals are very different from the issues raised above concerning Basotho professionals. The big question is not whether they will leave Lesotho, but what brought them here in the first place. They are already in Lesotho, and only one of them intends to leave within the next six months. Of the remainder, 5% will stay up to a year, 28% between one and two years, 19% between two and five years, 12% will stay more than five years, while 34% do not know how long they will stay. This does not mean they have necessarily cut their ties with home, since only 15% say they will never return to their home country. Table 8.13 explores the depth of their relations with Lesotho.

Clearly, few of the resident foreign professionals want to make Lesotho their long-term home, which confirms the large percentage who say they will only remain five years or less. There are no significant differences in willingness to put

Table 8.13: Percentage Wishing Long-term Status in Lesotho

To what extent do you want to (%)	Large extent	Some extent	Don't know	Hardly at all	Not at all
Become a permanent resident of Lesotho	8	25	8	9	51
Become a Lesotho citizen	2	12	6	15	66
Retire in Lesotho	2	13	13	9	63
Be buried in Lesotho	0	6	22	2	70
N = 67					

down roots in Lesotho according to the home country of the foreign professional, although being from somewhere in Africa makes this more likely. Similarly, there are no differences according to the field of employment, with one small exception. The one foreign accountant in the sample intends to remain in Lesotho permanently, which supports the finding that the accountants in the Lesotho sample also show more interest in remaining in Lesotho than members of other professions.

A measure of the commitment to Lesotho can be constructed from the four variables listed in Table 8.13. Maximum commitment means affirming permanent residency, Lesotho citizenship, retirement in Lesotho, and being buried in Lesotho. Minimum commitment means denying each of these items. A total of 39% of the foreign professionals showed no commitment whatever to Lesotho, while 9% had the maximum level of commitment, indicating that they agreed to each of these items.

There is a significant tendency for those from other African countries to have a higher level of long-term commitment to Lesotho than those from outside Africa. The mean commitment score of Africans is significantly higher than that of non-Africans. Over half of the Africans showed either a mild or a strong commitment to Lesotho, while only a quarter of the non-Africans had that level of commitment. On the other hand, two-thirds of the non-Africans had almost no commitment to remaining in Lesotho, as opposed to only a third of the Africans.

It is possible that the Africans feel bonded to the continent, but it is more likely that they too are suffering from bad conditions at home. The sample's Nigerians, Zambians, Tanzanians, Ghanaians, Ugandans, Congolese, Ethiopian, Djiboutian and Sudanese came to improve themselves and their conditions. On the other hand, they have little long-term commitment to Lesotho, and doubtless would be glad to find a better job elsewhere. In addition, the non-Africans rate Lesotho much lower in comparison with their home country than do the Africans, implying that the non-Africans have a higher opinion of their prospects in their own countries than do those holding African passports.

Table 8.14 gives the principal reason for leaving home to come to Lesotho and the principal reason for leaving Lesotho for another country. As in Table 8.12, the third column lists the percentage of those who feel that things are better outside Lesotho, in this case in the country where the person originated. Table 8.14 should be compared with Table 8.12 to see just how different the foreign professionals are from the Basotho professionals in their attitudes to their presence in Lesotho. However, what is striking is that these two tables in some ways are like an inverse mirror, implying that people come to Lesotho to improve themselves, just as the Basotho are saying they want to leave the country for the same reason. The same fail-safe option remains as in Table 8.12, namely, job security.

However, there are other significant differences, in that the foreigners say they have better schools and better medical care at home. Both Basotho and foreigners believe that life is safer in their own countries.

Table 8.14: Reasons for Foreign Professionals Leaving and Staying

Would the following be better in Lesotho or in your home country?	Most important reason for wanting to *leave* Lesotho	Most important reason for wanting to *stay in* Lesotho	Better or much better at home
Cost of living	3	8	21 (67)
Having a job	2	13	28 (67)
Job security	13	8	64 (67)
Advancement	5	10	56 (66)
Income	2	21	32 (66)
Taxation	0	2	43 (65)
Good house	0	0	37 (67)
Good school	2	0	70 (63)
Health care	2	0	58 (67)
Personal safety	36	13	80 (66)
Family safety	21	2	82 (65)
Children's future	10	4	72 (65)
Stability, peace	2	4	Not asked
Patriotism	0	0	Not asked
Government	2	0	Not asked
Amenities	0	10	58 (66)
Personal	2	4	Not asked

Note: N = 61 reason for wanting to leave Lesotho, 48 reason for wanting to stay in Lesotho, (N) in rows in last column.

The most important factor which would lead foreign professionals, both men and women, to leave Lesotho, in most cases to go home, is the safety of themselves and their families. The main reasons for remaining in Lesotho are related to job and income. In short, there is a trade-off between having a secure source of employment and money, and running the risk of being exposed to the dangers of life in Lesotho. The fact that the safety question is so high on the list is doubtless related to the troubles that the country was experiencing during the time of the interviews. The foreigners have come to Lesotho primarily to get a job and to make money. They believe, moreover, that the cost of living is lower in Lesotho than at home. Were the foreigner to choose to leave Lesotho the most preferred and most likely destinations are given in Table 8.15.

Table 8.15: Most Preferred and Most Likely Destinations of Foreign Professionals

Destination (%)	Which country(s) would you *most prefer* to go and live?	Which country would you *most likely* end up living in?
Home country	0	67
South Africa	6	3
Botswana	4	2
Other African country	27	8
United Kingdom	4	0
Other European country	10	2
USA/Canada/Latin America	40	13
Australia/New Zealand/Japan	4	2
Other Asian country	4	3

Note: N = 48 most preferred other country, 60 most likely other country.

The gap between preference and expectation is much wider for the foreign professionals than for the Basotho professionals. Two-thirds of the foreigners expect realistically that they will return to their home country. However, their hopes remain high, with the United States and Canada the most preferred destinations. A number also hope that they may find their way to Europe or elsewhere in Africa. What is surprising is the small number who either prefer or expect to take up work in South Africa or Botswana, in strong contrast with the Basotho, for whom these countries are both the strongly preferred and the most likely destinations after leaving home.

A set of composite variables was created to test the relation between attitudes and factors related to staying in or leaving Lesotho, as for the Basotho professionals. The relations between these variables and basic indicators of willingness to remain in Lesotho or depart are not as clear as in the case of the Basotho professionals, largely due to the limited sample of only 67 foreign professionals. Table 8.16 lists the significant correlations at the .02 level or below between variables. The number of cases is given in parentheses. If there had been more foreign professionals in the sample, then it is very likely there would have

Table 8.16: Correlation Levels Among Attitude Variables for Foreign Professionals

Variable	Identifies with home country	Basotho like foreigners	Satisfied with the present	Prefers Lesotho to home
1. Identity with home country	1	-.409 (63)	-.257 (64)	Not sig.
2. Hopes for good life at home	.354 (57)	-.357 (57)	-.321 (58)	Not sig.
3. Harassment/assault while in Lesotho	Not sig.	Not sig.	-.429 (62)	-.316 (53)
4. Basotho like foreigners	-.409 (63)	1	.498 (66)	.352 (57)
5. Satisfied with the present	-.257 (64)	.498 (66)	1	.541 (58)
6. Optimism for the future	Not sig.	.288 (65)	.527 (66)	.545 (57)
7. Commitment to Lesotho	-.273 (64)	.325 (66)	Not sig.	.287 (57)
8. Permanence in Lesotho	Not sig.	.279 (66)	Not sig.	.383 (57)
9. Prefers Lesotho to home country	Not sig.	.352 (57)	.541 (57)	1

been more significant correlations. Those marked as not significant, however, in all cases have the correct sign, whether positive or negative.

Despite the shortage of foreign professionals in the sample, some conclusions can be drawn indicating what is likely to lead foreigners to stay or to go.

First, the stronger the identification with home the greater the hope for a good life at home. Moreover, those who are dissatisfied with the present and who feel that Basotho do not like them are more likely to identify with their home, and are unlikely to commit themselves to remain in Lesotho.

Not surprisingly, the more friendly foreigners perceive the Basotho to be, the less likely they are to identify with their home country and hope for a good life there. Those who are satisfied with the present and optimistic for the future also tend to believe that Basotho like them. If Basotho are friendly to foreigners, then foreigners in turn will be willing to commit themselves to working in Lesotho over a long period.

Those foreigners who are satisfied with their present conditions are unlikely to identify with their home country and also unlikely to believe that they can live well there. They are also unlikely to have been harassed or assaulted by Basotho. They are optimistic for the future and prefer Lesotho over their home country.

Finally, preference by foreign professionals for Lesotho means not having been assaulted or harassed by Basotho, a feeling that Basotho like them, as well as satisfaction with the present and optimism for the future. It also implies a commitment to remain permanently in the country rather than look for another place to work and live.

Preference for Lesotho over the home country correlates closely with the person's satisfaction with the present and optimism for the future. Likewise preference for Lesotho is higher if the foreign professional thinks Basotho think well of foreigners. Closely related is the inverse relation between the number of types of attack made on the foreigner himself or herself and the foreigner's desire to remain in Lesotho.

As was the case with Basotho professionals, the skilled foreigners do not relate their attitudes towards staying in Lesotho or leaving the country to household or personal factors. Neither the age nor the education nor the monthly income nor the number of dependents nor the level of savings is significantly correlated with any of the variables which measure attitudes toward staying or leaving. The conclusion drawn above for Basotho professionals applies here: that the important factors are attitudes, perceptions and beliefs, and not simply the hard cold facts of economic or family life. The only variable which is influenced by any of these factors is satisfaction with life at the moment, which is positively correlated with age, level of savings and education, but without direct influence on the choice to leave or stay.

On the other hand the person's continent of origin does influence attitudes and decisions. As mentioned before, those from Africa have a higher degree of commitment to staying in Lesotho than those from other continents. Likewise, those from Africa tend to think more highly of Lesotho than those from elsewhere. Moreover, those from African countries have a higher level of affirmation of their own citizenship than those from other continents. It would appear that being an African has a strong meaning to Africans, whereas those from other continents have a weak sense of identity with either their own country or with Lesotho.

Policy Implications and Conclusions

Deriving a policy from the data presented above depends on a basic value judgement, namely, whether the process which we describe here is best called a "brain drain" or a "brain gain". The country from which a professional departs loses a skilled person, but the country to which he or she goes has an equal gain. To judge the departure of a teacher or a nurse or an accountant as a bad thing is to place more weight on the value of that person to the former job than to the new job. In short, gain and loss is only indirectly a matter to the whole society, since it is mediated through the value of the job being done at a local level. Moreover, the idea of the African Renaissance, as discussed by both Thabo Mbeki and Kofi Annan, indicates that the loss to one country can be a gain to another, with perhaps no net loss to the continent.

Why should someone who has been teaching at the National University of Lesotho, to take a specific example, who then moves to a university in South Africa or Botswana, be considered a loss? There can be no abstract answer to that question. The concrete evaluation of the old and the new post can hardly be said to be a national question. Rather it depends on comparing the value of what that person offers to students in the two specific institutions.

If the former institution wishes to retain the person, it must respond to his or her overall needs and requirements. We have tried in this paper to identify what those needs and requirements may be. The package for an individual will include all the conflicting interests that we have summarised above, including patriotism, feeling of being treated fairly, personal and group satisfaction, breadth of contacts and knowledge of conditions elsewhere and the quality of life in a new country. A good job with prospects for advancement, a secure and sufficient income, good conditions for the family, safety and security, and national stability help greatly to keep that person on the present job.

Our findings do, of course, point to serious problems within Lesotho and also, by implication, within other African countries which have lost trained personnel to Lesotho. If Lesotho wishes to retain its trained people, then policymakers must realise that they have a strong base on which to begin, namely, love for their country and a willingness to work to improve it. Despite these factors, it is unfortunately true that people are presently leaving and will continue to leave, if nothing is done to build on the solid foundation of patriotism and national feeling. The government and other institutions in Lesotho must realise that the Basotho professionals who spoke to us in this survey believe that their country has failed to provide the conditions they need and desire in order that they would be willing to remain and to fulfil the duties they realise they have to Lesotho.

What these professionals, both Basotho and foreign, are saying to their countries is this: create a society in which there are equal opportunities, in which the government serves the people, in which there are good schools and good medical facilities, in which there are decent salaries on which one can support one's family, in which public amenities are well constructed and well cared for. Then and only then can we as patriotic professionals afford to do what we know we should do. But until that happens, we are going to leave in order to find better opportunities elsewhere.

Basotho who think in this way will leave for South Africa, Botswana and other countries, if they are offered good jobs. Other Africans will come to Lesotho on the same terms, in their case using Lesotho only as a way station to a better life elsewhere, because they too identify serious problems in Lesotho. The only reason they have come here is that conditions in their own countries are worse.

Other specific policy implications which would work for the betterment of society as a whole cannot be drawn from these data. Governments, institutions, companies, groups and organisations which quite rightly do not want to lose their well-qualified employees should look carefully at what is stated in Tables 8.12 and

8.14. In these tables, the reasons for going and staying are clearly listed. They should look as well at the broader conditions which motivate staying or going, as have been spelled out in the text and in other tables.

Any policies which block the free movement of professionally qualified and skilled people would, however, be counter-productive. It would be most inappropriate for governments anywhere in Africa to force professionals to remain behind. Such a policy would lead to neglect of those features of life and work which now motivate people to leave or to stay. The result would in the end be weak teaching, poor quality nursing, inadequate accounting, and shoddy engineering. Rather than creating political barriers to movement, instead countries and institutions which are now losing skilled professionals to what the next country must see as a "brain gain" should look to their own political, social and economic institutions and working conditions. A well-run country and a well-run business will not lose its key employees.

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Appendix A:

Aggregate Results of Interviews with Skilled Nationals

Notes: All figures are percentages unless otherwise noted and are rounded to the nearest percent. A small dash (–) represents a figure greater than zero and less than 0.5. Some questions have been left out of this appendix because they would require too much space to tabulate and are not central to the inquiry.

Q1: What is your **highest** academic qualification?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Less than High School Certificate	3	4	6
Diploma without High School Certificate	7	3	2
High School Certificate	8	8	18
Diploma with High School Certificate	32	35	32
Bachelors' Degree	26	27	26
Honours' Degree	1	3	9
Masters' Degree	21	14	5
Doctorate	1	4	1
Post-graduate Diploma	1	1	–
PGCE	–	0	–
Chartered Accounting	–	0	–
Certificate with High School Certificate	–	1	–
N	223	303	725

Q2: Could you please write the **exact name** of your highest qualification in the box below (e.g., B.A., B.Sc., etc.).	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Trades Diploma	4	29	18
Business/Accounting Diploma	3	7	2
Diploma in Engineering	1	5	–
B.A.	6	8	9
B.Comm.	5	4	0
B.Ed.	2	9	–
B.Sc.	3	8	18
B.Sc. Eng	–	0	5
LLB	3	–	0
LLM	0	1	0
Master of Arts	5	6	1
Master of Business Administration	3	0	5
Master of Public Health	0	–	–
Medicine	4	0	–
M.Sc.	6	6	0
M.Sc. (civil engineering)	–	–	1
M.Sc. (electrical engineering)	–	–	–
Higher diploma in accountancy	–	–	–
Higher diploma in education	1	–	–
Doctor of Philosophy	1	–	3
Diploma in nursing	15	7	–
Diploma in accounting	5	–	–
Diploma in anaesthesia	1	–	–

Q2: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Diploma in adult education	7	5	10
Diploma in medical laboratory technology	1	–	–
Diploma in computer science	1	–	–
Diploma in health education	0	–	–
Certificate in nursing	0	2	–
Bachelor of dental surgery	0	–	–
B.Ed (nursing)	6	–	–
Post-graduate diploma in development	0	–	–
Adult teacher's certificate	1	–	–
Diploma in community development	0	–	–
M.Phil.	1	–	–
O-level	2	–	–
High School	–	–	16
University Certificate	–	–	8
Other	11	–	–

Q3a: At which **institution** did you achieve your highest qualification? Please write the name of the institution and the country in which it is located in the box below.	Botswana
University of Botswana	33
Botswana Accountancy College (BAC)	3
Institute of Health Sciences	18
Botswana Institute of Administration	4
Institute of Development Management	1
Sussex University	1

Q3: Continued	Botswana
University of Nairobi	1
University of Manchester	3
University College (London)	1
University of Illinois	1
Moeng College	1
Birmingham University	1
University of Hartford	1
Jwaneng V.T.C.	1
University of Reading	1
Other	29

Q3b: At which **institution** did you achieve your highest qualification? Please write the name of the institution and the country in which it is located in the box below.	Lesotho
National University of Lesotho	29
University of Botswana	2
University of Cape Town	1
University of Natal (Pietermaritzburg)	1
University of the Witwatersrand	1
California State University	1
IDM	1
Bristol University	1
University of Liverpool	1
University of Manchester	1
National Teacher Training College	5
Lerotholi Polytechnic	7
Centre of Accounting Studies Lesotho	2
Birmingham University	1
Lesotho Agricultural College	2

Q3: Continued	Lesotho
Technical School of Leribe	3
North East London Polytechnic	1
University of Hertfordshire	1
University of Strathclyde	1
Roma College of Nursing	2
Thaba-Nchu Manpower Centre	1
Queen II Hospital School of Nursing	1
Maluti Adventist School of Nursing	2
Federal Republic of Germany	1
NHTC Lesotho	6
Aacen Technical High	1
University of London	1
Commercial Training Institute	1
Bradford University	1
Washington State University	1
Leloaleng Technical School	1
Leribe Craft Centre	1
Other	18

Q3c: At which **institution** did you achieve your highest qualification? Please write the name of the institution and the country in which it is located in the box below.	South Africa
Technikon Natal	2
Technical Colleges	4
Nursing Colleges	2
Educational Colleges	9
In-House Training	2
Correspond Colleges	2
Institutes of Training	1

Q3: Continued	South Africa
Potchefstroom University	5
Rand Afrikaans University	2
Rhodes University	1
Technikon Pretoria	3
Technikon Vaal Triangle	1
Free State Technikon	1
University of Cape Town	3
University of South Africa	8
University of Pretoria	8
Stellenbosch University	4
University of the Orange Free State	3
University of the Western Cape	1
Vista University	1
Technikon Witwatersrand	3
University of the Witwatersrand	2
High Schools	19
Cape Town Technikon	1
Port Elizabeth Technikon	1
Port Elizabeth University	1
Technikon RSA	1
Other	9

Q7: Have you been awarded a **scholarship**, and/or **bursary** from the government [of your country]?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yes	70	57	13
No	27	42	87

Q7: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Don't know	3	1	0
N	221	306	725

Q8: If yes, what was the total amount of funding in domestic currency?	Botswana (Pula)	Lesotho (Maluti)	SA (Rand)
0–4999	17	28	46
5000–9999	15	21	21
10000–19999	13	21	22
20000–49999	31	29	3
50000–10000	12	0	9
>100000	12	2	–
N	48	123	78

Q9: How would you describe your **employment** status?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Unemployed (not looking for work)	–	2	–
Unemployed (looking for work)	–	2	2
Housewife (looking for work)	–	0	–
Student/scholar	–	0	3
Pensioner	–	2	–
Military (permanent force, commissioned)	–	0	0
Work in informal sector (not looking for formal sector)	1	0	–
Work in informal sector (looking for formal sector)	–	0	0
Self-employed formal sector (part-time)	–	0	2

Q9: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Self-employed formal sector (full–time)	2	3	26
Self-employed informal sector (full–time)	–	1	4
Self-employed informal sector (part–time)	–	0	1
Employed (part–time)	2	6	3
Employed (full–time)	96	83	57
Other	–	–	–
N	223	305	725

Q10: Which **one** of the following best describes your **occupation** (or most recent if currently unemployed)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Non-manual office worker	1	1	2
Foreman	0	1	1
Skilled manual worker	–	3	3
Semi-skilled manual worker	0	–	0
Miner	–	–	–
Unskilled manual worker	–	–	–
Farmer (own subsistence farm)	0	–	0
Farmer (own commercial farm)	–	–	3
Agricultural worker	–	2	–
Services worker	–	1	1
Domestic worker	–	–	–
Trader, hawker, vendor	–	1	3
Informal sector producer	–	1	0
Security personnel	2	0	–

Q10: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Police/ military	0	1	1
Employer/ manager of establishment with ten or more employees	–	–	8
Employer/ manager of establishment with fewer than ten employees	22	1	13
Professional worker	4	10	11
Lawyer	12	1	1
Accountant	1	5	9
Medical doctor/ practitioner (e.g. Dentist etc.)	–	0	4
Nurse/ medical technician	24	15	4
Teacher/ lecturer	14	36	16
Engineer	2	6	7
Managerial office worker	7	3	4
Supervisory office worker	9	4	3
Other	0	8	5
N	221	292	725

Q11: Which **one** of the following best describes your employment **field/ sector/ industry** (or most recent if currently unemployed)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Finance	5	1	4
Accounting	7	5	10
Banking	0	2	2
Insurance / assurance	–	0	1
Medical	21	14	10

Q11: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Law firm	4	0	2
Retail	–	0	7
Textile	1	1	2
Automotive	–	2	1
Manufacturing	0	3	5
Food	1	0	2
Steel & iron	–	0	1
Marine	–	0	–
Mining	1	0	1
Transport	–	0	2
Energy	1	1	2
Agriculture/ farming	1	2	5
Engineering	3	5	9
Construction	1	4	4
Real estate	–	0	1
Research	2	2	1
Government/ public sector	36	13	4
Military/ police	0	1	1
Private security	–	1	0
Primary education	2	4	6
Secondary education	1	12	6
Post-secondary / tertiary education	11	19	4
Other	0	8	9
N	223	294	725

Q12: How **long** have you been employed in this field/ sector/ industry?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
=1 year	6	14	6
1–2 years	4	10	12
2–5 years	14	18	14
5–10 years	15	25	21
10–20 years	47	28	28
20+ years	14	6	19
N	216	291	725

Q13: How **easy** or **difficult** do you think it would be for you to get another job in a different occupation?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very easy	10	14	8
Easy	38	33	36
Difficult	25	25	35
Very difficult	16	14	17
Don't know	11	14	4
N	221	296	725

Q14: How **easy** or **difficult** do you think it would be for your company to find someone else to replace you?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very easy	10	20	7
Easy	29	28	33
Difficult	35	23	36
Very difficult	18	15	15
Don't know	10	14	9
N	217	295	725

Q15: How **easy** or **difficult** do you think it would be for your company to find someone else more efficient than yourself?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very easy	2	11	6
Easy	8	12	18
Difficult	36	23	39
Very difficult	30	23	26
Don't know	24	31	10
N	220	295	725

Q16: It makes you proud to be called a citizen of your country	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Strongly agree	81	66	24
Agree	15	22	52
Neither	2	4	8
Disagree	1	5	13
Strongly disagree	0	1	2
Do not know	1	3	1
N	222	306	725

Q 17: You have more in common with people from other countries working in your profession than with people from your country	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Strongly agree	5	9	6
Agree	10	19	21
Neither	15	14	17
Disagree	41	27	42

Q 17: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly disagree	24	16	10
Do not know	5	15	4
N	220	298	725

Q18: Being a citizen of your country is a very important part of how you see yourself	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly agree	60	50	16
Agree	25	30	57
Neither	6	9	8
Disagree	8	6	16
Strongly disagree	1	2	1
Do not know	0	3	1
N	225	305	725

Q19: You would want your children to think of themselves as citizens of your country	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly agree	69	58	15
Agree	24	28	54
Neither	4	6	8
Disagree	1	4	15
Strongly disagree	1	2	2
Do not know	1	3	6
N	223	304	725

Q20: It really does not matter where you are a citizen as long as you have a good quality of life	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly agree	16	37	18
Agree	18	25	51
Neither	5	5	8
Disagree	37	18	19
Strongly disagree	23	11	3
Do not know	1	4	1
N	222	303	725

Q21: You have a strong desire to help build your country	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly agree	79	68	18
Agree	21	28	63
Neither	0	1	7
Disagree	–	2	9
Strongly disagree	–	1	2
Do not know	–	2	1
N	224	305	725

Q22: It is your duty to contribute your talents and skills to the growth of your country	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly agree	80	69	19
Agree	18	25	61
Neither	0	1	6
Disagree	1	3	11
Strongly disagree	–	1	2
Do not know	–	1	0
N	223	304	725

Q23: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your country were to require citizens to work in the country for several years after completion of their education?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Completely justified	45	42	8
Justified	38	29	31
Neither	5	6	4
Unjustified	11	17	48
Completely unjustified	0	7	8
Do not know	1	1	1
N	221	303	725

Q24: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your country were to require citizens who have received government bursaries for education to complete some form of national service?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Completely justified	34	47	13
Justified	32	36	73
Neither	10	6	3
Unjustified	18	5	9
Completely unjustified	4	5	2
Do not know	2	1	0
N	219	304	725

Q25: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your country were to require citizens to pay taxes on all income earned outside of your country (e.g. this would include interest on investments)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Completely justified	14	20	8
Justified	34	25	29
Neither	7	9	7
Unjustified	30	28	45
Completely unjustified	9	15	8
Do not know	5	4	3
N	221	302	725

Q26: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your country were to require citizens to pay a larger share of their income in taxes according to their ability to pay?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Completely justified	10	11	6
Justified	29	22	18
Neither	9	8	5
Unjustified	36	32	45
Completely unjustified	12	21	26
Do not know	4	5	0
N	221	302	725

Q27: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your country were to require citizens to serve in the armed forces in cases of national emergency?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Completely justified	9	21	10
Justified	28	26	60
Neither	10	11	7
Unjustified	29	16	19
Completely unjustified	16	20	3
Do not know	7	6	1
N	221	300	725

Q28: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your country were to limit the amount of money you may send out of the country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Completely justified	23	19	7
Justified	35	24	37
Neither	5	6	8
Unjustified	22	25	39
Completely unjustified	10	20	7
Do not know	5	5	2
N	218	304	725

Q29: **How many** members of your immediate family have left your country to work and live in another country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
None	80	47	81
Just one or two	14	25	15
Several	4	15	3
Most	2	8	1
Almost all	–	5	0
Don't know	0	–	–
N	217	291	725

Q30: **How many** members of your extended family have left your country to work and live in another country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
None	55	15	64
Just one or two	25	19	23
Several	9	36	11
Most	3	22	1
Almost all	1	8	1
Don't know	6	–	0
N	214	264	725

Q31: **How many** of your close friends have left your country to work and live in another country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
None	54	17	41
Just one or two	25	17	23
Several	11	37	30

Q31: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Most	3	24	5
Almost all	1	5	1
Don't know	6	–	0
N	216	281	725

Q32: How many of your co-workers have left your country to work and live in another country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
None	55	22	60
Just one or two	21	18	18
Several	13	33	17
Most	4	22	2
Almost all	0	5	–
Don't know	7	–	3
N	210	255	725

Q33: How many people in your profession that you know have left your country to work and live in another country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
None	42	7	43
Just one or two	22	14	19
Several	18	39	30
Most	4	31	5
Almost all	1	9	1
Don't know	13	–	2
N	215	264	725

Q34: Generally speaking, to what **extent** do people who have left your country continue to see themselves as citizens of it?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Large extent	50	30	26
Some extent	25	49	52
Hardly at all	1	15	10
Not at all	2	5	5
Do not know	22	–	8
N	222	261	725

Q35: Generally speaking, to what **extent** do people who have left your country tend to blend in with their new culture/ or countries?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Large extent	11	37	17
Some extent	36	47	56
Hardly at all	10	9	13
Not at all	7	8	4
Do not know	37	–	11
N	214	238	725

Q36: For those people who have left, do you think their lives have been **better or worse** than they were?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	21	61	9
Better	22	26	52
About the same	19	9	19

Q36: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Worse	6	3	10
Much worse	3	1	2
Don't know	28	–	8
N	222	292	725

Q37: Many people from your country are currently moving to live and work in another country. Generally speaking, has this had a **positive** impact, **no impact**, or a **negative** impact on you personally?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	9	13	2
Positive	12	22	16
No impact	53	35	39
Negative	12	25	39
Very negative	3	5	4
Do not know	10	–	0
N	210	289	725

Q38: Many people from your country are currently moving to live and work in another country. Generally speaking, has this had a **positive** impact, **no impact**, or a **negative** impact on your family?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	2	10	3
Positive	13	25	12
No impact	56	43	45

Q38: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Negative	12	17	36
Very negative	3	5	3
Do not know	13	–	2
N	209	262	725

Q39: Many people from your country are currently moving to live and work in another country. Generally speaking, has this had a **positive** impact, **no impact**, or a **negative** impact on your close friends?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	2	15	2
Positive	19	35	16
No impact	46	23	38
Negative	14	21	38
Very negative	2	5	2
Do not know	17	–	3
N	205	239	725

Q40: Many people from your country are currently moving to live and work in another country. Generally speaking, has this had a **positive** impact, **no impact**, or a **negative** impact on your company?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	5	7	2
Positive	6	11	11
No impact	42	24	40

Q40: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Negative	20	35	37
Very negative	7	24	4
Do not know	20	–	6
N	203	232	725

Q41: Many people from your country are currently moving to live and work in another country. Generally speaking, has this had a **positive** impact, **no impact**, or a **negative** impact on your profession?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	5	14	2
Positive	11	16	13
No impact	39	19	30
Negative	23	31	44
Very negative	8	21	6
Do not know	14	–	4
N	209	271	725

Q42: Many people from your country are currently moving to live and work in another country. Generally speaking, has this had a **positive** impact, **no impact**, or a **negative** impact on your country in general?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	5	12	2
Positive	19	11	9
No impact	13	3	7

Q42: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Negative	24	34	63
Very negative	19	39	17
Do not know	20	–	1
N	213	262	725

Q43: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the cost of living	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	1	1	2
Satisfied	23	6	17
Neutral	17	11	10
Dissatisfied	40	50	58
Very dissatisfied	17	31	13
Don't know	1	1	0
N	218	301	725

Q44: Please indicate whether you expect the cost of living to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	4	9	2
Better	21	19	11
Same	17	7	7
Worse	36	27	45
Much worse	18	33	32
Don't know	4	5	3
N	219	292	725

Q45: Please indicate how **satisfied or dissatisfied** you are with your job	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very satisfied	7	6	10
Satisfied	42	35	54
Neutral	17	16	11
Dissatisfied	24	23	18
Very dissatisfied	9	18	4
Don't know	1	1	2
N	215	293	725

Q46: Please indicate whether you expect your job to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	16	14	6
Better	32	28	23
Same	25	15	24
Worse	12	15	28
Much worse	8	15	12
Don't know	6	13	6
N	217	289	725

Q47: Please indicate how **satisfied or dissatisfied** you are with prospects for professional advancement	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very satisfied	9	5	6
Satisfied	26	23	36
Neutral	16	18	20
Dissatisfied	31	31	24

Q47: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very dissatisfied	16	18	6
Don't know	1	5	8
N	216	296	725

Q48: Please indicate whether you expect the prospects for professional advancement to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	12	12	5
Better	35	28	22
Same	20	19	24
Worse	14	14	22
Much worse	11	14	15
Don't know	8	12	10
N	218	293	725

Q49: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the security of your job	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	15	9	7
Satisfied	45	34	49
Neutral	20	13	15
Dissatisfied	13	22	19
Very dissatisfied	5	19	6
Don't know	2	4	3
N	215	292	725

Q50: Please indicate whether you expect the security of your job to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	12	12	5
Better	29	26	22
Same	35	19	29
Worse	12	18	25
Much worse	6	9	14
Don't know	6	15	6
N	220	285	725

Q51: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your level of income	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very satisfied	3	1	3
Satisfied	28	9	47
Neutral	17	18	11
Dissatisfied	35	34	30
Very dissatisfied	16	36	7
Don't know	0	2	2
N	213	291	725

Q52: Please indicate whether you expect your level of income to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	10	11	5
Better	33	22	28

Q52: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Same	26	16	20
Worse	14	15	27
Much worse	10	22	13
Don't know	7	14	6
N	221	282	725

Q53: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your ability to find a house you want to live in.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	6	3	10
Satisfied	14	16	56
Neutral	17	16	12
Dissatisfied	34	29	18
Very dissatisfied	28	32	4
Don't know	1	4	1
N	213	296	725

Q54: Please indicate whether you expect your ability to find a house you want to live in to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	7	10	6
Better	20	22	24
Same	20	20	31
Worse	27	20	27
Much worse	18	17	8
Don't know	7	12	3
N	200	292	725

Q55: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your ability to find a good school for your children.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	5	5	7
Satisfied	18	21	45
Neutral	23	13	10
Dissatisfied	33	30	21
Very dissatisfied	16	26	6
Don't know	4	6	11
N	209	288	725

Q56: Please indicate whether you expect your ability to find a good school for your children to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	6	8	7
Better	20	24	13
Same	30	18	14
Worse	23	16	32
Much worse	15	23	20
Don't know	7	10	13
N	216	291	725

Q57: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your ability to find medical services for your family and children.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	6	2	9

Q57: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Satisfied	42	21	58
Neutral	17	15	9
Dissatisfied	22	30	18
Very dissatisfied	9	29	4
Don't know	3	3	3
N	212	300	725

Q58: Please indicate whether you expect your ability to find medical services for your family and children to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	10	11	7
Better	30	23	16
Same	29	20	18
Worse	14	17	38
Much worse	10	18	15
Don't know	7	11	6
N	220	292	725

Q59: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your level of taxation	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	6	1	1
Satisfied	25	2	15
Neutral	23	8	8
Dissatisfied	31	31	51
Very dissatisfied	11	55	24

Q59: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Don't know	4	3	2
N	212	298	725

Q60: Please indicate whether you expect your level of taxation to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	2	7	1
Better	22	10	6
Same	25	14	9
Worse	29	21	42
Much worse	11	36	37
Don't know	11	12	5
N	220	289	725

Q61: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	2	1	1
Satisfied	22	5	19
Neutral	29	22	16
Dissatisfied	23	26	44
Very dissatisfied	9	32	15
Don't know	14	14	4
N	211	296	725

Q62: Please indicate whether you expect the relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	3	6	1
Better	13	9	7
Same	35	24	15
Worse	19	13	42
Much worse	7	27	27
Don't know	22	22	7
N	217	288	725

Q63: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your personal safety.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	8	5	2
Satisfied	32	21	24
Neutral	28	22	8
Dissatisfied	18	26	43
Very dissatisfied	11	24	23
Don't know	3	3	0
N	213	299	725

Q64: Please indicate whether you expect your personal safety to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	6	11	1

Q64: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Better	24	17	10
Same	31	19	10
Worse	19	20	39
Much worse	11	21	37
Don't know	9	11	4
N	219	291	725

Q65: Please indicate how **satisfied or dissatisfied** you are with your family's safety.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	8	3	1
Satisfied	31	18	23
Neutral	26	24	7
Dissatisfied	21	30	45
Very dissatisfied	11	22	23
Don't know	3	3	1
N	213	298	725

Q66: Please indicate whether you expect your family's safety to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	6	9	2
Better	23	17	9
Same	32	21	9
Worse	18	20	38
Much worse	12	21	38
Don't know	9	12	4
N	215	289	725

Q67: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the future of your children in your country.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very satisfied	5	1	2
Satisfied	2	16	23
Neutral	23	18	11
Dissatisfied	11	28	39
Very dissatisfied	39	27	16
Don't know	20	10	9
N	212	290	725

Q68: Please indicate whether you expect the future of your children in your country to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	10	10	3
Better	21	16	16
Same	25	15	10
Worse	16	15	31
Much worse	13	27	29
Don't know	15	16	10
N	218	291	725

Q69: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the upkeep of public amenities.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very satisfied	0	–	3
Satisfied	11	3	19

Q69: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Neutral	15	7	7
Dissatisfied	42	32	45
Very dissatisfied	25	55	25
Don't know	6	4	1
N	215	299	725

Q70: Please indicate whether you expect the upkeep of public amenities in your country to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	5	9	5
Better	24	15	10
Same	17	12	11
Worse	21	16	34
Much worse	18	32	36
Don't know	15	15	3
N	218	291	725

Q71: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the availability of affordable quality products	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very satisfied	2	–	4
Satisfied	26	13	54
Neutral	23	18	14
Dissatisfied	29	36	24
Very dissatisfied	15	30	4
Don't know	4	3	1
N	214	288	725

Q72: Please indicate whether you expect the future availability of affordable quality products to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	4	10	4
Better	28	16	19
Same	24	19	23
Worse	20	20	35
Much worse	14	22	14
Don't know	10	13	3
N	217	288	725

Q73: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the level of customer service in your country.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very satisfied	0	1	4
Satisfied	17	7	29
Neutral	19	13	11
Dissatisfied	39	36	39
Very dissatisfied	23	40	17
Don't know	2	4	0
N	212	297	725

Q74: Please indicate whether you expect the level of customer service to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	4	9	5

Q74: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Better	32	14	16
Same	25	22	15
Worse	15	14	32
Much worse	16	27	28
Don't know	8	14	5
N	217	288	725

Q75: In general would you say that your life today is **better, about the same,** or **worse** than it was **five years ago?**	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	17	11	3
Better	42	35	19
About the same	28	31	23
Worse	11	17	44
Much worse	3	6	11
Don't know	–	–	0
N	225	305	725

Q 76: During the past year, did you:	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Save money	15	18	29
Just get by	31	30	42
Spend some of your savings	16	18	14
Spend some of your savings and borrow	37	35	15
Refused to answer	0	–	0
N	222	305	725

Q 77: Which of the following best describes your **economic** status?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Poor/ lower class	5	18	2
Working class	51	56	17
Middle class	35	22	48
Upper middle class	4	4	28
Upper class	1	1	5
Don't know	4	–	1
N	225	292	725

Q 78: Purely for statistical purposes, which of the following best describes you?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Black/ African	96	100	18
White/ European	2	–	74
Coloured	2	0	5
Indian/ Asian	–	–	3
N	225	306	725

Q79: What **language** do you speak mostly at home?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Afrikaans	1	0	49
English	4	1	32
Both Afrikaans and English	0	0	2
Ndebele	0	0	–
Pedi	0	0	–
Setswana	84	0	–
Tswana	0	0	2
Kalanga	8	0	0

Q79: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Ngohoga	1	0	0
Xhosa	0	1	5
Sesotho	0	98	3
Northern Sotho	0	0	2
Tsonga	0	0	0
Venda	0	0	0
Zulu	0	0	5
Tonga	0	0	–
N	224	305	725

Q80: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better**, **worse**, or the **same** as other citizens of your country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	8	6	7
Better	39	30	56
Same	40	45	31
Worse	8	14	5
Much worse	0	4	0
Don't know	4	–	1
N	223	295	725

Q81: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better**, **worse**, or the **same** as other people of your profession?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	2	3	3
Better	14	14	29
Same	54	54	57

Q81: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Worse	20	24	8
Much worse	5	5	0
Don't know	5	–	2
N	221	286	725

Q82: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse**, or the **same** as people in your economic class?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	3	2	4
Better	11	14	26
Same	65	58	59
Worse	12	20	9
Much worse	3	5	0
Don't know	7	–	2
N	220	277	725

Q83: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse**, or the **same** as other people of your race?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	6	4	4
Better	31	29	43
Same	40	45	43
Worse	12	17	8
Much worse	2	5	1
Don't know	9	–	1
N	218	275	725

Q84: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse**, or the **same** as other people who share your home language?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	8	5	5
Better	30	30	37
Same	40	46	50
Worse	8	14	6
Much worse	3	5	1
Don't know	11	–	2
N	218	272	725

Q85: Would you say the overall conditions of **people of your race** are better, worse, or about the same as those in other groups in this country?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	2	3	4
Better	17	14	45
Same	53	42	27
Worse	17	32	20
Much worse	6	9	2
Don't know	6	–	2
N	213	277	725

Q86: Would you say the overall conditions of **people who share your home language** are better, worse, or about the same as those in other groups in this country?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	2	3	3

Q86: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Better	12	16	36
Same	55	46	38
Worse	19	27	19
Much worse	4	9	2
Don't know	7	–	2
N	216	277	725

Q87: Would you say the overall conditions of **people in your profession** are better, worse, or about the same as those in other groups in this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	5	4	6
Better	24	28	38
Same	49	42	41
Worse	15	19	13
Much worse	1	6	1
Don't know	5	–	2
N	217	273	725

Q88: Would you say the overall conditions of **people in your economic class** are better, worse, or about the same as those in other groups in this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	5	4	5
Better	25	24	35
Same	50	44	44
Worse	13	22	14

Q91: In comparison to this country, do you think a person like you would do better, worse, or about the same in North America?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	22	39	10
Better	26	38	48
Same	15	11	13
Worse	9	8	13
Much worse	4	3	2
Don't know	24	–	12
N	220	214	725

Q92: In comparison to this country, do you think a person like you would do better, worse, or about in the same in Australia/New Zealand?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better	15	36	12
Better	27	41	47
Same	15	12	18
Worse	10	8	11
Much worse	3	4	2
Don't know	29	–	9
N	220	199	725

Q93: Do you **approve** or **disapprove** of the way the national government has performed its job over the past year?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Strongly approve	13	3	4

Q88: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much worse	1	6	1
Don't know	6	–	2
N	218	272	725

Q89: In comparison to this country, do you think a person like you would do better, worse, or about the same in another Southern African country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	13	27	4
Better	25	51	22
Same	32	19	17
Worse	20	2	48
Much worse	2	1	3
Don't know	8	–	6
N	221	284	725

Q90: In comparison to this country, do you think a person like you would do better, worse, or about the same in Europe?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better	18	40	8
Better	32	37	49
Same	13	12	14
Worse	10	8	17
Much worse	4	2	2
Don't know	23	–	11
N	220	225	725

Q93: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Approve	49	25	20
Disapprove	24	31	46
Strongly disapprove	5	24	26
Don't know	9	17	5
N	223	306	725

Q94: How much of the time can you trust the government to do what is right?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Just about always	6	5	3
Most of the time	36	14	13
Some of the time	49	51	50
Never	3	18	32
Don't know	5	12	2
N	220	305	725

Q95: Over the past year, did the actions of the government have a positive, negative or no impact on you personally?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	3	3	1
Positive	52	22	15
None	23	35	22
Negative	15	19	54
Very negative	3	12	7
Do not know	4	9	1
N	221	300	725

Q96: Over the past year, did the actions of the government have a positive, negative or no impact on people of your race?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very positive	2	2	2
Positive	47	23	11
None	25	20	12
Negative	10	19	63
Very negative	4	9	10
Do not know	12	28	2
N	214	292	725

Q97: Over the past year, did the actions of the government have a positive, negative or no impact on people who share your language?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very positive	1	2	1
Positive	47	25	12
None	24	17	14
Negative	10	18	59
Very negative	4	8	12
Do not know	14	30	2
N	217	294	725

Q98: Over the past year, did the actions of the government have a positive, negative or no impact on people of your economic class?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Very positive	3	1	2
Positive	47	23	12

Q98: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
None	22	22	19
Negative	14	20	58
Very negative	2	8	6
Do not know	12	26	3
N	217	295	725

Q99: Over the past year, did the actions of the government have a positive, negative or no impact on your country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very positive	9	7	4
Positive	57	24	16
None	12	12	9
Negative	12	20	57
Very negative	1	15	11
Do not know	9	22	3
N	217	297	725

Q100: How interested do you think people in government are in hearing what people like you think?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very interested	5	7	5
Interested	41	26	21
Not interested	34	36	36
Not at all interested	9	31	37
Do not know	11	–	2
N	222	264	725

Q101: In comparison to other groups in this country, how interested do you think people in government are in the opinions of people of your race?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more interested	3	8	5
More interested	15	16	11
About the same	47	31	16
Less interested	19	38	47
Much less interested	4	7	19
Do not know	13	–	1
N	219	251	725

Q102: In comparison to other groups in this country, how interested do you think people in government are in the opinions of people who share your home language?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more interested	3	7	4
More interested	14	14	12
About the same	47	35	20
Less interested	19	36	43
Much less interested	4	7	20
Do not know	13	–	2
N	217	254	725

Q103: In comparison to other groups in this country, how interested do you think people in government are in the opinions of people of your economic class?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more interested	6	5	4
More Interested	19	13	14
About the same	41	30	23
Less interested	17	38	40
Much less interested	4	14	17
Do not know	14	–	2
N	218	249	725

Q104: What role if any do you feel you personally have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Important role	67	73	43
Some role	27	20	31
Minor role	3	5	18
No role at all	1	2	7
Do not know	2	–	0
N	222	297	725

Q105: What role if any do you feel people of your race have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Important role	50	67	54
Some role	39	28	30
Minor role	5	5	12

Q105: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
No role at all	1	1	4
Do not know	6	–	0
N	221	286	725

Q106: What role if any do you feel people who share your language have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Important role	51	65	52
Some role	35	30	31
Minor role	6	4	13
No role at all	2	1	4
Do not know	6	–	0
N	221	286	725

Q107: What role if any do you feel people in your economic class have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Important role	66	72	55
Some role	26	24	29
Minor role	3	3	12
No role at all	1	1	3
Do not know	4	–	1
N	221	285	725

Q108: To what extent do you think people of your race are treated unfairly by the government?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Always	5	13	7

Q108: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Large extent	12	21	35
Some extent	43	46	46
Hardly at all	17	15	8
Never	13	4	3
Do not know	10	–	1
N	214	256	725

Q109: To what extent do you think people who share your home language are treated unfairly by the government?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Always	4	9	7
Large extent	12	20	36
Some extent	42	52	42
Hardly at all	18	16	10
Never	14	4	3
Do not know	10	–	1
N	216	246	725

Q110: To what extent do you think people of your economic class are treated unfairly by the government?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Always	3	12	6
Large extent	13	23	29
Some extent	47	48	47
Hardly at all	15	15	13
Never	13	3	3
Do not know	10	–	1
N	216	258	725

Q111: To what extent do you think you personally are treated unfairly by the government?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Always	3	10	7
Large extent	14	22	26
Some extent	48	44	45
Hardly at all	16	15	15
Never	14	9	6
Do not know	5	–	1
N	217	274	725

Q112: Do you support or oppose the government encouraging businesses to give preference to hiring people from historically disadvantaged backgrounds?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly support	24	35	6
Support	37	30	22
Oppose	18	13	34
Strongly oppose	9	10	34
Don't know	11	12	3
N	220	303	725

Q113: How much consideration have you given to moving to another country to live and work?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
A great deal	13	33	30
Some	27	35	38
None at all	58	32	31

Q113: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Don't know	1	–	1
N	222	300	725

Q114: How often do you get information about living conditions in other countries from journals/ newsletters?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	37	48	33
Once in a while	32	20	18
Seldom	24	22	15
Never	7	11	32
Don't know	0	–	2
N	216	290	725

Q115: How often do you get information about living conditions in other countries from newspapers?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	55	60	28
Once in a while	24	16	19
Seldom	15	18	20
Never	6	6	32
Don't know	0	–	1
N	217	297	725

Q116: How often do you get information about living conditions in other countries from friends?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	30	41	37
Once in a while	35	34	23
Seldom	26	19	14
Never	8	6	24
Don't know	0	–	1
N	213	297	725

Q117: How often do you get information about living conditions in other countries from family?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	21	28	29
Once in a while	24	25	19
Seldom	26	25	15
Never	29	22	35
Don't know	1	–	2
N	214	292	725

Q118: How often do you get information about living conditions in other countries from professional associates?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	30	32	20
Once in a while	26	25	15
Seldom	22	20	16
Never	20	23	46
Don't know	2	–	3
N	213	287	725

Q119: How often do you get information about job opportunities in other countries from journals/ newsletters?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Often	29	48	27
Once in a while	27	20	15
Seldom	23	18	15
Never	20	14	41
Don't know	2	–	2
N	217	294	725

Q120: How often do you get information about job opportunities in other countries from newspapers?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Often	34	60	22
Once in a while	26	18	16
Seldom	21	14	16
Never	17	8	45
Don't know	2	–	2
N	217	300	725

Q121: How often do you get information about job opportunities in other countries from friends?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Often	14	33	26
Once in a while	24	33	21
Seldom	29	23	14
Never	30	11	37

Q121: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Don't know	2	–	1
N	214	295	725

Q122: How often do you get information about job opportunities in other countries from family?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	17	30	20
Once in a while	24	23	17
Seldom	22	16	15
Never	33	31	47
Don't know	4	–	2
N	214	290	725

Q123: How often do you get information about job opportunities in other countries from professional associates?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Often	11	20	18
Once in a while	27	36	13
Seldom	24	25	14
Never	19	11	52
Don't know	18	8	2
N	216	285	725

Q124: How easy or difficult would it be for you to leave your country to go and work in another country if you wanted to?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very easy	11	20	14

Q124: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Easy	27	36	23
Difficult	24	25	37
Very difficult	19	11	25
Don't know	18	8	2
N	222	306	725

Q125: At this point, are the costs of travelling to another country and finding a good home affordable or unaffordable to your family?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very affordable	3	5	6
Affordable	23	37	35
Unaffordable	35	34	42
Very unaffordable	17	12	13
Don't know	22	11	3
N	221	305	725

Q126: Have you ever worked for a foreign company?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yes	11	21	12
No	88	79	88
Don't know	0	–	1
N	221	304	725

Q127: Have you ever worked for a foreign client?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yes	11	14	12
No	88	86	87
Don't know	0	–	1
N	206	298	725

Q128: In years, how long did you work for the foreign company?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
=1	43	15	93
1–2	23	39	2
2–5	24	28	2
5–10	10	16	2
10–20	–	2	1
20+	–	–	0
N	21	61	725

Q129: In total, how long did you work for the foreign client?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
=1	36	41	95
1–2	14	22	1
2–5	43	26	2
5–10	7	11	1
10–20	–	–	1
20+	–	–	–
N	14	46	725

Q130: How often do you travel to other countries in Southern Africa?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	4	39	1
Once a month	9	16	1
Once every few months	25	23	4
Once or twice a year	23	10	10
Once every few years	14	3	14
Just once or twice	16	7	19

Q130: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Never	9	2	50
N	218	305	725

Q131: How often do you travel to other countries elsewhere in Africa?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	–	0	1
Once a month	2	1	1
Once every few months	2	6	4
Once or twice a year	6	8	10
Once every few years	17	20	14
Just once or twice	19	19	19
Never	55	47	50
N	209	304	725

Q132: How often do you travel to other countries in Europe	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	–	–	0
Once a month	–	0	–
Once every few months	–	0	1
Once or twice a year	5	2	6
Once every few years	13	8	12
Just once or twice	17	18	13
Never	64	71	67
N	208	302	725

Q133: How often do you travel to other countries in North America	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	–	–	0

Q133: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Once a month	–	–	0
Once every few months	–	1	0
Once or twice a year	1	1	3
Once every few years	6	3	4
Just once or twice	10	8	9
Never	83	87	83
N	211	302	725

Q134: How often do you travel to other countries in Australia/New Zealand?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	–	–	0
Once a month	–	–	0
Once every few months	–	–	1
Once or twice a year	–	–	3
Once every few years	1	1	5
Just once or twice	2	3	–
Never	97	96	91
N	209	302	725

Q135: How often do you travel to other countries in Asia?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	0	–	0
Once a month	–	–	–
Once every few months	0	–	0
Once or twice a year	0	0	1
Once every few years	0	1	2
Just once or twice	8	3	6
Never	90	95	91

Q135: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
N	209	302	725

Q136: How often are you in contact with members of your profession living and working in other countries?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	10	14	8
Once a month	2	8	9
Once every few months	11	20	11
Once or twice a year	11	12	9
Once every few years	9	10	3
Just once or twice	13	12	10
Never	44	24	51
N	220	305	725

Q137: How often are you in contact with professional associations in other countries?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	4	7	4
Once a month	4	5	4
Once every few months	7	13	7
Once or twice a year	10	9	6
Once every few years	9	9	3
Just once or twice	16	14	6
Never	51	44	70
N	219	302	725

Q138: How often are you in contact with employment placement agencies in other countries?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
More than once a month	1	4	2
Once a month	1	2	2
Once every few months	2	6	4
Once or twice a year	4	6	2
Once every few years	4	3	2
Just once or twice	7	8	5
Never	80	72	84
N	219	302	725

Q142: If you were ever to leave this country, which country would you most **prefer** to go live?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
USA	24	7	19
South Africa	19	41	–
Netherlands	1	0	1
Belgium	1	–	1
France	1	1	2
Italy	1	0	0
Switzerland	–	1	2
Britain	17	6	12
Denmark	–	1	0
Germany	–	1	2
Sweden	1	–	–
Norway	1	–	–
Australia	3	4	27

Q142: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
New Zealand	1	–	8
Singapore	1	–	–
Thailand	1	–	–
Japan	1	–	0
Saudi Arabia	1	–	2
Ivory Coast	1	–	–
Mauritius	1	–	0
Central African Republic	–	–	–
Seychelles	1	–	–
Mozambique	1	–	0
Zambia	1	–	0
Kenya	–	–	0
Tanzania	–	–	–
Zimbabwe	3	1	1
Namibia	8	1	1
Malawi	1	–	0
Lesotho	1	–	–
Botswana	–	32	2
Swaziland	3	2	0
U.A.E.	1	–	0
Canada	–	2	5
Other	4	–	1
None	–	–	10
N	196	296	725

Q143: If you were ever to leave this country, which country would you be most **likely** to end up living in?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
USA	25	5	18
USSR	1	1	–
South Africa	29	48	–
Belgium	1	–	0
Netherlands	–	–	1
Germany	–	–	2
Switzerland	–	1	2
France	1	0	2
Britain	14	4	15
Sweden	1	–	–
Norway	1	–	–
Australia	1	4	26
Congo	–	1	–
New Zealand	1	–	7
Singapore	1	–	–
Japan	1	–	1
Saudi Arabia	1	–	2
Ivory Coast	1	–	–
Mauritius	1	–	0
Seychelles	1	–	–
Rwanda	1	–	–
Mozambique	1	0	0
Zambia	1	–	–
Zimbabwe	4	–	1

Q143: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Namibia	8	1	1
Malawi	1	–	–
Lesotho	1	–	–
Swaziland	3	1	0
Botswana	–	32	2
Canada	–	1	5
None	2	–	11
Other			2
N	202	295	725

Q144: In general, would you say the overall conditions in this country are better, worse or about the same as in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	25	6	5
Better in home country	16	8	7
About the same	17	13	16
Better in MLD	19	24	45
Much better in MLD	17	49	19
Don't know	5	–	8
N	210	289	725

Q145: Would you say the cost of living in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	16	7	3

Q145: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Better in home country	25	14	13
About the same	16	11	20
Better in MLD	29	32	44
Much better in MLD	11	32	10
Don't know	3	4	10
N	207	300	725

Q146: Would you say your job in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	11	3	3
Better in home country	20	7	15
About the same	13	8	22
Better in MLD	26	33	39
Much better in MLD	23	42	9
Don't know	6	6	13
N	201	297	725

Q147: Would you say that prospects for professional advancement in this country are better, worse or about the same they would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	5	3	2
Better in home country	16	4	12
About the same	15	7	19
Better in MLD	28	31	39

Q147: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in MLD	28	48	10
Don't know	8	7	18
N	206	299	725

Q148: Would you say the security of your job in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	15	8	2
Better in home country	37	18	14
About the same	17	16	19
Better in MLD	9	20	42
Much better in MLD	5	24	10
Don't know	16	14	14
N	207	297	725

Q149: Would you say your level of income in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	6	1	2
Better in home country	13	2	8
About the same	11	5	17
Better in MLD	26	26	46
Much better in MLD	34	62	14
Don't know	9	4	13
N	202	298	725

Q150: Would you say your ability to find the house you want in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	11	6	5
Better in home country	22	10	28
About the same	16	11	24
Better in MLD	21	26	22
Much better in MLD	12	36	5
Don't know	17	12	16
N	207	301	725

Q151: Would you say your ability to find a good school for your children in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	4	3	3
Better in home country	9	7	11
About the same	13	10	13
Better in MLD	37	27	40
Much better in MLD	28	46	13
Don't know	9	7	20
N	206	301	725

Q152: Would you say your ability to find medical services for your family and children in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	6	3	3
Better in home country	10	4	12
About the same	17	11	13
Better in MLD	32	29	45
Much better in MLD	25	45	14
Don't know	10	7	13
N	207	301	725

Q153: Would you say your level of taxation in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	10	3	1
Better in home country	25	7	5
About the same	17	19	11
Better in MLD	10	22	43
Much better in MLD	3	17	18
Don't know	35	31	22
N	205	294	725

Q154: Would you say the relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better in home country	6	3	2
Better in home country	24	7	7
About the same	17	16	15
Better in MLD	12	20	42
Much better in MLD	2	16	10
Don't know	40	37	23
N	204	291	725

Q155: Would you say your personal safety in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better in home country	26	16	1
Better in home country	35	21	4
About the same	18	17	8
Better in MLD	4	15	46
Much better in MLD	6	21	35
Don't know	11	11	7
N	206	301	725

Q156: Would you say your family's safety in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better in home country	27	15	1
Better in home country	33	22	4
About the same	20	17	7
Better in MLD	5	13	45
Much better in MLD	5	23	35
Don't know	11	9	8
N	205	299	725

Q157: Would you say the future of your children in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Much better in home country	19	5	3
Better in home country	29	15	8
About the same	13	13	8
Better in MLD	22	23	44
Much better in MLD	9	37	21
Don't know	9	8	16
N	205	157	725

Q158: Would you say the upkeep of public amenities in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	1	1	2
Better in home country	7	3	8
About the same	13	7	7
Better in MLD	32	26	46
Much better in MLD	34	51	26
Don't know	12	13	11
N	203	301	725

Q159: Would you say the availability of affordable quality products in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	2	1	2
Better in home country	9	3	9
About the same	10	10	16
Better in MLD	33	27	47
Much better in MLD	38	52	15
Don't know	9	7	11
N	206	301	725

Q160: Would you say the customer service in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much better in home country	1	1	2
Better in home country	7	5	8
About the same	21	12	11
Better in MLD	23	25	45
Much better in MLD	31	40	23
Don't know	17	17	13
N	206	300	725

Q164: Which factor would be most important in determining your decision to leave this country and go to your most likely destination (MLD)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Cost of living	12	10	2
My job	3	10	2
Prospects for professional advancement	28	12	1
Job security	1	3	2
Income level	21	37	2
Ability to find the house you want to live in	2	2	–
Good school for children	10	3	2
Good medical services; expenses	5	2	0
Taxation	–	–	3
Share of taxes	–	0	0

Q164: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Personal safety	4	2	3
Family safety	6	5	4
Future of children	4	7	5
Upkeep of public amenities	–	–	0
Affordable quality products	3	–	0
Customer service	2	–	0
Affirmative action	–	–	1
Economic deterioration	–	–	5
High crime rates	–	–	12
Poor currency value	–	–	0
Poor education	–	–	1
Poor quality of life	–	0	0
Poor government	–	–	2
Lack of job opportunity	–	–	2
Living conditions in other countries	–	–	0
New opportunities	–	0	0
Safety and security	–	–	38
War; civil war	–	2	1
Religion	–	–	0
Communism	–	–	0
Family ties	–	–	0
Cultural differences	–	–	0
Weather; climate	–	–	0
Don't know	–	0	4
Will not leave	–	–	6
N	178	287	725

Q 168: Most important factor which would lead you to stay in this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Cost of living	3	6	4
Your job	6	2	4
Prospects for professional advancement	4	2	1
The security of your job	22	12	3
Your level of income	6	6	1
Ability to find the house you want to live in	2	2	1
Ability to find medical services for your children	1	1	2
Your level of taxation	1	1	0
Your personal safety	19	16	1
Your family's safety	26	24	2
The future of your children	9	7	5
Availability of affordable quality products	1		0
Ability to find a good school for your children	–	1	2
The relative share of taxes you pay	–	0	–
Customer services	–	0	1
Personal health	–	0	–
Political stability/stable government	–	1	–
Low rate of crime/violence	–	2	–
Patriotism	–	2	–
Improved safety & security	–	–	19
Age	–	–	1

Q 168: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Culture	–	–	1
Family	–	–	18
Good life	–	–	1
Have future here	–	–	2
Climate; weather; nature	–	–	2
Patriotism; love country	–	–	10
Other	2	1	4
None	–	–	4
Don't know	–	4	4
Will not leave	–	3	3
N	159	232	725

Q169: How likely or unlikely would it be for an employer in your most likely destination to be able to pay for your transportation?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	15	20	6
Likely	22	27	23
Unlikely	24	16	21
Very unlikely	5	5	17
Don't know	33	32	33
N	184	299	725

Q170: How likely or unlikely would it be for an employer in your most likely destination to be able to help you find a house?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	15	26	6
Likely	37	35	30
Unlikely	9	9	16
Very unlikely	4	4	15
Don't know	35	27	32
N	183	301	725

Q171: Would your family encourage or discourage you from leaving this country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Strongly encourage	6	18	9
Encourage	9	22	34
Neither	14	16	14
Discourage	28	20	32
Strongly discourage	33	17	9
Don't know	10	7	2
N	187	304	725

Q172: Who would be most likely to make the final decision of whether to leave this country or not?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yourself	68	72	62
Your spouse	22	19	13
Your parent(s)	4	5	2

Q172: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Other family members	3	–	7
Together with family	–	–	16
Don't know	4	2	–
N	180	299	725

Q173: To what extent would you want to move to your most likely destination and live and work for a short period of less than two years?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Great extent	19	20	17
Some extent	40	41	25
Hardly at all	12	11	12
Not at all	21	21	41
Don't know	7	6	5
N	169	294	725

Q174: To what extent would you want to move to your most likely destination and live and work for longer than two years?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Great extent	20	35	28
Some extent	33	31	28
Hardly at all	13	11	11
Not at all	28	15	26
Don't know	7	7	6
N	167	297	725

Q175: How likely or unlikely is it that you would ever move to your most likely destination and live and work for a short period of less than two years?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	4	14	10
Likely	25	30	20
Unlikely	35	27	22
Very unlikely	28	17	42
Don't know	7	12	5
N	181	292	725

Q176: How likely or unlikely is it that you would ever move to your most likely destination and live and work for longer than two years?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	7	26	19
Likely	19	28	27
Unlikely	25	18	18
Very unlikely	37	16	30
Don't know	12	13	6
N	174	296	725

Q177: If you had to move to your most likely destination, how long would you want to stay?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Less than 6 months	14	5	10
6 months to one year	8	5	4
1 to 2 years	23	16	16

Q177: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
2 to 5 years	28	33	15
More than 5 years	14	41	44
Don't know	14	–	11
N	191	257	725

Q178: If you had to move to your most likely destination, how often would you like to return to your home country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Weekly	3	5	3
Monthly	18	30	5
Once every few months	32	33	13
Yearly	28	21	46
Once every few years	13	9	13
Never	2	2	9
Don't know	4	–	11
N	195	281	725

Q179: If you moved to your most likely destination, how many family members would you take with you?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
0	10	0	18
1	10	11	13
2	29	22	16
3	26	30	18
4	17	18	17
5	5	11	9
6	1	3	3

Q179: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
7	1	3	1
8	1	2	0
9	–	–	0
10	1	0	1
11			0
12	–	1	1
13			0
>13	–	–	2
N	148	227	725

Q180: If you had to move to your most likely destination, how often would you like to send money to people in your home country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	4	7	2
Once a month	45	67	16
A few times a year	24	12	6
Once or twice a year	9	4	5
Just once or twice	4	3	4
Never	5	7	56
Don't know	8	–	11
N	194	261	725

Q181: To what extent would you want to become a permanent resident in your most likely destination?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Large extent	8	23	24
Some extent	17	30	25
Hardly at all	12	12	13
Never	57	30	32
Do not know	7	6	6
N	172	271	725

Q182: To what extent would you want to become a citizen of your most likely destination?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Large extent	4	18	24
Some extent	15	30	23
Hardly at all	12	13	13
Never	61	34	34
Do not know	8	4	6
N	186	295	725

Q183: To what extent would you want to retire in your most likely destination?	**Botswana**	**Lesotho**	**SA**
Large extent	4	17	21
Some extent	12	23	21
Hardly at all	13	15	13
Never	61	36	37
Do not know	9	9	9
N	184	293	725

Q184: To what extent would you want to be buried in your most likely destination?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Large extent	5	9	20
Some extent	9	9	16
Hardly at all	6	10	13
Never	73	64	41
Do not know	6	9	10
N	185	294	725

Q185: Have you applied for a work permit in your most likely destination?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yes	2	2	4
No	95	91	94
In the process of applying	3	6	2
N	193	297	725

Q186: Have you applied for a permanent residence permit in your most likely destination?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yes	2	4	3
No	97	92	95
In the process of applying	1	4	2
N	189	296	725

Q187: Have you applied for citizenship in your most likely destination?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Yes	2	3	2
No	97	93	97

Q187: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
In the process of applying	1	4	1
N	187	294	725

Q188: How willing or unwilling would you be to sell your house in your home country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very willing	2	5	15
Willing	2	7	33
Unwilling	32	38	27
Very unwilling	62	43	20
Don't know	3	6	5
N	194	293	725

Q189: How willing or unwilling would you be to take all your savings out of your home country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very willing	2	13	19
Willing	2	19	35
Unwilling	35	34	26
Very unwilling	59	30	18
Don't know	3	3	2
N	196	299	725

Q190: How willing or unwilling would you be to take all your investments out of your home country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very willing	2	12	18
Willing	3	14	35

Q190: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Unwilling	32	40	26
Very unwilling	59	31	18
Don't know	4	3	3
N	193	299	725

Q191: How willing or unwilling would you be to give up citizenship in your home country?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very willing	2	9	8
Willing	2	10	19
Unwilling	21	33	31
Very unwilling	72	44	37
Don't know	3	4	4
N	196	299	725

Q192: How likely or unlikely is it that you will move from your home country in the next six months?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	1	6	3
Likely	2	7	4
Unlikely	21	32	23
Very unlikely	70	42	68
Don't know	6	13	2
N	189	296	725

Q193: How likely or unlikely is it that you will move from your home country in the next two years?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	2	14	5
Likely	10	22	20
Unlikely	26	20	22
Very unlikely	55	29	47
Don't know	8	15	5
N	187	299	725

Q194: How likely or unlikely is it that you will move from your home country in the next five years?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Very likely	7	19	13
Likely	13	27	29
Unlikely	18	12	14
Very unlikely	45	22	37
Don't know	17	20	8
N	190	297	725

Q195: Would you be more or less likely to leave your home country if the government took steps to make it more difficult to emigrate?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more likely	2	6	6
More likely	6	8	24
No difference	49	57	56
Less likely	19	10	9
Much less likely	11	8	3
Don't know	14	11	3
N	192	296	725

Q196: Would you be more or less likely to leave your home country if the government required people leaving professional schools to do one year of service in their area of expertise?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more likely	6	5	6
More likely	12	18	20
No difference	49	52	63
Less likely	15	11	5
Much less likely	9	5	2
Don't know	8	8	4
N	194	296	725

Q197: Would you be more or less likely to leave your home country if the government was going to allow people to hold only one passport?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more likely	6	4	6

Q197: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More likely	8	9	18
No difference	53	63	62
Less likely	11	9	8
Much less likely	10	6	2
Don't know	11	7	4
N	193	297	725

Q198: Would you be more or less likely to leave your home country if the government were to increase fees for emigration documents?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Much more likely	3	5	6
More likely	8	6	12
No difference	55	61	66
Less likely	14	11	11
Much less likely	9	8	2
Don't know	11	9	3
N	194	296	725

Q199: What is your gender?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Male	38	47	61
Female	62	53	39
N	208	303	725

Q200a: What is your age?	Botswana	Lesotho	
15–19	1	0	
20–24	1	6	
25–29	14	21	

Q200a: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho
30–34	20	20
35–39	26	19
40–44	22	15
45–59	9	13
50–54	4	2
55–59	2	3
60+	1	2
N	220	302

Q200b: What is your age?	SA
Refused to answer	2
18–24	6
25–34	29
35–49	45
50+	17

Q201: What is your marital status?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Married	49	64	68
Separated	1	2	0
Divorced	3	2	5
Abandoned	0	2	–
Widowed	1	2	2
Cohabitating/living together	4	1	2
Single	41	27	22
N	220	306	725

Q202: What is your spouse's occupation?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Not married / co-habitating	10	22	30
Housewife / househusband	5	13	20
Non-manual office worker	1	2	10
Foreman	1	1	0
Skilled manual worker	3	2	3
Semi-skilled manual worker	1	2	0
Miner	1	3	0
Unskilled manual worker	1	1	0
Farmer (own subsistence farm)	1	1	0
Farmer (own commercial farm)	–	–	1
Agricultural worker	3	1	0
Services worker	2	1	1
Domestic worker	–	1	–
Trader, hawker, vendor	1	3	2
Informal sector producer	1	1	1
Security personnel		0	0
Police/ military	6	1	1
Employer/ manager of establishment with ten or more employees	1	1	4
Employer/ manager of establishment with fewer than ten employees	–	1	3
Professional worker	15	6	4
Lawyer	1	0	1
Accountant	5	3	3
Medical doctor/ practitioner (e.g. dentist, etc.)	1	0	1

Q202: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Nurse/ medical technician	5	3	2
Teacher/ lecturer	22	12	6
Engineer	3	3	1
Managerial office worker	5	4	1
Supervisory office worker	3	4	1
Other	1	7	3
N	151	269	725

Q203: In which field or sector is your spouse/partner employed?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Not Married / co-habitating	9	23	30
Housewife / househusband	4	11	20
Finance	1	1	1
Accounting	2	1	5
Banking	1	3	2
Insurance	1	0	0
Medical	3	5	5
Law firm	1	0	1
Retail	1	3	6
Textile	2	2	1
Automotive	2	1	1
Manufacturing	1	1	2
Food	2	0	1
Steel & iron	1	0	0
Marine	–	–	–
Mining	2	5	0
Transport	1	1	1

Q203: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Energy	1	–	1
Agriculture/ farming	5	3	2
Engineering	3	2	2
Construction	2	3	2
Real Estate	1	–	1
Research	2	0	0
Government/ public sector	20	10	4
Military/ police	4	2	1
Private security	–	–	0
Primary education	6	3	2
Secondary education	10	5	3
Post-secondary/ tertiary education	11	6	2
Other	2	8	3
N	122	259	725

Q204: What is your status in this household? Are you:	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Head of household	58	54	66
Spouse (husband or wife) of head of household	32	29	22
Child of head of household	4	11	10
Parent of head of household	2	2	–
Brother or sister of head of household	2	3	0
Grandparent of head of household/ elder	–	–	–
Grandchild of head of household	1	–	0

Q204: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Other family member of head of household	1	1	1
Visitor	1	–	–
Lodger	1	0	1
Other	–	–	–
N	192	298	725

Q205: How many children do you have?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
0	17	26	26
1	18	18	14
2	26	27	34
3	20	17	17
4	15	8	7
5	3	2	1
6	–	1	0
7	1	1	0
8	–	–	0
N	203	297	725

Q206: How many people live in your household?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
0	5	–	–
1	8	9	8
2	9	7	21
3	17	20	20
4	17	21	27
5	21	15	14
6	13	12	4

Q206: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
7	5	6	2
8	2	5	1
9	1	3	0
10	–	1	0
11	0	1	0
12	0	0	0
13	–	–	0
17	–	0	–
18	–	0	–
Refused to answer	–	–	2
N	208	289	725

Q207: How many people are **totally economically dependent** on you (excluding domestic workers)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
0	11	10	27
1	8	4	14
2	11	16	20
3	18	15	17
4	16	16	11
5	10	11	6
6	10	8	1
7	4	8	1
8	4	5	1
9	3	1	0
10	2	3	1
11	1	0	–

Q207: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
12	2	2	0
14	1	0	0
>20	1	0	1

Q208: How may people are **partially economically dependent** on you (excluding domestic workers)?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
0	10	14	54
1	19	14	15
2	23	22	13
3	14	10	5
4	15	13	6
5	6	6	3
6	3	5	1
7	2	5	–
8	2	4	0
9	1	1	0
10	3	4	1
11	1	0	–
12	1	–	0
14	1	1	–
>20	2	–	0

Q209a: Purely for statistical purposes, please indicate your **joint monthly household income before tax.** (in Pula)	**Botswana**
Less than P 2 700	11
P 2 800 – P 5 400	32
P 5 500 – P 8 200	15
P 8 300 – P 11 000	12
P11 100 – P13 800	6
P13 900 – P16 600	4
P16 700 – P19 400	2
P19 500 – P22 200	0
P22 300 – P25 000	0
P25 100 – P27 800	1
P27 900 – P30 600	2
P30 700 – P33 400	2
P33 500 – P36 200	1
P36 300 – P39 000	1
P39 100 – P41 800	1
P41 900 – P44 600	–
P44 700 – P47 400	0
P47 500 – P50 200	1
P50 300 – P53 000	1
Over P53 000	7

Q209b: Purely for statistical purposes, please indicate your **joint monthly household income before tax.** (in Maluti)	**Lesotho**
less than M2 000	24
M2 100 – M4 000	30
M4 100 – M6 000	13
M6 100 – M8 000	8

Q209b: Continued	Lesotho
M8 100 – M10 000	7
M10 100 – M12 000	3
M12 100 – M14 000	5
M14 100 – M16 000	1
M16 100 – M18 000	1
M18 100 – M20 000	1
M20 100 – M22 000	1
M22 100 – M24 000	1
M24 100 – M26 000	1
M26 100 – M28 000	–
M28 100 – M30 000	–
M32 100 – M34 000	–
M36 100 – M38 000	–
Over M38 000	2

Q209c: Purely for statistical purposes, please indicate your **joint monthly household income before tax?** (in Rand)	SA
< R2000	3
R2100 – R4000	8
R4100 – R6000	11
R6100 – R8000	9
R8100 – R10000	11
R10100 – R12000	8
R12100 – R14000	6
R14100 – R16000	7
R16100 – R18000	4
R18100 – R20000	4
R20100 – R22000	4

Q209c: Continued	SA
R22100 – R24000	1
R24100 – R26000	3
R26100 – R28000	–
R28100 – R30000	1
R30100 – R32000	2
R32100 – R34000	–
R34100 – R36000	1
R36100 – R38000	–
>R38000	4
Refused to answer	11
Don't know	2

Q210: How often do you send money to friends or relatives abroad?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	1	3	–
Monthly	6	11	1
Once every few months	9	5	1
Once or twice yearly	7	3	1
Once every few years	3	1	1
Just once or twice	6	3	1
Never	69	73	95

Q211: How often do you send money to foreign bank accounts/ investments?	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
More than once a month	1	1	–
Monthly	3	17	1
Once every few months	3	6	1

Q211: Continued	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Once or twice yearly	0	3	1
Once every few years	0	2	1
Just once or twice	2	3	1
Never	89	67	95

Q212: What **percentage** of your joint total monthly household income would you say you **send out of the country?**	Botswana	Lesotho	SA
Zero/ None	70	49	91
0 – 5 Percent	14	20	7
5 – 10 Percent	5	9	1
10 – 15 Percent	1	3	0
15 – 20 Percent	1	4	0
20 – 25 Percent	1	4	–
25 – 30 Percent	7	5	1
30 – 35 Percent	–	1	–
35 – 40 Percent	–	1	–
40 – 45 Percent	–	1	–
45 – 50 Percent	1	2	0
More than 50 Percent	–	2	–

Q213a: In which **province** do you live?	Botswana
Central	16
Southern	4
Southeast	61
Northern	4
Kweneng	4

Q213a: Continued	Botswana
Kgalagadi	3
Gantsi	2
Ngwaketse	1
Northwest	4
Kgatleng	1
Bobonong	0
Northeast	0

Q214a: In which village do you live?	Botswana
Lobatse	2
Selebiphikwe	7
Jwaneng	3
Gaborone	57
Tlokweng	1
Serowe	4
Sefharevillage	0
Francistown	4
Metsimotlhabe	0
Letlhakane village	0
Maun	3
Gabane village	1
Tsabong	0
Ramotswa	1
Mmadinare village	1
Thamaga village	1
Palapye	2
Gantsi	3

Q214a: Continued	Botswana
Mogoditshane	1
Molepolole	1
Mahalapye	1
Good-hope	0
Kasane	1
Morwa	0
Hukuntsi	0
Bobonong	0
Masunga	0
Mochudi	0
Gumare	0

Q213b: In which discrict do you live?	Lesotho
Buthe-buthe	3
Leribe	15
Berea	1
Maseru	68
Mafeteng	3
Mohaleshoek	1
Thaba-tseka	10

Q5: Continued	Botswana	SA
Israel	1	1
Trinidad & Tobago	1	–
West Indies	–	0
N	123	400

Q6: What is your status in your host country?	Botswana	SA
Permanent resident	2	63
Work permit holder	85	37
Exemption certificate holder	10	–
Temporary resident	3	–
N	124	400

Q7: For how many years have you held this status?	Botswana	SA
1	16	7
2	16	6
3	8	11
4	10	10
5	8	8
6	9	7
7	5	3
8	9	3
9	4	3
10	2	2
11	2	2
12	3	1
13	2	1
14	3	1

Q7: Continued	Botswana	SA
15+	5	36
N	117	400

Q8: How would you describe your current **employment** status?	Botswana	SA
Unemployed (not looking for work)	1	–
Unemployed (looking for work)	–	–
Housewife (looking for work)	–	–
Student/scholar	1	–
Pensioner	–	–
Military (permanent force, commissioned)	–	–
Work in informal sector (not looking for formal sector)	–	–
Work in informal sector (looking for formal sector)	–	–
Self-employed formal sector (part–time)	–	2
Self-employed formal sector (full–time)	8	21
Self-employed informal sector (full–time)	1	5
Self-employed informal sector (part–time)	–	1
Employed (part–time)	–	8
Employed (full–time)	90	64
Other	–	–
N	125	400

Q9: Which **one** of the following best describes your **occupation** (or most recent if currently unemployed)?	Botswana	SA
Non-manual office worker	–	–
Foreman	1	–
Skilled manual worker	–	–

Q9: Continued	Botswana	SA
Semi-skilled manual worker	–	–
Miner	–	–
Unskilled manual worker	–	–
Farmer (own subsistence farm)	–	–
Farmer (own commercial farm)	1	–
Agricultural worker	–	–
Services worker	1	–
Domestic worker	–	–
Trader, hawker, vendor	–	–
Informal sector producer	–	4
Security personnel	5	1
Police/ Military	–	1
Employer/ Manager of establishment with ten or more employees	2	13
Employer/ Manager of establishment with fewer than ten employees	13	2
Professional worker	2	2
Lawyer	26	9
Accountant	22	2
Medical doctor/ Practitioner	–	12
Nurse/ Medical Technician	3	12
Teacher/ Lecturer	22	11
Engineer	–	22
Managerial office worker	2	4
Supervisory office worker	–	2
Other	1	6
N	125	400

Q10: What is your **highest** academic qualification?	Botswana	SA
Less than High School Certificate	1	1
Diploma without High School Certificate	1	0
High School Certificate	1	7
Diploma with High School Certificate	13	36
Bachelor's Degree	28	32
Honour's Degree	14	10
Master's Degree	15	12
Doctorate	23	3
Post-graduate Diploma	3	–
PGCE	3	–
Chartered Accounting	–	–
Certificate with High School Certificate	–	–
N	123	400

Q11: Could you please write the **exact name** of your highest qualification in the box below (e.g., B.A., B.Sc., etc.)	Botswana	SA
Diploma in business studies	3	–
Diploma in education	1	–
Diploma in nursing		–
Diploma in public health	1	–
B.A.	4	10
B.Com.	7	–
B.Sc.	1	2
B.A. Hons.	2	7
B.Eng.		3
B. Ed.	–	2
B. Com. Honours	3	4

Q11: Continued	Botswana	SA
B. Nursing	–	1
B.Sc. Honours	2	2
LL.B.	3	2
LL.M.	5	–
M.B.A.	5	3
Master of orthopaedic surgery	1	–
M.Com.	1	–
B.Med.	3	8
M.Med (psychiatry)	1	–
M.Med (surgery)	2	–
M.Sc.	4	3
Doctor of Education	1	–
Doctor of Philosophy	16	5
Ph.D. (chemistry)	1	–
Ph.D. (archaeology)	1	–
J.S.D	1	–
M.In.Sc.	1	–
M. Bchb	11	–
Diploma in diagnostic radiography	5	–
Bachelor of accountancy	2	–
Diploma in physiotherapy	1	–
Diploma in accounts	2	–
Chartered certified accountancy	9	1
Diploma in hotel management	1	–
Diploma in technical studies	1	–
Technology Degree/Diploma	–	1
Trades Diploma	–	23

Q11: Continued	Botswana	SA
Other	–	23
N	118	369

Q16: Have you been awarded a **scholarship**, and/or **bursary** from your home country government?	Botswana	SA
Yes	47	13
No	52	87
Don't know	1	1
N	124	400

Q17: What was the total amount of funding?	SA
833	3
1000	3
1200	3
1250	3
2500	3
4800	3
5000	3
7000	3
7462	3
7692	3
9000	3
10000	9
12000	3
12600	3
14400	3
15000	5

Q17: Continued	SA
20000	3
30000	5
50000	5
60000	9
66000	3
72000	5
120000	3
132000	3
180000	3
300000	3
400000	3
N	400

Q18: Which **one** of the following best describes your employment **field/ sector/ industry** (or most recent if currently unemployed)?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Finance	7	3
Accounting	15	3
Banking	2	1
Insurance / assurance	2	2
Medical	28	10
Law firm	2	2
Retail	2	8
Textile	–	2
Automotive	–	3
Manufacturing	2	8
Food	2	6
Steel & iron	–	1

Q18: Continued	Botswana	SA
Marine	–	1
Mining	2	0
Transport	1	2
Energy	–	1
Agriculture/ farming	–	–
Engineering	1	13
Construction	2	3
Real estate	–	2
Research	1	4
Government/ public sector	5	4
Military/ police	–	0
Private security	–	1
Primary education	–	1
Secondary education	–	3
Post-secondary / tertiary education	1	6
Other	24	12
N	124	400

Q19: How **long** have you been employed in this field/ sector/ industry?	Botswana	SA
=1 year	15	10
1–2 years	17	8
2–5 years	28	33
5–10 years	24	19
10–20 years	15	20
20+ years	2	12
N	119	400

Q20: How **easy** or **difficult** do you think it would be for you to get another job in a different occupation?	Botswana	SA
Very easy	13	8
Easy	27	24
Difficult	21	37
Very difficult	20	26
Don't know	19	5
N	123	400

Q21: How **easy** or **difficult** do you think it would be for your company to find someone else to replace you?	Botswana	SA
Very easy	4	4
Easy	15	20
Difficult	45	40
Very difficult	22	26
Don't know	14	10
Not applicable	–	1
N	117	400

Q22: How **easy** or **difficult** do you think it would be for your company to find someone else more efficient than yourself?	Botswana	SA
Very Easy	–	1
Easy	4	11
Difficult	32	36
Very Difficult	41	39
Don't Know	23	13
Not Applicable	–	1
N	116	400

Q23: How long have you been in your host country on this current stay? (in years)	Botswana	SA
1	15	4
2	16	7
3	11	7
4	9	8
5	6	7
6	9	7
7	6	5
8	7	4
9	4	3
10	2	2
11	2	2
12	3	2
13	2	1
14	3	2
15	1	1
16	2	1
17	1	2
18	1	5
19	1	2
20+	–	25
N	108	400

Q24: From which country did you come to this country?	Botswana	SA
USA	2	2
South Africa	17	–
Netherlands	1	1

Q24: Continued	**Botswana**	**SA**
UK	6	27
Norway	1	–
Germany	1	6
Australia	1	0
India	6	–
Sri Lanka	2	–
Guinea	1	–
Sierra Leone	1	–
Ghana	3	2
Nigeria	5	7
Seychelles	1	–
Ethiopia	2	–
Kenya	5	1
Tanzania	6	–
Uganda	1	2
Zimbabwe	12	9
Zambia	13	3
Malawi	3	1
Lesotho	2	3
Swaziland	1	2
Ireland	1	1
Papua New Guinea	1	–
Taiwan	1	–
China	1	–

Q24: Continued	Botswana	SA
Canada	1	1
Portugal	–	1
Italy	–	1
Belgium	–	1
Switzerland	–	1
Austria	–	1
Spain	–	1
France	–	0
Hungary	–	0
Greece	–	0
Former USSR	–	1
Czech Republic	–	0
Bulgaria	–	0
Malaysia	–	1
Taiwan	–	1
China	–	1
U.A.E.	–	0
Japan	–	0
Hong Kong	–	0
Botswana	–	3
Mozambique	–	2
Cameroon	–	1
Senegal	–	1
New Zealand	–	1
Israel	–	1
Mauritius	–	1
Kenya	–	1

Q24: Continued	Botswana	SA
Namibia	–	1
Liberia	–	–
Gabon	–	0
Nigeria	–	7
Democratic Republic of the Congo (Zaire)	–	5
Uganda	–	1
Mali	–	0
Angola	–	–
Congo	–	0
Cuba	–	–
Argentina	–	0
N	111	400

Q25: What was your employment status before you left your home country?	Botswana	SA
Unemployed (not looking for work)	1	2
Unemployed (looking for work)	2	2
Housewife (looking for work)	–	0
Housewife (not looking for work)		1
Student/scholar	3	24
Pensioner	–	–
Military (temporary, NCO)	–	0
Military (permanent force, commissioned)		1
Work in informal sector (not looking for formal sector)	–	0
Work in informal sector (looking for formal sector)	–	1
Self-employed formal sector (part-time)	–	1
Self-employed formal sector (full-time)	6	6

Q25: Continued	Botswana	SA
Self-employed informal sector (full–time)	2	1
Self-employed informal sector (part–time)	–	1
Employed (part–time)	3	5
Employed (full–time)	84	56
Other	–	–
N	125	400

Q26: Which **one** of the following best describes your employment **field/ sector/ industry** before you left your home country?	Botswana	SA
Finance	10	29
Accounting	17	3
Banking	2	2
Insurance / assurance	1	2
Medical	29	1
Law firm	2	10
Retail	–	1
Textile	–	3
Automotive	1	2
Manufacturing	3	2
Food	–	6
Steel & iron	–	3
Marine	–	1
Mining	–	1
Transport	1	0
Energy	1	1
Agriculture/ farming	–	0
Engineering	2	1

Q26: Continued	Botswana	SA
Construction	1	10
Real Estate	–	4
Research	2	1
Government/ public sector	4	2
Military/ police	–	4
Private Security	–	1
Primary education	–	2
Secondary education	2	2
Post-secondary / tertiary education	21	4
Other	2	5
N	123	400

Q27 It makes you proud to be called a citizen of your home country	Botswana	SA
Strongly	54	40
Agree	29	40
Neither	10	14
Disagree	3	4
Strongly disagree	1	1
Do no know	2	0
N	124	400

Q 28: You have more in common with people from other countries working in your profession than with people from your home country	Botswana	SA
Strongly agree	10	9
Agree	18	39
Neither	25	23
Disagree	31	24
Strongly disagree	14	4
Do not know	3	2
N	124	400

Q29: Being a citizen of your home country is a very important part of how you see yourself	Botswana	SA
Strongly agree	40	29
Agree	32	37
Neither	14	15
Disagree	10	17
Strongly disagree	3	2
Do not know	1	1
N	124	400

Q30 You would want your children to think of themselves as citizens of your home country	Botswana	SA
Strongly agree	42	22
Agree	25	32
Neither	18	20
Disagree	7	19
Strongly disagree	2	3
Do not know	6	4
N	123	400

Q31: It really does not matter where you are a citizen as long as you have a good quality of life	Botswana	SA
Strongly agree	31	29
Agree	26	47
Neither	9	8
Disagree	21	12
Strongly disagree	12	3
Do not know	1	2
N	123	400

Q32: You have a duty to contribute your talents and skills to the development of your home country	Botswana	SA
Strongly agree	24	19
Agree	29	27
Neither	20	16
Disagree	18	31
Strongly disagree	4	6
Do not know	6	1
N	123	400

Q33: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your home country were to require citizens to work in the country for several years after completion of their education?	Botswana	SA
Completely justified	21	6
Justified	26	33
Neither	6	10
Unjustified	32	38
Completely unjustified	14	12
Do not know	2	1
N	125	400

Q34: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your home country were to require citizens who have received government bursaries for education to complete some form of national service?	Botswana	SA
Completely justified	30	15
Justified	48	55
Neither	2	10

Q34: Continued	Botswana	SA
Unjustified	12	16
Completely unjustified	6	5
Do not know	1	0
N	124	400

Q35: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your home country were to require citizens to pay taxes on all income earned outside of your country (e.g., this would include interest on investments)?	Botswana	SA
Completely justified	2	3
Justified	7	9
Neither	3	13
Unjustified	40	42
Completely unjustified	46	33
Do not know	1	1
N	125	400

Q36: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your home country were to require citizens to pay a larger share of their income in taxes according to their ability to pay?	Botswana	SA
Completely justified	6	2
Justified	25	22
Neither	6	14
Unjustified	27	38
Completely unjustified	34	23
Do not know	2	2
N	124	400

Q37: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your home country were to require citizens to serve in the armed forces in cases of national emergency?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Completely justified	13	14
Justified	44	42
Neither	11	14
Unjustified	15	19
Completely unjustified	14	8
Do not know	3	2
N	124	400

Q38: Would you feel that it would be **justified** or **unjustified** if the government of your home country were to limit the amount of money you may send out of the country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Completely justified	2	4
Justified	16	19
Neither	4	12
Unjustified	40	39
Completely unjustified	34	25
Do not know	4	2
N	124	400

Q39: **How many** members of your immediate family have left your home country to work and live in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
None	60	45
Just one or two	26	33
Several	5	13
Most	4	4

Q39: Continued	Botswana	SA
Almost all	6	5
Don't know	–	–
N	124	400

Q40: **How many** members of your extended family have left your home country to work and live in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
None	74	62
Just one or two	15	15
Several	5	15
Most	2	4
Almost all	2	3
Don't know	2	2
N	121	400

Q41: **How many** of your close friends have left your home country to work and live in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
None	45	45
Just one or two	26	22
Several	17	21
Most	6	7
Almost all	2	3
Don't know	3	3
N	121	400

Q42: **How many** of your co-workers have left your home country to work and live in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
None	47	57
Just one or two	18	14
Several	29	17
Most	–	5
Almost all	2	1
Don't know	4	6
N	119	400

Q43: **How many** people in your profession that you know have left your home country to work and live in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
None	22	37
Just one or two	14	19
Several	54	30
Most	5	6
Almost all	3	2
Don't know	2	6
N	122	400

Q44: Generally speaking, to what **extent** do people who have left your home country continue to see themselves as citizens of it?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Large extent	71	52
Some extent	17	35
Hardly at all	3	5
Not at all	4	4
Do not know	5	5
N	123	400

Q45: Generally speaking, to what **extent** do people who have left your home country tend to blend in with their new culture/ or countries?	Botswana	SA
Large extent	16	31
Some extent	56	50
Hardly at all	16	10
Not at all	4	7
Do not know	7	3
N	122	400

Q46: For those people who have left your home country, do you think their lives have been **better** or **worse** than they were at home?	Botswana	SA
Much better	10	21
Better	60	49
About the same	20	19
Worse	4	5
Much worse	–	–
Don't know	6	6
N	124	400

Q47: Do you generally have **positive** or **negative** relations with **people from your home country?**	Botswana	SA
Very positive	37	27
Positive	46	60
Neither positive or negative	14	10
Negative	2	4

Q47: Continued	Botswana	SA
Very negative	1	–
Do not know	–	0
N	125	400

Q48: Do people from this country generally have a **positive**, or **negative** view of **foreign residents?**	Botswana	SA
Very positive	5	7
Positive	25	44
Neither positive or negative	15	18
Negative	31	25
Very negative	15	3
Do not know	9	3
N	124	400

Q49: Do your co-workers generally have a **positive**, or **negative** view of **foreign residents?**	Botswana	SA
Very positive	12	10
Positive	48	59
Neither positive or negative	20	19
Negative	17	9
Very negative	1	0
Do not know	2	4
N	124	400

Q50: Do people in your profession generally have a **positive**, or **negative** view of **foreign** residents?	Botswana	SA
Very positive	12	13
Positive	50	60
Neither positive or negative	23	17
Negative	11	6
Very negative	1	5
Do not know	3	–
N	121	400

Q51: Do people from your new country have a **positive**, or **negative** view of people from your home country?	Botswana	SA
Very positive	8	10
Positive	42	43
Neither positive or negative	26	25
Negative	10	17
Very negative	9	3
Do not know	5	3
N	125	400

Q52: To what extent do you think people of your home country are treated unfairly by the people of your new country?	Botswana	SA
Large extent	5	8
Some extent	31	32
Hardly at all	35	36
Never	14	18
Do not know	15	6
N	124	400

Q53: To what extent do you think people of your home country are treated unfairly by the government of your new country?	Botswana	SA
Large extent	3	12
Some extent	15	31
Hardly at all	34	30
Never	33	20
Do not know	16	8
N	120	400

Q54: To what extent do you think you personally are treated unfairly by the people of your new country?	Botswana	SA
Large extent	2	5
Some extent	22	22
Hardly at all	36	34
Never	36	39
Do not know	4	1
N	125	400

Q55: To what extent do you think you personally are treated unfairly by the government of your new country?	Botswana	SA
Large extent	2	7
Some extent	11	27
Hardly at all	31	29
Never	51	36
Do not know	5	1
N	122	400

Q56: In this country, have you ever been harassed?	Botswana	SA
Yes	29	35
No	71	65
N	117	400

Q57: In this country, have you ever been assaulted?	Botswana	SA
Yes	4	18
No	96	82
N	114	400

Q58: In this country, have you ever been robbed?	Botswana	SA
Yes	29	57
No	71	44
N	120	400

Q59: In this country, have you ever been raped?	Botswana	SA
Yes	1	1
No	99	99
N	111	400

Q60: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the cost of living	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	4	9
Satisfied	48	38
Neutral	17	16
Dissatisfied	28	32
Very dissatisfied	3	5
Don't know	–	0
N	123	400

Q61: Please indicate whether you expect the cost of living to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	2	9
Better	19	22
Same	21	14
Worse	45	45
Much worse	12	8
Don't know	2	2
N/A	–	0
N	121	400

Q62: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your job	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	16	19
Satisfied	54	60
Neutral	18	13
Dissatisfied	11	8
Very dissatisfied	–	1
Don't know	1	0
N	124	400

Q63: Please indicate whether you expect your job to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	11	11
Better	31	32
Same	38	38
Worse	18	14
Much worse	1	2

Q63: Continued	Botswana	SA
Don't know	2	4
N/A	–	0
N	120	400

Q64: Please indicate how **satisfied or dissatisfied** you are with prospects for professional advancement	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	7	10
Satisfied	31	49
Neutral	23	19
Dissatisfied	23	16
Very dissatisfied	12	5
Don't know	4	2
N	124	400

Q65: Please indicate whether you expect the prospects for professional advancement to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	7	10
Better	27	29
Same	35	34
Worse	16	17
Much worse	11	5
Don't know	4	5
N/A	–	1
N	121	400

Q66: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the security of your job	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	7	9
Satisfied	41	53
Neutral	30	19
Dissatisfied	15	13
Very dissatisfied	5	5
Don't know	2	1
N	123	400

Q67: Please indicate whether you expect the security of your job to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	7	7
Better	21	22
Same	41	42
Worse	19	16
Much worse	6	5
Don't know	7	8
N/A	–	1
N	121	400

Q68: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your level of income	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	5	7
Satisfied	51	44
Neutral	20	18
Dissatisfied	23	26
Very dissatisfied	2	4

Q68: Continued	Botswana	SA
Don't know	–	2
N	124	400

Q69: Please indicate whether you expect your level of income to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	6	12
Better	43	34
Same	23	31
Worse	21	14
Much worse	3	4
Don't know	5	5
N/A	–	1
N	120	400

Q70: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your ability to find a house you want to live in.	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	5	17
Satisfied	40	54
Neutral	22	14
Dissatisfied	23	10
Very dissatisfied	7	4
Don't know	3	1
N	124	400

Q71: Please indicate whether you expect your ability to find a house you want to live in to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	2	11
Better	25	25
Same	43	45
Worse	17	12
Much worse	7	2
Don't know	7	4
N/A	–	1
N	122	400

Q72: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your ability to find a good school for your children.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	6	12
Satisfied	36	34
Neutral	19	18
Dissatisfied	19	16
Very dissatisfied	8	2
Don't know	13	15
N/A	–	4
N	117	400

Q73: Please indicate whether you expect your ability to find a good school for your children to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	5	11
Better	19	18

Q73: Continued	Botswana	SA
Same	38	21
Worse	16	22
Much worse	6	8
Don't know	16	18
N/A	–	4
N	114	400

Q74: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your ability to find medical services for your family and children.		
Very satisfied	12	15
Satisfied	51	51
Neutral	15	12
Dissatisfied	13	14
Very dissatisfied	6	5
Don't know	2	4
N	123	400

Q75: Please indicate whether you expect your ability to find medical services for your family and children to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	10	12
Better	31	20
Same	38	30
Worse	13	25
Much worse	3	9
Don't know	5	6

Q75: Continued	Botswana	SA
N/A	–	0
N	120	400

Q76: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your level of taxation	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	15	3
Satisfied	52	12
Neutral	22	22
Dissatisfied	7	39
Very dissatisfied	2	21
Don't know	1	3
N	121	400

Q77: Please indicate whether you expect your level of taxation to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	7	3
Better	31	11
Same	47	27
Worse	8	37
Much worse	3	14
Don't know	3	8
N/A	–	1
N	118	400

Q78: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	8	2

Q78: Continued	Botswana	SA
Satisfied	53	18
Neutral	22	28
Dissatisfied	9	31
Very dissatisfied	2	14
Don't know	5	8
N/A	–	1
N	122	400

Q79: Please indicate whether you expect the relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	5	2
Better	22	8
Same	52	36
Worse	8	28
Much worse	3	12
Don't know	9	12
N/A	–	2
N	119	400

Q80: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your personal safety.	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	18	3
Satisfied	59	13
Neutral	15	16
Dissatisfied	5	35
Very dissatisfied	1	34
Don't know	2	0

Q80: Continued	Botswana	SA
N	123	400

Q81: Please indicate whether you expect your personal safety to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	10	7
Better	32	19
Same	26	21
Worse	27	31
Much worse	2	19
Don't know	4	4
N/A	–	0
N	117	400

Q82: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with your family's safety.	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	17	1
Satisfied	56	11
Neutral	14	17
Dissatisfied	5	33
Very dissatisfied	2	34
Don't know	6	4
N/A	–	1
N	121	400

Q83: Please indicate whether you expect your family's safety to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	9	6

Q83: Continued	Botswana	SA
Better	31	18
Same	27	20
Worse	22	29
Much worse	3	20
Don't know	9	6
N/A	–	1
N	117	400

Q84: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the future of your children in this country.	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	3	2
Satisfied	22	16
Neutral	33	24
Dissatisfied	18	26
Very dissatisfied	6	19
Don't know	18	13
N/A	–	1
N	119	400

Q85: Please indicate whether you expect the future of your children in this country to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	5	9
Better	17	15
Same	30	20
Worse	20	21
Much worse	10	18

Q85: Continued	**Botswana**	**SA**
Don't know	17	17
N/A	–	1
N	115	400

Q86: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the upkeep of public amenities.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Very satisfied	7	8
Satisfied	30	27
Neutral	14	17
Dissatisfied	31	26
Very dissatisfied	12	23
Don't know	6	1
N	121	400

Q87: Please indicate whether you expect the upkeep of public amenities in this country to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	6	11
Better	25	21
Same	33	20
Worse	16	27
Much worse	10	18
Don't know	9	4
N/A	–	0
N	123	400

Q88: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the availability of affordable quality products	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	5	13
Satisfied	51	51
Neutral	23	19
Dissatisfied	17	13
Very dissatisfied	3	4
Don't know	1	0
N	120	400

Q89: Please indicate whether you expect the future availability of affordable quality products to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	8	12
Better	28	25
Same	40	32
Worse	16	22
Much worse	4	6
Don't know	4	3
N/A	–	0
N	123	400

Q90: Please indicate how **satisfied** or **dissatisfied** you are with the level of customer service in your country.	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	2	9
Satisfied	23	27
Neutral	15	18
Dissatisfied	40	27

Q90: Continued	Botswana	SA
Very dissatisfied	20	21
Don't know	1	–
N	123	400

Q91: Please indicate whether you expect the level of customer service to get better, stay the same or get worse in the next five years.	Botswana	SA
Much better	2	9
Better	27	23
Same	35	29
Worse	18	21
Much worse	12	14
Don't know	5	3
N/A	–	1
N	121	400

Q 92: During the **past year**, did you:	Botswana	SA
Save money	34	32
Just get by	50	36
Spend some of your savings	4	20
Spend some of your savings and borrow	11	12
Refused to answer	–	–
N	123	400

Q 93: Which of the following best describes your economic status?	Botswana	SA
Poor/ lower class	1	2
Working class	11	19
Middle class	43	53
Upper middle class	34	22
Upper class	6	3
Don't know	4	2
N	125	400

Q94: What language do you speak mostly at home?	Botswana	SA
Afrikaans	3	1
Bulgarian	2	–
Chinese	1	1
Dutch/Flemish	1	1
English	60	67
German	1	4
Indian	1	–
Lozi	2	–
Ndebele	1	1
Norwegian	1	–
Russian	1	0
Shona	2	2
Swahili	4	1
Yoruba	1	1
Akan	2	–
Telugu	4	–
Serbian	1	0
Tigrinya	1	–

Q94:Continued	Botswana	SA
Ga	1	–
Chichewa	3	0
Bemba	2	–
Sinhala	2	–
Bengali	1	0
Nyanja	1	–
Tamil	1	–
Amharic	1	–
Dinka	1	–
Spanish	–	1
French	–	4
Igbo	–	2
Akan	–	0
Sesotho	–	2
Greek	–	0
Bulgarian	–	0
Kikongo	–	1
Portuguese	–	1
Lingala	–	0
Swazi	–	2
Twi	–	1
Setswana	–	2
Nyanja	–	1
Japanese	–	0
Malawian	–	0
Mandarin	–	1
Tumbuka	–	0

Q94:Continued	Botswana	SA
Hebrew	–	0
Zulu	–	1
Korean	–	0
Tshopi	–	0
Senyembane	–	0
Wolof	–	1
Etuno	–	0
Italian	–	0
Hungarian	–	0
Edo	–	0
Kikuyu	–	0
Romanian	–	0
Pakistani	–	0
Tamil	–	0
Arabic	–	0
N	125	400

Q 95: Purely for statistical purposes, which of the following best describes you?	Botswana	SA
Black/ African	49	n/a
White/ European	36	n/a
Coloured	2	n/a
Indian/ Asian	12	n/a
White/African	1	n/a
N	124	n/a

Q96: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse,** or the **same** as other foreign residents living in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	2	7
Better	24	32
Same	55	51
Worse	13	5
Much worse	–	0
Don't know	6	6
N	125	400

Q97: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse,** or the **same** as other people from your home country living in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	2	6
Better	25	25
Same	59	57
Worse	8	6
Much worse	1	0
Don't know	5	6
N	124	400

Q98: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse,** or the **same** as citizens of this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	9	9
Better	40	36
Same	33	40
Worse	7	7
Much worse	2	1

Q98: Continued	**Botswana**	**SA**
Don't know	9	7
N	123	400

Q99: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse,** or the same as other people in your profession?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	–	5
Better	17	14
Same	69	64
Worse	12	11
Much worse	1	1
Don't know	2	4
N	125	400

Q100: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse,** or the same as other people in your economic class?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	–	3
Better	9	16
Same	76	70
Worse	13	7
Much worse	–	1
Don't know	2	4
N	124	400

Q101: Would you say that your overall **personal conditions** are **better, worse,** or the **same** as other people who share your home language?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	1	4
Better	22	24
Same	62	58
Worse	7	5
Much worse	–	0
Don't know	7	8
N	125	400

Q102: Would you say that your personal **conditions** are **better, worse,** or the **same** as other people of your race?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	2	5
Better	21	27
Same	60	55
Worse	8	6
Much worse	1	1
Don't know	8	8
N	123	400

Q103: Would you say that the overall **conditions** of foreign residents living in this country are **better, worse,** or the **same** as other groups in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	4	6
Better	51	34
Same	31	40
Worse	6	12

Q103: Continued	Botswana	SA
Much worse	–	1
Don't know	8	7
N	124	400

Q104: Would you say that the overall **conditions** of people from your home country who live in this country are **better, worse**, or the **same** as other groups in this country?	Botswana	SA
Much better	5	6
Better	35	36
Same	53	46
Worse	2	7
Much worse	–	1
Don't know	6	5
N	124	400

Q105: Would you say that the overall **conditions** of people in your profession are **better, worse**, or the **same** as other groups in this country?	Botswana	SA
Much better	3	6
Better	35	32
Same	49	51
Worse	8	6
Much worse	–	1
Don't know	5	5
N	123	400

Q106: Would you say that the overall **conditions** of people in your economic class are **better**, **worse**, or the **same** as other groups in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	5	4
Better	32	31
Same	54	54
Worse	4	5
Much worse	–	1
Don't know	5	6
N	123	400

Q107: Would you say that the overall **conditions** of people who share your home language are **better**, **worse**, or the **same** as other groups in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	4	5
Better	30	30
Same	55	52
Worse	2	5
Much worse	–	1
Don't know	9	9
N	123	400

Q108: Would you say that the overall **conditions** of people of your race are **better**, **worse**, or the **same** as other groups in this country?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Much better	3	4
Better	26	32
Same	52	49
Worse	9	7

Q108: Continued	Botswana	SA
Much worse	1	1
Don't know	8	7
N	121	400

Q109: What role if any do you feel you personally have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	SA
Important role	44	30
Some role	50	46
Minor role	5	16
No role at all	1	7
Do not know	–	2
N	124	400

Q110: What role if any do you feel foreign residents who live here have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	SA
Important role	47	24
Some role	44	54
Minor role	6	15
No role at all	1	4
Do not know	2	4
N	124	400

Q111: What role if any do you feel people from your home country who live here have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	SA
Important role	33	20
Some role	56	54
Minor role	7	18
No role at all	1	5

Q111: Continued	Botswana	SA
Do not know	2	4
N	124	400

Q112: What role if any do you feel people in your economic class have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	SA
Important role	45	28
Some role	49	54
Minor role	5	11
No role at all	1	3
Do not know	1	4
N	125	400

Q113: What role if any do you feel people who share your language have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	SA
Important role	28	24
Some role	55	54
Minor role	10	14
No role at all	3	3
Do not know	4	5
N	124	400

Q114: What role if any do you feel people of your race have to play in the future of this country?	Botswana	SA
Important role	32	35
Some role	50	47
Minor role	10	11
No role at all	2	3

Q114: Continued	Botswana	SA
Do not know	7	4
N	122	400

Q115: How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with overall conditions in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Very satisfied	10	12
Satisfied	34	44
Unsatisfied	35	25
Very unsatisfied	19	13
Don't know	3	7
N	124	400

Q116: Do you expect the overall conditions in your home country to get better, worse, or stay about the same twelve months from now?	Botswana	SA
Much better	3	6
Better	21	30
About the same	47	51
Worse	18	8
Much Worse	7	1
Don't know	3	5
N	125	400

Q117: Do you expect the overall conditions in your home country to get better, worse, or stay about the same five years from now?	Botswana	SA
Much better	13	17
Better	32	39
About the same	22	31

Q117: Continued	Botswana	SA
Worse	15	8
Much Worse	9	1
Don't know	9	5
N	125	400

Q118: In general would you say your life today is better, worse, or about the same as it was in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better	10	18
Better	50	47
About the same	32	25
Worse	4	8
Much Worse	3	1
Don't know	1	2
N	125	400

Q119: Would you say the cost of living in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	17	17
Better in this country	38	40
About the same	16	18
Better in home country	22	16
Much better in home country	7	7
Don't know	–	2
N	125	400

Q120: Would you say your job in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	9	18
Better in this country	24	40
About the same	40	24
Better in home country	22	12
Much better in home country	4	4
Don't know	1	2
N	124	400

Q121: Would you say that prospects for professional advancement in this country are better, worse or about the same they would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	6	14
Better in this country	14	35
About the same	24	20
Better in home country	27	21
Much better in home country	27	6
Don't know	2	4
N	125	400

Q122: Would you say the security of your job in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	3	10
Better in this country	11	23
About the same	28	31
Better in home country	33	22
Much better in home country	23	11

Q122: Continued	Botswana	SA
Don't know	2	3
N	124	400

Q123: Would you say your level of income in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	10	14
Better in this country	54	32
About the same	20	22
Better in home country	9	20
Much better in home country	7	8
Don't know	1	4
N/A	–	1
N	123	400

Q124: Would you say your ability to find the house you want in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	2	22
Better in this country	15	37
About the same	25	21
Better in home country	40	12
Much better in home country	15	5
Don't know	2	4
N	124	400

Q125: Would you say your ability to find a good school for your children in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	3	11
Better in this country	12	16
About the same	18	21
Better in home country	34	26
Much better in home country	26	13
Don't know	7	12
N/A	–	2
N	124	400

Q126: Would you say your ability to find medical services for your family and children in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	5	13
Better in this country	20	24
About the same	25	21
Better in home country	28	23
Much better in home country	18	16
Don't know	4	4
N	125	400

Q127: Would you say your level of taxation in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	24	3
Better in this country	42	13
About the same	19	28

Q127: Continued	Botswana	SA
Better in home country	11	32
Much better in home country	2	16
Don't know	2	8
N/A	–	0
N	125	400

Q128: Would you say the relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	11	2
Better in this country	38	12
About the same	29	29
Better in home country	12	31
Much better in home country	2	14
Don't know	9	13
N/A	–	0
N	125	400

Q129: Would you say your personal safety in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	22	4
Better in this country	27	4
About the same	30	14
Better in home country	14	29
Much better in home country	8	49
Don't know	–	1
N	125	400

Q130: Would you say your family's safety in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	21	3
Better in this country	27	4
About the same	30	14
Better in home country	12	27
Much better in home country	8	51
Don't know	2	2
N	125	400

Q131: Would you say the future of your children in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	7	7
Better in this country	20	13
About the same	15	13
Better in home country	30	24
Much better in home country	16	31
Don't know	12	11
N/A	–	1
N	125	400

Q132: Would you say the upkeep of public amenities in this country is better, worse or about the same as it would be in your home country?	Botswana	SA
Much better in this country	8	13
Better in this country	28	21
About the same	21	18
Better in home country	22	20

Q 142: Continued	Botswana	SA
Your level of income	14	6
Ability to find the house you want to live in	–	2
Ability to find a good school for your children	2	1
Ability to find medical services for your family and children	1	–
Your level of taxation	2	1
The relative share of taxes you pay in comparison to others	–	–
Your personal safety	8	4
Your family's safety	23	5
Crime/violence	–	12
The future of your children	5	3
Upkeep of public amenities (e.g., parks, beaches, toilets, etc.)	–	–
Availability of affordable quality products	–	–
Customer service	–	0
Weather	–	5
Job opportunities abroad	–	5
Other	1	7
N	105	400

Q143: How many of your friends are from this country?	Botswana	SA
0	8	5
1	7	3
2	16	4
3	5	3
4	10	3
5	10	4

Q143: Continued	Botswana	SA
6	3	4
7	2	2
8	2	2
9	–	1
10	13	17
11–15	7	7
16–20	7	17
21–50	5	22
50+	7	7
N	61	400

Q144: How many of your immediate family live with you in this country?	Botswana	SA
0	15	31
1	22	15
2	19	16
3	20	17
4	16	8
5	7	6
6	–	3
7	1	2
8	–	2
9	–	0
10+	1	1
N	96	400

Q145: How many people from your home country do you know here?	Botswana	SA
0	2	2
1	1	2
2	5	3
3	2	3
4	2	5
5	6	7
6–10	16	21
11–15	4	11
16–20	21	13
20–50	25	22
50+	17	12
N	85	400

Q146: Would you send for any further family or friends from your home country to come and live in this country?	Botswana	SA
Yes	33	29
No	53	65
Don't know	14	7
N	125	400

Q147: If yes to 146, how many?	Botswana	SA
1	29	17
2	37	33
3	8	11
4	13	7
5	3	10
6	–	5

Q147: Continued	Botswana	SA
7	3	2
8	–	1
9	–	–
10+	8	14
N	38	116

Q148: To what extent are you involved in a professional organisation in this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	21	19
Some extent	57	30
Hardly at all	6	10
Not at all	15	40
Don't know	1	1
N	124	400

Q149: To what extent are you involved in any community associations in this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	15	10
Some extent	40	31
Hardly at all	21	13
Not at all	23	46
Don't know	1	1
N	122	400

Q150: To what extent are you involved in community service in this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	19	13
Some extent	33	26
Hardly at all	21	12

Q150: Continued	Botswana	SA
Not at all	22	48
Don't know	4	1
N	120	400

Q151: How long would you want to stay in this country?	Botswana	SA
Less than 6 months	3	2
6 months to one year	4	3
1 to 2 years	20	7
2 to 5 years	22	17
More than 5 years	31	49
Don't know	20	24
N	124	400

Q152 : How often do you return to your home country?	Botswana	SA
Often	29	16
Occasionally	26	27
A few times	18	13
Once or twice	22	32
Never	2	12
Don't know	2	1
N	125	400

Q153: To what extent would you want to become a permanent resident of this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	21	16
Some extent	29	13
Hardly at all	10	1

Q153: Continued	Botswana	SA
Not at all	33	6
Don't know	6	1
Already am a permanent resident	–	63
N	124	400

Q154: To what extent would you want to become a citizen of this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	12	24
Some extent	21	23
Hardly at all	15	12
Not at all	42	35
Don't know	10	6
N	121	400

Q155: To what extent would you want to retire in this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	7	25
Some extent	25	26
Hardly at all	15	11
Not at all	39	28
Don't know	14	11
N	122	400

Q156: To what extent would you want to be buried in this country?	Botswana	SA
Great extent	7	18
Some extent	14	15
Hardly at all	10	5
Not at all	49	43

Q156: Continued	Botswana	SA
Don't know	20	19
N	122	400

Q157: Have you applied for a work permit in this country?	Botswana	SA
Yes	21	6
No	14	45
Already have it	65	49
N	122	400

Q158: Have you applied for a permanent residence permit in this country?	Botswana	SA
Yes	4	7
No	89	30
Already have it	7	63
N	113	400

Q159: Have you applied for citizenship in this country?	Botswana	SA
Yes	4	9
No	94	92
Already have it	2	–
N	107	400

Q160: In your home country, do you still own a house?	Botswana	SA
Yes	61	35
No	38	65
Don't know	1	0
N	107	400

Q161: In your home country, do you still have a bank account?	Botswana	SA
Yes	85	50
No	14	49
Don't know	1	1
N	112	400

Q162: In your home country, do you still have investments?	Botswana	SA
Yes	56	34
No	43	66
Don't know	1	0
N	115	400

Q163: In your home country, do you still have a job to return to?	Botswana	SA
Yes	28	19
No	61	76
Don't know	11	6
N	113	400

Q164: If you were to leave this country, would you prefer to return to your home country or go to some other destination?	Botswana	SA
Return to home country	52	46
Go to live in some other country	39	50
Don't know	9	5
N	116	400

Q167: If you were to leave this country, which country would be your most **preferred** destination?	**Botswana**	**SA**
USA	16	21
South Africa	10	1
France	1	5
Italy	1	1
Switzerland	1	2
Czechoslovakia	1	–
UK	6	8
Norway	1	–
Malaysia	1	0
Australia	15	16
New Zealand	10	5
Singapore	1	–
Thailand	1	–
Japan	1	1
Namibia	7	–
West Indies	1	–
Mauritius	2	0
Angola	1	–
Kenya	1	–
Tanzania	1	1
Uganda	2	1
Mozambique	1	1
Swaziland	1	1
Cyprus	1	–
Finland	1	–
Malta	2	0

Q167: Continued	Botswana	SA
Canada	8	9
Germany	–	2
Portugal	–	1
Ireland	–	2
Belgium	–	0
Netherlands	–	1
Spain	–	1
Greece	–	–
Sweden	–	1
Chile	–	0
Mexico	–	–
China	–	0
India	–	0
Zimbabwe	–	1
Zambia	–	1
Lesotho	–	0
Malawi	–	–
Cameroon	–	0
Botswana	–	3
Pacific Islands	–	0
Israel	–	0
Nigeria	–	1
Democratic Republic of the Congo	–	1
Ghana	–	1
Brazil	–	0
Caribbean Islands	–	1
South America	–	1

Q167: Continued	Botswana	SA
Don't know/none	–	8
N	115	400

Q168: If you were to leave this country, which country would you be most **likely** to end up living in?	Botswana	SA
Home country	1	–
USA	77	10
South Africa	6	–
Switzerland	1	0
UK	4	5
Australia	3	8
New Zealand	4	1
Cyprus	1	–
Malta	1	–
Solomon Islands	1	–
Canada	2	4
Germany	–	1
Portugal	–	1
Italy	–	0
Ireland	–	1
Belgium	–	0
Netherlands	–	2
Austria	–	0
Spain	–	0
France	–	1
Denmark	–	0
Mexico	–	0

Q168: Continued	Botswana	SA
Seychelles	–	0
Taiwan	–	0
China	–	0
Japan	–	0
Thailand	–	0
India	–	0
Zimbabwe	–	0
Lesotho	–	0
Botswana	–	1
Swaziland	–	1
Pacific Islands	–	0
Namibia	–	1
Kenya	–	0
Nigeria	–	1
Uganda	–	0
Ghana	–	1
Tanzania	–	1
West Indies	–	0
Cuba	–	1
Caribbean Islands	–	1
South America	–	0
Don't know/none	–	58
N	87	400

Q169: What year did you obtain your first work permit for this country?	Botswana	SA
Never had one	4	0
1951	–	0
1960	–	1
1964	–	0
1965	–	0
1966	–	1
1967	–	1
1968	–	0
1969	–	1
1972	–	1
1973	–	1
1974	–	2
1975	–	0
1976	–	0
1977	–	0
1978	1	–
1979	–	1
1980	2	1
1981	–	0
1982	2	2
1983	2	1
1984	3	1
1985	1	0
1986	3	1
1987	4	1
1988	2	2

Q169: Continued	Botswana	SA
1989	5	1
1990	4	2
1991	5	1
1992	9	3
1993	6	2
1994	11	3
1995	10	6
1996	14	9
1997	10	17
1998	2	39
N	108	400

Q170: What year did you obtain your most recent work permit?	Botswana	SA
Never had one	4	–
1962	–	0
1964	–	0
1965	–	0
1968	–	1
1969	–	0
1973	–	1
1974	–	1
1975	–	2
1976	–	2
1977	–	0
1979	–	1
1980	1	1
1982	–	2

Q170: Continued	Botswana	SA
1983	–	1
1984	–	0
1986	–	1
1987	3	–
1988	–	2
1989	–	1
1990	–	1
1991	–	1
1992	2	1
1993	–	1
1994	4	2
1995	9	3
1996	18	3
1997	35	30
1998	24	41
N	115	400

Q171: How easy or difficult was it for you to obtain your first work permit in this country?	Botswana	SA
Very easy	36	15
Easy	45	28
Difficult	10	15
Very Difficult	1	8
Have never had one	5	34
Don't know	3	1
N	112	400

Q172: How easy or difficult was it for you to obtain your most recent work permit in this country?	Botswana	SA
Very easy	38	10
Easy	43	31
Difficult	6	13
Very difficult	2	7
Have never had one	6	37
Don't know	5	3
N	117	400

Q173: How easy or difficult was it for you to obtain permanent residence in this country?	Botswana	SA
Very easy	4	17
Easy	5	30
Difficult	1	10
Very difficult	–	5
Have never had one	68	37
Don't know	23	2
N	109	400

Q174: If the government of this country made it more difficult to obtain a work permit, what would you do?	Botswana	SA
Leave when current permit expires	42	8
Unsure	19	8
Reapply for a work permit	25	20
I have a permanent residence document	2	63
Don't know	14	1
N	102	400

Q175: Many governments use an "immigration points system" that gives preference to people with skills that the country needs. Would such a policy:	**Botswana**	**SA**
Make it harder for you to obtain a permit	3	4
Make no difference to you	47	11
Make it easier for you to get a permit	34	18
I have a permanent residence document	3	63
Don't know	14	4
N	118	400

Q176: What is your age?	**Botswana**	**SA**
15–19	1	0
20–24	–	2
25–29	4	14
30–34	18	21
35–39	14	14
40–44	25	11
45–49	11	12
50–54	17	14
55–59	6	8
60+	4	4
N	118	400

Q177: What is your gender?	**Botswana**	**SA**
Male	85	68
Female	15	32
N	122	400

Q178: What is your marital status?	Botswana	SA
Married	84	59
Separated/divorced/widowed	7	12
Cohabitating/living together	2	6
Single	6	25
N	125	400

Q179: What is your **status** in this household? Are you:	Botswana	SA
Head of household	91	76
Spouse (husband or wife) of head of household	7	18
Joint head of household	2	–
Child of head of household	–	2
Parent of head of household	–	–
Brother or sister of head of household	–	1
Grandparent of head of household/ elder	–	–
Grandchild of head of household	–	–
Other family member of head of household	–	1
Visitor	–	1
Lodger	–	3
Other	–	–
N	125	400

Q180: What is your spouse's occupation?	Botswana	SA
Not married / co-habitating	2	42
Housewife / househusband	28	12
Non-manual office worker	1	2
Foreman	–	0
Skilled manual worker	–	2

Q180: Continued	Botswana	SA
Semi-skilled manual worker	–	0
Miner	–	0
Unskilled manual worker	–	–
Farmer (own subsistence farm)	–	–
Farmer (own commercial farm)	–	–
Agricultural worker	–	–
Services worker	1	2
Domestic worker	–	–
Trader, hawker, vendor	–	0
Informal sector producer	–	0
Security personnel	–	0
Police/ Military	–	0
Employer/ manager of establishment with ten or more employees	4	5
Employer/ manager of establishment with less than ten employees	–	4
Professional worker	9	6
Lawyer	3	–
Accountant	8	2
Medical doctor/ practitioner	3	2
Nurse/ medical technician	13	2
Teacher/ lecturer	19	4
Engineer	2	2
Managerial office worker	6	3
Supervisory office worker	1	3
Other	–	7
N	121	400

Q181: In which field or sector is your spouse/ partner employed?	Botswana	SA
Not married / co-habitating	2	42
Housewife / househusband	27	13
Finance	4	1
Accounting	6	1
Banking	1	2
Insurance	2	1
Medical	14	5
Law firm	2	1
Retail	2	4
Textile	–	2
Automotive	2	0
Manufacturing	–	4
Food	1	3
Steel & iron	–	–
Marine	–	–
Mining	–	0
Transport	–	0
Energy	–	0
Agriculture/ farming	2	–
Engineering	1	3
Construction	–	2
Real estate	–	1
Research	3	2
Government/ public sector	6	3
Military/ police	–	0
Private security	–	0

Q181: Continued	Botswana	SA
Primary education	7	1
Secondary education	4	2
Post-secondary/ tertiary education	11	2
Other	4	5
N	106	400

Q182a: Purely for statistical purposes, please indicate your **joint monthly household income before tax.** (in Pula)	Botswana
P2800 – P5 400	11
P5 500 – P8 200	24
P8 300 – P11 000	18
P11 100 – P13 800	12
P13 900 – P16 600	9
P16 700 – P19 400	3
P19 500 – P22 200	3
P22 300 – P25 000	2
P27 900 – P30 600	2
P30 700 – P33 400	3
P33 500 – P36 200	2
P36 300 – P39 000	1
P39 100 – P41 800	3
P44 700 – P47 400	1
P50 300 – P53 000	1
over P53 000	8
N	102

Q182b: Purely for statistical purposes, please indicate your **joint monthly household income before tax.** (in Rand)	SA
R2 100 – R4 000	4
R4 100 – R6 000	15
R6 100 – R8 000	14
R8 100 – R10 000	7
R10 100 – R12 000	9
R12 100 – R14 000	7
R14 100 – R16 000	9
R16 100 – R18 000	5
R18 100 – R20 000	4
R20 100 – R22 000	5
R22 100 – R24 000	3
R24 100 – R26 000	3
R26 100 – R28 000	1
R28 100 – R30 000	2
R30 100 – R32 000	4
R32 100 – R34 000	1
R34 100 – R36 000	1
R36 100 – R38 000	1
Over R38 000	5
Don't know/refused to answer	2
N	400

Q183: How often do you send money to friends or relatives abroad?	Botswana	SA
More than once a month	–	0
Monthly	15	7
Once every few months	20	8

Q183: Continued	Botswana	SA
Once or twice yearly	27	10
Once every few years	7	2
Just once or twice	10	9
Never	21	64
N	120	400

Q184: How often do you send money to foreign bank accounts/ investments?	Botswana	SA
More than once a month	–	0
Monthly	10	2
Once every few months	19	4
Once or twice yearly	16	5
Once every few years	6	1
Just once or twice	12	4
Never	37	83
N	115	400

Q185: What **percentage** of your joint total monthly household income would you say you **send out of the country**?	Botswana	SA
Zero/ None	15	60
0 – 5 Percent	17	18
5 – 10 Percent	18	6
10 – 15 Percent	8	6
15 – 20 Percent	7	6
20 – 25 Percent	12	1
25 – 30 Percent	1	2
30 – 35 Percent	4	0

Q185: Continued	Botswana	SA
35 – 40 Percent	3	0
40 – 45 Percent	2	–
45 – 50 Percent	7	1
More than 50 Percent	5	1
N	115	400

Q186a: In which **district** do you live?	Botswana
South east	69
North east	8
Central	11
Gantsi	1
North west	7
Kgalagadi	2
Botswanaeti	2
Kweneng	1
	121

Q186b: In which **town/village** do you live?	Botswana
Gaborone	65
Francistown	8
Serowe	2
Gantsi	1
Lobatse	4
Gumare	2
Selebi-phikwe	4
Tsebong	2
Letlhakane	2
Kasane	1

Q186b:Continued	Botswana
Maun	4
Orapa	2
Notwane	1
Palapye	1
Molepolole	1
Rakops	1
Bobonong	1
Sefhare	1
N	122

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