

Small-Town Xenophobia and Migrant Anxieties in South Africa's Limpopo Province



Small-Town Xenophobia and Migrant Anxieties in South Africa's Limpopo Province

Godfrey Tawodzera and Jonathan Crush

SAMP MIGRATION POLICY SERIES NO. 84

Series Editor: Prof. Jonathan Crush

Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP)
2022

AUTHORS

Godfrey Tawodzera is an Associate Professor in the Department of Environmental Science at the University of Namibia, Windhoek, Namibia.

Jonathan Crush is Professor at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Canada, and Extraordinary Professor at the University of the Western Cape, Cape Town, South Africa.

© Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) 2022

Published by the Southern African Migration Programme, International Migration Research Centre, Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
samponline.org

First published 2022

ISBN 978-1-920596-48-4

Cover photo by Guy Oliver, IRIN

Production by Bronwen Dachs Muller, Cape Town

CONTENTS

PAGE

Summary	1
Introduction	2
Migrant Profile	4
Big-City Xenophobia	7
Moving to Limpopo	7
Informal-Sector Xenophobia	11
Service-Delivery Xenophobia	12
Policing Xenophobia	14
Conclusion	16
References	18
Migration Policy Series	22

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Study Sites	5
Table 2: Countries of Origin of Migrants in Limpopo	6
Figure 1: Timeline of Arrival in South Africa and Limpopo Province	7
Table 3: Urban Centres of Previous Residence	8
Table 4: Challenges Faced by Informal-Business Owners	11

SUMMARY

South Africa's major cities are regularly wracked by large-scale xenophobic violence directed at migrants and refugees from other countries. Informal-sector businesses and their migrant owners and employees are particularly vulnerable targets during these attacks. Migrant-owned businesses are also frequently targeted in smaller-scale looting and destruction of property. There is now a large literature on the characteristics and causes of xenophobic violence and attitudes in South Africa, based on quantitative and qualitative research in the country's major metropolitan areas. One of the consequences of big-city xenophobia has been a search for alternative markets and safer spaces by migrants, including relocating to the country's many smaller urban centres. The question addressed in this report is whether they are welcomed in these cities and towns or subject to the same kinds of victimization as in large cities. This report is the first to systematically examine this question by focusing on a group of towns in Limpopo province and the experiences of migrants in the informal sector there. Through survey evidence and in-depth interviews and focus groups with migrant and South African vendors, the report demonstrates that xenophobia is also pervasive in these smaller centres, in ways that both echo and differ from that in the large cities.

INTRODUCTION

South Africa's largest cities are periodically roiled by large-scale outbreaks of xenophobic violence (Bekker, 2015; Crush, 2008; Crush et al., 2013; Hassim et al., 2008; Mlilo and Misago, 2019; Pheto, 2019). Attacks by armed mobs on homes and businesses owned by migrants (including economic migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers and immigrants) have led to significant loss of life, destruction of property and internal displacement as migrants flee from their communities and take refuge in other parts of the city or the country. In addition to these outbreaks of extreme xenophobia, looting and destruction of informal businesses owned by migrants occurs on a daily basis in many of the townships and informal settlements that surround the major cities (Crush and Ramachandran, 2015a, 2015b). Migrants operate in a climate of fear and uncertainty since there is often little or no warning of impending violence (MRW, 2020; Ramachandran et al., 2017). There is now a large literature seeking to explain why South Africa's citizens are among the most hostile in the world to outsiders, particularly those from other African countries. Some see it as an apartheid legacy, a form of 'new racism', while others view it as a product of the identity politics and 'othering' associated with post-apartheid nation building (Fouchard and Segatti, 2015; Hayem, 2013; Matsinhe, 2016; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Solomon, 2019). A different set of perspectives focuses more on material conditions in the cities, on poverty and high unemployment and competition for scarce resources between enterprising migrants and marginalized South Africans (Steinberg, 2018; Tevera, 2013). Localized struggles for political control over resources in various communities are also viewed by some as key to unravelling the geographies of xenophobia and explaining why large-scale outbreaks of collective violence and smaller-scale everyday attacks and looting of migrant-owned businesses are geographically uneven in occurrence, prevalence and intensity (Misago, 2017, 2019).

South Africans blame migrants for taking jobs and bringing disease and crime (Crush, 2008; Crush et al., 2013; Dube, 2018; Gordon, 2018), while the South African state seeks to absolve itself of any responsibility for dealing with xenophobia by denying it exists. The official ANC government position is that violence against migrants is motivated by unfair competition and criminality, and that uncontrolled migration to South Africa rather than xenophobic violence is the real crisis (Crush, 2020; Hiropoulos, 2020). In addition to analyses of the immediate and structural drivers of xenophobic attitudes and violence, there is also a growing case study literature on the livelihood strategies of migrants, the impacts of xenophobic violence

on those livelihoods, and their avoidance and mitigation tactics particularly with reference to employment and self-employment in the informal sector (de Jong, 2018; Jinnah, 2010; Waiganjo, 2018). This is an important corrective for it helps explain why migrants continue to come to South Africa and demonstrates that migrants, while victimized, are not passive victims devoid of agency. Studies of migrant entrepreneurship in the informal economy have been particularly effective in demonstrating the strength and depth of migrant resilience and innovation (Crush et al., 2015; Moyo, 2017; Moyo et al., 2018).

Understanding of the nature, causes and impacts of xenophobia and xenophobic violence is largely based on evidence from qualitative and survey research conducted in the country's major metropolitan areas of Johannesburg (5.9 million people), Cape Town (4.7 million) Durban (3.7 million) and Port Elizabeth (1 million). There has been little systematic exploration of the extent to which migrants have settled in smaller South African secondary towns and cities and whether they are similarly infested with xenophobic attitudes and behaviours. The underlying question is whether the symptoms of this social plague are scale-dependent, perhaps manifesting in different ways in smaller urban centres. National attitudinal surveys of South Africans suggest that greater contact with migrants dilutes xenophobic sentiment (Crush et al., 2013; Gordon and Maharaj, 2015). In theory, xenophobic attitudes and actions might be less prevalent and intense in secondary urban centres since South Africans and migrants are more likely to interact through spatial proximity.

Some support for this argument comes from the literature on medical xenophobia; a term we coined to describe how migrants seeking medical care at public hospitals and clinics in major cities are systematically excluded or denied treatment by hospital staff purely because they are not South African (Crush and Tawodzera, 2014; Alfaro-Velcamp, 2017; White et al., 2020a, 2020b; Zihindula et al., 2017). One recent study has suggested that in smaller urban centres, the same prejudices and exclusions do not necessarily apply. As the study notes, "in spite of several institutional and policy-related challenges, frontline health care providers in Musina provided public health care services and HIV treatment to black African migrants" (Vanyoro, 2019). Musina is a small secondary centre of 40,000 people and this conclusion implies that medical xenophobia may be less intense or non-existent in such smaller centres. On the other hand, a national audit of collective violence against migrant-owned informal businesses between 2009 and 2014 found evidence of attacks in numerous South African secondary towns and cities (Crush and Ramachandran, 2015b: 20).

Over the last two decades, there has been major expansion of the informal sector in South African towns and cities (Rogan and Skinner, 2018). Although the precise numbers are unknown, the sector has provided important niche opportunities for migrants and refugees to establish and grow informal enterprises, particularly in poorly-served, low-income communities and inner-city areas. Because South Africa lacks the large formal and informal food markets characteristic of most of the rest of Africa, the protections offered by clustering in safe spaces are generally denied. Isolated and vulnerable, migrant-owned businesses have emerged as major targets of xenophobic violence in large cities, which destroys livelihoods and increases food insecurity for migrants and their customers (Crush et al., 2015). Less is known about migrant participation in the informal sector of smaller urban centres and very little at all about whether migrant informal-business owners experience the same hostility in smaller towns as they do in the country's large cities.

This report focuses on six towns in the province of Limpopo, some 300km north of Johannesburg. The report draws on data from a 2017 SAMP survey of migrant and refugee-owned businesses in Limpopo's informal sector and a control group of informal businesses owned by South African internal migrants. By comparing the sample and the control group, it is possible to establish whether the challenges faced by informal businesses in secondary urban centres are unique to migrants or common to all informal-sector operators, regardless of national origin. The data from the surveys is supplemented by individual in-depth interviews and focus group discussions to add insights into the experience of running an informal business in South Africa's secondary urban centres.

MIGRANT PROFILE

The research for this report was conducted in six Limpopo towns with a combined population of nearly 280,000 (Table 1). These ranged in size from the provincial capital, Polokwane, with a population of 130,000, to Burgersfort with less than 7,000 residents.

TABLE 1: Study Sites

	2011 Census Population*	Migrant sample	%	South African sample	%
Polokwane	130,028	159	31.6	166	29.3
Thohoyandou	69,453	59	11.7	57	10.1
Musina	42,678	121	24.1	74	13.1
Louis Trichardt	25,360	36	7.1	51	9.0
Tzaneen	14,571	33	6.5	177	31.3
Burgersfort	6,369	96	19.0	41	7.2
	288,459	504	100.0	566	100.0
<i>*2011 Population</i>					

The survey of migrant vendors was administered to randomly-selected migrants in all six centres. Although the survey originally set out to interview registered refugees, it became apparent that a much broader cross-section of migrants were operating informal businesses in the towns. In total, 504 migrants were surveyed from seven SADC countries, 12 other African countries and four Asian countries. A total of 566 South Africans were also surveyed. Because the numbers interviewed in some towns were relatively small, we aggregated the surveys from all six to produce two comparable data sets, one for migrants and one for South Africans. In-depth interviews about their experiences were conducted with 26 migrant informal vendors from countries including Ethiopia, Eritrea, Malawi, Somalia and Zimbabwe. In-depth interviews were also conducted with a smaller number of South Africans about their interactions with migrants. The interviews were supplemented with four focus group discussions with 6-10 migrants from one or two countries in each.

As Table 2 shows, the migrant sample working in the informal sector proved to be extremely heterogeneous. The largest number were from Ethiopia, followed by Zimbabwe, the DRC and Somalia. Interspersed with African migrants were those from Asian countries including Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and China. A central aspect of xenophobia in South Africa is that it homogenizes all migrants irrespective of their national origins as 'outsiders', 'foreigners' and 'aliens'. However, a population as diverse as this in a small urban centre would exhibit obvious and even dramatic cultural and language heterogeneity, which would theoretically not be as amenable to homogenizing narratives.


TABLE 2: Countries of Origin of Migrants in Limpopo

	No.	%
SADC countries		
Zimbabwe	56	11.1
DRC	55	10.9
Angola	3	0.6
Mozambique	3	0.6
Lesotho	1	0.2
Tanzania	1	0.2
Zambia	1	0.2
Sub-total	120	23.8
Other Africa		
Ethiopia	141	28.0
Somalia	37	7.4
Ghana	34	6.8
Nigeria	29	5.8
Eritrea	23	4.6
Sudan	5	1.0
Cameroon	4	0.8
Burundi	3	0.6
Congo Brazzaville	3	0.6
Kenya	1	0.2
Rwanda	1	0.2
Uganda	1	0.2
Sub-total	282	56.2
Asia		
Bangladesh	49	9.7
Pakistan	27	5.4
India	4	0.8
China	3	0.6
Sub-total	83	16.5
Other	18	3.5
Total	503	100.0

BIG-CITY XENOPHOBIA

Most of the migrants in Limpopo had arrived in South Africa relatively recently with only 6% having been in the country since the 1990s (Figure 1). Another 16% arrived between 2000 and 2004 but the rest (over three-quarters) had migrated after 2005. This is generally consistent with overall trends in increasing international migration to South Africa accompanying globalization (Crush, 2014).

FIGURE 1: Timeline of Arrival in South Africa and Limpopo Province



MOVING TO LIMPOPO

Figure 1 shows that many migrants did not come directly to these six Limpopo towns but relocated there from other urban centres. While 22% came to South Africa before 2005, only 7% had arrived in one of the secondary urban centres in Limpopo prior to that date. Or again, while 63% arrived in South Africa before 2010, only 42% had been living in a Limpopo town since before 2010. In fact, two-thirds of the sample had lived in at least one other urban centre prior to moving to their current location.

Table 3 summarizes the urban centres in which migrants previously resided before moving to Limpopo. Johannesburg was easily the most important initial destination with nearly one-third of the migrants having lived there. Some migrants had also lived in other major South African cities including Pretoria (13%), Durban (5%) and the more distant Cape Town (5%). In general, these complex patterns suggest a pattern of diffusion out from an initial larger centre down the urban hierarchy to secondary centres to set up or run an informal enterprise. However, movement from one secondary centre to another is also evident. As many as 16% had moved from another urban centre within Limpopo to their current location and 20% had lived in secondary centres in other South African provinces.

TABLE 3: Urban Centres of Previous Residence

	No.	% of total
Large cities		
Johannesburg	148	29.4
Pretoria	65	12.9
Durban	25	4.8
Cape Town	23	4.6
Port Elizabeth	12	2.4
Bloemfontein	3	0.6
Secondary towns/cities		
Other Limpopo	78	15.5
Other	101	20.1

Note: Multiple-response question

Why do migrants leave the large cities for smaller towns such as those in Limpopo? Since all respondents run small informal businesses, it is possible that this was purely a business decision motivated by opportunities and markets and/or a response to the intense competition that exists in the informal sector in South Africa's major cities. However, in the in-depth interviews and focus groups, it was striking how many people cited big-city xenophobic violence as a reason for moving from larger to smaller urban centres; often after they had been traumatized by being attacked or witnessing attacks on others. Some respondents had been caught up in the nationwide xenophobic violence of 2008 and 2015. Others had been victims of everyday

xenophobic attacks on their informal businesses in different cities. For example:

If you are a foreigner you are always affected by xenophobia. There is no way that you can live here and not be affected. Xenophobia starts from your customer. Some customers are very rude and if you respond, they will talk to you in their language and scold you and then tell you to go back to your country. They have bad words for foreigners. Many times, my business was robbed when I was in Johannesburg. It was because I was a foreigner because they rarely stole from the locals. Sometimes criminals would come to you and ask you to give them money and they would just ask you the foreigner. Why not the local people? That is xenophobia.

In 2007 I was in Port Elizabeth and seven thugs robbed me and I went to the police and told them the name of the tsotsis. The police just said, 'My brother, I don't want to die for your safety.' I had a spaza shop and the criminals started breaking the shop and we reported to the police but the police said they don't have enough vehicles at the moment so they said we must wait. We waited for them for three hours, and eventually after they arrived they started smoking my cigarettes and sipping my drinks. After they opened a case, they demanded money because they said they were doing me a favour.

I think there are very few people who have not been affected by xenophobia in this country. If you are a foreigner, it always affects you. When I was in Pretoria, I saw four spaza shops being burnt. They had goods worth over R4-million and nothing was recovered. These people who are at the forefront of xenophobia first break in and loot the shop then they burn what is left so that you will not recover anything.

In Soweto I had seen two people being killed in broad daylight and they were all foreigners and their shops were robbed. So I wanted to go somewhere else. Orange Farm (south of Johannesburg) was a good area for business but it was not safe. As a foreigner you are always conscious of your security and you can feel that this place is not good. It is far from the Johannesburg CBD and there are few police there. I was robbed seven times in the period that I stayed in Orange Farm. There were many spaza shops around me, but they kept stealing from me. Is that not xenophobia? Why not steal from the locals? Most of the time the

robbers would come at night and you are still operating. They pounce on you with sticks, spanners or iron bars and they hit you hard. So I was almost killed twice and I thought this is enough. Let me leave this place. Then I left and came here.

There were also accounts of xenophobic violence within Limpopo forcing a move from one town to another. One Eritrean migrant, for example, was hounded out of Burgersfort and moved to Musina:

I was running a spaza shop in a place called Quete. They robbed me at night and stole my goods and burnt the things that they could not carry. There were goods worth over R60,000 in the shop. They stole almost three-quarters of the goods and burnt the goods that were left. So I lost more than R60 000. They almost killed me and I ran away. I came here with nothing. I am not going back there again. I came here because I was running for my life. I was not thinking of doing business, but of surviving. I was almost killed that night. Where I came here, friends took me in. For some time I was not doing anything because I did not have enough money. I had about R12,000 with me when I left Burgersfort. I used that money and some that I borrowed from friends to start a business here.

Some have suggested that attacks on migrant-owned businesses in major cities are instigated or orchestrated by South African competitors, including various shadowy informal business associations. This phenomenon – dubbed “violent entrepreneurship” – involves the use of intimidatory violence as a business strategy to drive non-South African competitors out of an area (Charman and Piper, 2012; Piper and Charman, 2016). Although this phenomenon cannot be completely discounted in Limpopo, the migrants who were interviewed and in focus groups did not report any examples of violent entrepreneurship that had been instigated by South African competitors. South African respondents in a focus group in Musina even said that the presence of migrants was a boon to their business:

There are a lot of foreigners in this town. Our business is booming because of the foreigners. They come here to buy our pap and that makes us money. So we have a business relationship. They buy our pap and wors and braai and we get money from them. There is no problem between us. This is one of the towns that is peaceful. People can talk a lot about xenophobia, but here it does not happen much.

INFORMAL-SECTOR XENOPHOBIA

Nearly half of all migrants surveyed said they had experienced prejudice from South Africans because of their nationality and one-third had been subject to xenophobic verbal insults while operating their businesses. Neither were significant challenges for South Africans (Table 4). Piper and Charman (2016) suggest that it is incorrect to ascribe violence against foreign-owned informal businesses in the large cities as a function of xenophobia. Rather, all informal-sector operators are equally vulnerable. In Limpopo, as many as 30% of migrants and 22% of South Africans reported that they had experienced conflict with the other group (Table 4). But both groups also reported roughly similar levels of conflict with business owners of their own background (26% of migrants with other migrants and 22% of South Africans with other South Africans). One implication is that inter- and within-group conflict may simply be a function of intense competition. Over 70% of respondents in both groups, for example, reported that competition with other businesses was their most significant business challenge.

TABLE 4: Challenges Faced by Informal-Business Owners

		Migrants % Yes	South Africans % Yes
Xenophobic attitudes	Prejudice against my nationality	47.6	1.1
	Verbal insults against my business	35.3	6.9
Levels of conflict	Conflict with foreign-owned businesses	25.6	22.1
	Conflict with South African-owned businesses	30.2	21.4
Prevalence of theft	Theft of goods/stock	38.3	30.4
	Theft of money/income	31.3	11.8
Xenophobic violence	Physical attacks/assaults by South Africans	19.0	1.6
Police misconduct	Harassment/demands for bribes by police	26.2	3.9
	Confiscation of goods by police	18.8	4.9
	Arrest/detention	9.1	1.2
	Physical attacks/assaults by police	8.7	1.1

Migrants and South African micro-businesses in Limpopo also appear to be equally vulnerable to crime. As many as 38% of migrant businesses reported being victims of theft of goods and stock, but so had 31% of South Africans. However, it would be

premature to conclude that all forms of victimization of migrants are unmotivated by xenophobia. Migrant business owners reported much higher levels of prejudice and verbal insults against their operations than South Africans and nearly 20% of migrants surveyed in the six towns had experienced violent attacks on their businesses. Only 2% of the South African business owners had been victims of violence.

In contrast to theft of stock, migrants were twice as likely as South Africans to have been robbed of business income (26% versus 13%).

The most pressing problem is that we cannot open bank accounts. The law says that we can open an account and we can work and study. But banks do not want to help us. It is as if they have their own laws that they use which are not the laws of the country. They do not even bother to give reasons for their refusal, they just refuse. They just tell you that you need a green ID book, but where do we get the green ID book? We are not South Africans.

Without a bank account, where does one keep his money? If you keep a lot of money with you in the shop or at home you are inviting criminals who will later come and rob you or even kill you. That is the problem that the government is creating for us. They should give us proper documents that will allow us to open accounts. Or at least compel the banks to allow us to open bank accounts with the current documents that we have.

While robbery may be more a reflection of opportunism than xenophobia, it is thus enabled by institutionalized xenophobia in the South African banking sector. Unlike South Africans, most migrants are unable to open personal or business bank accounts. Not only does this mean that they cannot access credit from the formal banking system to expand their operations, but it also means they have to keep their cash on the business premises or at home, making them a soft target.

SERVICE-DELIVERY XENOPHOBIA

Service-delivery protests by South Africans against their own government have been a recurrent feature of post-apartheid South Africa as citizens in low-income settlements express their dissatisfaction with the slow pace of delivery of basic services such as housing, transportation, electricity and water. Much of the violence has occurred in large cities, but secondary urban centres, including those in Limpopo,

have also experienced violent protests (Beyers, 2015; Mamhokere, 2021; Mamhokere et al., 2021). In April 2019, for example, service-delivery protests began in Alexandra and spread to other Johannesburg neighbourhoods, major cities such as Tshwane and Cape Town, and smaller urban centres in Gauteng and Western Cape provinces. Anti-government service-delivery protests often descend into chaos as the police respond with considerable force. On numerous occasions, the protests have also been followed by looting and destruction of informal businesses owned by migrants (Chikulo, 2016; von Holdt and Alexander, 2012). Several migrant business owners interviewed for this study reported that physical attacks and looting of their business properties were often preceded by service delivery protests. One noted that the ‘first victims’ are those whose shops remain open during the protests and that the looting is therefore opportunistic and not necessarily related to the protests:

When there is a protest the first victims are usually those whose shops will be open as the crowd can just get in and loot everything. However, sometimes you can also be a victim even when the shop is closed because when they cannot steal, they burn the shop just to spite you. It is bad, but that is what happens. One time a friend of mine watched his shop being burnt. There was nothing that he could do.

However, sometimes even closed shops are looted ‘just to spite you’; you, in this case, being the migrant shop-owner. Another key informant expressed puzzlement over why people protesting over service delivery would turn on informal businesses:

In most cases, locals are protesting for water and electricity service delivery. When they do that, some people take the chance in the confusion to steal. We are not the government. We do not provide water and we do not provide electricity. So why are we the target? It is because we are easy and they know that when our shops are looted, the police do not do anything. So we are just victims and the government fails to protect us from this irrational behaviour. Local shops open even during protests and they are very safe. You cannot understand why we are always the target.

This phenomenon, attacking and looting migrant-owned businesses and leaving intact those of South Africans in the same vicinity, is certainly not confined to Limpopo and is a common thread in protests nationwide. The behaviour may seem irrational or mere opportunism, but it is clear from the accounts that migrant and not locally owned businesses are targeted and therefore the behaviour has an under-

lying xenophobic logic. Indeed, a persistent strain of xenophobic sentiment is that migrants use up resources and services and therefore disadvantage South Africans.

The abject failure of the police in large cities to respond to xenophobic violence and protect those under attack is well-documented (Steinberg, 2012). This raises the question of whether policing of xenophobic violence and crime in secondary cities is any more sympathetic and effective in smaller secondary centres.

POLICING XENOPHOBIA

Large-city studies have consistently pointed to the existence of xenophobia in the ranks of SAPS and municipal police services (Masuku, 2006; Steinberg, 2012). The primary complaint of migrant respondents in Limpopo is their treatment at the hands of local police who they maintain are corrupt, abusive and xenophobic. In 2013, the police in Limpopo launched a province-wide campaign to shutter migrant-owned businesses, dubbed Operation Hardstick. They closed over 600 businesses, detained owners, confiscated stock, imposed fines and verbally abused the migrants. Migrant associations took the government to court and, in a landmark judgment in 2014, won their case in the Supreme Court. The judgment against the provincial and national governments noted that the police actions “tell a story of the most naked form of xenophobic discrimination and the utter desperation experienced by the victims of that discrimination” (Supreme Court, 2014). While the judgment allowed the businesses to re-open, it did not put an end to criminality by local police:

We feel that we are not protected here in South Africa. It is as if a foreigner is not a person in this country. We are attacked and injured or killed but nothing happens to the perpetrators. We report our cases to the police but they do nothing. Sometimes they come and talk to us and give us case numbers, but that is as far as it goes. We rarely hear of arrest, or if there is an arrest, the criminals are released on bail and that is usually the end of it. There are times when we know the criminals and we tell the police, but nothing really happens to the criminals. We see them walking the streets and we are afraid of them.

All they want is to suppress us. It is as if their duty is to suppress us every day. That is what they do. The police are always looking for trouble. They are not here to help. Whenever they stop you, they are looking to find out what fault is there

(with your shop). It is very difficult for them not to find something that is not right with you or your car or your stock.

As well as a failure to protect, the police in these small secondary cities prey on migrants, questioning documentation and demanding money:

We do not have a good relationship with the police at all. They just want to take money from us. We know some of them by name and they come to the streets and take legally printed permits and they repossess them, pretending to go and check for authenticity, but they never return the documents unless you pay them. I know a person whose papers were taken and he had to pay to get them just this last week. It happens every day. If you walk in town today, you will see them. Today they are targeting Zimbabweans, Mozambicans and Malawians. We just ask that they should respect our legally issued papers. In some instances they ask you to pay R1,000, R1,500 or even R2,000. They do not ask you to pay directly, but they frustrate you until you pay.

Reporting cases actually creates problems for you. When you report that robbers have stolen R30,000 from you, it tells the police that you are making money and they will be your biggest problem. One of our biggest challenges is on bank accounts. Something must be done on bank accounts so that we do not become targets of criminals. When police stop you at a roadblock, they check the hole even under your seats and they will be looking for money. Sometimes they even have knives and they can rip your car seats wanting to find money. The way they search us is humiliating. If they find you with money they will take some of it and you will have nothing to do. If you have R1,000, they can take R500 and leave you to go. If you have R10,000, they can take even R5,000. You cannot refuse because they can shoot you. As a foreigner you should always have money in your pocket, that is your ID.

One of our challenges is the traffic police. They are a problem here. They come on most days demanding money, bribe money. When you give them, they also send their colleagues to demand more money and so it does not end. We do not even understand why the traffic police should come and harass us. We are not traffic and it is not their job to police us. They should be on the roads looking for traffic offenders, but they like coming here to us and asking for money. It is very bad and it is bad for business.

By comparison, very few of the surveyed South African business owners reported demands for bribes by the police (4% compared with 26% of migrants), confiscation of goods (5% versus 19%) or physical assault (1% versus 9%).

CONCLUSION

This is the first study we know of to systematically investigate the phenomenon of anti-migrant xenophobia in African secondary cities. The literature on dimensions, manifestations and impacts of xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa tends to draw for its evidence base either on national attitudinal surveys or on case study evidence from the country's large metropolitan areas. Studies of the drivers of xenophobic violence or extreme xenophobia have similarly focused on the major cities where the largest outbreaks have occurred and where mob attacks are quickly reported by media outlets. The net result of big-city bias is that there has been a general cloak of invisibility on the question of whether xenophobia is scale-dependent; in other words, does xenophobia and xenophobic violence also exist in South African secondary urban centres and, if it does, is it distinctive in any way from the well-documented situation in cities such as Cape Town and Johannesburg?

In this report, we adopt a case study approach by focusing on six towns of varying size in the northern South African province of Limpopo. Because the informal sector is a major site of ongoing xenophobic violence in South Africa's large cities, we focused on the question of whether migrants operating informal businesses in smaller centres are able to operate without the fear and insecurity that plagues those operating in major urban centres. To understand both the forms and experience of xenophobia at the local level we adopted a mixed-methods approach, combining a representative survey of migrant-owned businesses in the study sites with in-depth interviews and focus groups with migrants. We also conducted a survey, interviews and a focus group with South African internal migrants working in the sector as a control group. This is important because there is a school of thought in South Africa that contends that migrants are no more likely to be targets than South Africans when it comes to crime, theft and violent attacks on informal-sector businesses.

The survey revealed several distinctive features about the profile of migrants working in the informal sector in small-town Limpopo. First, despite the fact that Limpopo adjoins Zimbabwe, the major source of migrants to South Africa, the informal sector in these towns was peopled by an unexpectedly heterogenous group of business owners from many African and Asian countries. Second, it was clear that most did

not come directly to these towns on moving to South Africa. Instead, they lived and worked for varying lengths of time in major migrant destinations; that is, the large cities. Relocation to Limpopo was a decision that came later, partly to seek out new and less competitive markets, but also because of the trauma they had witnessed or experienced during attacks by xenophobic mobs. In other words, large-city xenophobia has the effect of driving migrants down the urban hierarchy towards secondary cities which, at least initially and in principle, are safer spaces in which to start and grow an informal enterprise. If this was their hope and expectation, many were quickly disabused.

Xenophobia in small-town Limpopo mirrors that in the large cities in several distinct ways, the primary difference being one of scale rather than substance. First, although the evidence is filtered through the narratives of migrants, xenophobic attitudes and hostility appear to be no less intense in secondary cities. While some have correctly argued that it is incorrect to typecast all South Africans as xenophobic (and none of our survey findings have done this), it seems that xenophobia is no respecter of scale. Second, xenophobic violence, when it occurs, is no less random, indiscriminate and destructive. The only difference appears to be that there is less loss of life involved in secondary cities. Third, as in the large cities, anti-government service-delivery protests quickly spill over into mob attacks on informal businesses owned by migrants. Migrant narratives are clear that in the general mayhem, they and not South Africans running businesses in the same neighbourhood are targeted. The targeting of migrant-owned businesses was confirmed by the surveys which, on most metrics, showed that migrants were more likely to be victims of violence, looting and theft. Fourth, even as xenophobic violence forced relocation from large cities to small towns, there were at least some accounts (one of which is quoted in this report) of relocation within Limpopo to escape the violence and start afresh somewhere else.

There appear to be two main differences between large-city xenophobia and secondary-centre xenophobia. First, violent entrepreneurship (in which attacks on migrant-owned businesses are orchestrated or directed by South African competitors in large cities) was not reported in this research. One of the reasons for this could be that in the big cities more South African business owners are organized into associations and there are large groups of the unemployed ready to do their bidding for a price, secure in the knowledge that they are unlikely to be apprehended or prosecuted. Second, this is not purely a function of big-city anonymity as there is abundant evidence that the police are unable or unwilling to arrest and prosecute violent offenders. This emerged clearly in the migrant narratives about their prior

experiences in cities such as Johannesburg. As one member of the police noted to a migrant, “I don’t want to die for your safety.” While the police in secondary centres seem equally uninterested in bringing the perpetrators of xenophobic criminality to book, they appear extremely committed to extortion from migrants. There is evidence of similar forms of extortion and corruption in large cities but it appears to be particularly blatant in small town Limpopo with anyone in a uniform, including traffic police, getting in on the act. Like ordinary citizens who know that they are unlikely to fall foul of the law for criminal acts of xenophobia, institutionalized xenophobia means that the supposed enforcers of the law can act with even greater impunity. As one pointed out, migrants believe that “nothing really happens” to xenophobic criminals inside and outside the state.

REFERENCES

1. Alfaro-Velcamp, T. (2017). “Don’t Send Your Sick Here To Be Treated, Our Own People Need it More’: Immigrants’ Access to Healthcare in South Africa.” *International Journal of Migration, Health and Social Care* 13: 53-68.
2. Bekker, S. (2015). “Violent Xenophobic Episodes in South Africa, 2008 and 2015.” *African Human Mobility Review* 1: 229–252.
3. Beyers, L. (2015). “Service Delivery Challenges within Municipalities in the Capricorn District of Limpopo Province.” *Journal of Human Ecology* 50: 121-127.
4. Charman, A. and Piper, L. (2012). “Xenophobia, Criminality and Violent Entrepreneurship: Violence Against Somali Shopkeepers in Delft South, Cape Town, South Africa” *South African Review of Sociology* 43: 81-105.
5. Chikulo, B. (2016). “‘The Smoke That Calls’: A Review of Service Delivery Protests in South Africa 2005 -2014.” *Journal of Human Ecology* 55: 51-60.
6. Claassen, C. (2017). “Explaining South African Xenophobia.” Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 173, Cape Town.
7. Crush, J. (2008) *The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa* (Cape Town: SAMP).
8. Crush, J. (2014). “Southern Hub: The Globalization of Migration to South Africa.” In R. Lucas (Ed.), *International Handbook on Migration and Economic Development* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 211-240.
9. Crush, J. (2020). *Deadly Denial: Xenophobia Governance and the Global Compact for Migration in South Africa* (Cape Town: SAMP).
10. Crush, J. and Frayne, B. (2011). “Supermarket Expansion and the Informal Food Economy in

- Southern African Cities: Implications for Urban Food Security.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37: 781-807.
11. Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015a). “Migration Myths and Extreme Xenophobia in South Africa” In D. Arcarazo and A. Wiesbrock (eds.), *Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics: Volume 3* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger), pp. 71-96.
 12. Crush, J. and Ramachandran, S. (2015b). “Doing Business with Xenophobia.” In J. Crush, A. Chikanda and C. Skinner (Eds.), *Mean Streets: Migration, Xenophobia and Informality in South Africa* (Ottawa: IDRC), pp. 25-59.
 13. Crush, J. and Tawodzera, G. (2014). “Medical Xenophobia and Zimbabwean Migrant Access to Public Health Services in South Africa.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40: 655-670.
 14. Crush, J. and D. Tevera (Eds.) (2010). *Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival* (Ottawa and Cape Town: IDRC and SAMP).
 15. Crush, J., Chikanda, A. and Skinner, C. (Eds.) (2015). *Mean Streets: Migration, Xenophobia and Informality in South Africa* (Ottawa: IDRC).
 16. Crush, J., Ramachandran, S. and Pendleton, W. (2013). *Soft Targets: Xenophobia, Public Violence and Changing Attitudes to Migrants in South Africa After May 2008* (Cape Town: SAMP).
 17. Crush, J., Tawodzera, G., Chikanda, A. and Tevera, D. (2017). “The Owners of Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Enterprise and Xenophobic Violence in South Africa.” *African Human Mobility Review* 3: 878-909.
 18. de Jong, N. (2018). “Displays of Masculinity and Rituals of Display: Congolese Immigration and Xenophobia in Johannesburg.” *Journal of Historical Sociology* 31: 106-118.
 19. Desai, A. (2015). “Migrants and Violence in South Africa: The April 2015 Xenophobic Attacks in Durban.” *Oriental Anthropologist* 15: 247-259.
 20. Dube, G. (2019). “Black South Africans’ Attitudes toward African Immigrants between 2008 and 2016.” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 25: 191-210
 21. Fourchard, L. and Segatti, A. (2015). “Xenophobia and Citizenship: The Everyday Politics of Exclusion and Inclusion in Africa.” *Africa* 85: 2-12.
 22. Gordon, S. (2018). “Who Is Welcoming and Who Is Not? An Attitudinal Analysis of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment in South Africa.” *South African Review of Sociology* 49: 72-90.
 23. Gordon, S. and Maharaj, B. (2015). “Neighbourhood-Level Social Capital and Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in an African Context: An Individual-Level Analysis of Attitudes Towards Immigrants in South Africa.” *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 53: 197-219.
 24. Hassim, S., Kupe, T. and Worby, E. (Eds.) (2008). *Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press).
 25. Hayem, J. (2013). “From May 2008 to 2011: Xenophobic Violence and National Subjectivity in South Africa.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 39: 77-97.

26. Hiropoulos, A. (2020). "South Africa, Migration and Xenophobia: Deconstructing the Perceived Migration Crisis and its Influence on the Xenophobic Reception of Migrants." *Contemporary Justice Review* 23: 104-121.
27. HRW (2020). *'They Have Robbed Me of My Life': Xenophobic Violence Against Non-Nationals in South Africa* (New York: Human Rights Watch).
28. Jinnah, Z. (2010). "Making Home in a Hostile Land: Understanding Somali Identity, Integration, Livelihood and Risks in Johannesburg." *Journal of Sociology and Anthropology* 1: 91-99.
29. Mamhokere, J. (2021). An Assessment of Reasons Behind Service Delivery Protests: A case of Greater Tzaneen Municipality." *Journal of Public Affairs* 20: e2049.
30. Mamokhere, J., Netshidzivhani, M. and Mavhungu, E. (2021). "Evaluating the Impact of Service Delivery Protests in Relation to Socio-Economic Development: A Case of Greater Tzaneen Local Municipality, South Africa." *European Journal of Economics, Law and Social Sciences* 5.
31. Masuku, T. (2006). "Targeting Foreigners: Xenophobia Among Johannesburg Police." *SA Crime Quarterly* 15: 19-24.
32. Matsinhe, D. (2016). *Apartheid Vertigo: The Rise in Discrimination Against Africans in South Africa* (New York: Routledge).
33. Misago, J-P. (2017). "Politics by Other Means? The Political Economy of Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *The Black Scholar* 47: 40-53.
34. Misago, J-P. (2019). "Political Mobilisation as the Trigger of Xenophobic Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 13: 646.
35. Mlilo, S. and Misago, J-P. (2019). *Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: 1994-2018: An Overview* (Johannesburg: ACMS).
36. Moyo, I. (2017). *African Immigrant Traders in Johannesburg Inner City: A Deconstruction of the Threatening Other* (London: Palgrave: Macmillan).
37. Moyo, I., Gumbo, T. and Nicolau, M. (2018). "African Migrant Traders' Experiences in Johannesburg Inner City: Towards the Migrant Calculated Risk and Adaptation Framework." *South African Review of Sociology* 49: 53-71.
38. Nyamnjoh, F. (2006). *Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa* (London: Zed Books).
39. Pheto, B. (2019). "Fear and Looting in Soweto: Inside the Latest Xenophobic Nightmare." *Sunday Times*, August 19.
40. Piper, L. and Charman, A. (2016). "Xenophobia, Price Competition and Violence in the Spaza Sector in South Africa." *African Human Mobility Review* 2.
41. Polzer, T., and Takabvirwa, K. (2010) "'Just Crime': Violence, Xenophobia and Crime; Discourse and Practice, *SA Crime Quarterly* 33.

42. Ramachandran, S., Crush, J. and Tawodzera, G. (2017). "Security Risk and Xenophobia in the Urban Informal Sector." *African Human Mobility Review* 3: 855-878.
43. Rogan, M. and Skinner, C. "The Size and Structure of the South African Informal Sector 2008-2014: A Labour-Force Analysis." In F. Fourie (Ed.), *The South African Informal Sector: Creating Jobs, Reducing Poverty* (Cape Town: HSRC), pp. 77-102.
44. Skinner, C. (2019). "Contributing Yet Excluded? Informal Food Retail in African Cities." In J. Battersby and V. Watson (Eds.), *Urban Food Systems Governance and Poverty in African Cities* (London: Routledge), pp. 104-115.
45. Solomon, R. (2019). "Xenophobic Violence and the Ambivalence of Citizenship in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Citizenship Studies* 23: 156-171
46. Steinberg, J. (2012). "Security and Disappointment: Policing, Freedom and Xenophobia in South Africa." *British Journal of Criminology* 52: 345-360.
47. Steinberg, J. (2018). "Xenophobia and Collective Violence in South Africa: A Note of Scepticism About the Scapegoat." *African Studies Review* 61: 119-134.
48. Supreme Court (2014). *Somali Association of South Africa and Others v Limpopo Department of Economic Development Environment and Tourism and Others* (48/2014) [2014] ZASCA 143; 2015 (1) SA 151 (SCA); [2014] 4 All SA 600 (SCA) (26 September 2014).
49. Tevera, D. (2013). "African Migrants, Xenophobia and Urban Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa." *Alternation* 7: 9-26.
50. Vanyoro, K. (2019). "'When They Come, We Don't Send Them Back': Counter-Narratives of 'Medical Xenophobia' in South Africa's Public Health Care System." *Palgrave Communications* 5: 101.
51. von Holdt, K. and Alexander, P. (2012). "Collective Violence, Community Protest and Xenophobia." *South African Review of Sociology* 43: 104-111.
52. Waiganjo, A. (2018). "Coping Mechanisms in Navigating Xenophobia-Afrophobia-Related Challenges Within the Transnational Space: Case of Somali Refugee Women in Gauteng, South Africa." *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 19: 649-666.
53. White, J., Blaauw, D. and Rispel, L. (2020a). "Social Exclusion and the Perspectives of Health Care Providers on Migrants in Gauteng Public Health Facilities, South Africa." *PLoS One*, 15(12): e0244080.
54. White, J., Levin, J. and Rispel, L. (2020b). "Migrants' Perceptions of Health System Responsiveness and Satisfaction with Health Workers in a South African Province." *Global Health Action* 13.
55. Zihindula, G., Meyer-Weitz, A. and Akintola, O. (2017). "Lived Experiences of Democratic Republic of Congo Refugees Facing Medical Xenophobia in Durban, South Africa." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52: 458-470.

MIGRATION POLICY SERIES

- 1 *Covert Operations: Clandestine Migration, Temporary Work and Immigration Policy in South Africa* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-51-9
- 2 *Riding the Tiger: Lesotho Miners and Permanent Residence in South Africa* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-52-7
- 3 *International Migration, Immigrant Entrepreneurs and South Africa's Small Enterprise Economy* (1997) ISBN 1-874864-62-4
- 4 *Silenced by Nation Building: African Immigrants and Language Policy in the New South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-64-0
- 5 *Left Out in the Cold? Housing and Immigration in the New South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-68-3
- 6 *Trading Places: Cross-Border Traders and the South African Informal Sector* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-71-3
- 7 *Challenging Xenophobia: Myth and Realities about Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-70-5
- 8 *Sons of Mozambique: Mozambican Miners and Post-Apartheid South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-78-0
- 9 *Women on the Move: Gender and Cross-Border Migration to South Africa* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-82-9
- 10 *Namibians on South Africa: Attitudes Towards Cross-Border Migration and Immigration Policy* (1998) ISBN 1-874864-84-5
- 11 *Building Skills: Cross-Border Migrants and the South African Construction Industry* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-84-5
- 12 *Immigration & Education: International Students at South African Universities and Technikons* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-89-6
- 13 *The Lives and Times of African Immigrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8
- 14 *Still Waiting for the Barbarians: South African Attitudes to Immigrants and Immigration* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8
- 15 *Undermining Labour: Migrancy and Sub-Contracting in the South African Gold Mining Industry* (1999) ISBN 1-874864-91-8
- 16 *Borderline Farming: Foreign Migrants in South African Commercial Agriculture* (2000) ISBN 1-874864-97-7
- 17 *Writing Xenophobia: Immigration and the Press in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-01-3
- 18 *Losing Our Minds: Skills Migration and the South African Brain Drain* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-03-x
- 19 *Botswana: Migration Perspectives and Prospects* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-04-8
- 20 *The Brain Gain: Skilled Migrants and Immigration Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa* (2000) ISBN 1-919798-14-5

- 21 *Cross-Border Raiding and Community Conflict in the Lesotho-South African Border Zone* (2001) ISBN 1-919798-16-1
- 22 *Immigration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa* (2001) ISBN 1-919798-30-7
- 23 *Gender and the Brain Drain from South Africa* (2001) ISBN 1-919798-35-8
- 24 *Spaces of Vulnerability: Migration and HIV/AIDS in South Africa* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-38-2
- 25 *Zimbabweans Who Move: Perspectives on International Migration in Zimbabwe* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-40-4
- 26 *The Border Within: The Future of the Lesotho-South African International Boundary* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-41-2
- 27 *Mobile Namibia: Migration Trends and Attitudes* (2002) ISBN 1-919798-44-7
- 28 *Changing Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Botswana* (2003) ISBN 1-919798-47-1
- 29 *The New Brain Drain from Zimbabwe* (2003) ISBN 1-919798-48-X
- 30 *Regionalizing Xenophobia? Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in Southern Africa* (2004) ISBN 1-919798-53-6
- 31 *Migration, Sexuality and HIV/AIDS in Rural South Africa* (2004) ISBN 1-919798-63-3
- 32 *Swaziland Moves: Perceptions and Patterns of Modern Migration* (2004) ISBN 1-919798-67-6
- 33 *HIV/AIDS and Children's Migration in Southern Africa* (2004) ISBN 1-919798-70-6
- 34 *Medical Leave: The Exodus of Health Professionals from Zimbabwe* (2005) ISBN 1-919798-74-9
- 35 *Degrees of Uncertainty: Students and the Brain Drain in Southern Africa* (2005) ISBN 1-919798-84-6
- 36 *Restless Minds: South African Students and the Brain Drain* (2005) ISBN 1-919798-82-X
- 37 *Understanding Press Coverage of Cross-Border Migration in Southern Africa since 2000* (2005) ISBN 1-919798-91-9
- 38 *Northern Gateway: Cross-Border Migration Between Namibia and Angola* (2005) ISBN 1-919798-92-7
- 39 *Early Departures: The Emigration Potential of Zimbabwean Students* (2005) ISBN 1-919798-99-4
- 40 *Migration and Domestic Workers: Worlds of Work, Health and Mobility in Johannesburg* (2005) ISBN 1-920118-02-0
- 41 *The Quality of Migration Services Delivery in South Africa* (2005) ISBN 1-920118-03-9
- 42 *States of Vulnerability: The Future Brain Drain of Talent to South Africa* (2006) ISBN 1-920118-07-1
- 43 *Migration and Development in Mozambique: Poverty, Inequality and Survival* (2006) ISBN 1-920118-10-1
- 44 *Migration, Remittances and Development in Southern Africa* (2006) ISBN 1-920118-15-2
- 45 *Medical Recruiting: The Case of South African Health Care Professionals* (2007) ISBN 1-920118-47-0
- 46 *Voices From the Margins: Migrant Women's Experiences in Southern Africa* (2007) ISBN 1-920118-50-0

- 47 *The Haemorrhage of Health Professionals From South Africa: Medical Opinions* (2007) ISBN 978-1-920118-63-1
- 48 *The Quality of Immigration and Citizenship Services in Namibia* (2008) ISBN 978-1-920118-67-9
- 49 *Gender, Migration and Remittances in Southern Africa* (2008) ISBN 978-1-920118-70-9
- 50 *The Perfect Storm: The Realities of Xenophobia in Contemporary South Africa* (2008) ISBN 978-1-920118-71-6
- 51 *Migrant Remittances and Household Survival in Zimbabwe* (2009) ISBN 978-1-920118-92-1
- 52 *Migration, Remittances and 'Development' in Lesotho* (2010) ISBN 978-1-920409-26-5
- 53 *Migration-Induced HIV and AIDS in Rural Mozambique and Swaziland* (2011) ISBN 978-1-920409-49-4
- 54 *Medical Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Access to Health Services in South Africa* (2011) ISBN 978-1-920409-63-0
- 55 *The Engagement of the Zimbabwean Medical Diaspora* (2011) ISBN 978-1-920409-64-7
- 56 *Right to the Classroom: Educational Barriers for Zimbabweans in South Africa* (2011) ISBN 978-1-920409-68-5
- 57 *Patients Without Borders: Medical Tourism and Medical Migration in Southern Africa* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920409-74-6
- 58 *The Disengagement of the South African Medical Diaspora* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920596-00-2
- 59 *The Third Wave: Mixed Migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920596-01-9
- 60 *Linking Migration, Food Security and Development* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920596-02-6
- 61 *Unfriendly Neighbours: Contemporary Migration from Zimbabwe to Botswana* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920596-16-3
- 62 *Heading North: The Zimbabwean Diaspora in Canada* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920596-03-3
- 63 *Dystopia and Disengagement: Diaspora Attitudes Towards South Africa* (2012) ISBN 978-1-920596-04-0
- 64 *Soft Targets: Xenophobia, Public Violence and Changing Attitudes to Migrants in South Africa after May 2008* (2013) ISBN 978-1-920596-05-7
- 65 *Brain Drain and Regain: Migration Behaviour of South African Medical Professionals* (2014) ISBN 978-1-920596-07-1
- 66 *Xenophobic Violence in South Africa: Denialism, Minimalism, Realism* (2014) ISBN 978-1-920596-08-8
- 67 *Migrant Entrepreneurship Collective Violence and Xenophobia in South Africa* (2014) ISBN 978-1-920596-09-5
- 68 *Informal Migrant Entrepreneurship and Inclusive Growth in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique* (2015) ISBN 978-1-920596-10-1
- 69 *Calibrating Informal Cross-Border Trade in Southern Africa* (2015) ISBN 978-1-920596-13-2

- 70 *International Migrants and Refugees in Cape Town's Informal Economy* (2016) ISBN 978-1-920596-15-6
- 71 *International Migrants in Johannesburg's Informal Economy* (2016) ISBN 978-1-920596-18-7
- 72 *Food Remittances: Migration and Food Security in Africa* (2016) ISBN 978-1-920596-19-4
- 73 *Informal Entrepreneurship and Cross-Border Trade in Maputo, Mozambique* (2016) ISBN 978-1-920596-20-0
- 74 *Informal Entrepreneurship and Cross-Border Trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa* (2017) ISBN 978-1-920596-29-3
- 75 *Competition or Co-operation? South African and Migrant Entrepreneurs in Johannesburg* (2017) ISBN 978-1-920596-30-9
- 76 *Refugee Entrepreneurial Economies in Urban South Africa* (2017) ISBN 978-1-920596-35-4
- 77 *Living With Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Informal Enterprise in South Africa* (2017) ISBN 978-1-920596-37-8
- 78 *Comparing Refugees and South Africans in the Urban Informal Sector* (2017) ISBN 978-1-920596-38-5
- 79 *Rendering South Africa Undesirable: A Critique of Refugee and Informal Sector Policy* (2017) ISBN 978-1-920596-40-8
- 80 *Problematizing the Foreign Shop: Justifications for Restricting the Migrant Spaza Sector in South Africa* (2018) ISBN 978-1-920596-43-9
- 81 *Rethinking the South African Medical Brain Drain Narrative* (2019) ISBN 978-1-920596-45-3
- 82 *Deadly Denial: Xenophobia Governance and the Global Compact for Migration in South Africa* (2020) ISBN 978-1-920596-46-0
- 83 *Between Burden and Benefit: Migrant Remittances, Social Protection and Sustainable Development* (2021) 978-1-920596-47-7

South Africa's major cities are regularly wracked by large-scale xenophobic violence directed at migrants and refugees from other countries. Informal-sector businesses and their migrant owners and employees are particularly vulnerable targets during these attacks. Migrant-owned businesses are also frequently targeted in smaller-scale looting and destruction of property. There is now a large literature on the characteristics and causes of xenophobic violence and attitudes in South Africa, based on quantitative and qualitative research in the country's major metropolitan areas. One of the consequences of big-city xenophobia has been a search for alternative markets and safer spaces by migrants, including relocating to the country's many smaller urban centres. The question addressed in this report is whether they are welcomed in these cities and towns or subject to the same kinds of victimization as in large cities. This report is the first to systematically examine this question by focusing on a group of towns in Limpopo province and the experiences of migrants in the informal sector there. Through survey evidence and in-depth interviews and focus groups with migrant and South African vendors, the report demonstrates that xenophobia is also pervasive in these smaller centres, in ways that both echo and differ from that in the large cities.