BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH:
THE EU-ACP MIGRATION
RELATIONSHIP

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ACRONYMS

ACM  African, Caribbean and Pacific (Group of States)

AU  African Union

CONCORD  European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development

EC  European Commission

EU  European Union

GAM  Global Approach to Migration (EU)

GAMM  Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (EU)

GCIM  Global Commission on International Migration

GFMD  Global Forum on Migration and Development

GMG  Global Migration Group

GMOD  Global Migrant Origins Database

HLD  High Level Dialogue (UN)

IOM  International Organization for Migration

MDGs  Millennium Development Goals

MIDSA  Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa

MME  Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (Africa-EU)

OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

RCPs  regional consultative processes

SADC  Southern African Development Community

SAMP  Southern African Migration Project

UN  United Nations

UNDP  UN Development Programme

UNESCO  UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNFPA  UN Population Fund
INTRODUCTION

Before the turn of the century, international migration had an extremely low profile on the global development agenda. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), for example, make no mention at all of international migration. Although a number of studies have attempted to “mainstream” migration into the MDGs after the fact, it is still largely ignored in official assessments of progress made towards them (Usher, 2005; Crush and Frayne 2007; Skeldon, 2008). According to the United Nations (UN), the silence surrounding migration in the MDGs was because it was too divisive and sensitive an issue between developed and developing countries (United Nations Population Fund [UNFPA], 2005). At the time, cooperation between North and South on the governance of migration more broadly seemed highly unlikely. Nation states in the North increasingly believed that their territorial sovereignty was under threat from irregular migration from the South, and states in the South saw their development prospects undermined by a crippling “brain drain” to the North. Repeated efforts by the UN to convene an international conference on migration in the late 1990s were unsuccessful.

Since 2000, however, international migration has moved to the top of the global governance agenda and a whole range of bilateral and multilateral partnerships have taken shape (Koser, 2010; Newland, 2010; Betts, 2011; Hansen, Koehler and Money, 2011; Koslowski, 2011; Kunz, Lavenex and Pannizon, 2011). This process began with various initiatives within the UN, notably the 2003 Doyle Report to Secretary-General Kofi Annan and his appointment of a special rapporteur on migration and development. Outside the UN, discussions about international migration gathered momentum with the appointment of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) and the first UN High Level Dialogue (HLD) on International Migration and Development in 2006 (GCIM, 2005; UN, 2006). In 2007, the first meeting of the new Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) was convened in Brussels. This was followed by annual meetings in the Philippines in 2008; Greece in 2009; Mexico in 2010; Switzerland in 2011; and Mauritius in 2012.

The GFMD is a state-led, voluntary, non-binding consultative process open to all member states and observer states of the UN (Omelianuk, 2008; 2012; Newland, 2012). In 2009, the major UN agencies, plus the International Organization for Migration (IOM), combined to form the Global Migration Group (GMG) with a brief to “promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international migration” (GMG, 2012). In 2010, the GMG issued a handbook for states with recommendations on how to mainstream migration into their development planning and vice-versa (GMG, 2010).

Another notable feature of the “new optimism” around international migration is the growth of cooperation on the issue within and between regional blocs of states. Regional consultative processes (RCPs) on migration, for example, now exist in many parts of the globe (Thouez and Chanan, 2006; Hansen, 2010). While the original focus of many RCPs was migration management, issues of migration and development grew increasingly on their agendas. In Southern Africa, for example, the Migration Dialogue for Southern Africa (MIDSA) was founded by IOM and SAMP as a non-binding consultative forum for Southern African Development Community (SADC) states in 2002 and meets on an annual basis. Originally focussed on regional cooperation in managed migration, the MIDSA agenda has been increasingly shaped by migration and development issues. In addition to the RCPs, geographically dispersed blocs of states also moved migration and development higher on their lists of priorities: these include the Commonwealth, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the African Union (AU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States (AU, 2006a; AU, 2006b; ACP, 2010; Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2011; de Boeck, 2012; Melde, 2012; OECD, 2012; Ramphal Institute, 2012).

The most recent trend is the emergence of increased dialogue and cooperation on international migration between blocs of states. The European Union (EU) has been a central player in many of these initiatives. Following the adoption of its Global Approach to Migration (GAM) in 2005, the EU pursued “mobility partnerships” with major migrant-sending regions and countries (Parkes, 2009; Devisscher, 2011; Reslow, 2012). In relation to Africa, the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, held in Rabat, Morocco in July 2006, was followed by the Joint EU-AU Declaration on Migration and Development in Tripoli, Libya in November that year.1 One of the outcomes of the declaration is the recent Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment (MME). The MME partnership commits the parties to dialogue on a broad range of issues, including diasporas; remittances; brain drain; migrant rights; the social consequences of migration; regular, circular and irregular migration; visa issues; smuggling and trafficking of migrants; readmission and return; refugee protection; the mobility of students; and harmonization processes. The partnership’s current 12-point action plan includes the establishment of an African Institute for Remittances in Addis Ababa, the implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings and the Diaspora Outreach Initiative.

1 See: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47fd3b010.html.
In the space of a decade, how and why has migration shifted from being an issue that was of marginal interest on the international development agenda to one that is increasingly at its centre? How has one of the most contentious North-South issues of the 1990s become the focus of so much bilateral and multilateral dialogue and cooperation between them? The first section of this paper provides a possible answer to these questions, which provides a context for understanding the nature of cooperation between the EU and ACP Group of States on international migration governance.

FROM THREAT TO LEVER

Most existing discussions about EU migration policy towards states and regions outside of it emphasize the threat of in-migration to “Fortress Europe” as the driving concern (Geddes, 1999; 2012; Albrecht, 2002; Caviedes, 2004; Gebrewold-Tochalo, 2007; Luedktke, 2009). This “fortress” or “migration as threat” perspective is inward-looking and control-oriented in its policy outcomes, and is inherently unlikely to garner any sympathy from migrant-sending states in the South. As Geddes points out, framing the issue in terms of the “threat” of migration is a “cause of irritation” to African countries, particularly as those same countries see that EU countries are only too willing to open their doors to skilled migrants, “draining the brains” of Africa and the rest of the global South (Geddes, 2012: 406). The “migration-as-threat” policy approach provides little basis for dialogue and cooperation between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving states, as the experience of the 1990s made all too clear.

Over the last decade, however, international migration has increasingly been reframed as a development issue. One of the consequences of this reframing is that states formerly at loggerheads now have a common language and the appearance of complementary interests on migration management (Lahav, 2008). After all, no one disputes that “development” is a good thing for the South; thus, anything that enhances development should be viewed in a similarly positive light. While many states continue to view migration primarily through a security lens, the overall result has been the emergence of an alternative “migration-as-development lever” perspective, which has laid the basis for new forms of inter-regional cooperation and dialogue. Understanding this global shift in thinking is essential to an analysis of the nature and content of EU-ACP cooperation on international migration governance.

The primary challenge is to tackle the main push factors for migration: poverty and lack of employment opportunities. The EU must recognize that creating jobs in developing countries could significantly reduce migratory pressure from Africa. Migrants should be supported in contributing to the development of their countries of origin...Promoting investments in labour-intensive sectors in regions with high outward migration will be an important priority, in a wider context of facilitating intra-African labour migration and mobility. (European Commission [EC], 2006: 5-6)

Climate change has recently been added to the list of root causes of migration (Brown, 2008; Martin, 2010; Piguot, Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2011). Despite the fact that the root causes argument has many academic critics who contend that economic development actually increases migration and mobility, it remains a shared policy belief and the conceptual foundation of much inter-regional cooperation (Gent, 2002; Lindstrom, 2005; de Haas, 2007; Castles and van Hear, 2011).

The second point of agreement is that migrant remittances from North to South have positive short- and long-term development implications for the migrant-sending countries, communities and households (Kapur, 2004; Bali and Balli, 2011; Gupta, Patillo and Wagh, 2009; Mundaca, 2009; Ratha et al., 2011). In 2012, officially recorded global remittance flows exceeded US$400 billion, 80 percent of which went to developing countries. In the South, remittance inflows are now three times as high as official development assistance. Remittance outflows from EU countries reached US$108 billion in 2008, up from US$29 billion in 2000. While no one disputes the fact that remittance flows are massive and growing, there is a vigorous debate on their development impacts and potential. The consensus in policy circles is that remittances are a significant source of external finance for developing countries, but should neither be confused with, nor seen as a substitute for, official aid (Lindley, 2011). Nevertheless, remittances are seen as a way of addressing the root causes of migration, as they reduce poverty and dampen pressures for out-migration. States in the North and South not only agree that remittances are a positive outcome of international migration, but moreover, that their impact on development can be maximized by reducing, for example,
transaction costs for migrants through more formal and accessible remitting channels, and by introducing policies that promote the development “multiplier effects” of remittances, such as a growth in savings, investment, employment and productive activity.

The third point of agreement derives from the observation that migrants engage in a wide range of activities, maintaining their linkages with, and contributing to the development of their countries of origin. In the EU, such activities once signified a failure of migrant integration; today, these same migrants are recast as the diaspora, who often play major roles in the development of their countries of origin (Nurse, 2004; Plaza and Ratha, 2011; Durutalo, 2012). In other words, the idea that there is a crippling “brain drain” from the South has been largely replaced by the idea of engaging diasporas for development. The AU has even rebranded the African diaspora as the “sixth region” of the continent and held the first Global African Diaspora Forum in South Africa in 2012.

Increasingly common worldwide, diaspora engagement events seek to promote a range of initiatives, such as collective remitting, philanthropy, tourism, investment and entrepreneurship, knowledge networks, bonds, technology transfer and return migration (Kuznetsov, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Plaza and Ratha, 2011; Agunias and Newland, 2012). Increasingly, diasporic communities are even viewed as “development agents” and “partners” in policy circles in both the North and South.

The fourth point of agreement is encapsulated in the idea of “co-development,” which suggests that international migration is beneficial for all those involved:

True co-development involves sustained cooperation between receiving nations and source nations in the management of both legal and illegal migratory flows. At the same time, it fosters the economic and demographic development of both the sending and the receiving country. This cooperation is based in large measure on understanding that, more than ever before, the best migration policy for developed nations is one that seeks not to block, but to smoothly regulate the circulation and re-circulation of the majority of foreigners and immigrants. (Weil, 2002)

Co-development, in the form of temporary circular migration for work, is a “triple win” for all concerned: temporary labour market needs in the EU are met; countries of origin receive remittances and new skills acquired by returning migrants; and migrants themselves earn income and acquire new knowledge and skills without “giving up their roots” (de Wenden, 2008; Newland, 2009; de Bergh, 2009). Circular migration can also be more easily “sold” to skeptical publics in Europe. While researchers have criticized the co-development concept, which suggests that the benefits of migration are equally shared by states and temporary migrants (who are, in fact, often highly exploited), the concept itself is powerful, convincing states in the South that, in meeting the labour needs of the North, they share its interests.

The fifth and final point of agreement is that intra-regional freedom of movement is economically beneficial for both origin and destination states. While this principle is viewed with skepticism by many states in the North and South, it is a founding principle in several regional compacts between groups of states. It has clearly achieved greatest practical application in the EU, but is also embedded in the founding documents of regional blocs throughout the ACP, including the AU, the Economic Community of West African States, the SADC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the East African Community and the Caribbean Community. Dogged by individual state opposition and prevarication, the actual implementation of the principle has generally been quite limited. Nevertheless, the new interface between migration and development over the last decade has given impetus to the idea that the development of both sending and receiving states in the South will be enhanced by greater labour mobility across international borders (Pécoud and de Guchteneire, 2007).

Allied to the argument for policies that facilitate intra-regional migration, is the attention now being paid to South-South migration (Ratha and Shaw, 2007; Bakewell, 2009; Hujo and Piper, 2010; Gagnon and Khoudour-Castéras, 2012). On a global scale, South-South migration is clearly a significant phenomenon. In 2010, for example, it accounted for one-third of all migrants worldwide (UN, 2012). While South-South migration seems a natural subject for South-South dialogue and cooperation, its interest and relevance to the EU are not immediately apparent. Understanding why the EU might take an interest in South-South migration is critical if we are to make sense of the EU-ACP migration relationship.

**MAPPING MIGRATION**

The sources for mapping migration within and from the ACP Group of States are few and dated. The most comprehensive source is the University of Sussex Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalization and Poverty’s Global Migrant Origins Database (GMOD), which was last updated in 2007. By aggregating the bilateral flows between countries on a regional basis from this database, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about migration that help to explain the distinctive geographical focus of the EU-ACP migration relationship. According to the GMOD, a total of 23 million migrants from ACP countries live outside their country of
birth (Table 1). Of these, 37 percent are resident in the North (Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand) and 63 percent are in the global South. Overall, South-South migration is an extremely significant phenomenon for the ACP and far more important than migration to the North. At the same time, the relative importance of South-South migration varies considerably from region to region and sub-region to sub-region. In Africa, for example, South-South migrants make up 78 percent of the total of all migration, compared with only 24 percent in the Pacific and 15 percent in the Caribbean. The most common destinations for Caribbean migrants are the United States and Canada (70 percent of total migration), while Australia and New Zealand are most important for migrants from the Pacific region (48 percent of the total). Within Africa, there is also considerable inter-regional variation in South-South migration, which varies from a high of 83 percent of migrants in West Africa to a low of 48 percent in Southern Africa.

### Table 1: South-South and South-North Migration from the ACP Group of States, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Total Number of Migrants from All Regions</th>
<th>Total Number of Migrants to States in the North</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Migration</th>
<th>Total Number of Migrants to States in the South</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>888,504</td>
<td>462,022</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>426,482</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>5,520,343</td>
<td>1,468,411</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>4,051,932</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>8,130,420</td>
<td>1,341,519</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>6,788,901</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>3,007,541</td>
<td>634,591</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>2,372,950</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa</td>
<td>17,546,808</td>
<td>3,906,543</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>13,640,265</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caribbean</td>
<td>5,199,538</td>
<td>4,414,408</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>785,130</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pacific</td>
<td>466,526</td>
<td>352,694</td>
<td>75.6</td>
<td>113,832</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,212,872</td>
<td>8,673,645</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>14,539,227</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.

In both absolute and relative terms, migration from the ACP countries to the EU seems relatively insignificant, compared to migration to other regions (Table 2). A total of 3.5 million ACP migrants (78 percent of whom are from the African region) live in the EU. However, they make up only 15 percent of the total number of ACP migrants. In the case of the Pacific, the figure is as low as 4 percent. In virtually every ACP region and sub-region, fewer than 20 percent of migrants are in the EU. In West Africa, the figure is only 11 percent. In other words, despite the high media profile given to migration from Africa to Europe, it is only a relatively small component of total African migration movement. This is enough for some in the EU to pursue a security-driven fortress agenda and others to be concerned that the numbers will increase in the future if the root causes of migration are not addressed; however, it is certainly insufficient to justify the moral panic often felt in the EU. Just as important, these figures help to explain why South-South, rather than ACP-EU, migration has become a major area of cooperation between the two blocs.

### Table 2: Migration from ACP Group of States to the EU, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Total Number of Migrants from All Regions</th>
<th>Number of Migrants Settling in the EU</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Migration</th>
<th>Number of Migrants Settling Outside the EU</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>888,504</td>
<td>241,293</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>647,211</td>
<td>72.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>5,520,343</td>
<td>1,021,392</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>4,498,951</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>8,130,420</td>
<td>932,707</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7,197,713</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>3,007,541</td>
<td>581,397</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2,426,144</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa</td>
<td>17,546,808</td>
<td>2,776,789</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>14,770,019</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caribbean</td>
<td>5,199,538</td>
<td>760,034</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>4,439,504</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pacific</td>
<td>466,526</td>
<td>17,673</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>448,853</td>
<td>96.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,212,872</td>
<td>3,554,496</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>19,658,376</td>
<td>84.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.
The majority of South-South ACP migration is intra-regional, that is, between countries in the same regional bloc. For example, 12.2 million, or 86 percent of South-South migrants move to another country within the same ACP region (Table 3). Only 1.9 million (14 percent) move to non-ACP countries in the South. However, this overall pattern disguises important inter-regional differences. In Africa, for example, 90 percent of South-South migrants move to another ACP state within Africa. The rest migrate to non-ACP African states (North Africa) and the Middle East. Extra-regional migration is highest from Eastern Africa (20 percent) and lowest from West Africa (5 percent). Intra-Caribbean migration, by contrast, makes up only one-third of South-South migration in that ACP region. The other two-thirds migrate to Mexico, Central and South America. In the Pacific, intra-ACP migration is even less significant (at 10 percent of migration). The major South-South destination for Pacific islanders tends to be Southeast Asian countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Origin</th>
<th>Number of South-South Migrants</th>
<th>Number of Intra-regional Migrants</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Migration</th>
<th>Number of Extra-regional Migrants</th>
<th>Percentage of Overall Migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>426,482</td>
<td>385,986</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>40,496</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Africa</td>
<td>4,051,932</td>
<td>3,232,712</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>819,220</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>6,786,901</td>
<td>6,435,227</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>353,674</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>2,372,950</td>
<td>2,237,911</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>135,039</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa</td>
<td>13,640,265</td>
<td>12,291,836</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>1,349,429</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Caribbean</td>
<td>785,130</td>
<td>266,216</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>518,914</td>
<td>66.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Pacific</td>
<td>113,832</td>
<td>11,429</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>102,403</td>
<td>90.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14,539,227</td>
<td>12,569,481</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>1,970,746</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations, compiled from GMOD, 2007.

In sum, South-South migration is the most important form of migration for the ACP as a whole. Intra-regional migration is also very significant, either to other ACP states (Africa) or to neighbouring regions in the South (the Caribbean and the Pacific). The information base on South-South migration is, however, extremely limited, and policy making around migration and development is severely hampered by the paucity of information. As a result, it is perhaps not surprising that the impetus for the EU-ACP Group of States’ cooperation on migration focuses so strongly on South-South migration and on filling the knowledge gaps that currently exist.

**DEVELOPING THE MIGRATION PARTNERSHIP**

The 2000 Cotonou Agreement, which entered into force in April 2003, provides the framework for cooperation between the EU and the ACP countries across a broad range of issues. Article 13 of the agreement specifies that “[t]he issue of migration shall be the subject of in-depth dialogue in the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership” (EC, 2010). What stands out in Article 13 is the focus on migration control. The parties agree to the deportation of “illegal immigrants,” including third-country nationals and, moreover, to develop strategies “aim[ed] at reducing poverty, improving living and working conditions, creating employment and developing training contribute in the long term to normalising migratory flows” (EC, 2010). To that end, the EU committed to supporting the economic and social development of, and reducing poverty in, the migrants’ regions of origin. In other words, while the threat of migration was clearly paramount in EU thinking, the trade-off for cooperation on control was development assistance to reduce migration flows by addressing its root causes. One critic has suggested that this trade-off means that the EU was, in effect, “turning development aid into a tool for implementing restrictive and security-driven immigration policies which are at odds with its commitment to make migration work for development” (European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development [CONCORD], 2010).

In June 2006, the report of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly noted that it would debate and make recommendations on “migration issues and the contribution which it [sic] can make to ways which will foster development in the countries of origin and to action designed to counter trafficking in human beings” (ACP-EU, 2006). That same month, the ACP-EC Council of Ministers meeting in Papua, New Guinea “concluded a major agreement on financing the Cotonou Partnership Agreement” and also “held a debate on migration and development, reflecting the importance of development policy in managing trends in migration for the benefit of both regions of origin and destination” (Council of the EU, 2006). Clearly influenced by the global reframing of migration as a development issue, the EU and ACP initiated a new type of dialogue on the migration file.
Despite considerable pressure, however, the shift was not reflected in either the 2005 or 2010 revisions to the Cotonou Agreement, which left Article 13 intact (Koeb and Hohmeister, 2010). The failure of the EU and ACP to reach an agreement on a reworded Article 13 resides primarily in the clause on readmission, which the EU insists should be binding for all ACP countries. In 2010, a joint declaration on Article 13 was issued, noting that the two parties had agreed to strengthen and deepen their dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, building on the three pillars: migration and development, including issues relating to diasporas, brain drain and remittances; legal migration, including admission, mobility and movement of skills and services; and illegal migration, including smuggling and trafficking of human beings and border management, as well as readmission. The declaration laid the groundwork for an ongoing conversation on the first pillar through the ACP-EU Dialogue on Migration and Development.

The 2010 dialogue focused on remittances and South-South migration corridors, including promoting competitiveness and transparency in the financial products market; broadening the range of formal channels used to send and receive remittances; allowing migrants to open bank accounts in both source and receiving countries; decreasing the costs of remittances; and promoting education to enhance the management and development impact of remittances. The second dialogue in April 2012, however, reverted to the readmission issue. It was at this meeting that the deep divisions between the EU and the ACP over revisions to the security components of Article 13 were once again apparent.

The degree to which the ACP’s view of migration was increasingly dominated by the idea of migration as a lever of development is evident in both the ACP’s 2006 Brussels Declaration on Asylum, Migration and Mobility, and its 2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and Development. The 2006 declaration cites conflicts, poverty, population growth, poor management, underdevelopment, lack of opportunities and environmental issues as contributory factors to migration and asserts that “effective management of migration requires that these root causes be examined” (ACP, 2006). In addition, it notes that “the issue of irregular or forced migration is being addressed in terms of security considerations, rather than in the wider context of development that takes account of the problems of migration in development” (ACP, 2006). The declaration also contains a section on “The Role of the Diaspora in Development” and pledges concerted action (in collaboration with banking institutions, the EU, and regional and national authorities) to promote “cost-effective transfer of funds that are currently dominated by cash transfer offices, aimed at reducing costs and eliminating the bias against remittances in national and regional regulatory systems” and engaging with diaspora organizations in schemes that “highlight the positive role of the Diaspora for channeling their knowledge, skills and financial resources to their home countries” (ACP, 2006). The declaration’s plan of action includes the establishment of an Intra-ACP Migration Facility and the ACP Migration Observatory.

The 2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and Development focusses even more explicitly on migration as a development issue. The preamble, for example, notes that migration and mobility programs and principles are “important instruments for sustainable development” (ACP, 2008) and contribute to the attainment of the MDGs. Further, it suggests that there is a need to manage the root causes, impacts and consequences of migration while exploiting migration to the benefit of sustainable development (ibid.). The resolution identifies the following four areas for action:

- the contribution of migrants and diaspora to sustainable development, which includes: the research and promotion of the role of migrants’ and diasporas’ networks; sharing migration experiences and its positive aspects, such as the transfer of technology and enhanced skills and remittances; the development and promotion of innovative solutions for curbing illegal migration and brain drain through “brain gain” and the implementation of flexible circular migration programs; strengthening national legal and financial environments for enhancing the multiplier effects of remittances; and reducing the cost of transfers “while recognising the private nature of these funds and that they can never be a substitute for official development aid”;
- migration and environment, including better analysis of the nexus between migration and the environment, especially through research on environmentally related migration and the environmental impact of forced migration;
- migration and human security; and
- a consideration of migration in the identification of development projects and programs (ibid.).

Embedded in the language and actions of both the declaration and the resolution are all of the central themes of the post-2000 global migration and development discourse.

The ACP’s 2011 Human Mobility Report continues in the same vein, explicitly proposing a suite of “migration-friendly development policies” and “development-friendly migration policies” (ACP, 2011: 17). The report initially advocates the “definitive abandonment” of the root causes approach to migration on the grounds that there is no evidence to support its basic premise. Almost immediately, however, the report reverses its position,
arguing that the root causes of migration remain a challenge for ACP, and that eliminating them is a priority. The root causes argument is then used to support the case for greater development assistance.

The report identifies five key challenges for the ACP Group of States: developing time- and cost-effective research tools for analyzing the mobility-development nexus in the ACP states, with particular emphasis on addressing the scarcity of comprehensive, reliable and comparable data on South-South migration; ensuring free, regulated and secure mobility, including enhanced circular migration; addressing environmentally induced migration, a “key policy challenge” for ACP countries in the twenty-first century; integrating human mobility in national development strategies; and assuring the social cohesion, respect for, and protection of migrants in ACP countries.

Many regional blocs of states have very limited migration research capacity and rely quite heavily on outsourcing. The ACP has developed a different and more coherent approach by establishing the Intra-ACP Migration Facility, which includes the ACP Observatory on Migration, both based near the ACP Secretariat in Brussels. A private consultancy firm was selected to establish the capacity-building components of the Facility and an IOM-led consortium was awarded the Observatory tender. In the two years since its public launch in Brussels in October 2010, the Observatory has achieved a great deal while the rest of the Facility is yet to deliver on its mandate. The Observatory has an active academic advisory board with representation from 18 non-governmental research organizations throughout the ACP regions and has launched 27 separate research studies in 12 pilot countries and regions on topics prioritized by those country governments and regional organizations.

The Observatory manages an extremely active website and is a regular participant in international gatherings on migration and development (de Boeck, 2010). The primary research focus of the Observatory is on South-South migration, with a particular emphasis on remittances, diasporas and other aspects of the migration-development relationship. In a short space of time, the Observatory has emerged as the leading global information and research source on South-South mobility. It has also held technical capacity-building workshops for government officials on migration and development in all ACP regions, and convenes national stakeholder workshops in the ACP pilot countries. The success of the Observatory (which is funded by the EU) contrasts sharply with the rather limited achievements of the Facility. The future of both is now under review in Brussels. What is clear is that the Observatory’s research, policy and capacity-building agenda is completely consistent with the idea of migration as a development lever that currently preoccupies global players such as the GFMD and the UN HLD.

CONCLUSIONS

A comparison of the separate migration-related resolutions of the EU and ACP shows considerable overlap between the two. The EU’s 2005 GAM and its 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) lay out an agenda which certainly does not ignore the security “threat” of irregular migration and trafficking, but places great emphasis on the need for mobility partnerships and migration as a “development lever” (Lavenex and Kunz, 2008). The fourth pillar of the GAMM, entitled “maximising the development impact of migration and mobility,” proposes a range of related actions to “promote the beneficial development outcomes of migration.” (EC, 2011: 6; 18). These actions include remittances, diasporas and “the mainstreaming of migration in development thinking” (EC, 2011: 19). On the ACP side, as noted, migration is also framed as a development issue in the 2006 Declaration on Asylum, Migration and Mobility and the 2008 Brussels Resolution on Migration and Development (ACP, 2006; 2008). When both groups of states independently define migration as a development lever in this way, there is considerable common ground for a constructive conversation; however, nothing in these programmatic statements is original or unique to either the EU or the ACP. This is exactly the same set of issues, policies and prescriptions that run through a host of other initiatives including the GCIM, the UN HLD, the GFMD and the GMG. In other words, to understand the EU-ACP Group of States relationship, it is insufficient simply to look at what these two groups of states say to one another.

Why does the EU and ACP migration relationship focus primarily on South-South migration and not migration between the two blocs? This is a departure for the EU, whose other initiatives and MME partnerships are focussed on managing migration to the EU. As this paper has shown, South-South migration has recently come onto the global migration and development agenda and is commanding increasing international attention. But that does not, in itself, explain why the EU and the ACP should make it a focus of cooperation. The importance of South-South migration to the ACP countries seems self-evident, but why would the EU take an interest?

First, there is the argument in the EU’s own GAMM that “inter- and intra-regional migration in developing regions far exceeds migration to the EU. This ‘south-south’ migration often brings benefits to migrants in the form of better job opportunities and higher incomes than available at home” (EU, 2011: 18). In other words, the EU takes a broader position on the beneficial impacts of migration on development and is prepared to support ACP initiatives on South-South migration as part of its “aid package” to the group. Second, and more instrumentally, by encouraging greater intra- and inter-regional migration within the South, the EU is, in fact, addressing root causes, facilitating
alternative opportunities for migrants, and therefore, in its calculation, reducing migration pressure on Europe.

By framing their dialogue on international migration as a development rather than security issue, the EU and the ACP have actually made considerable progress since Cotonou. While points of disagreement remain, particularly over revisions to Article 13, the relationship is generally collegial and has defined common ground for productive exchange and practical programming. The two are now in regular dialogue over migration, and the EU has largely funded both the Intra-ACP Migration Facility and the influential ACP Observatory on Migration. This rapprochement would have been inconceivable in the 1990s. This paper has attempted to explain this shift by contextualizing it, first, within a broader seismic shift in global migration governance, from conflict to cooperation, and second, within a broader change in the global discourse about migration itself.
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