Food remittances: rural-urban linkages and food security in Africa

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The transfer of funds by migrants to their home countries (cash remittances) is at an all-time high. By 2017, it is predicted to rise to US$500 billion – and there is a growing policy consensus that cash remittances can be mainstreamed into development. Equally, food remitting also has a role to play in urban and rural food security. Yet despite its importance, researchers and policymakers tend to ignore food remitting.

This report is aimed at researchers and policymakers interested in transforming rural-urban linkages and the implications for food security of rural and urban residents. At a time of rapid urbanisation in the South, a wider lens is needed: focusing on rural-urban linkages and moving beyond cash-based, market transactions to consider the bidirectional flows of goods – including food – and their impact on food security. Using case studies from Zimbabwe and Namibia, this report demonstrates how lessons related to food remitting can be applied in other African contexts – and highlights the urgent need for a new research agenda.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of figures and tables</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Introduction</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 What do we know about food remitting in Africa?</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Cross-border migration and food remittances</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Internal migration and food remittances</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Comparing rural-urban and urban-urban food remittances</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Frequency of food remitting</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Types of food remittances</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Food remitters in rural areas</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Case study: food remitting in a state of crisis, Harare, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Case study: reciprocal remitting, Windhoek, Namibia</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Conclusions</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Recommendations for researchers and policymakers</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further reading</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of figures and tables

Figure 1. Global cash remittance flows, 1990–2014 9
Figure 2. Frequency of food remittances 15
Figure 3. Type and frequency of rural-urban food remittances to Epworth, Harare 21
Figure 4. Types of food remittances to Mabvuku, Tafara and Dzivarasekwa, Harare 21
Figure 5. Self-assessment of importance of food remittances in Harare 22
Figure 6. Self-assessment of importance of food remittances in Windhoek 26

Table 1. Top destinations of international African migrants 12
Table 2. Cash, goods and food remittances in Southern Africa 13
Table 3. International and internal remittances in Southern Africa, 2008 13
Table 4. Food remittances to poor urban households 14
Table 5. Frequency of cereals remitting 16
Table 6. Types of food remitted 16
Table 7. Maize remittance destinations 17
Table 8. Maize remittances and rural household income 18
Table 9. Prevalence of food insecurity in low-income suburbs, Harare, 2008 20
Table 10. Changes in food insecurity prevalence, 2008 and 2012 22
Table 11. Changes in types of rural-urban food remittances to Harare, 2008 and 2012 23
Table 12. Types of rural-urban food remittance to Windhoek, 2008 25
Table 13. Frequency of rural-urban food remitting to Windhoek, 2008 25
Table 14. Levels of food insecurity, Windhoek (%) 27
Summary

The need for a new research agenda

Globally, the transfer of funds by migrants to their home countries or areas (cash remittances) is at an all-time high. By 2017, it is predicted to rise to US$500 billion – and there is a growing policy consensus that cash remittances can be mainstreamed into development. Equally, food remitting also has a role to play in urban and rural food security. Yet despite its importance, researchers and policymakers tend to ignore food remitting.

The growing literature on rural-urban linkages highlights their complex, dynamic nature in the context of rapid urbanisation and growing rural-urban migration in Africa. Food remitting cannot be treated in isolation from the ‘complex web of relations and connections incorporating rural and urban dimensions and all that is in between’ (Tacoli, 2007). Yet the remitting of goods, and especially foodstuffs, across international boundaries and within countries has received little attention, particularly in Africa, where it seems that ‘transfers of food are invisible in the sense that they run within the family and outside market channels’ (Andersson Djurfeldt 2015a: 540).

What are the main lessons?

Rural-urban linkages in a rapidly urbanising world require much more attention from researchers and policymakers. As this report shows, several key findings have emerged from the existing literature on food remitting.

The importance of bidirectional food remittances: Most studies overlook food remitting as a key link between rural and urban areas and food security. Understanding these linkages must move beyond cash-based, market transactions to consider bidirectional flows of goods, including foodstuffs, and their impact on food security. Concepts of the divided or stretched household (Francis, 2000) and multi-local household livelihoods (Andersson Djurfeldt, 2015a) should guide any analysis of the dynamics of food remitting.

Cross-border migration and food remittances: Food remitting is an important livelihood strategy. Remittances across international boundaries are important to food security (Crush, 2013) and there is a massive informal trade in food in Africa.

Internal migration and food remittances: Reciprocal rural-urban-rural remitting is ‘fundamental to the ability of poor urban households to survive’ (Frayne, 2004). Many urban migrant households rely on informal, non-marketed...
food from rural counterparts. But we still know little about what it means for rural food security in terms of food sent and received.

Comparing rural-urban and urban-urban food remittances: For food-insecure households, food remittances from both rural and urban sources are important. In one study around a third of poor urban households received food remittances from outside the city the year before (Frayne et al., 2010). But while rural-urban food remitting was significant, urban-urban food remitting was greater still. This phenomenon suggests that we need a much more nuanced notion of linkages and flows.

Frequency and types of food remitting: Frayne et al. (2010) also showed that households receiving food from another urban area did so far more often. This might suggest that urban-urban networks and support mechanisms are stronger than rural-urban ties. What impact this has on the food security of producers and purchasers requires additional research.

Food remitters in rural areas: Rural-urban food flows tend to focus more on poor urban neighbourhoods and households and are important to food security. There is some evidence that better-off rural households remit more than their less well-off counterparts – and that the effects of food remitting are much more severe on poorer rural households. Food remittances can be seen as ‘social security’ (Andersson Djurfeldt and Wambugu, 2011) but also as having an important cultural dimension (Kuuire et al. 2013).

Lessons from the Zimbabwe and Namibia case studies

These case studies highlight different facets of food remitting with potentially broader applicability. The first, of Harare in Zimbabwe, looks at the significance of food remittances under conditions of extreme economic and political duress. It allows an assessment of the impact of macro-economic and political stability on food remitting. The Windhoek case study provides an important example of cash remittances for food remittances reciprocity. It also raises important hypotheses about food remittances that need further elaboration and testing, such as the relationship between urban poverty and the level of food remitting and whether the volume and frequency of food remitting is related to the strength of links between urban and rural residents.

What are the main recommendations for researchers and policymakers?

The massive global attention paid to cash remittances over the past decade provides a solid evidence base for policymaking and advocacy at international, regional and national levels. Policy prescriptions for maximising the flow and impacts of cash remittances on development are now legion and part of a growing policy consensus that remittances can be mainstreamed into development planning and the practices of the private sector, for the benefit of both senders and recipients, whether individuals, communities or whole countries. Yet no equivalent knowledge base or policy dialogue exists with regard to food remittances.

- A new research agenda and policy dialogue are urgently required relating to food remittances and urban and rural food security. Food remitting is a major research gap that demands much greater attention and a systematic, comparative programme of primary research.

- The case studies from Zimbabwe and Namibia in this report highlight how a deeper understanding of food remitting can be applied in other African contexts: the nature of rural-urban linkages under conditions of state failure and crisis (Zimbabwe) and the importance of reciprocal cash and food remittances for food security (Namibia).

- The notion of a rural-urban divide is outdated and oversimplifies the issues. Food remitting cannot be treated in isolation from the complex web of relations and connections between both rural and urban contexts. An extremely useful starting point is to explore how stretched or multi-nodal households drive and impact on food remitting at both urban and rural ends of the spectrum.

Much additional research on this important, yet much-neglected, aspect of urban-rural linkages and informal cross-border transactions is urgently required. By drawing attention to the importance of food remittances for urban and rural food security and identifying the current knowledge gaps, this report creates a platform for the design of a new research agenda.
Food Remittances: Rural-Urban Linkages and Food Security in Africa

1 Introduction

Globally, the transfer of funds by migrants to their home countries or areas (cash remittances) have grown rapidly over the past two decades and are now at an all-time high. The World Bank (2015) estimates that international remittances reached $436 billion in 2014, and predicts that they will increase to $500 billion by 2017 (Figure 1). These figures, which exclude transfers through informal channels, far exceed global flows of official development assistance (ODA). Comparable data for internal remittance flows is ‘non-existent’ (McKay and Deshingkar, 2014), but may significantly exceed cross-border cash remittances.

There is much debate about what kinds of impacts these remittances have on the regions where migrants come from and the households that send the cash (Adams and Page, 2005; Adams, 2011). Following Kapur (2004), some see remittances as a ‘new development mantra’ and a major driver of macro- and micro-economic development and poverty reduction in countries and areas of migrant origin (Fajnzylber and Humberto Lopez, 2008; Singh et al., 2010; Adams, 2011; Combes and Ebeku, 2011; Ratha et al., 2011; Adams and Cuecuecha, 2013; Orozco and Ellis, 2014). Others regard cash remittances as a ‘curse’ (Abadi et al., 2013) with negative effects because they increase dependency, weaken institutional capacity and rarely contribute to overall economic growth (Azam and Gubert, 2006; Rao and Hassan, 2011, 2012; Ahmed, 2013).

In their recent review of the state of research on the links between migration and development, Clemens et al. (2014) argue that we have now moved ‘far beyond remittances’. But there are still some aspects of remitting that have received scant attention to date – for example, the neglected relationship between migration, remittances and food security (Crush, 2013). The literature on rural food security in Africa and Asia has recently begun to acknowledge the importance of migration and remitting to mitigating food shortages among rural households (Lacroix, 2011; Zezza et al., 2011; Mendola, 2012). But most of the research in this field focuses on the impact of cash remittances on rural agricultural systems and food production (Karamba et al., 2011; Lacroix, 2011; Nguyen and Winters, 2011). It is now generally acknowledged that rural recipients of cash remittances spend a significant proportion of this income on food rather than farming. This undermines the idea that rural areas are agriculturally self-sufficient or have the inherent potential to reach this state with the right dose of ‘rural development’ (Crush and Pendleton, 2009; Rosser, 2011; Abadi et al., 2013; Olowa et al., 2013; Generoso, 2015; Regmi et al., 2015). There is also case-study evidence from countries such as Ghana and Nigeria, which show that off-farm income (primarily in the form of cash remittances) improves levels of food security among rural households (Babatunde and Qaim, 2010; Owusu et al., 2011). However, at the national level Karamba et al. (2011) argue that there is no evidence that increased migration leads to better rural food security outcomes in Ghana.

In their global overviews of remitting practices and impacts, both Adams (2011) and Yang (2011) define remittances to include both cash and in-kind (goods) flows. But they then proceed to ignore the latter in the rest of their analyses, a response that is typical in much of the literature on this topic. The economistic bias of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and national governments also fails to consider the volume and impacts of goods remitting, both domestic and international. As a result, researchers and policymakers tend to ignore goods (including food) remitting when discussion turns to the impacts of remittances on development. A World Bank study of the Canada-Caribbean remittance corridor (Todoroki et al., 2009), for example, devoted just two short paragraphs to goods and food remitting in a 163-page report. Even such well-known practices as the sending of barrels containing food and other consumer goods from Canada and the United States to family members in the Caribbean have
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Figure 1. Global cash remittance flows, 1990–2014


attracted little serious analysis (Crawford, 2003). Simmons et al. (2008) provide a classic example of the problem, confining their analysis of remittances between Canada and the Caribbean entirely to financial remittances. They left it to one of their informants to note, in passing, that ‘we have been shipping down barrels, many, many barrels. We sent new stuff, used stuff, perishable items.’ As Andersson Djurfeldt (2015a: 540) observes of remittances research in Africa, ‘transfers of food are invisible in the sense that they run within the family and outside market channels.’

The growing interdisciplinary literature on rural-urban linkages might be expected to focus on both cash and goods remitting by migrants. After all, as Berdegué et al. (2014: 26) point out, rural-urban linkages involve the ‘reciprocal flows of people, goods, services, money and environmental services between rural and urban locations’. Certainly, the importance of cash remittances to rural food purchasing is acknowledged. As Tacoli and Vorley (2015) note, a growing number of rural people buy more food than they sell and ‘these net food buyers are typically from low-income groups who rely on access to affordable food and the cash to purchase it.’ But much less attention has been paid to the practice of food remitting. Tacoli’s (1998) seminal study of rural-urban linkages, for example, outlined a variety of bidirectional flows but did not specifically discuss food remitting and its relationship to the food security of urban and rural households. Subsequent studies have tended to follow suit, mostly overlooking the potential importance of food remitting as a key link between rural and urban areas which impacts on food security in both (Bah et al., 2003; Tacoli, 2006, 2007; Steinberg, 2011; de Brauw et al., 2014; Berdegué and Proctor, 2014; Proctor, 2014).

The search for a ‘wider lens’ on the nature of urban and rural linkages, therefore, needs to move beyond cash-based, market transactions and consider bidirectional flows of goods, including foodstuffs, and their impact on the food security of urban and rural populations. These linkages, and the way they are being reconfigured by the rapid urbanisation of the global South, require much more attention from researchers and policymakers interested in the transformation of rural-urban linkages and the implications for food security of rural and urban residents. Research on rural-urban linkages has increasingly abandoned the dualistic idea that the urban and the rural are discrete and bounded spatial entities (Lerner and Eakin, 2010). As Tacoli (2007) points out, ‘the notion of a “rural–urban divide” is increasingly misleading, and oversimplifies a reality, which is more akin to a complex web of relations and connections incorporating rural and urban dimensions and all that is in between – often termed the peri-urban interface’. Bidirectional food remittances are an essential but under-explored component of this ‘complex web’ that characterises economic and social life across the global South.

Despite the general context of Africa’s rapid urban transition, it is important not to view rural-urban migration
as a one-time relocation of all members of a household. Circular migration – of varying periodicity and spatiality – is still very much the norm in many parts of the continent (Potts, 2010b). The key conceptual question is: what kinds of social units do migrants circulate between? Rather than viewing this in binary terms – as movement between separate and discrete rural and urban households – it can be more productive to see the household as dispersed or ‘stretched’ over space, across the rural-urban divide and very often between countries. Concepts of the divided or stretched household (Francis, 2000) and multi-local household livelihoods (Andersson Djurfeldt, 2015a) are an important starting point for any analysis of the dynamics of food remitting.

As Tacoli (2007) presciently argues, a household’s multi-local strategies involve ‘spreading assets and activities in both rural and urban areas, sometimes in the form of circular migration, at other times re-organising their households as multi-local units with members living and working in different locations but sharing common assets [and that] crossing rural-urban boundaries is an important strategy to reduce vulnerability for both rural and urban poor’. Andersson Djurfeldt (2015a: 529) further suggests that bidirectional and multidirectional food remitting needs to be seen primarily as a form of intra-household transfer rather than a set of transfers between different households. But it is important to stress that not all remittances, and not all food remitting, occur within multi-local or ‘stretched’ households. While remittances tend to flow to immediate family and kin, there is also evidence of remitting to households of relatives. Migrants, and especially those who have lived in urban areas for a lengthy period, may well have their own discrete, nuclear or extended households in urban areas and remit to other households (such as that of an elderly parent or relative).

Because food remitting is a new research area, there is limited evidence on which to draw in order to construct a clear picture of its drivers, dimensions and impacts. This report, therefore, reviews the current state of knowledge about food remittances in Africa. It aims to make a number of contributions to the study of changing rural-urban linkages by expanding the geographic and thematic scope of research; demonstrating the value of examining the links between informal food transfers and urban-based household food security; and arguing for a new research and policy agenda focused on food remitting.
Rural-urban linkages in a rapidly urbanising world require much more attention from researchers and policymakers. As this report shows, several key findings have emerged from the existing literature on food remitting. The following sections focus on: international cross-border migration within the African continent and associated flows of cash and food remittances; internal migration and food remittances; a comparison of rural-urban and urban-urban food remittances; the frequency and types of food remitting; and food remitting in rural areas.

2.1 Cross-border migration and food remittances

Much of the literature on rural-urban linkages assumes that they are bounded by the borders of the country concerned. Yet many countries in Africa send migrants to, and receive remittances from, other countries in the North and the South (Ratha et al., 2011; Anich et al., 2014). Of Africa’s 25 million international migrants, as many as 13 million (53 per cent) are estimated to live in other countries on the continent. Eleven of the top 15 destinations for African migrants are within Africa (Table 1). In 2005, Africa received an estimated US$19 billion in cash remittances, of which US$2.1 billion were from other African countries (Chikanda and Crush, 2014: 75). The volume of goods and food remitting is unknown.

Most migrants who remit across borders within Africa earn income in the urban areas of the countries to which they have migrated and then remit to relatives in both rural and urban areas in their countries of origin. The potential significance of international cash remitting for food security is suggested by cross-national comparative surveys conducted by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) and the World Bank. SAMP’s Migration and Remittances Survey (MARS) in five Southern African countries (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) in 2005–6 found, for example, that 82 per cent of migrant-sending households had purchased food with cash remittances in the previous year and that 81 per cent of household purchases of food by value were paid with remittances (Pendleton et al., 2006). The World Bank’s Africa Migration Project surveyed households in Burkina Faso, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda in 2010 and found that a significant proportion of remittances were spent on human and physical capital investments, including food (Plaza et al., 2011). In each country, a greater proportion of internal rather than international cash remittances was spent on food. In Kenya for example, the proportion of cash remittances spent on food was 30 per cent for internal remittances, 14 per cent for South-South remittances and 13 per cent for North-South remittances. The equivalent figures in Senegal were 82 per cent, 72 per cent and 63 per cent.

To focus exclusively on the use of cash remittances for food purchases is to miss another crucial dimension of the relationship between migration and food security: food remittances across international boundaries (Crush, 2013). This is clearly a problematic assumption in Africa where there is so much cross-border movement of foodstuffs. Across the continent, there is considerable evidence of a massive informal trade in food, including staples, fresh and processed products (Lesser and Moisé-Leeman, 2009; Sarris and Morrison, 2010; Afrika and Ajumbo, 2012; FEWSNET, 2012; Golub, 2015;
FOOD REMITTANCES: RURAL-URBAN LINKAGES AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA

Table I. Top destinations of international African migrants

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>AFRICAN-BORN MIGRANTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,048,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2,261,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,341,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1,086,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1,033,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>931,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>842,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Tanzania</td>
<td>828,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Sudan</td>
<td>774,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*South Africa</td>
<td>729,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Guinea</td>
<td>669,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Nigeria</td>
<td>643,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ethiopia</td>
<td>635,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Uganda</td>
<td>511,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Ghana</td>
<td>502,496</td>
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| *= African destination country

Source: Chikanda and Crush (2014: 71)

Peberdy et al., 2015). Informal cross-border trade (ICBT) is dominated by women, though there are signs of greater male participation in food trading and associated gender struggles over control of the food trade (Akinboade, 2005; Mutopo, 2010; Njikam and Tchouassi, 2011). Though informal in nature, ICBT is animated by commercial transactions by small-scale entrepreneurs at point of purchase in one country and sale in another. One of the complications of monitoring ICBT at borders is that not all of the foodstuffs that cross informally are destined for markets and purchase by urban and rural consumers in the countries of destination. An unknown proportion of the informal trade in foodstuffs is actually food remittances on their way from migrants in one country to family and kin in the country of origin.

Evidence on the magnitude of cross-border cash and food remitting in Southern Africa comes from a survey (Pendleton et al., 2006) of 4,765 cross-border migrant-sending households in five countries. The survey found that goods remitting was a significant component of overall remittance flows within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region (ibid). In total, two-thirds of the households had received cash in the previous year, and intercountry variation in cash remitting was relatively minor (Table 2). The proportion of cash remittances spent on food was 37 per cent, with considerable intercountry variation from a high of 67 per cent in Mozambique to a low of 28 per cent in Lesotho. Just over one-third of the households had also received goods in the previous year. Here again there was considerable variation from country to country. Goods remittances were most important to households in Zimbabwe (69 per cent) and Mozambique (65 per cent) and least important to households in Lesotho (20 per cent) and Swaziland (17 per cent). The average annual value of cash remittances were about three times as much as goods remittances, though in Mozambique they were virtually identical and in Zimbabwe only twice as much. These figures suggest that cash remitting is important to more households but that goods remitting is still significant.

For the purposes of this report, it is more important to know the proportion of households that received food remittances as part of the goods package. The survey showed that a wide variety of goods were remitted, of which clothing and food were by far the most important. In total, 28 per cent of migrant-sending households across the five countries had received food remittances, with a high of 60 per cent in Mozambique and a low of 8 per cent in Lesotho. The low figure for Lesotho may seem surprising given the impoverished state of agriculture in that country (Turner, 2009; Crush et al., 2015), but Lesotho also had the highest proportion of cash remittances spent on food of all the countries surveyed. This suggests that the country’s proximity to and integration into the South African economy means that food is readily available, provided that a household has the cash to purchase it.

Other research, such as SAMP’s Migration and Poverty Survey (MAPS), has compared domestic and cross-border remitting patterns in the Southern African region (Frayne and Pendleton, 2009) by examining internal as well as international migration. This survey canvassed a total of 9,032 households through national surveys in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Of these, 49 per cent were migrant-sending households. A total of 1,900 households had international migrants (42 per cent of migrant-sending households), 2,134 (48 per cent) had internal migrants and 436 (10 per cent) had both. The vast majority of households (between 90 and 95 per cent in both cases) regarded remittances as important or very important for household survival. Though information was collected on goods remitting, the types of goods were not disaggregated.

The regional data set showed that households with international migrants were more likely to receive both cash and goods remittances than internal migrants: 68 per cent of international and 44 per cent of internal migrant-sending households received cash remittances, and 36 per cent of international and 19 per cent of internal migrant-sending households received goods remittances (Table 3). Based on the earlier MARS survey, it is likely that a significant proportion of the goods comprised foodstuffs.

Other studies of international migrants in South Africa corroborate the importance of food remitting as a livelihood strategy. One study of 487 households compared the
remitting behaviour of internal and international migrants in Johannesburg (Vearey et al., 2009). Three-quarters of the international migrants were living in an informal settlement (compared with only 11 per cent of the international migrants). Most of the international migrants (86 per cent) lived in the inner city, often in multi-household flats. Just over half of all the households in the total sample remitted money and another 21 per cent sent food. However, international migrants were more likely to remit both cash (60 per cent) and food (30 per cent) than internal migrants (38 per cent cash and 6 per cent food).

2.2 Internal migration and food remittances

There is now considerable evidence that urban migrant households rely to varying degrees on an informal, non-marketed supply of food from their rural counterparts to survive in precarious urban environments. Frayne (2004: 489), for example, has argued that ‘rural-urban social relations that are fostered and maintained by the migration process are fundamental to the ability of poor urban

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<tr>
<th>Table 2. Cash, goods and food remittances in Southern Africa</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Cash remittances</strong></td>
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<td>Cash remittances (% of households)</td>
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<td>Average annual cash remittances</td>
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<td>% of cash remittances spent on food</td>
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<td>% of food expenditure paid with cash remittances</td>
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<th>Goods remittances</th>
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<td>Goods remittances (% of households)</td>
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<td>Average annual value of goods remittances</td>
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<th>Food remittances</th>
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<td>Food remittances (% of households)</td>
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Source: Pendleton et al. (2006)

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<th>Table 3. International and internal remittances in Southern Africa, 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNATIONAL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of migrant households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% receiving cash remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% receiving goods remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean cash remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean value of goods remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Importance to survival (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pendleton et al. (2006)
FOOD REMITTANCES: RURAL-URBAN LINKAGES AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA

14

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households to survive’. In Kenya, Owuor (2003, 2010) found evidence of extensive remitting of cash, clothing, building materials, agricultural equipment and items for funerals from town to countryside and reciprocal remitting of foodstuffs – such as green maize, local vegetables, sweet potatoes, cassava, maize and millet flour, groundnuts, fruits and chicken – from countryside to town.

Around one in three of the 6,000 poor urban households in 11 Southern African cities surveyed by the African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) in 2008–9 had received food remittances from relatives or friends outside the city in the year prior to the study (Frayne et al., 2010). The prevalence of food remitting varied considerably from city to city, for reasons that are not clear (Frayne, 2010). Receipts of food remittances were highest in Windhoek (at 47 per cent of all households), followed by Lusaka (44 per cent), Harare (42 per cent), Maseru (37 per cent), Blantyre (36 per cent) and Manzini (35 per cent) (Table 4).

By contrast, the proportion of urban households receiving food remittances was significantly lower in the three South African cities surveyed. The survey showed that food transfers were particularly important for food-insecure urban households. Of the 1,809 households receiving food transfers from outside the city, 84 per cent were food insecure and 16 per cent were food secure (Frayne, 2010). Around 80 per cent of households receiving food transfers said that they were important or very important to the household, while 9 per cent said they were critical to household survival. Seventy-seven per cent said that the food was sent to help the urban household’s food needs, while 20 per cent said the food was sent as a gift. The importance of food transfers to urban food consumption was illustrated by the fact that only 3 per cent of households receiving food sold it for cash income, while the rest consumed the food themselves.

2.3 Comparing rural-urban and urban-urban food remittances

The importance of food remittances for poor urban food-insecure households was not especially contingent on whether the food was received from rural areas or other urban areas; both were important for recipient households. Though rural-urban food remitting was significant (at 41 per cent of all households receiving transfers), even more remitting (48 per cent) occurred between urban areas. Only a small number (around 11 per cent) received food remittances from both areas. In Gaborone, for example, households were more likely to be food secure if they received food from rural sources (33 per cent), compared with either urban only (7 per cent) or combined urban and rural sources (8 per cent). But in Maputo just one per cent of food-secure households received food from rural areas only compared with 17 per cent of food-secure households getting food from urban areas only (mostly from migrants in South African cities) and the rest from both sources (Frayne, 2010).

Table 4. Food remittances to poor urban households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING FOOD REMITTANCES</th>
<th>% OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING REMITTANCES FROM RURAL AREAS ONLY</th>
<th>% OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING REMITTANCES FROM URBAN AREAS ONLY</th>
<th>% OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS RECEIVING REMITTANCES FROM BOTH RURAL AND URBAN AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Windhoek, Namibia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusaka, Zambia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maseru, Lesotho</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blantyre, Malawi</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manzini, Swaziland</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Msunduzi, South Africa</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo, Mozambique</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaborone, Botswana</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johannesburg, South Africa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town, South Africa</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In three of the cities, more than half of the recipient households received food remittances from rural areas only: Windhoek (72 per cent), Gaborone (70 per cent) and Manzini (53 per cent). Around half of the Maseru recipients received food from rural areas. Since these four cities are among the smaller centres surveyed by AFSUN, this suggests that rural-urban food remitting might be stronger in countries with lower rates of urbanisation, in so-called 'secondary cities' with populations of less than 500,000 and possibly in countries with more viable rural smallholder agricultural production. In stark contrast, the proportion of recipient households receiving food remittances from the countryside in all three South African cities were very much lower: at 24 per cent in Johannesburg, 15 per cent in Msunduzi and 14 per cent in Cape Town. The relative unimportance of rural-urban food remitting in South Africa may be due to the fact that the country is the most urbanised of the nine countries in the study, that these three are larger urban conurbations, and that rural areas are so impoverished that they do not produce excess food that can be sent to support migrants in the city.

There was also considerable intercity variation in the relative importance of urban-urban food remitting (Table 4). While recipients of rural-urban food remittances in Windhoek made up 72 per cent of total transfers, urban-urban remittance recipients made up only 12 per cent. In Cape Town, on the other hand, the figures were 14 per cent for rural-urban and 83 per cent for urban-urban remittances. More than 80 per cent of recipients in the other two South African cities also received food from other urban areas. However, it is not only in South Africa that urban-urban food remittances predominate over rural-urban flows. In Maputo for example, 62 per cent of food remittances received were urban-urban. High rates of urban-urban remitting were also found in Blantyre (51 per cent), Maseru (44 per cent), Lusaka (44 per cent) and Harare (43 per cent). In each case, it was likely that a proportion of transfers came in the form of food remittances from migrants working in one city to their relatives living in another.

The reasons why so many urban households receive food remittances either from rural or from urban areas, but not both, requires additional analysis and explanation. Is it a function of how long a migrant has lived in the city, with more recent migrants likely to retain stronger links with the countryside? Or is it related to the fact that migrants receiving food remittances from other urban areas do so primarily from urban centres in other countries? And what is the relationship, if any, between the size of an urban centre and the incidence of food remitting? Certainly, the phenomenon of urban-urban food remitting suggests that we need a much more nuanced notion of linkages and flows, which goes beyond the standard idea that rural-urban linkages are the only important influence on the food security of urban populations.

2.4 Frequency of food remitting

In the AFSUN study, the geography of remitting, whether rural-urban or urban-urban, was related to the frequency with which urban households received food remittances. Households receiving food from another urban area did so far more often. Around a quarter of households that received food remittances from other urban areas did so at least once a week (compared with only 5 per cent of households which received food from rural areas).
Some 50 per cent of households received urban-urban remittances at least once every two months, compared with only around 35 per cent of households receiving rural-urban remittances (Figure 2). This might suggest that urban-urban networks’ support mechanisms are stronger than rural-urban ties. Alternatively, transportation is undoubtedly easier between urban areas and urban-urban transfers are also much less likely to be affected by the seasonal agricultural cycle.

2.5 Types of food remittances

Food remittances from both rural and other urban areas are dominated by cereals, primarily maize. All of the recipient urban households in the cities in the AFSUN study received cereals at some point during the year, irrespective of the source. But there was a marked difference in the frequency of transfers, with over a quarter of urban-sourced cereals arriving at least once per week and almost three-quarters arriving at least once every couple of months or more frequently (Table 5). In contrast, cereals from rural areas came far less frequently, because of the rural agricultural cycle. (Those receiving cereals from other urban areas are not dependent on the cycle since the cereals can be purchased and sent at any time of the year.)

In general, the primary difference between rural-urban and urban-urban food remitting is that the former foodstuffs are home produced while the latter are purchased. What impact this has on the food security of producers and purchasers requires additional research.

The types of foodstuffs remitted from rural to urban areas are clearly dependent on the main crops produced by small-scale rural farmers. All of the recipient households received cereals, primarily maize and millet, which are staples in the region. Other agricultural products sent to town included beans/peas/lentils/nuts (40 per cent of recipients), vegetables (37 per cent), roots/tubers (21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOOD TYPE</th>
<th>FREQUENCY</th>
<th>URBAN-URBAN (%)</th>
<th>RURAL-URBAN (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>At least once a week</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least once every 2 months</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3–6 times a year</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least once a year</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RURAL-URBAN % OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS</th>
<th>URBAN-URBAN % OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals/grain</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food from beans, peas, lentils, nuts</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat/poultry</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots/tubers</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese/dairy products</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foods made with oil, fat, butter</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar/honey</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
<td>753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

per cent) and fruit (9 per cent) (Table 6). Around a quarter of households also received their meat and poultry in the form of food remittances. Urban households receiving food from other urban areas received fewer legumes than those receiving rural-urban transfers. But households receiving urban-urban remittances were more likely to receive all other types of foodstuffs. For example, 51 per cent of households receiving urban-urban transfers received vegetables compared with 37 per cent of those receiving rural-urban transfers. Or again, 39 per cent of urban-urban transfer households received meat or poultry compared with only 23 per cent of rural-urban transfer households. The differences were particularly marked for processed foods such as sugar/honey (40 per cent versus 5 per cent) and foods made with oil, fat or butter (33 per cent versus 6 per cent). There was only minor evidence of rural-urban processed food remitting. This shows that urban-urban remitting is characterised by a greater variety of foodstuffs and is more likely to enhance dietary diversity than rural-urban remitting.

2.6 Food remitters in rural areas

There have been few large-scale regional studies undertaken about food remitters in rural areas. The best general picture comes from a study by Sweden's Lund University. In 2008, researchers interviewed 3,388 rural farm households in nine African countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (Andersson Djurfeldt and Wambugu, 2011; Djurfeldt et al., 2011; Andersson Djurfeldt, 2015a, 2015b). They focused on maize remitting and found that 2,857 households (or 84 per cent) were maize producers and that 1,192 (35 per cent) remitted maize to relatives. The proportion of maize-remitting households varied from a high of 69 per cent in Nigeria to a low of 22 per cent in Tanzania.

The Lund study makes three main contributions to the emerging literature on food remittances. First, it shows that the geography of remitting is more complex than suggested by the traditional rural-urban and urban-urban binary (Table 7). They show, for example, that the most frequent type of remitting is rural-rural (to neighbouring villages and other rural areas). In addition, rural-urban food remittances tend to vary with the proximity and size of the destination. About the same proportion of households (just over one-third in each case) send remittances to towns within and outside the district. But much fewer remit to the capital city (23 per cent) and other major urban centres (17 per cent). These figures also suggest that households not only remit to other rural areas but that some remit to more than one destination.

Second, the Lund study found that food remitting varies with rural household income. As household income increases, so does the propensity to remit. The proportion of households with access to non-farm income (largely cash remittances) varied from 30 per cent for those in the lowest income quintile to 76 per cent for those in the highest income quintile (Table 8). The proportion of households that remit maize increased from 27 per cent in the lowest quintile to 55 per cent in the highest quintile. The total amount of maize remitted also increased with household income, from 117kg for those in the lowest quintile to 321kg for those in the upper quintile. As Andersson Djurfeldt (2015a: 535) concludes: 'The notion that transfers are concentrated among the poorest is to some extent refuted'.

Third, there is a clear relationship between access to household income and the amount of maize produced. This refutes the common argument that increased off-farm income tends to depress food production. It also shows that despite large differences in average household production across the income quintiles, there is no statistically significant relationship between household income and amount remitted. In other words, all households tend to remit a similar proportion of their maize production irrespective of how well off they are. This suggests that there is a ‘distributional dualism of food transfers: households in the lower income quintiles are clearly forfeiting their own food security to be able to feed family members and relatives outside the co-resident household and in this sense are not transferring according to their capacity’ (Andersson Djurfeldt 2015a: 536).

The implications of food remitting for the food security of both senders and recipients are not well researched. But the Lund case studies of particular local areas do suggest hypotheses for further exploration. Andersson Djurfeldt (2015b), for example, suggests that better-off rural households distribute surplus production, while the poorest households support vulnerable family members by sacrificing part of their own subsistence needs via small food gifts. The effects of food remitting are therefore much more severe on poorer households. In a paper on remitting from six rural villages in the Nyeri and Kakamega districts of Kenya, Andersson Djurfeldt and Wambugu (2011) found that between a third and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% OF REMITTING HOUSEHOLDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neighbouring villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns in same district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns outside district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major urban centres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andersson Djurfeldt (2015a: 538)
a half of the sampled households remitted maize. They suggest that ‘transfers may represent a mechanism for counteracting food shortages, price shocks and volatility for receiving households under a system in which markets cannot be trusted to deliver, or do so at seasonally inflated prices’ and that ‘transfers appeared to act as a parallel informal system of social security in the absence of formal systems guaranteeing a certain measure of food security for vulnerable households’ (Andersson Djurfeldt and Wambugu, 2011: 457–8).

Another study of eight villages in Malawi found that between 30 per cent and 64 per cent of maize producers were also maize remitters (Andersson, 2011). The study found that maize sellers were more likely to remit than non-sellers, and both selling and remitting were positively correlated with total household production. Among poorer households ‘remittances take out a relatively large proportion of total production for already food-insecure households, pushing them below their non-remitting counterparts’. Echoing the Kenya findings, Andersson (2011: 19) concludes that there are two very different scenarios at work among maize remitters. On the one hand, the most affluent and food-secure households engage in remittances as a widening of family consumption over space, without compromising the resident household’s ability to feed itself. On the other hand, the more vulnerable households undermine the food security of the co-resident household unit to support family members outside the village.

Another issue is rural-rural food remitting to migrants who have migrated to other rural areas to work or farm. Kuuire et al. (2013) have drawn attention to this phenomenon in the Upper West Region (UWR) of Ghana. Though they argue that food remitting has a ‘major influence’ on the amount of food consumed and on the frequency and type of food eaten, their small sample size makes it difficult to assess the significance of this form of rural-rural food remitting. The real significance of the study is the suggestion that food remitting is not simply about material needs and food security but that it also has an important cultural dimension. Kuuire et al. (2013) argue that food remittances symbolise the continuity and strength of kin relationships with relatives who live elsewhere. Wives ‘left behind’ by spouses also gauged their husbands’ affection from the regularity and amount of food they received. They also noted that food from migrant husbands is shared with in-laws to build stronger bonds and strengthen marital ties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME QUINTILE</th>
<th>% WITH ACCESS TO NON-FARM INCOME</th>
<th>MEAN MAIZE PRODUCTION (KG)</th>
<th>% OF HOUSEHOLDS REMITTING</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL PRODUCTION REMITTED</th>
<th>MEAN AMOUNT OF MAIZE REMITTED (KG)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>649</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1,768</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>3,211</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Andersson Djurfeldt (2015a)
The inter-connections between urbanisation, migration and rural-urban linkages in the first 20 years of Zimbabwean independence have been well documented (Andersson, 2001; Andersson Djurfeldt, 2012; Potts, 2000, 2010a; Potts and Mutambirwa, 1990). The post-2000 economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe, which reached its height in 2008, is also well documented (Chan and Primorac, 2007; Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012; Derman and Kaarhuis, 2013). The crisis led to the mass exodus of migrants to neighbouring countries such as Botswana and South Africa, as well as further afield to Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States (Crush and Tevera, 2010; McGregor and Primorac, 2010; Chikanda and Crush, 2012; Forrest et al., 2013, Pasura, 2014; Chaumba, 2015). By 2008, with formal unemployment in the country running at more than 80 per cent and rampant inflation destroying any residual value held by the Zimbabwean dollar, cash remittances from other countries had become essential to household survival and to the Zimbabwean economy as a whole (Crush and Tevera, 2010). Internally, the crisis led to a slowing of urbanisation, increased circular migration and intensification of rural-urban linkages (Potts, 2006, 2010b).

Flows of cash (especially from South Africa) were complemented by flows of foodstuffs, particularly as many formal retail outlets in Zimbabwe had empty shelves. But what impact did the crisis have on patterns of internal cash and food remitting between urban and rural areas? And did a general change in macro-economic circumstances and the resolution, albeit partial, of the crisis impact on household food security, rural-urban linkages and remitting practices? Godfrey Tawodzera’s research in Epworth, Harare in 2008, combined with the data from AFSUN household food security surveys in 2008 and 2012 in three other low-income areas of the city, helps answer both questions (Tawodzera, 2010–2014; Tawodzera et al., 2012).

In 2008, Harare’s poor were among the most food insecure in the whole SADC region. The household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS) score, which shows the prevalence of food insecurity, was an extremely high 14.7 for the 462 households interviewed by AFSUN in the Harare suburbs of Mabvuku, Tafara and Dzivarasekwa (Tawodzera et al., 2012). On the HFIAS scale, only 2 per cent of households were food secure and 72 per cent were severely food insecure (Table 9). The situation in nearby Epworth was a little better, at 3 per cent and 59 per cent respectively (Tawodzera, 2010). Dietary diversity was also low with two-thirds of the households in the AFSUN survey scoring 5 or less on a scale from 0 to 12 and 29 per cent scoring 3 or less. Similarly in Epworth, the mean household dietary diversity score (HDDS) was 4.2. As Tawodzera (2013: 5) notes, narrow household diets ‘reflected a deeper food security problem […] than prevalence measures alone are able to indicate’. All of the households consumed sadza (mealie meal porridge) and a vegetable relish (94 per cent);
Harare. Though the net flow was towards the urban areas, incorrect to conclude that this became a one-way flow to
sent, suggesting that the flow of resources between rural
were increasingly getting more from the village than they
the sale of farm produce or livestock. Urban households
reason for visiting rural areas was to get food and/or
As many as 64 per cent of those surveyed said that their
increasing costs of travel and declining urban incomes.
poverty and the frequency of visits to rural areas, despite
significant relationship between levels of household
the two. According to Tawodzera (2013), there was a
frequency of visits and the resource flows between
countryside during the crisis was indicated by the
strength that is important to urban livelihoods. In the past,
the established practice was for urban households to
 send money and supplementary food to rural areas. The
economic crisis in the country changed the nature of these
relationships and remittances from the urban areas, making
it harder for them to continue. Many urban households
maintained small plots of land in the village to grow crops
keep animals. This became increasingly important as
the food crisis worsened in the cities. By engaging in rural
farming, urban household members generated food to eat
when they visited the countryside or they could sell it to
generate a supplementary income for use in both the rural
and urban areas. Tawodzera (2010) found that 35 per cent
of the households in Epworth visited rural areas to engage
in farming activities.

The strength of the linkages between Harare and the
countryside during the crisis was indicated by the
frequency of visits and the resource flows between the
two. According to Tawodzera (2013), there was a
significant relationship between levels of household
poverty and the frequency of visits to rural areas, despite
increasing costs of travel and declining urban incomes.
As many as 64 per cent of those surveyed said that their
reason for visiting rural areas was to get food and/or
money. Money from rural areas was primarily generated by
the sale of farm produce or livestock. Urban households
were increasingly getting more from the village than they
sent, suggesting that the flow of resources between rural
and urban areas had reversed. However, it would be
incorrect to conclude that this became a one-way flow to
Harare. Though the net flow was towards the urban areas,
just over a third also said that they visited rural areas to take
money and/or food.

The net flow of resources, and especially food, towards
the city was partly responsible for the ability of poor
households to remain there, though it is clear that it did
not ameliorate overall food insecurity. More than half of
the households (61 per cent) surveyed in Epworth in
2008 received food remittances from rural areas in the
previous year (Tawodzera, 2013). The most common foods
transferred from rural areas to Epworth included cereals
(54 per cent of households), root and tubers (36 per
cent), meat and poultry (26 per cent) and food made from
beans and nuts (16 per cent) (Figure 3). The high cost of
transport between rural and urban areas meant that most
food transfers only took place three to six times a year, or
even less frequently.

The AFSUN survey found that 29 per cent of low-income
households in Harare had received food remittances from
rural areas in the previous year (Figure 4). Cereals were
again predominant (at nearly 50 per cent of recipient
households), but overall the foodstuffs received were far
less diverse than those arriving in Epworth, with lower
proportions of all other types of food and very few roots,
tubers, fruit, meat or poultry sent at all. AFSUN also found
that more households (42 per cent) had received food
remittances from other urban areas outside Harare (most
probably outside the country) than from rural areas. Of
the recipient households, 37 per cent had received food
remittances from rural areas only, 43 per cent from urban
areas only and 20 per cent from both. This clearly implies
that while rural-urban food remitting became important
to urban households during a time of severe crisis, food
remittances from other urban centres were even more
important.

These studies, conducted at the height of the Zimbabwean
crisis, shed light on the nature of reciprocal food and
cash remitting during a time of acute economic and social
hardship. The Zimbabwean case, therefore, could help
us understand the nature of rural-urban linkages under
conditions of state failure and deep crisis in other African
countries. It also raises the question of what happens to
these rural-urban linkages and cash and food remittances
when a crisis eases or is resolved? To try to answer this
question, AFSUN repeated its household survey in the
same areas of Harare in 2012 when the worst aspects of
the crisis were over. Political stability had been restored
through a Government of National Unity, the economy was
dollarised and inflation brought under control. Between
2009 and 2011, Zimbabwe’s GDP growth averaged
7.3 per cent, making it one of the world’s fastest growing
economies, albeit from a very low base. According to
Newfarmer and Pierola (2015), Zimbabwe experienced
an economic rebound after 2009 and ‘with the support of
record international price levels, exports of minerals
— notably diamonds, platinum, gold, and other products
— have injected new life into the economy’. Zimbabwean
trade flows increased rapidly, with exports (primarily

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EPWORTH (%) OF HOUSEHOLDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food secure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly food insecure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately food insecure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely food insecure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tawodzera (2010); Tawodzera et al. (2012)

the other two main components of the diet were foods
made with oil and fat (66 per cent) and sugar (58 per cent).

Tawodzwer (2013: 6) argues that it is not the mere
existence or persistence of rural-urban linkages but their
strength that is important to urban livelihoods. In the past,
the established practice was for urban households to
send money and supplementary food to rural areas. The
economic crisis in the country changed the nature of these
relationships and remittances from the urban areas, making
it harder for them to continue. Many urban households
maintained small plots of land in the village to grow crops
keep animals. This became increasingly important as
the food crisis worsened in the cities. By engaging in rural
farming, urban household members generated food to eat
when they visited the countryside or they could sell it to
generate a supplementary income for use in both the rural
and urban areas. Tawodzera (2010) found that 35 per cent
of the households in Epworth visited rural areas to engage
in farming activities.

The strength of the linkages between Harare and the
countryside during the crisis was indicated by the
frequency of visits and the resource flows between the
two. According to Tawodzera (2013), there was a
significant relationship between levels of household
poverty and the frequency of visits to rural areas, despite
increasing costs of travel and declining urban incomes.
As many as 64 per cent of those surveyed said that their
reason for visiting rural areas was to get food and/or
money. Money from rural areas was primarily generated by
the sale of farm produce or livestock. Urban households
were increasingly getting more from the village than they
sent, suggesting that the flow of resources between rural
and urban areas had reversed. However, it would be
incorrect to conclude that this became a one-way flow to
Harare. Though the net flow was towards the urban areas,
Figure 3. Type and frequency of rural-urban food remittances to Epworth, Harare

![Graph showing type and frequency of rural-urban food remittances](image)

Source: Tawodzera (2010)

Figure 4. Types of food remittances to Mabvuku, Tafara and Dzivarasekwa, Harare

![Graph showing types of food remittances](image)

Source: Tawodzera et al. (2012)
minerals) rising at 39 per cent per year. Imports also rose in response to domestic demand, averaging 34 per cent per year from 2009 to 2011. As the economy stabilised, commercial food production increased and shops restocked with food imported primarily from South Africa.

A comparison of the 2008 and 2012 employment profile of household members suggests little change in the labour market prospects of poor urban households in Harare. Overall employment was only slightly different in 2012 (59 per cent employed) than it had been in 2008 (58 per cent employed) (Tawodzera et al., 2012). Unemployment figures were also similar (at 42 per cent in 2008 and 40 per cent in 2012). However, among the employed there was a move away from full-time towards part-time employment. The proportion of all working-age adults employed full-time fell from 43 per cent to 35 per cent between 2008 and 2012 and the proportion of those employed part-time rose from 15 per cent to 24 per cent. But aggregate improvements in household income were reflected in declining levels of food insecurity. For example, the mean household HFIAS fell from 14.7 to 9.6 between 2008 and 2012. This was reflected in the share of food-secure and mildly food-insecure households increasing from 5 per cent to 17 per cent and the proportion of severely food-insecure households falling from 72 per cent to 63 per cent (Table 10). Aggregate household dietary diversity also improved between 2008 and 2012, with the mean HDDS score increasing from 4.8 in 2008 to 6.5 in 2012. But despite the overall improvement in Zimbabwe’s macro-economic situation, it is clear that levels of urban household food insecurity have remained extremely high in poor neighbourhoods (Tawodzera, 2014). The question then is whether there have been any changes in food remitting practices.

A comparison of the self-assessment of the importance of food remittances in 2008 and 2012 shows a definite easing over the four-year period (Figure 5). In 2008 for example, more than 70 per cent of the households receiving food remittances said they were either very important or critical to survival. This had fallen to 50 per cent by 2012. Similarly, only 2 per cent of households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food secure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly food insecure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately food insecure</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely food insecure</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Changes in food insecurity prevalence, 2008 and 2012

Source: Tawodzera (2014)
said that they were unimportant or somewhat important in 2008, compared with 22 per cent in 2012. Overall then, food remittances remained important for most households but were less critical.

Logically, we might expect that as food remittances become less important, they might also decline in volume and frequency. Interestingly, the proportion of households in the surveyed areas receiving food remittances increased from 42 per cent in 2008 to 47 per cent in 2012 and most of the increase came from rural-urban remitting (from 37 per cent to 42 per cent). But there was also a slight drop in the proportion of households receiving food remittances from other urban centres (from 43 per cent to 37 per cent). The proportion receiving food from both rural and urban areas remained virtually the same at around 20 per cent. Although the confiscation of land from white farmers (the Fast Track Land Reform Programme) had a major negative impact on large-scale commercial agriculture in the country, there is an emerging consensus that resettled smallholder farmers are producing a great deal more than they used to. Maize production, for example, increased from 0.525 million MT in 2008 to 1.45 million MT in 2011. This might explain continued and even increased flows of food remittances. The possibility of harvest-related annual fluctuations means that a definitive answer would require tracking over a much longer time frame. Yet despite the improved macro-economic situation in 2012, the continuing high levels of urban food insecurity do not appear to have impacted on the demand for food remittances to any significant degree.

Table 11. Changes in types of rural-urban food remittances to Harare, 2008 and 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots or tubers</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tawodzera (2014)

The final question is whether there were any changes in the types of food remitted from rural areas to households in urban Harare. Here there were some interesting shifts (Table 11). In 2008, the top three food types remitted (in terms of the proportion of recipient households receiving that type) were cereals (95 per cent), vegetables (35 per cent) and lentils and nuts (30 per cent). In 2012, cereals were still dominant though there was a drop from 95 per cent to 80 per cent (possibly because maize meal was now more available for purchase in the city), a major drop in vegetables from 35 per cent to 18 per cent (possibly for the same reason), and an increase in roots or tubers (9 per cent to 23 per cent) and fruit (from 5 per cent to 24 per cent) (for reasons that are not clear).
FOOD REMITTANCES: RURAL-URBAN LINKAGES AND FOOD SECURITY IN AFRICA

4

Case study: reciprocal remitting, Windhoek, Namibia

Even in ‘normal times’ urban migrant households rely to varying degrees on informal, non-marketed food remittances to survive in precarious urban environments. Frayne (2004: 489) has argued that ‘rural-urban social relations that are fostered and maintained by the migration process are fundamental to the ability of poor urban households to survive’. This observation is confirmed by Frayne’s own research on two-way or reciprocal rural-urban-rural remitting in Namibia and also by work by Owuor in Nakuru, Kenya. As stated earlier, Owuor (2003, 2010) found evidence of extensive remitting of cash, clothing, building materials, farm inputs and items for funerals from town to countryside and reciprocal remitting of foodstuffs – such as green maize, local vegetables, sweet potatoes, cassava, maize and millet flour, groundnuts, fruits and chicken – from countryside to town.

Frayne’s (2001) study of 305 households in the poorer areas of Windhoek found that 85 per cent of respondents (household heads) were migrants to Windhoek and that rural-urban migration is creating dynamic socio-economic relationships between the city and the rural north of the country. One component of this ‘reciprocal social economy’ linking urban and rural households (or nodes of the same household) in Namibia was rural-urban remitting of goods and especially cash. The practice of cash remitting has a long history in Namibia but is certainly not ubiquitous. Frayne (2004) for example found that 37 per cent of urban households in his study had remitted cash in the previous year, the same proportion as in 1991. However, given Windhoek’s dramatic growth during the 1990s, this means that the absolute number of rural households receiving cash remittances continued to increase. Half of those remitting cash did so at least once per quarter. Remittances were largely spent on school fees, healthcare and the purchase of foodstuffs in rural areas. In 2008, Pendleton et al. (2014) found that rates of cash remitting had increased to 52 per cent of households and that 90 per cent of cash remittances went to the rural north of the country.

Frayne (2005a,b; 2007) found that levels of urban food insecurity in Windhoek were lower than expected given pervasive poverty, high unemployment, a relatively small informal economy and scant evidence of urban agriculture. Strong and resilient rural-urban social networks had ameliorated the food insecurity of poor urban households. The resources required to satisfy immediate food needs came predominantly from rural areas direct to urban households outside market channels. The most vulnerable households were those with weaker rural connections. Sixty-two per cent of the households had received food remittances from rural relatives in the year prior to the survey and 58 per cent received remittances 2 to 6 times per year (Frayne, 2007). Produce received by urban households included millet (received by 42 per cent of households), wild foods (41 per cent), and meat and fish (9 per cent). The vast majority of households consumed the food themselves, with only 6 per cent selling any of it. In Windhoek, therefore, urban food security for economically marginal households was dependent to a large degree on food remittances. However, the reciprocal flow of cash remittances from Windhoek was critical for rural livelihoods.
The flow of goods between the urban and rural areas is truly reciprocal. With about two-thirds of urban households both sending money to rural areas and receiving food from rural households, the rural-urban symbiosis is well established. Unless there is rapid economic growth with jobs for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in Windhoek, the flow of food into urban areas is likely to continue as urban households continue to diversify their sources of food and income (Frayne, 2001: 278).

Guettou and Djurfeldt (2014:36) suggest that in reciprocal remitting the amount of money sent does not depend on the amount of food received. In that sense, the system is not based on true reciprocity but on other variables such as available income and rural needs, in the case of cash remitting, and the absence of cash to buy food and the nature of the harvest, in the case of food remitting.

The practice of reciprocal remitting was confirmed in AFSUN's 2008 survey of 513 households in formal and informal settlements in Windhoek (Pendleton et al., 2014). Again, there was a strong migration connection with 49 per cent of households consisting exclusively of migrants, 40 per cent comprising a mix of migrants and non-migrants (mainly children born in the city) and only 11 per cent in which all members were non-migrants. A total of 41 per cent of surveyed households received food remittances from relatives in rural areas in the previous year. Of these, nearly 80 per cent received cereals (primarily millet), 27 per cent meat and poultry and 19 per cent milk and dairy products (Table 12). Rates of receipt of vegetables and fruit were much lower. The frequency of remitting varied with the type of food involved. For example, more than half of the households received cereals three to six times per year (Table 13). This suggests that remitting does not only occur after the harvest but also at other times as well, presumably from household stores. Products less tied to the agricultural calendar such as meat, poultry, milk and dairy products still tended to be remitted more frequently. Fish (and also vegetables) were remitted much less frequently.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12. Types of rural–urban food remittance to Windhoek, 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cereals                                                      79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat and poultry                                             27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk and dairy products                                       19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legumes                                                      13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables                                                   12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oils, fats, butter                                           4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruits                                                       3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs                                                         1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roots or tubers                                              0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Frayne et al. (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 13. Frequency of rural–urban food remitting to Windhoek, 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CEREALS</td>
</tr>
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<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS % OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS % OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS % OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS % OF RECIPIENT HOUSEHOLDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a week 1 2 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least every two months 24 56 42 17 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3–6 times a year 56 29 46 38 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least once a year 19 13 12 45 57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Frayne et al. (2010)
Households receiving food remittances from rural areas emphasise that they are important for household survival. In the AFSUN survey, only a tiny minority (2.8 per cent) indicated that the food received was unimportant to the household (Figure 6). The rest reported varying degrees of significance, with as many as 52 per cent saying they were very important and 15 per cent that they were critical to household survival. Interestingly, of the 11 Southern African cities surveyed by AFSUN, poor Windhoek residents spent the lowest proportion of their income on food. Indeed, in Windhoek’s informal settlements, it appears, paradoxically, that ‘the poorer you are the less you actually spend on food’ (Nickanor, 2013: 108–9). This seems to confirm the self-assessment of the importance of food remitting to urban food security.

Some broader hypotheses about rural-urban food remitting are suggested by the work on Windhoek. The first concerns the relationship between urban income and poverty and food remittances. In general, there is a strong relationship between household income and food-security status in Windhoek (Frayne, 2010: 306). But is there also a relationship between income and food remittances? Frayne (2007) cross-tabulated the amounts of millet received by household income and found that the poorest households received the greatest average amounts of millet. At the same time, the relationship was relatively weak since households receiving millet were spread across income categories, prompting the overall conclusion that in poor areas of the city high income levels do not translate into lower transfers of food, at least among poorer households (Frayne, 2005a: 66). In the AFSUN survey, there was a slight decline in the importance of food remitting with increased income. For example, 35 per cent of households receiving food remittances from rural relatives were in the lowest income tercile, 33 per cent were in the middle tercile and 31 per cent were in the upper tercile. A complete assessment of the frequency of food remitting across all income groups would require a city-wide survey, rather than one focusing on poorer neighbourhoods only.

The second hypothesis is that food remittances improve food security and that we should therefore expect higher rates of remittance receipts among less food insecure households. But the 2008 AFSUN regional data set found that food transfers were particularly important for food-insecure households and that this relationship was statistically significant (Frayne, 2010: 300). In total, only 16 per cent of recipient households were food secure compared with 84 per cent who were food insecure. Overall, the AFSUN dataset showed that ‘the migration status of a household is not statistically correlated with an improvement in food security status’ (Frayne, 2010: 300). Cross-tabulating household food security (as measured by the HFIAS) with food remittances in Windhoek, in particular, gave exactly the same results as for the 11-city dataset as a whole: 16 per cent of recipient households were food secure and 84 per cent were food insecure. This suggests that food remittances probably do make households less food insecure but that they are a response to acute insecurity and insufficient in quantity and regularity to guarantee a household’s overall food security.

Third, is food remitting tied to the strength of the links that urban households maintain with rural areas? Over the generational long term, as the South African case makes clear, permanent urbanisation and the loosening of rural linkages is likely to lead to the decline and
eventual demise of food remitting. At the other end of the spectrum, as in Namibia, linkages remain very strong, not only in terms of material transfers but also through personal visits and interactions. Frayne (2007) found that about 86 per cent of his respondents visited their relatives in rural areas at least once a year, and many even more frequently. Reasons include special family events and also to participate in farming-related activities. Pomuti and Tvedten (1998) also argue that the length of time spent in Windhoek has no impact on the strength of ties to rural areas. This contrasts with the more personal but cynical view of one of Nickanor’s (2013: 173) respondents that ‘in today’s life you cannot rely on your own family elsewhere to support you because when you are working you are regarded as family but when you are not working then you are on your own’. To test this hypothesis more rigorously it would be necessary to collect data on a range of linkage types and then to correlate these with the frequency of food remittance receipts.

Fourth, there is considerable inter-household variation in levels of food security within the same geographical area of the city (Table 14). For example, food security levels are significantly higher in formal versus informal areas of the city (Nickanor, 2013). Within the informal areas, there are also significant variations by household type. The most food-secure households are nuclear and male-centred (both male-headed). Both tend to be more food secure than extended family households, but the most food-insecure households are clearly female-headed households. More research is needed on how the characteristics of the household, such as size, location and demography, impact on food remitting from the countryside, and these characteristics need to be related to a similar range of characteristics of the rural household.

Fifth, there is the issue of gender, food insecurity and food remittances and the particular vulnerability to poverty and food insecurity of female-centred households (Dodson et al., 2012). Nickanor (2013) conducted detailed interviews with female heads of households in Windhoek and supplemented her qualitative analysis with quantitative data from the 2008 AF Sun survey. Her research found a consistent pattern of exclusion, labour market discrimination and economic hardship among female-centred migrant households in the poorer areas of the city: female-centred households are far more vulnerable than nuclear, male and extended households. Gender discrimination in the labour market means female heads of households are forced to adopt other livelihood strategies including informal selling of food as well as brewing beer, selling wood and sex work (Nickanor, 2013: 189). Extremely high levels of food insecurity translate into great anxiety and uncertainty about household food supply (Nickanor, 2013: 119). Asked how often over the previous month they had worried about whether the household would have enough food, 56 per cent of female household heads said they were often or sometimes worried. Most households had adjusted their food intake in some way: 62 per cent had sometimes or often eaten smaller meals because of a lack of resources; 55 per cent had cut the number of meals due to a lack of food; 55 per cent had sometimes or often had no food in the house; 47 per cent had gone to sleep hungry due to lack of food;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WINDHOEK FORMAL AREAS</th>
<th>WINDHOEK INFORMAL AREAS</th>
<th>TYPES OF HOUSEHOLD IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food secure</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mildly food insecure</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderately food</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>insecure</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severely food</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>insecure</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Frayne et al. (2010)
and 45 per cent had gone a whole day and night without eating. But Nickanor (2013) also found that the proportion of households receiving food remittances was not significantly higher for female-centred households. Gettou and Djurfeldt (2014: 45) could find no rural evidence of gender discrimination in the amounts of food remitted in Windhoek.

Finally, do reciprocal remitting patterns change over time and, if so, why? At the household level, for example, is the volume and value of food and cash remitting dependent on the life cycle of the multi-spatial household? Does remitting tend to decline with length of urban residence? Do cash remittances increase and food remittances decrease if the urban household can secure a regular income through stable employment? At the regional level, are there longer-term trends in rural agriculture that are affecting rural production and therefore the amounts of food available to remit? And, if agriculture is in decline as it is in many other rural areas in Southern Africa, is this because of social, economic or environmental factors? Certainly, there was an apparent decline in food remittances between 2000 and 2008 (from 58 per cent to 44 per cent of recipient households). The reasons for this are not clear, though Nickanor’s (2013: 169) informants suggested that their links with rural areas remain strong, but ‘out-migration and environmental changes [are] making rural agriculture less productive and causing a decline in the flow of food to Windhoek.’
Conclusions

The research literature and policy discussions on the impact of migrant remittances — at global, regional and national scales — focus almost exclusively on cash remitting. Connections between remittances and food tend to be confined to discussions of the impact of cash remittances on rural agricultural production and the widespread use of cash remittances by recipients to purchase food. The remitting of goods, and especially foodstuffs, across international boundaries and within countries has received little attention primarily, it seems, because these flows occur outside market channels. The result is that there is not much solid information on the volume, value and impacts of food remitting. This report reviews the available evidence for Africa, but it is clear that food remitting is a major research gap that demands much greater attention and a systematic, comparative programme of primary research.

The growing literature on rural-urban linkages has highlighted the complexity and dynamism of these connections in the context of rapid urbanisation and greatly increased rural-urban migration in Africa. However, informal food remittances as a form of linkage have been neglected in favour of discussions of formal, market-based interactions and other types of flows. But the rural-urban linkages literature has important implications for understanding the practice of food remitting. First, linkages tend to be bidirectional in nature. Cash remittances tend to be uni-directional (from urban to rural), but food remittances are often bidirectional, with fresh produce flowing one way and processed foods flowing the other. Alternatively, there is an element of reciprocity, with cash remittances flowing one way and food remittances the other. Second, the literature suggests that the rural-urban binary is arbitrary, outdated and unhelpful. Certainly, it is hard to avoid these terms in describing remittances but it must be within the context of ‘a complex web of relations and connections incorporating rural and urban dimensions and all that is in between’ (Tacoli, 2007). Food remitting cannot be treated in isolation from this complex web. Third, at the household level, the notion of the stretched or multi-nodal household is an extremely useful starting point for examining the drivers and impacts of food remitting at both urban and rural ends of the spectrum.

Several key findings emerge from the existing research literature on food remitting. First, there is considerable spatial variability in the volumes, frequency and types of foodstuffs that flow to the towns and cities for reasons that are not yet clear, given that many towns and cities have equally poor and food-insecure populations. For example, it is clear why rural-urban food remitting is unimportant in South Africa where nearly 70 per cent of the population is urbanised and rural smallholder production is extremely impoverished. But why would there be such a large difference between Windhoek and Maputo, for example, when both have strong connections to the countryside? Second, the evidence suggests that rural-urban food flows tend to focus more on poor urban neighbourhoods and households than middle- and upper-income areas and are important to bolstering their food security. On the other hand, there is some evidence that better-off rural households remit more than their less well-off counterparts. There have been no large-scale systematic studies that look simultaneously at the rural and the urban nodes of a household and chart the actual food pathways between them. Most of the existing research has been conducted either in the cities or in the countryside, not both. Third, we know a reasonable amount about the importance of food remitting to urban food security but little about what it means for rural food security both in terms of food sent and received. Finally, while it is important to focus on the rural-urban dimensions of food remitting, we should not ignore the fact that there are also other significant dimensions of food remitting that are relatively unexplored, including rural-rural and urban-urban remitting.

The two case studies presented in this report are designed to highlight different facets of food remitting with potentially broader applicability. The first case study, of Harare in Zimbabwe, looks at food remittances under conditions of extreme economic and political duress. Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown after 2000 is
probably unprecedented but many African countries are no strangers to economic crisis, civil strife and, in some cases, state failure. The significance of food remitting to the urban poor in a state in crisis is amply demonstrated by the Harare case. In addition, the case study allows an assessment of the impact on food remitting with macro-economic and political stability. Clearly, without significant improvement in employment levels, incomes and the cost of food, the amelioration of a crisis, in itself, will have only a marginal impact on the significance of food remitting. The Windhoek case study provides an important example of cash remittances for food remittances reciprocity. At the same time, it raises a set of hypotheses about food remittances that need further elaboration and testing. These include the relationship between urban poverty and the level of food remitting; that food remittances substantially reduce levels of urban food insecurity; that the volume and frequency of food remitting is related to the strength of the other links that urban residents maintain with the rural end; the reasons for inter-household variation in levels of food security and food receipts within the same geographical area of the city; the apparent greater vulnerability of female-centred households despite the lack of evidence for gender discrimination in food remitting; and whether reciprocal remitting patterns change over time with increased migration and urbanisation.

5.1 Recommendations for researchers and policymakers

The massive global attention paid to cash remittances over the past decade provides a solid evidence base for policymaking and advocacy at the international, regional and national level. Policy prescriptions for maximising the flow and impacts of cash remittances on development are now legion and part of a growing policy consensus that remittances can be mainstreamed into development planning and the practices of the private sector, for the benefit of both senders and recipients, whether individuals, communities or whole countries. Yet no equivalent knowledge base or policy dialogue exists with regard to food remittances.

- There is a growing policy consensus that cash remittances can be mainstreamed into development planning. But a new research agenda and policy dialogue are urgently required relating to food remittances and urban and rural food security. Food remitting is a major research gap that demands much greater attention and a systematic, comparative programme of primary research.

- The case studies from Zimbabwe and Namibia in this report highlight how a deeper understanding of food remitting can be applied in other African contexts: the nature of rural-urban linkages under conditions of state failure and crisis (Zimbabwe) and the importance of reciprocal cash and food remittances for food security (Namibia).

- The notion of a rural-urban divide is outdated and oversimplifies the issues. Food remitting cannot be treated in isolation from the complex web of relations and connections between both rural and urban contexts. An extremely useful starting point is to explore how stretched or multi-nodal households drive and impact on food remitting at both urban and rural ends of the spectrum.

Much additional research on this important, yet much-neglected, aspect of rural-urban linkages and informal cross-border transactions is urgently required. By drawing attention to the importance of food remittances for urban and rural food security and identifying the current knowledge gaps, this report creates a platform for the design of a new research agenda.


Clemens, M et al. (2014) Migration and development research is moving far beyond remittances. World Development 64: 121–124.


Further reading

Urbanisation, rural-urban transformations and food systems

This policy brief is part of the IFAD-funded project Rural-Urban Transformations and Food Systems: Re-Framing Food Security Narratives and Identifying Policy Options That Foster Sustainable Transitions. Global food security and rural development are often framed in terms of inadequate agricultural production. But urbanisation is driving profound transformations in food systems in rural, peri-urban and urban areas – from food consumption to food processing, transport, markets and all related activities. Local, national, regional and global policies are critical to shaping rural-urban linkages and the political economy of food systems. Policies must support food security and livelihoods of low-income groups in all locations – while fostering sustainable rural-urban transitions.

IIED is convening and supporting a global network of researchers and practitioners in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and China. These include local government officials, civil society organisations and regional research institutions, both urban and rural. Network members are also engaging with international agencies such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UN Habitat, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). For a full list of project policy briefs and working papers, see: www.iied.org/urbanisation-rural-urban-transformations-food-systems
Acronyms

AFSUN  African Food Security Urban Network
HDDS   Household dietary diversity score
HFIAS  Household food insecurity access scale
ICBT   Informal cross-border trade
MAPS   SAMP’s Migration and Poverty Survey
MARS   SAMP’s Migration and Remittances Survey
ODA    Official development assistance
SADC   Southern African Development Community
SAMP   Southern African Migration Project
The transfer of funds by migrants to their home countries (cash remittances) is at an all-time high. By 2017, it is predicted to rise to US$500 billion – and there is a growing policy consensus that cash remittances can be mainstreamed into development. Equally, food remitting also has a role to play in urban and rural food security. Yet despite its importance, researchers and policymakers tend to ignore food remitting.

This report is aimed at researchers and policymakers interested in transforming rural-urban linkages and the implications for food security of rural and urban residents. At a time of rapid urbanisation in the South, a wider lens is needed: focusing on rural-urban linkages and moving beyond cash-based, market transactions to consider the bidirectional flows of goods – including food – and their impact on food security. Using case studies from Zimbabwe and Namibia, this report demonstrates how lessons related to food remitting can be applied in other African contexts – and highlights the urgent need for a new research agenda.

IIED is a policy and action research organisation. We promote sustainable development to improve livelihoods and protect the environments on which these livelihoods are built. We specialise in linking local priorities to global challenges. IIED is based in London and works in Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and the Pacific, with some of the world’s most vulnerable people. We work with them to strengthen their voice in the decision-making arenas that affect them — from village councils to international conventions.